The two Zhengzhou conferences [2] were convened too hastily.

At that time, I still didn’t fully understand how to pursue socialism in China.

During the first one, I simply copied Stalin and once lectured on his work *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*.

The second was held in three batches—the first batch lasted one day, and the final one took a day and a half. How could that solve any problems?

Back then, my mind was already on wrapping things up quickly, because the spring plowing season was coming in March. If you really wanted to get to the bottom of the issues, one or two days simply wouldn’t do. With such a short time, all you could do was force submission, not persuade anyone. Many comrades came to talk to me back then—I tried to convince them, but they weren’t convinced. With just a day or two, how could you get through to them?

After the Lushan Conference, where did we go wrong? The mistake was that we shouldn’t have disseminated the resolution on Peng, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou [3] down to the county level and below. It should have stopped at the county level. Below the county, we should have continued implementing the *Zhengzhou Conference Record* [4] and the 18 Articles of the Shanghai Conference, and kept on combating “leftism.” As soon as we swung to opposing the right, it created a false impression—oh, wonderful, production is booming—but that wasn’t the reality. The matter of Peng, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou should only have been communicated within a small circle of some hundred-odd thousand people. It would have been better not to push it down to the company level in the military, or below the commune level on the civilian side. By pushing it down, a whole bunch of “Right-leaning opportunists” got dug out. Looking back now, this was a mistake: we branded honest people, people who spoke the truth, as “Right-leaning opportunists,” and even as “counterrevolutionaries.”

Of course, the Zhengzhou Conferences were basically correct, and the 18 Articles put forward at the Shanghai Conference were also basically correct, but the views expressed on the issues of public canteens and the supply system were incorrect. [5] In April 1959, I summoned some members of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee in Beijing, along with some comrades attending the NPC session, to talk it over, and then wrote those six points addressed to the six-level cadres. [6] Those six points were pure rubbish, because many of our cadres at various levels didn’t understand what socialism was, what “distribution according to work” meant, and what “exchange of equal values” was.

In the spring of 1960, we saw the “Communist wind” reemerging. In Guangzhou, I first called together comrades from the Central-South provinces for a three-hour meeting—such a short duration! Then in Hangzhou, I convened comrades from the East China and Southwest provinces for a three- or four-day meeting, with no focused agenda; issues like small furnaces, technological innovation and revolution, mechanization and semi-mechanization were all thrown in. The egalitarian and indiscriminate transfer [7] was not made the central theme. A meeting should have only one focus—one focus is good. If a meeting puts out piles of documents without a single central theme, that’s no good. Later, in Tianjin, I convened comrades from the Northeast, Northwest, and North China provinces, but that didn’t solve the problems either.

At that time, we promoted several “Great Initiatives”: great efforts in water conservancy, great efforts in county and commune industries, great efforts in pig farms, great efforts in transportation, great efforts in culture and education. Once these five “Great Initiatives” came along—what a mess! Wasn’t that just the “Communist wind” blowing again? At the Beidaihe Conference [8] in July and August last year, seventy to eighty percent of the time was spent on international issues, and only the tail end touched on food issues and agricultural problems, without even criticizing the two kinds of egalitarianism. The thorough resolution of the issue of egalitarian and indiscriminate transfers only started with the issuance of the Twelve-Point Directive [9] in November. An error occurred in the implementation of that directive: we only dealt with the third-category counties, communes, and production brigades, while the first- and second-category ones were left alone, untouched. In Henan, a full six months were spent just on the third-category ones, without touching the first and second categories—the “Communist wind,” the wind of commandism, the wind of boasting, the wind of arbitrary direction, and the wind of cadres’ privileges were not universally tackled. When someone brought up the “five winds,” the assumption was that the first- and second-category areas could be at ease, but now a closer look reveals those winds are rampant in those very places. That is why this year’s central document [10] stipulates that the “five winds” must be universally rectified in all three categories of counties, communes, and production brigades—no one on the list will escape.

