Interjections While Listening to the Report on the Self-Defense Counterattack Operation on the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian Border [I]
(February 19, 1963)

The Indian army can attack us here, but we can’t go there? There’s still a hint of fearing ghosts in this, including in my own thinking. At the start, you wanted to fight, but I was dead set against it. That time in the Galwan Valley on the western side, the Premier, Comrade Shaoqi, Comrade Xiaoping, and Comrade Luo Ruiqing all said we absolutely had to fight, that there was no other way—they were bullying us terribly! I said, let them bully us, under no circumstances should we fight. Later, somehow, I also saw that not fighting was no longer an option. If we had to fight, then fight—they had been messing with us for three years. Look, starting from 1959—1959, 1960, 1961, 1962—four full years before we finally struck back.

[1] Sections 1 to 12 of this piece are the main contents of Mao Zedong’s interjections while listening to a report by Zhang Guohua, Commander of the Tibet Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, during a Central Work Conference of the CPC.
[2] The Premier refers to Zhou Enlai. Shaoqi refers to Liu Shaoqi. Xiaoping refers to Deng Xiaoping, then General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council. Luo Ruiqing was then Secretary-General of the CPC Central Military Commission, Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, and Vice Premier of the State Council.

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The Chinese people have fighting spirit. Of course, there are a few who fear death. Apart from a handful of death-fearers, the majority can fight and possess a combative spirit.

Especially that 55th Division—they set out from Xining, Qinghai, transported by truck, and were mobilized right on the road, practically going into battle as soon as they arrived. The 130th Division was in Sichuan, a production unit—they put down their hoes, got on the trucks, and fought as soon as they arrived. Mobilization work was also done on the truck journey, very hastily. Even you, General [1], were dispatched temporarily. Who wanted to fight at the start? No one thought of fighting. You left on the 10th and fought on the 20th—only ten days from departure to battle. You said, if there’s a fight, I’ll go. I heard you were ill, and if there was no fight, you wouldn’t have gone. But as soon as you heard there was a fight, your illness vanished. Your health is not good either; you should be recuperating.

We must pay attention, comrades present here—you must always be prepared for war. Don’t assume the world is at peace and all sides are free of trouble. Of course, I am included in this. This time, I participated, and the Premier, Comrade Shaoqi, Comrade Xiaoping, and comrades from the Military Commission all took part. We were in Beijing, though we didn’t go to the front lines. You don’t all have to go to the front lines either. But you must always be involved and always pay attention to military affairs. Only engaging in civil matters and not military ones—that is dangerous. Comrades from the greater administrative regions, provincial comrades, and central comrades—you must be prepared for war.

[1] Refers to Zhang Guohua.

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IV
Our logistics are relatively primitive, while the Indian army’s are modern. Now in South Vietnam, America’s modernity is going to be defeated by primitiveness—just watch.

I think the Indian army is no good in daytime, no good at night, no good in defense, and no good in attack. Yet you still praise it a bit. What’s so good about its daytime operations? When attacking fixed positions, it must be admitted that its artillery is decent. But at Tawang, they shelled for so many days, and we only suffered a total of 32 casualties—what’s so good about that? We simply concealed ourselves thoroughly.

As for the Indian soldiers’ bayonet fighting, that still deserves some praise.

When fighting externally, our troops don’t understand foreign languages—this is a very big problem. In the future, when fighting foreigners, we can learn some foreign languages.

Now we must train troops, seven or eight months each year.

In this battle, not a single one of our men defected. In the past, we feared political incidents, feared our officers and soldiers might run over to their side. The Indians also claimed they captured our prisoners, but in the end, they couldn’t produce a single person.

This time, we fought a military-political battle, or you could call it a political-military battle.

V
Communications have greatly improved compared to the past. Telegrams sent on the first day of fighting arrived by the next morning—communications are so fast now. Now you receive telegrams at the same time we do. For example, the advance regiment of the 11th Division sent telegrams simultaneously to its division headquarters, to your command post, and to us in Beijing.

