Comments on a Document Concerning Japan’s Economic Policy and the Development of Its Defense Industry (July 13, 1961)

Comrades Lin Biao, He Long, Rongzhen, and Ruiqing[1]: This document[2] is worthy of attention; I presume you have already read it. China’s industrial and technological level lags far behind Japan’s. The course we should adopt merits careful study. Might I ask that you first exchange views on the matter, after which I will discuss it further with you in August? Mao Zedong, July 13, Hangzhou.

Printed from the manuscript. Notes [1] Lin Biao was then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defense. He Long was then Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission and Director of the Commission for Defense Industry, as well as a Vice Premier of the State Council. Rongzhen refers to Nie Rongzhen, who at the time served as Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Chairman of the Science and Technology Commission. Ruiqing refers to Luo Ruiqing, then a member of the Standing Committee and Secretary-General of the CPC Central Military Commission, and Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army.

[2] Refers to an internal document issued on July 6, 1961. The document states that in February 1960, at the request of the Japanese Defense Agency, the Japan Financial and Fiscal Affairs Research Association submitted an internal report titled “An Analysis of the Defense Industry from the Perspective of Economic Policy.” The association’s chairman, Takeo Fukuda, currently serves as Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Policy Research Council, while its advisor, Masamichi Yamagishi, is now Governor of the Bank of Japan. The report’s main points are as follows:

I. The Starting Point for Japan’s National Defense and Arms Production: (1) Japan’s defense posture should differ from that of Europe and the United States; it can only be conceived in terms of localized conflicts. (2) Greater emphasis must be placed on the relationship between weapons production and national strength. The development of modern military science has outstripped the capabilities of Japan’s national resources. (3) The principle of joint U.S.-Japan responsibility for Japan’s defense should be firmly upheld, leading to the establishment of a joint U.S.-Japan defense arrangement.

II. Future Directions for Japan’s National Defense and Arms Production: (1) The priority in Japan’s defense should be maintaining the combat effectiveness of ground forces and maritime logistical support capabilities. (2) Japanese arms production should be confined to items that can be manufactured concurrently with civilian goods. (3) Air defense, requiring high-performance combat aircraft, should be assumed by the United States.

III. Existing Biases in Japan’s Current National Defense and Arms Production: (1) The army maintains a relatively large personnel strength, while the air force is burdened with an excessive number of aircraft. (2) Arms production policies neglect the enhancement of ground and naval combat power, running counter to developments both domestically and internationally.