Today I will focus on the question of whether the Communist Party can collapse or not. If the Communist Party collapses, who will come? After all, there are two major parties. If we collapse, the Kuomintang will come. The Kuomintang ruled for twenty-three years and then collapsed; we still have some years ahead.

The peasants have already been mobilized, but there is still the issue of a comeback by the bourgeoisie, rightists, landlords, and rich peasants. There is also the direction of Yugoslavia. (Someone interjected: The Kuomintang in Taiwan has drawn up a political program, with land going to peasants as their property, but also protecting landlords.) Various localities and departments focus exclusively on those specific issues, yet neglect the most widespread, significant directional problems.

Farming by individual households will inevitably lead to polarization; it won't take two years—polarization will set in within a year.

(Comrade Li ×× exposed Deng Zihui's problems.) Sending cadres down without achieving ideological "unity," departing without discussion—such a method is no good. Why not invite Deng Zihui to come? If he doesn't come, we cannot stage a rivalry act. I suggest adding five more people to the central group: Deng Zihui, Wang ××, Kang Sheng, Wu ××, and Hu ×.

Capitalist ideology has existed for decades, centuries—let’s not talk about thousands of years; stretching that far frightens people. Socialism has only been around for a few decades—has it been wiped perfectly clean? All dynasties have been like this. The Soviet Union has been around for decades and still has revisionism, serving international capitalism, actually counterrevolutionary.

In the book *The Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*, there is a note stating that the bourgeoisie has been eliminated, with only the residual influence of capitalist ideology remaining—this was wrongly stated and needs to be corrected.

There are difficulties, which are a test for the collective economy—this is a major trial, and even greater tests will come in the future. The Soviet Union went through the great trials of two world wars, took many winding paths, and still produced revisionism. Our difficulties are greater than those of the Soviet Union.

Of all cooperativization efforts worldwide, we have done the best. This is because, nationwide, land reform was relatively thorough—though there were places where peaceful land reform occurred. Many bad elements and Ma Bufang agents have infiltrated the political power. Changing the ownership of the means of production does not mean resolving the reflection of consciousness. Socialist transformation eliminated the ownership of the exploiting classes, but this does not mean political and ideological struggles have ceased. The influence on ideological consciousness is long-term. Advanced cooperativization and the socialist transformation of 1956 completed the elimination of bourgeois ownership; the political-ideological revolution proposed in 1957 supplemented what was lacking. The bourgeoisie can regenerate—this is exactly the situation in the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union, individual farming went on for nearly ten years from 1921 to 1928, with no way out, until Stalin proposed collectivization. Various ration coupons were not abolished until 1935; their coupons were no fewer than ours.

Find a few comrades to compile a set of materials on the Soviet process from hardship to development. Comrade Kang Sheng is responsible for this—produce an economic materials dossier.

The wavering elements resolutely clamor for individual farming, and later, seeing the situation is unfavorable, they demand to return. It’s best not to approve; let them farm individually for two or three years and we’ll decide then. Their early return will not play a positive role in the collective economy.

We must analyze—do not speak of all brightness, nor can we speak of all darkness. Since 1960, we have not spoken of all brightness, only of all darkness, or mostly darkness. Ideological confusion then gave rise to the proposal: individual farming, wholly or largely. It is said that only this way can grain output increase; otherwise, agriculture has no solution. Shifting 40 percent of production quotas to households—individual farming and collective farming competing side by side—this in essence means largely individual farming. The proposal is very explicit: polarization, embezzlement and theft, speculation and profiteering, taking concubines, loan sharking—on one side prosperity, and on the other, the families of servicemen, revolutionary martyrs, workers, and cadres, as well as households under the five guarantees, will fall into poverty.

Khrushchev still dares not openly dissolve collective farms.

(Comrade Kang Sheng interjected: Current prices—low when buying, high when selling—are unfavorable to the collective economy.)

A department head from the Ministry of Internal Affairs went to Fengcheng to promote Anhui’s experience with household production quotas. Those sent down by the central authorities often go wrong; we must be careful. Cadres sent down by the central authorities should be of some help to the localities; they must not blindly proffer advice or casually put forward personal opinions. Policies can only be set by the central government; everything must be approved by the central government. No matter how exceptional the circumstances, independent policies must not be established.