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VI
We must emphasize close combat and night combat. When dealing with imperialist armies, I don’t believe that in face-to-face close combat or night combat, I can’t defeat you. On the Korean battlefield, the Americans feared close combat, feared hand-grenade fights, feared bayonet clashes, and feared shooting at ranges of a few dozen or a hundred meters.

VII
You haven’t yet touched on the most fundamental reason. The most fundamental reason is that we are an army of workers and peasants, not an army of landlords and the bourgeoisie; an army led by the Communist Party, not an army led by the Kuomintang. Then, as you said, there’s the pent-up frustration of three years.

An army of workers and peasants, an army led by the Communist Party—can it not win battles? Can it not drive back an attacking enemy? If beings from another planet come, what then? We have no experience with that now. But as for those on Earth, I say we must crush them. We’ve fought wars for so many years and seen quite a few enemies—a Chiang Kai-shek in China, a Japan, an America, and now an India. I don’t think the British will come, the French won’t come, the Germans won’t come. At most, a Japan might come, an America might come, a Chiang Kai-shek might come, an India might come—just these few. Ngo Dinh Diem [1] can’t come either; he’s now like a clay bodhisattva crossing a river—hardly able to save himself. That’s all the enemies there are.

VIII
Party branches within the army are probably better than local Party branches, because the army is relatively concentrated.

[1] Ngo Dinh Diem, then serving as "President," "Prime Minister," and "Minister of Defense" of the South Vietnamese regime.

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Now we must pay attention to local Party branches. Party branches in urban institutions, schools, factories, and neighborhoods, and rural Party branches based on production brigades, must truly play the role of vanguard units.

Including Walong, we lost a total of 800 people. The seriously wounded numbered about four to five hundred; the lightly wounded recovered quickly. The seriously wounded still have a role—as long as they don’t die, they can serve an educational purpose. Excluding the dead, those who gained lessons and training amount to over 27,000 people, and including the western sector, over 32,000. I think we should assign some of them to various divisions, with each division swapping some personnel with you. Of the over 30,000 who participated in this battle, I think keeping half is enough. You can select 15,000 and distribute them nationwide, especially to frontline units, particularly to duty divisions. Send them there to tell these stories and serve as instructors.

IX
In this battle, the Tibetan common people performed very well. This is because they were oppressed in the past and have now been liberated; because they are not wealthy but poor—proletarians and semi-proletarians; and because we treat the working people of Tibet with a comradely attitude. Otherwise, would they have acted this way?

X
A foreign soldier requires a logistics support team of seven people. If we followed that model, with 32,000 of us fighting, three times seven would mean over 200,000 people—how could that be manageable?

Regarding the concentration of superior forces, it’s still the old saying: with tenfold strength, besiege; with fivefold strength, attack. If besieging a city, you need ten times the force; if engaging in field operations, you need five times. In specific tactical maneuvers, it goes beyond that—you must hold absolute superiority.

The troops should strengthen their mortars, 60mm mortars, and also those 40mm rocket launchers.

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Fight and take shape as you go. Must there necessarily be a model? I don’t think so. At the start of the Chinese revolution, we didn’t have our own model—it was nothing more than the approaches of Hong Xiuquan and the Northern Expedition. The Communist Party fought and gradually took shape as it went along; in the past, there was no model. The Soviet Union had a model. But before the October Revolution, what model was there? Wasn’t that model created precisely by the October Revolution?

Flanking maneuvers to the rear—this is not just a weakness of the Indian army; since ancient times, every army has feared this tactic most.
Cleaning up the battlefield took over a month. They wouldn’t come out, hiding in the forests. This was a new problem, one we hadn’t anticipated.

11
Zhang Guohua hasn’t yet mentioned the western front. The western front was extremely arduous, with snow several meters deep. Despite such difficulties, we were able to overcome them. We must propagate this experience throughout the entire Party, the entire army, and among the people.

12
It seems our army still needs political work—grasping the "Four Firsts," grasping the "Three Great Democracies," strengthening weak links, and doing a good job in Party building.