Annotations on the Report by Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou [!] Concerning Measures to Counter Jiang’s Forces’ Raids
[2]
(December 9, 1963)
Small-, medium-, and large-scale raids by the enemy are sufficient to hone our army and people’s combat capabilities; this is a good thing. The more such raids there are, the better. Therefore, item 8 of the 131 measures should not be implemented for the time being; it would be advisable to reconsider at a later date depending on the situation.
Mao’s Note
This particular item No. 131 should not be carried out at the present stage; we will decide again later based on how circumstances develop.
Mao’s Note
December 9th
[I]
Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou both held the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army at that time.

Annotations on the Report by Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou Concerning Measures to Counter Jiang’s Forces’ Raids
[2]
This first annotation pertains to the report dated December 2, 1963, submitted by Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou to Premier Zhou Enlai of the State Council, as well as to Lin Biao, He Long, Nie Rongzhen—vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission—and to the Commission itself. The report states:

“Upon receipt of the Premier’s instruction of November 27, calling for further study of the new characteristics and tactics of possible Jiang bandit raids, along with our corresponding countermeasures, all departments of the General Staff immediately took action. On the 30th, the General Staff Party Committee convened an executive meeting and, based on input from various quarters, conducted additional research. We now submit the following findings: In accordance with the spirit of the Premier’s directive and in light of various indications, in addition to those previously assessed, the following possibilities exist regarding potential surprise raid-and-sabotage operations by the Jiang bandits:

1. An increase in the variety of methods. They may occupy certain unoccupied islands of ours, or launch sudden attacks against our less heavily defended islands and promontory areas on the mainland. On the high seas, they could hijack our transport vessels, disrupt maritime shipping, seize our fishing boats, and sabotage fisheries production. Moreover, in remote mountainous regions or in areas where reformed criminals are concentrated deep within our territory, small armed groups might be air-dropped to instigate riots.

2. A gradual escalation in scale. Chiang Kai-shek may adopt a strategy progressing from small-scale operations involving dozens of personnel to medium-sized incursions of two to three hundred men, then to larger raids numbering in the hundreds or even thousands, ultimately culminating in massive assaults involving several thousand or more troops.

3. A broader geographic scope. The areas targeted by these raids would not be limited to Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang; rather, they could extend to the entire coastal region as well as to the China–Myanmar and China–Nepal border zones.

4. An increase in frequency—raids becoming ever more common.

5. More cunning methods, making their patterns harder to discern.

In view of these considerations, our immediate priority should be to prepare for enemy raids involving tens, hundreds, or even up to a thousand troops, while simultaneously remaining ready to counter larger-scale incursions. With regard to specific measures, in addition to those already reported, we propose the following supplementary steps:

1. The key to countering Jiang bandit raid-and-sabotage activities lies in strengthening the combat readiness of our forces, fully mobilizing and relying on the militia and the general populace, closely integrating the two, and thereby reinforcing joint military-civilian defense.

2. Enhancing situational awareness, with particular emphasis on direct observation, vigilance, and patrolling.

3. Appropriately augmenting troop strength and firepower, and constructing fortifications, in certain technical reconnaissance units and on islands relatively distant from the mainland that are vulnerable to enemy attack.

4. Maintaining necessary mobile reserves of troops, vehicles, and ships in key areas likely to come under attack, so as to provide timely reinforcement.

5. Public security, port authority, and fisheries departments should tighten control over ports and vessels.

6. Public security checkpoints, militia headquarters, and select local Party and government offices that may be targeted should undertake essential self-defense fortification work.

7. All military regions, provincial military districts, sub-districts, and people’s armed forces departments, as well as naval, ground, and border units and divisions, should dispatch capable cadres to conduct on-site inspections and provide practical assistance.

8. It is recommended that complementary political, diplomatic, and propaganda measures be taken accordingly.” This second annotation addresses item 8 of the measures proposed in the report.
[3]
Refers to the eighth measure among those suggested in the report by Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou as supplementary steps to be taken in response to small-, medium-, and large-scale enemy raids.