When there is ideological divergence, the leadership must adopt an attitude; otherwise, erroneous things will spread unchecked. After all, there are three -isms: feudalism, capitalism, socialism. Capitalism has a comprador class. The average American capitalist farm has sixteen households per farm; our production teams have over twenty households. With household quotas, large families will still divide—parents will have no one to care for them and manage meals—all for the benefit of middle peasants under heaven.

Hu Kaiming of Hebei—there is such a person, him. "Kaiming" (enlightened), but precisely "Hu" Kaiming—a vice-governor. Having heard the relayed criticism of the "all darkness" argument, he felt the pressure. You have pressed me for so long, since 1960—over two years of this talk—I can also put some pressure on you.

Is there class struggle? Someone in Guangzhou said that listening to the rumbling of trains, those heading south sound like "marching toward brightness," "marching toward brightness," while those heading north sound like "no hope," "no hope."

Some people profit from the nation’s misfortune—making wealth from the state’s difficulties—by embezzlement and theft. Within the Party there is a segment of people who are not communists, but capitalists and feudalists.

Every province has such a place, the so-called later-liberated areas, where in reality the democratic revolution was not thorough.

The Party membership includes large numbers of the petty bourgeoisie, a segment of well-off peasants and their children, and a batch of intellectuals. There is also a batch of unreformed bad elements—not actually Communist Party members. In name, Communists; in reality, Kuomintang. For these people, the democratic revolution is still incomplete, with clear embezzlement and corruption; these are easy to handle. Intellectuals and children of landlords and rich peasants—some have been Marxified, some not at all, some only to a poor degree. These people were not mentally prepared for the socialist revolution, and we did not have the time to educate them. Remove the label from all bourgeois intellectuals? Bourgeois intellectuals—outwardly compliant, inwardly defiant, their ghostly aura not yet dispersed—must be analyzed.

The democratic revolution lasted twenty-eight years, promoting anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism among the people, with concentrated propaganda efforts known to all women and children, deeply ingrained in hearts and minds. Socialism has only been around for ten years; last year we proposed re-educating cadres—this is an important task. At the Sixth Congress, it was only said that the bourgeoisie was bad, but a specific analysis of the bourgeoisie was added—opposing the bureaucratic, comprador bourgeoisie—while other segments of the bourgeoisie were not much opposed; the Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns targeted them somewhat. Confiscating the property of the Kuomintang, big capitalists, and imperialists—when these come into our hands, they become socialist in nature; in others’ hands, they are capitalist in nature. In 1953 and 1954 we started cooperatives, beginning to build socialism. Mutual-aid teams, cooperativization, elementary cooperatives, advanced cooperatives—all developed continuously. The real socialist revolution began in 1953. Afterward, through many movements, socialist construction and socialist transformation unfolded nationwide. In 1958, some spirit was already off; there were errors in some work in between, the most significant being excessive state procurement by quota, blind commandism, the communist wind, several "great campaigns," Anhui’s "Three Reforms," and Yellow River irrigation (originally a good thing, but the salinization was not foreseen). Thus, in addition to the four contradictions, there was a fifth: the contradiction between correct and erroneous. High targets and excessive state procurement by quota were cognitive errors, not a question of two roads. Good people committing mistakes are completely different from those taking the capitalist road, and even more so from infiltrated elements and feudalists. For example, recruiting an extra twenty million people for capital construction without seeing clearly—peasants then had no food, became edematous—and now we are cutting back.

Some comrades waver at the slightest sign of disturbance; that shows they are mentally unprepared for the socialist revolution and lack Marxism. Without ideological preparation, without Marxism-Leninism, they cannot withstand the wind. Toward these people, we should let them speak; it is better to speak out than to remain silent. Let the speaker be blameless, but we must know what’s what. In action, the minority must obey the majority; there must be leadership. Comrade ××’s report says: “We must correctly handle individual farming, impose disciplinary sanctions, expel from the Party…” I think those who lead can be sanctioned; for the overwhelming majority, it is a matter of education, not disciplinary action—though those leading the splitting bear no exception from disciplinary sanctions.

Let everyone analyze the reasons.