Now, some cadres think they’ve sensed a certain “pattern”—they believe that if we just keep rectifying the “five winds” for about a year or so, the “wind” will blow over and then it’s done. But we can’t proceed like that. We should learn from Han Wengong [11]: what he wrote in his “Memorial to the Crocodiles” was, “If in three days it cannot, then five days. If in five days it cannot, then seven days. If in seven days it cannot, that means it will never be willing to depart,” and then he would strike it, kill it. We should likewise adopt the approach: three years won’t do, then five years; five years won’t do, then seven years; seven years won’t do, then ten years. If after ten years it still won’t do and shows no sign of changing, then we’ll dismiss them from office and investigate and deal with them.

We must conduct solid investigations and research, and we must adhere to the mass line. Financial and material assets that were taken in egalitarian transfers must be resolutely reimbursed or compensated, but we should not adopt a charity mentality. Another thing: anyone who has been wrongly accused must be rehabilitated.

The current problem is one of educating the cadres. All of you seated here are teachers now, because we have already educated ourselves. Through the Guangzhou Conference [12] and this Beijing Conference, our own thinking has been straightened out, and we must now lead by example and educate the cadres—educate the provincial-level, prefectural-level, and county-level cadres. These three levels must be the first to receive this education. Once these three levels are well educated, they will go back and educate the commune-level, brigade-level, and team-level cadres.

Our education of cadres during the period of the democratic revolution was also a long-term process. Chen Duxiu [13] didn’t understand the democratic revolution and pursued a Right-leaning opportunist line, leading the revolution to failure and reducing fifty thousand Party members to just over ten thousand. We went up into the mountains and fought a guerrilla war for ten years. During those ten years, we also committed the three “left” errors [14], and we were educated by the Long March. Then came the Yan’an Rectification [15]; we compiled several books, including *Since the Sixth Congress* and *The Two Lines*, and from 1942 to the first half of 1945, the rectification went on for three and a half years. It was conducted like a gentle breeze and light rain, with the slogan “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and cure the sickness to save the patient.” Individuals wrote self-reflections, reviewed documents, and spoke about their own thoughts. Before the Seventh Congress [16] convened, the “Resolution on Certain Historical Questions” was issued. The Seventh Congress became a congress of unity, achieving ideological unification across the entire Party. From the Party’s founding in 1921 to the eve of the Seventh Congress in 1945, a span of twenty-four years, our Party had never been fully ideologically unified—first there was Chen Duxiu’s Right-leaning opportunism, then the three bouts of “left” opportunism. Factions were numerous, each going their own way. Broadly, there were two main schools: one was subjectivism—that is, dogmatism—and the other was non-dogmatism. After the Yan’an Rectification and the Seventh Congress, our Party had a whole set of unified approaches in politics, military affairs, economic policy, cultural policy, and Party building. Why, then, was there no error in the three-plus years of the Liberation War that followed? Why did some people who had previously opposed certain things now endorse them? For example, in military affairs, some had earlier feared breaking our pots and pans, wanted to keep the enemy beyond the borders, advocated striking with two fists, favored regular warfare, and opposed guerrilla warfare—yet in that period, they all came around to ideas like luring the enemy deep into our territory. This was because the cadres were educated, especially through the Yan’an Rectification.

