We negotiated for peace, and the peace talks were sabotaged by Chiang Kai-shek, so he stayed. Gao Shuxun[1] was a general leading troops in the Handan area of Hebei province. He had several divisions of troops under him. He was captured and released, and only later came over to our side. Fu Zuoyi[2] was also a famous general. At that time, he and his army were besieged by us in Beiping. The east, west, south, and north of Beiping, as well as Tianjin, Baoding, Shijiazhuang, Zhangjiakou, and Rehe, were all in our hands. He had no other way out, so he sent people out of the city to negotiate. He handed over all his troops, which were all reorganized and dispersed among the various units of our army. The cadres were gathered for training and then assigned for use. Fu Zuoyi is now a Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council and the Minister of Water Resources and Electric Power. In the then-Suiyuan province, there was an army also under his jurisdiction. The army commander was named Dong Qiwu[3], who also came over to accept reorganization. After the reorganization, the majority of the cadres were our people, and that unit was thus communized. There was also Tao Zhiyue[4], who led troops in Xinjiang, originally under the jurisdiction of Zhang Zhizhong, who also rose up in insurrection and came over to our side. In Changsha, there was Chen Mingren[5], a Kuomintang army commander who had fought tough battles with us in the Northeast. When our army crossed the Yangtze River and continued to advance south, Cheng Qian[6] rose up in insurrection, and he also brought his troops over. He was a first-term graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy and was cultivated by Chiang Kai-shek. Some of our marshals and senior generals are also Whampoa graduates or old military officers. Luo Ruiqing is a seventh-term graduate of Whampoa, now a senior general, serving as Chief of the General Staff.

[1]
Gao Shuxun, former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Eleventh War Zone and concurrently Commander of the New Eighth Army of the Kuomintang forces. He led his troops in an uprising during the Ping-Han Campaign in October 1945.
[2]
Fu Zuoyi, former Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang forces' North China "Bandit Suppression" General Headquarters. He led his troops in Beiping to accept peaceful reorganization in January 1949.
[3]
Dong Qiwu, former Chairman of the Kuomintang's Suiyuan Provincial Government and Deputy Chief of the Kuomintang forces' Northwest Military and Administrative Affairs Office. He led his troops in an uprising in Suiyuan in September 1949.
[4]
Tao Zhiyue, former Deputy Chief of the Kuomintang forces' Northwest Military and Administrative Affairs Office and concurrently Commander-in-Chief of the Xinjiang Garrison General Headquarters. He led his troops in an uprising in Dihua (now Ürümqi) on September 25, 1949.
[5]
Chen Mingren, former Commander of the First Army Group of the Kuomintang forces. He, along with Cheng Qian, led his troops in an uprising in Changsha in August 1949.
[6]
Cheng Qian, former Chairman of the Kuomintang's Hunan Provincial Government and concurrently Director of the Kuomintang forces' Changsha Pacification Office. He, along with Chen Mingren, led his troops in an uprising in Changsha in August 1949.

