--- Notes



Comments on Wang Renzhong’s Letter Concerning the Situation at the Hunan Provincial Three-Level Cadre Conference〔1〕 (May 15, 1961) To be circulated to all comrades who are members of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat. Mao Zedong May 15

The original is to be returned to Mao. Printed from the manuscript.

Notes 〔1〕 Refers to a letter dated May 10, 1961, from Wang Renzhong, Second Secretary of the Central South Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and First Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, to Mao Zedong concerning the situation at the Hunan Provincial Party Committee’s three-level cadre conference.

The letter stated that the conference had concluded on April 26. Participants felt that their thinking had been liberated, their frustrations dispelled, and their spirits lifted. Secretaries of the prefectural party committees believed that in the past there had been too many rigid directives from higher authorities, which had stifled initiative; they also urged that in the future a few broad guidelines be established to provide clear guidance and prevent people from being caught between conflicting instructions.

Comrade Zhang Pinghua, First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, reviewed the shortcomings and errors in the provincial committee’s leadership work at the meeting, a move that was met with satisfaction by those in attendance.

Based on the outcomes of the conference, the main problems in Hunan were identified as follows: First, following the Lushan Conference of 1959, the struggle against rightist tendencies lacked clear criteria for distinguishing right from wrong. As a result, some good cadres were wrongly targeted, and the biases that had emerged in intra-party struggles were not promptly corrected, leading to an escalation of coercive practices and seriously detrimental consequences.

Second, the 1959 grain yield estimate was excessively high, resulting in excessive procurement and outward transfers of grain, which reduced farmers’ per capita food rations and dampened their production enthusiasm. This was also one of the primary causes of the 1960 output decline.

Third, arbitrary and ill-considered commandism in agricultural production during 1960 constituted another major factor behind the agricultural output reduction.

Fourth, during the large-scale water conservancy campaign of 1959, adequate oversight was lacking; certain medium- and large-scale water control projects were undertaken without prior surveying and design, wasting manpower and resources to little or no avail.

The conference reached decisions on several major policy issues: First, grain procurement would amount to 5 billion jin of paddy rice, with an additional 500–600 million jin of milled rice to be transferred out of the province.

Second, the agricultural tax rate would be set at 10 percent, with any amounts exceeding this threshold to be reduced.

Third, production teams were to allocate approximately 5 percent of their distributable surplus to provide for the “Five Guarantees” households and other needy families, with the remainder distributed entirely according to work contribution.

Fourth, most communal canteens had already been disbanded, and only a small number remained operational during peak farming seasons. ５£°