This is a contradiction between the proletariat and the well-off peasants. Landlords and rich peasants dare not speak freely; well-off peasants are not so—they dare come forward and speak. Upper-level influences must be reckoned with. Some prefectural Party secretaries and provincial Party secretaries (like Zeng Xisheng) will invariably represent the well-off peasants.

We must spend several years educating cadres, doing a good job of training cadres in rotation, running high-level Party schools and intermediate Party schools. Otherwise, if we engage in revolution our whole lives only to end up practicing capitalism or revisionism, how can that do?

This regime has taken on many people, including a large number from the Kuomintang—all taken on.

Luo Longji said the methods we are now adopting are all stopgap measures. The fundamental method is to not engage in class struggle. We must engage in class struggle for ten thousand years; otherwise, wouldn’t we turn into Kuomintang or revisionist elements?

Peaceful transition means stable non-transition, perpetual non-transition.

At the congress, I only introduced a topic and have not finished speaking; some I have only hinted at. In a couple of days, it may flow naturally into a complete piece.

Three years of the Liberation War, fierce land reform. After land reform, the transformation of the two types of capitalism proceeded very smoothly. In some areas, the democratic revolution is still not thorough—for example, Pan Hannian and Rao Shushi were not discovered for a long time.

The domestic root of revisionism is the remnants of capitalism; the external root is submission to imperialist oppression. These two lines in the Moscow Declaration were added by me.

In 1957, there was a slight disturbance internationally; a wind suddenly rose, ruffling the surface of a pond’s spring water. In June, a force-12 typhoon blew—they prepared to take over the government; we launched a counterattack and seized back all school positions. After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, counting half of 1958, then 1959 and 1960—the Great Leap Forward. In 1961, we began implementing the Twelve Articles; in 1960, we issued the Seventy Articles on Industry and the Sixty Articles on Agriculture.

In the past, land distribution meant peasants fighting landlords; now it means peasants fighting peasants, the strong laboring capacity oppressing the weak.

There is one type of peasant whom both sides try to win over—the landlords and rich peasants want to win them, and we want to win them as well.

The petty bourgeoisie and peasants have a dual nature—they waver when encountering difficulties—so we must fight for proletarian leadership, that is, leadership by the Communist Party. In rural affairs, rely on the poor peasants, but also win over the middle peasants; we practice distribution according to labor, but must care for the families of the four categories and the five guarantees.

Twenty million people summoned at a call, dismissed at a wave. If the Communist Party were not in power, who could accomplish that? At the first Zhengzhou Conference in November 1958, the commercial policy put forward was not implemented, nor was the policy of distribution according to labor; instead of promoting agriculture and the development of the collective economy, it had an adverse effect. The Ministry of Commerce should change its name to the "Ministry of Destruction"—comrades will be unhappy to hear this, so I deliberately put it rather harshly to draw attention. Commercial policies and methods must be fundamentally studied. In recent years, rabbits, sheep, and geese have grown rapidly—this is because these items are not subject to state procurement by quota. Striking at the collective, favoring individual farming—this issue must be resolved this time, no matter what.

The central authorities always consult with the provinces, municipalities, and ministries on matters, but some ministries just do not consult the central authorities. Some central ministries perform well, such as military and foreign affairs; some departments, like the Planning Commission, the Economic Commission, and portals like the Finance and Trade Office and the Agricultural Office, always face issues that cannot be resolved. The central authorities hold overall power, but if the situation is unclear, how can they hold overall power? People eat to make revolution; they need not make revolution necessarily within one department—why not go to another department or down below to make revolution? I am from Hunan; I spent seven or eight years in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Jiangxi, and thirteen years in northern Shaanxi. We need not work forever in one area or position. Between central and local departments, cadre exchanges—give it another year of trial to see if things can be resolved. Comrade Chen Boda said we can’t give any more.

The financial and economic ministries and commissions never make reports; they do not request instructions beforehand, nor do they report afterward—independent kingdoms. At every season and festival, they coerce signatures; upward they have no connection to the central authorities, downward no connection to the masses.

Thank heaven and earth, recently the Organization Department submitted a report.

We know all about foreign affairs—even what Kennedy intends to do—but as for Beijing’s various ministries, who knows what they are doing? I am unaware of the situation in several major economic departments. If I don’t know, how can I offer advice? It is said that the provinces have this same problem.