In my view, this working conference has been better than the previous ones. Everyone’s thinking is clearer than before, and there is a more balanced approach to both firmness and flexibility. In the past, we tended to be too lenient; this time we have made progress: we have analyzed the problems and gained a better understanding of the situation. Of course, much remains unclear. This applies at both the central level and in the provinces and municipalities. For example, we have a relatively good grasp of the situation in counties, communes, and production teams categorized as Class I, II, and III. Class I consists of those that are doing well—implementing policies properly and avoiding “communist wind” excesses. Class II is also fairly sound, while Class III comprises backward, unsatisfactory units. In some of these, leadership has been seized by landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and bad elements; they operate under the Communist Party’s banner but actually pursue the interests of the Kuomintang and the landlord class—essentially a restoration of the old order. Nationwide, about 30 percent of counties, communes, and production teams fall into Class I, 50 percent into Class II, and 20 percent into Class III. Within any given locality, the proportion of Class III units may exceed 20 percent or remain below that threshold. However, our overall picture is still not entirely precise; we can only say that this general breakdown holds true. We should not assume that all Class I and II communes and teams are wholly positive—there are still bad elements among them—and conversely, there are good people even in Class III units. Comrade ×× reviewed a report from Lingbao County in Henan Province, pointing out that problems persist in Class I and II units as well. Once the masses are mobilized, it becomes clear who is good and who is bad—the commune committees and the masses themselves can discern this—but our own leadership often lacks such clarity. Overall, the sound and relatively sound units account for about 80 percent, which is still a majority. The masses know who is who, but the leadership does not. We must resolve to address this: without strong leadership, and unless large numbers of cadres are dispatched to deeply engage the masses, identify active elements among the poor and lower-middle peasants, and adopt a strategy of applying pressure from both ends, we will not be able to solve the underlying issues.

Even in Lingbao County’s Class I and II units, numerous problems remain, and bad elements are still present; how much more so in Class III units! Although we do not yet have a complete understanding of the situation, we have taken a step forward in that direction. By conducting thorough investigations and studies going forward, we can achieve an even clearer picture. For instance, how much grain is actually being produced? We now have a relatively good grasp of this, thanks to measures such as setting low food rations, supplementing diets with vegetables, and carefully weighing and recording all grain entering storage. Nevertheless, there are still areas where we lack such clarity—for example, in Hebei Province, approximately ×× percent of counties, communes, and production teams remain poorly understood. Some localities are failing to adhere to provincial ration standards, overestimating consumption. Turning to urban industrial matters, our understanding here is closer to reality. Steel production has been set at ×××× million tons this year, while coal, timber, ore, and transportation requirements remain substantial. Coal quotas will need to be increased, as shortages already exist not only for winter heating but also for power generation. This year, our focus is on improving quality, specifications, and product variety. China’s steel output already ranks among the top in the world; quantity is not the main issue. Rather, the problem lies in inadequate quality. Therefore, we are not prioritizing further increases in tonnage this year.

As for the provincial party secretaries and standing committee members—including the first secretaries of prefectural party committees—are they truly grasping the situation? If they fail to do so, serious problems will arise. It is fair to say that progress has been made compared with the past, and steps are being taken. We should employ pilot projects to gain insight and investigate specific issues. Extensive surveys are not necessary; a single report from Tonghaikou nationwide would suffice, yet at present we have only that one document. Regarding the problems in Class III communes and production teams, we already possess the rectification experience documented in the Xinyang region. That alone provides sufficient guidance for addressing these issues. Additionally, a compelling report from Baoding in Hebei offers valuable lessons on when the “communist wind” arises, how to correct it, how to reorganize institutions, how to improve leadership, and how to achieve a great upsurge in production. Recently, positive developments have emerged in Henan, notably the Xinyang documents and Ji Dengkui’s report. I urge everyone, upon returning home, to set aside other tasks and, accompanied by one or two assistants, conduct field investigations of one or two communes or production teams. Similarly, in urban areas, thoroughly examine one or two factories and urban people’s communes.

