Annotations and Revisions [I]
(September 1963)
To Comrade Kang Sheng:
Agree to publication on the 13th. There are some revisions; please decide as you see fit.
Mao Zedong
7:00 A.M., November 11
[I] This piece is a note written by Mao Zedong on a report submitted on September 10, 1963, by Kang Sheng (Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Secretary of the Secretariat) and Wu Lengxi (President of the Xinhua News Agency, Editor-in-Chief of People’s Daily) regarding a revised draft of “On the Question of Stalin—A Second Critique of the Open Letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU” for his review. Pieces II through XIV contain Mao Zedong’s revisions to the drafts of the second critique dated September 2, September 5, and September 10. Notably, the original title of the September 2 draft was “Why Be Willing to Be an Enemy of Stalin?” which Mao changed to “On the Question of Stalin.” Text printed in Song typeface represents additions made by Mao during revision.
[2]
The article “On the Question of Stalin—A Second Critique of the Open Letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU” was published under the joint names of the Editorial Departments of People’s Daily and Red Flag Magazine in the issue of People’s Daily dated September 13, 1963, and in the eighteenth issue of Red Flag for 1963.

The question of Stalin is a major issue of global significance, having elicited responses from all classes across the world and continuing to be widely debated. Different social classes, as well as the political parties or factions representing them, hold divergent views. It is unlikely that a definitive conclusion will be reached on this matter within this century. However, among the international working class and revolutionary peoples, the majority share a common stance: they do not endorse a wholesale condemnation of Stalin and increasingly look back fondly upon him. The same holds true even in the Soviet Union. Our dispute with the leaders of the CPSU pertains to a specific segment of society. We aim to persuade this group so as to advance the revolutionary cause. This is the purpose behind our writing this article.
The Communist Party of China has consistently maintained that Comrade Khrushchev exploited the so-called “struggle against personality cults”
Four
The Communist Party of China has always acknowledged that Stalin did commit certain errors. These errors had both ideological and socio-historical roots. From a correct standpoint and using proper methods, it is indeed necessary to critically examine the actual mistakes Stalin made, rather than attributing to him fabricated ones.
[l]
Five
In certain matters, Stalin’s mode of thinking deviated from dialectical materialism, falling into formalism and subjectivism, which sometimes led him to lose touch with reality and with the masses. In both intra-party and extra-party struggles, he occasionally confused the contradictions between enemies and ourselves with those within the people, failing to apply the appropriate methods for handling each type of contradiction. While the anti-revolutionary purges he directed rightly punished many genuine counter-revolutionaries, they also resulted in wrongful convictions of innocent individuals, particularly in 1937 and 1938, when the scope of these campaigns was unduly expanded.
/\
As for the lesser-known aspects of Stalin’s errors, they should serve as historical lessons, warning both Soviet and other communist parties against repeating such mistakes, or at least minimizing them. Both positive and negative historical experiences, when accurately summarized and grounded in historical facts without distortion, are beneficial to all communists.
Seven
The roles played by Bebel, Luxemburg, and others in history cannot be compared to that of Stalin. Stalin was a great leader of the proletarian dictatorship in a particular historical era and of the international communist movement. Therefore, any assessment of him ought to be conducted with greater caution.

Eight
As early as the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, and later in the early and mid-1940s, Chinese Marxists-Leninists represented by Comrades Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi were already resisting the influence of certain erroneous policies of Stalin and gradually overcoming the erroneous lines of both “left” and “right” opportunism, ultimately leading the Chinese revolution to victory.
However, since some of Stalin’s erroneous policies were adopted and implemented by certain Chinese comrades, we ourselves bear responsibility. Consequently, our Party’s struggle against “left” and “right” opportunism has always been confined to criticizing those comrades who made mistakes, without placing blame on Stalin. The purpose of our criticism was to distinguish right from wrong, draw lessons, and advance the revolutionary cause. As long as the erring comrades corrected their ways, that sufficed. If they failed to do so, we could wait for them to gradually become enlightened through practical experience, provided they did not form secret cliques or engage in covert sabotage. The methods we employed—the normal practices of intra-party criticism and self-criticism—were rooted in the desire for unity; through criticism or struggle, new unity was achieved on a renewed basis, yielding excellent results. We regarded these as contradictions within the ranks of the people, not as antagonistic contradictions, and thus deemed it appropriate to address them in this manner.
Nine
The vast majority of Soviet citizens do not approve of vilifying Stalin in such a manner. On the contrary, they increasingly cherish his memory. The CPSU leadership has gravely alienated itself from the masses. They constantly feel haunted by Stalin’s lingering presence, as if he continues to threaten them—yet what this really reflects is the profound dissatisfaction of the broad populace with a blanket denunciation of Stalin.
Khrushchev’s secret report at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, which called for a total rejection of Stalin, has never been made public to the Soviet people or to the peoples of other socialist countries. The reason lies in the fact that this document is deeply unpopular and profoundly disconnected from the masses.
Ten
It is particularly noteworthy that while the CPSU leadership vehemently denounces Stalin, they simultaneously “express respect and trust” toward figures like Eisenhower and Kennedy! They brand Stalin as a “tyrant in the style of Ivan the Terrible,” “the greatest autocrat in Russian history,” yet extol Eisenhower and Kennedy as enjoying “the support of the vast majority of the American people.” They deride Stalin as a “fool,” while praising Eisenhower and Kennedy as “wise.”
Eleven
Stalin was capable of engaging in self-criticism. For example, he once offered some misguided advice concerning the Chinese revolution; after its successful completion, he acknowledged his errors. Similarly, regarding certain mistakes in the party rectification work, Stalin admitted them in his report to the Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party in 1939.
[ l]
Complete Works of Mao Zedong
Volume 46
Twelve
Stalin passed away in 1953. Three years later, the CPSU leadership launched a large-scale campaign against him at the Twentieth Congress; eight years thereafter, at the Twenty-Second Congress, they again mounted another fierce attack on Stalin and even proceeded to exhume and cremate his remains.
Three
Ten
Leaders of proletarian political parties—whether members of the Central Committee or local committees—are born out of class struggle and the mass revolutionary movement. They are deeply loyal to the people, closely connected to them, and skilled at accurately gathering and upholding the voice of the masses. Such leaders truly represent the proletariat and are universally recognized by the people.
Fourteen
We offer Comrade Khrushchev a sincere piece of advice: turn back from your completely mistaken path and return to the road of Marxism-Leninism.

Archival Photo
On September 13, 1963, Mao Zedong appeared on the cover of Time magazine for the sixth time. Alongside him, steering the “dragon boat” were Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. That September, the Sino-Soviet debate had already reached a fever pitch.

--- Notes

Khrushchev, at that time First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.


Eisenhower, a member of the U.S. Republican Party.
He served as President of the United States from 1953 to 1961. Kennedy, a member of the U.S. Democratic Party.
He became President in January 1961 and was assassinated in November 1963.
(2]
Ivan the Terrible,
also known as Ivan IV, the first Tsar of Russia.