The report states: Following the Premier’s instruction of November 27 to further study the new characteristics and tactics of possible Kuomintang bandit raids, as well as our corresponding countermeasures, all departments of the General Staff immediately took action. On the 30th, the General Staff Party Committee convened an executive meeting and, based on input from various quarters, conducted additional deliberations. The results of these deliberations are hereby reported as follows: In light of the spirit of the Premier’s directive and in view of various indications, in addition to what was outlined in our previous report, the following possibilities exist with respect to the Kuomintang’s potential surprise raid and sabotage activities: 1. An increase in the variety of methods: seizing certain unoccupied islands under our control, or launching sudden attacks against islands with relatively weak defenses, as well as against promontory areas on the mainland; robbing and hijacking our transport vessels at sea, disrupting maritime shipping, capturing our fishing boats, and undermining fisheries production; and parachuting small armed groups into remote labor-reform concentration zones or isolated mountainous regions to instigate riots. 2. A gradual expansion in scale: Chiang Kai-shek may adopt a strategy progressing from small-scale operations involving dozens of personnel to medium-sized ones with two to three hundred participants, and ultimately to large-scale incursions numbering in the thousands or even tens of thousands. 3. A broader geographic scope: The areas targeted by Kuomintang raids would not be limited to Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang, but could extend to the entire coastal region as well as to the China–Myanmar and China–Nepal border areas. 4. A higher frequency of attacks, becoming increasingly frequent over time. 5. More cunning methods, making their patterns difficult to predict.

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Annotations on the Report by Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou[1] Concerning Measures to Counteract Kuomintang Military Raids[2] (December 9, 1963)  One The enemy’s small-, medium-, and large-scale raids are highly beneficial in honing the combat capabilities of our armed forces and people; the more such raids there are, the better. Therefore, the eighth measure[3] should not be implemented for the time being; it would be advisable to reconsider it at a later date depending on the situation. Mao’s annotation Two This measure[3] should not be adopted at this stage; we will decide again later based on how circumstances develop. Mao’s annotation December 9th Printed from the manuscript. Notes [ ] Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou both held the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army at that time. [2] This section (I) consists of annotations on a report dated December 2, 1963, submitted by Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou to Premier Zhou Enlai of the State Council and to Lin Biao, He Long, Nie Rongzhen, and other members of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee.


In light of these considerations, we should currently focus primarily on countering enemy raids involving tens, hundreds, or even up to a thousand troops, while simultaneously preparing to deal with larger-scale incursions. With regard to specific measures, in addition to those already reported, we propose the following supplements: 1. The key to combating Kuomintang raid and sabotage activities lies in strengthening the combat readiness of our troops, fully mobilizing and relying on the militia and the general public, closely integrating the two, and reinforcing joint military-civilian defense efforts. 2. We must enhance our situational awareness, with particular emphasis on direct observation, vigilance, and patrolling. 3. For certain technical reconnaissance units stationed in areas with weak defenses and vulnerable to enemy attack, as well as for islands located far from the mainland, appropriate reinforcements of manpower and firepower should be provided, along with the construction of defensive fortifications. 4. In key regions likely to come under enemy attack, it is necessary to maintain adequate reserves of mobile forces, vehicles, and ships to ensure timely reinforcement. 5. Public security, port, and fisheries authorities should strengthen oversight and management of ports and vessels. 6. Police outposts, militia headquarters, and individual local Party and government organs that may be targeted by the enemy should undertake necessary self-defense fortifications. 7. All military regions, provincial military districts, sub-districts, and people’s armed forces departments, as well as naval, ground, and border units and divisions, should dispatch capable cadres to go down to the grassroots level to conduct detailed inspections and provide assistance. 8. It is recommended that corresponding coordinating measures be taken on the political, diplomatic, and propaganda fronts. This section (II) contains annotations on the eighth measure proposed in the report. [3] Refers to the eighth supplementary measure mentioned in the report by Zhang Aiping and Li Tianyou, intended to counter enemy small-, medium-, and large-scale raids.