During the period of socialist revolution and socialist construction, we haven’t yet carried out such a thorough rectification. I think we should start from now and use the Sixty Articles [17] to educate cadres over a long period—it can’t be done well without several decades. No one has ever practiced socialism before; there’s no such thing as first learning all the concrete socialist policies and then undertaking socialism. We’ve been building socialism for eleven years, and now we must sum up our experience. What I’m talking about today is summing up experience; I’ll speak again next time. We are historicists, so let me tell you some history—only by telling history can you persuade people. The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years from the Party’s founding to victory. Socialism has only been under way for eleven years. I ask: add another eleven years, making twenty-two—would that do? I’ve said in a little booklet [18] before: In the democratic revolution we started without experience, we stumbled and fell, gained experience, and finally achieved victory; perhaps the time required to gain experience in socialist revolution and construction can be shortened somewhat. That was just a notion. Looking at it now, since we’ve all become conscious, the time can be shortened. The democratic revolution took twenty-eight years. Even if socialist revolution and construction took twenty-two years—a reduction of six years compared to the democratic revolution—that would still mean another eleven years from now. Can that be shortened further? The experience of the Soviet Union is the experience of the Soviet Union—they ran into problems themselves. We still need to run into our own. It’s like catching a disease: once someone has had a certain illness, they develop immunity; if I haven’t had it, I don’t have that immunity.

We must pay attention to our methods of leadership. As I just mentioned, from the Beidaihe Conference, the First Zhengzhou Conference, the Wuchang Conference [19], the Second Zhengzhou Conference, the Shanghai Conference, the letter to the six-level cadres, the Lushan Conference, all the way up to the Sixty Articles and this current conference—none of these resolved the problems. If a problem is not solved, we must not just set it aside and ignore it; we must keep talking about it. Unsolved means unsolved, and it’s still unsolved now! I’m skeptical whether even one-third of the properties transferred under egalitarianism have been returned or compensated. I’ve asked: is there half? Many comrades say it’s not even half; maybe one-third at best. Anyway, it’s like tapping away at a piece of sticky candy: you tap away one third, then another third, and then a third of the remaining third—once you’ve tapped it all away, won’t you feel relieved? Resolutely carrying out the repayment or compensation educates our Party and educates our cadres.

I think we should now take materials like the Sixty Articles, plus Stalin’s book *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, as study materials. When was Stalin’s book written? He started from 1917, and after thirty-five years, it wasn’t until 1952 that he wrote it. Stalin produced that book after thirty-five years of their practice. We’ve only been at it for eleven years. If we were to write such a book now, I have no confidence it would be well done. Aren’t textbooks being compiled everywhere these days? In my view, even if they’re produced, they can’t be used; we’ll still have to rely on Stalin’s book.

After the March Guangzhou Conference and this Beijing Conference, this year’s situation is very different from the past. Now comrades have emancipated their thinking, and their understanding of socialism—of how to build socialism—has deepened significantly. Why this change? One objective reason is that we ran into setbacks in 1959 and 1960. Some say they “bumped their heads until the blood flowed”; I don’t see anyone’s head actually bleeding—this is merely a metaphor, meaning we’ve tasted hardship.

Transcribed and published based on the verbatim record held by the Central Archives.

**Notes**

[1] This is Mao Zedong’s speech at the Central Working Conference of the CPC, held in Beijing from May 21 to June 12, 1961.

[2] Refers to the working conference attended by some central leaders and some local responsible comrades held in Zhengzhou from November 2 to 10, 1958 (the First Zhengzhou Conference), and the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Zhengzhou from February 27 to March 5, 1959 (the Second Zhengzhou Conference).

[3] See note [9] on p. 231 of this volume.

[4] “Zhengzhou Conference Record,” see note [6] on p. 30 of this volume.

[5] The meeting summary “Eighteen Questions Concerning People’s Communes,” adopted at the Seventh Plenum of the Eighth CPC Central Committee held in Shanghai from April 2 to 5, 1959, still affirmed the practice of running canteens and implementing the supply system in the people’s communes.

[6] Refers to the six points stated in the letter of April 29, 1959, regarding agricultural issues addressed to the six-level cadres. See pp. 48–50 of this volume.

[7] On egalitarian and indiscriminate transfer (yi ping er tiao), see note [1] on p. 33 of this volume.

[8] Refers to the Central Working Conference of the CPC held in Beidaihe from July 5 to August 10, 1960.

[9] Refers to the “Urgent Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Current Policy Issues in Rural People’s Communes” issued on November 3, 1960, containing twelve articles in total.