On the Question of Strategy and Tactics in the Revolutionary Struggle in South Vietnam
Lin Biao is a fifth-term graduate of Whampoa, now a marshal, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, and Minister of National Defense. Xu Xiangqian is a first-term graduate of Whampoa, also a marshal. These three were originally Communist Party members. In our army, there are a few generals who graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy who were not originally Communist Party members. Having these people is beneficial for winning victory in the revolutionary war. Therefore, work should be done not only on soldiers and lower-ranking officers, but also on high-ranking officers when conditions permit. We have several marshals who were also originally high-ranking Kuomintang officers. You are now engaged in a war of national liberation in South Vietnam. It is possible that a few high-ranking officers may come over to your side as the situation develops and the enemy side further disintegrates.
You have achieved many victories and gained much experience in your struggle. Your military struggle, political struggle, economic struggle, and all your policies and struggle tactics are very correct, and you have achieved great results. The masses of the people are very brave, daring to struggle and daring to win. You leading comrades are far-sighted and able to analyze problems, preparing both to greet good situations and to deal with bad situations. You are much more brilliant than our leadership in 1927, and also more brilliant than our leadership in 1934. You have been well tempered in the struggle. Hundreds of thousands, millions of the masses have all been tempered in the struggle.
You are prepared to wage a long-term struggle, prepared to fight for eight or ten years, and also prepared for the situation to develop more quickly and for victory to come more quickly. If it develops more quickly, the high-ranking officers on their side will disintegrate; this is not just a matter of fighting. In fighting, you annihilate one or two of their companies at a time, and the small adds up to the large. When the ruling class reaches a certain point where it cannot maintain itself as it is, it is possible for changes to occur internally, with some people coming out to contend for leadership. Those who come out from within the ruling class to contend for leadership will still raise the anti-communist banner. The person who comes out to contend for power will say, you are not good at opposing communism, let me do it. As the situation in South Vietnam develops, this is a possibility. Whoever wants to oppose communism cannot do without the United States; without the United States, it won't work. Is it possible for you to win over another faction, the left-leaning, pro-you, progressive democrats, and have them cooperate with you to establish an interim, transitional political power? If there is no ideal figure for a time, you can also start by winning over less important figures to play a role. For such people to come over to your side, it must be step by step; you can first establish contact. When you are still in the countryside, they will not come over. At this time, train many cadres well, so that the broad masses are also tempered. Only when you have large cities will they come over. At that time, when they come over, welcome them; do not be afraid of them. Be patient and wait, and create the conditions.
You and we, our two families, are very friendly. The relations between our two parties, two countries, and two armies are all very friendly and very close. Your visit this time is good. There were many situations and good experiences from the struggle in South Vietnam that we did not know or understand before. We are very happy now. Your strategy and tactics are very correct.

Revisions to the First Draft of "On the Question of Industrial Development"[1]
(August, September 1963)
I
The Central Committee believes that only by correctly handling the relationships between the various aspects of the national economy can we effectively realize the general line of going all out, aiming high, and building socialism with greater, faster, better, and more economical results; only then can we truly develop our country's industry at a high speed; and only then can we, within a not-too-long historical period, build our country into a great socialist state with modernized agriculture, modernized industry, modernized national defense, and modernized science and technology.
II
After liberation, is it possible to achieve a great leap forward? Is it possible for our country to leap from a backward agricultural country to an advanced, great industrial country within a not-too-long historical period?
III
The demand we now put forward is: how to further realize the requirements of the Party's general line, to develop our industry with greater, faster, better, and more economical results, and to gradually approach the world's advanced levels of industry and technology.
IV
After the three-year transitional period, our industrial development can be considered in two steps: the first step, for fifteen years, is to establish an independent and complete industrial system, so that our country's industry can roughly catch up with the world's advanced levels; the second step, for another fifteen years, is to bring our country's industry close to the world's advanced levels.
V
From the 1840s to the mid-1940s, a period of one hundred and five years, almost all imperialist countries in the world, large, medium, and small, invaded our country and fought us. With the exception of the last time, namely the War of Resistance Against Japan, which, due to various domestic and international reasons, ended with the surrender of Japanese imperialism, not a single war did not end with our country's defeat and the signing of treaties that forfeited sovereignty and humiliated the nation. The reasons were: first, a corrupt social system, and second, backward economy and technology. Now, our country's social system has changed, and the first reason has been basically resolved; but it has not been completely resolved, as class struggle still exists in society. The second reason has also begun to change somewhat, but to change it completely will require at least several more decades. If in the next

few decades we do not strive to completely change the state of our country's economy and technology being far behind that of the imperialist countries, being beaten is unavoidable. Of course, imperialism is now in an era of decline, while our country and the socialist camp, and the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations of the world, are all in an era of ascent, and a world war may possibly be avoided. Here exist two possibilities: that war can be avoided and that war is unavoidable. But we should proceed from the starting point that we may possibly be beaten to deploy our work, and strive to change, within a not-too-long period of time, the backward state of our country's society, economy, and technology; otherwise, we will make a mistake.

Manuscript of a paragraph added by Mao Zedong when revising the first draft of "On the Question of Industrial Development."

The Complete Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 52
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