[10] See “Work Methods of the Central Committee of the CPC (Draft)” (January 1961).

[11] Han Wengong, i.e., Han Yu (A.D. 768–824), a writer and philosopher from the Tang Dynasty. The quotation is from his “Memorial to the Crocodiles.”

[12] Refers to the Central Working Conference of the CPC held in Guangzhou in March 1961.

[13] Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) was an editor-in-chief of *New Youth*, a major leader of the May Fourth New Culture Movement, and one of the chief founders of the CPC. From the First to the Fifth CPC National Congress, he served as the Party’s chief leader. During the later years of the First Revolutionary Civil War, he committed the error of Right-leaning capitulationism.

[14] Refers to the three “left” errors that occurred in the CPC’s history: the first was the blind-actionist error led by Qu Qiubai between November 1927 and April 1928; the second was the Li Lisan line that held sway from June to September 1930; the third was the Wang Ming line that dominated from January 1931 to January 1935.

[15] The Yan’an Rectification Movement, referring to the large-scale rectification movement carried out within the CPC starting from 1942, with the contents covering opposition to subjectivism, sectarianism, and the “eight-legged” Party essay in order to rectify the styles of study, Party conduct, and writing.

[16] The Seventh CPC National Congress, held in Yan’an from April 23 to June 11, 1945.

[17] Refers to the “Regulations on the Work of Rural People’s Communes (Draft)” adopted at the Central Working Conference of the CPC in March 1961. It contained sixty articles in total.

[18] Most likely refers to a small booklet compiled in June 1960 titled “Summaries of Experience During the Period of Socialist Construction,” comprising articles by Mao Zedong, including the speech “On the Ten Major Relationships.”

[19] Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Wuchang from November 28 to December 10, 1958.

〔10〕This refers to the “Summary of Discussions of the Central Work Conference on Rural Rectification and Community Improvement and Certain Policy Issues,” dated January 20, 1961.

〔11〕Han Wengong refers to Han Yu (768–824), a native of Heyang (present-day Meng County) in Henan Province, a Tang Dynasty writer and philosopher.

〔12〕This refers to the Central Work Conference of the CPC Central Committee held in Guangzhou from March 15 to 23, 1961.

〔13〕Chen Duxiu—see p. 206, note 7 of this volume.

〔14〕The three “Left” deviation errors—see p. 178, note 9 of this volume.

〔15〕This refers to a Marxist-Leninist ideological education campaign carried out within the entire Party over a period of more than three years, beginning in 1942.

Its main content was: opposing subjectivism to rectify the style of study, opposing sectarianism to rectify the style of Party conduct, and opposing Party jargon to rectify the style of writing.

Through this rectification movement, the entire Party further grasped the fundamental orientation of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

〔16〕The Seventh Congress refers to the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in Yan’an from April 23 to June 11, 1945.

At the congress, Mao Zedong delivered the political report “On Coalition Government,” Zhu De delivered the military report “On the Battlefields of the Liberated Areas,” Liu Shaoqi delivered the “Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution”; Zhou Enlai made an important speech on the question of the united front.

The congress defined the Party’s line: “Arouse the masses of the people, expand the people’s forces, and under the leadership of our Party, defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people, and build a new-democratic China.” It adopted a new Party constitution and elected a new Central Committee.

The new constitution stipulated that Mao Zedong Thought—the thought integrating Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution—would serve as the guiding principle for all the work of the Communist Party of China.

This congress was a congress of unity and a congress of victory.

〔17〕This refers to the “Working Regulations for Rural People’s Communes (Revised Draft),” comprising a total of 60 articles.

〔18〕This refers to “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People”—see pp. 204–243, Vol. VII of this book.

〔19〕This refers to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC, held in Wuchang from November 28 to December 10, 1958.

The session adopted the “Resolution on Certain Questions Concerning the People’s Communes.”