How can a single provincial party secretary possibly oversee both rural and urban affairs? A dedicated assistant is essential to carry out separate investigations, ensuring that the secretary has a solid grasp of the situation. Without such clarity, effective action is impossible. In the past, during wartime, what provided that clarity? In the early stages of the Liberation War, the central leadership had limited direct command experience, yet two key approaches proved effective: first, drawing on the Shaanxi–Northwest campaign against Hu Zongnan; and second, relying on reports from various front-line regions starting in April and May of 1947. These constituted the “yang” aspect—practical, tangible information—while complementary intelligence gathered from multiple sources served as the “yin,” providing a comprehensive overview. Today, however, such intelligence is lacking. Bureaucrats have effectively sealed off information channels, leaving the central leadership with insufficient data.

When we go down to the grassroots level to conduct investigations and inspect work, we must use our eyes to observe, our ears to listen, our hands to feel, and our mouths to communicate, holding symposiums and discussions. We need to assess whether grain production has increased and whether supplies are adequate. Pay close attention to people’s appearances—do they look pale and emaciated? Such signs are readily apparent. The approach taken in Baoding involved convening symposiums with veteran farmers and cadres, engaging in dialogue with branch secretaries and primary-level leaders, and allowing the masses to voice their opinions. These insights are invaluable and cannot be bought with money.

For many years, this kind of investigative work has been neglected. Our comrades have failed to conduct proper investigations, lacking both a solid foundation and a clear understanding of the situation, instead relying on mere impressions and rough estimates. I urge all comrades to vigorously revive the practice of investigation and study, always proceeding from reality. Let us refrain from speaking or making decisions rashly without sufficient evidence. Undertaking such investigations is not particularly difficult: they do not require large teams or extended periods. In rural areas, one or two communes or production teams will suffice; in cities, one or two factories, schools, or stores—perhaps seven to ten locations in total—should provide a representative sample. Nor is it necessary for each person to personally lead every effort. One can take charge of a couple of sites oneself, while delegating others to team members under one’s supervision. The Baoding report was compiled by the Rural Work Department and represents a significant achievement; the Tonghaikou case involved personnel seconded directly by the provincial party committee; Ji Dengkui conducted his investigation in Lingbao County, and the Xinyang report stemmed from efforts led by the local prefectural party committee after the rectification campaign.

Investigation and study are of paramount importance and must be systematically taught. All provincial party secretaries, standing committee members, heads of various departments, and leaders at the prefectural, county, and commune levels should engage in such work. Failure to do so will result in a lack of clarity regarding the actual situation. Even the first secretary of a commune may not fully understand its internal structure; a single commune may comprise more than thirty production teams, yet the commune leadership needs only to distinguish between the good, average, and poor performers. To accomplish our tasks, we require three essential elements: clear situational awareness, firm resolve, and appropriate methods. Among these, clear understanding of the situation comes first—it forms the very foundation of all our work. Without it, nothing else can proceed. The bourgeoisie, too, emphasizes the importance of investigation and study. For example, U.S. spokesmen frequently claim that Ho Chi Minh’s forces have entered Laos, yet they never specify exactly which troops, officers, or branches of the military were involved. At least the bourgeoisie is honest enough to admit ignorance when it lacks concrete information. We, on the other hand, often make sweeping statements without any basis. Yet even the bourgeoisie can be reckless; one capitalist magazine once proposed a plan to destroy the Soviet Union and all socialist countries between 1951 and 1960.

At this conference, our understanding of the situation has gradually improved, and our resolve has grown stronger. However, the degree of resolve varies considerably. Some comrades argue that overcoming the “communist wind” requires a complete liquidation of debts, a proposition that sounds harsh but is, in essence, a call for genuine debt restructuring. They suggest dissolving all county- and commune-level organizations, then rebuilding from scratch on a clean slate. As Marxists-Leninists, we must strip the exploiters of their wealth, not the working people. This principle lies at the core of our ideology. The bourgeoisie and the landlord class impoverish the working masses through gradual, insidious means, whereas we tend to impose abrupt, sweeping changes. It was precisely this approach that led to the establishment of collective and state-owned economies. Unfortunately, our state-owned enterprises have become excessively profit-driven, aggressively purchasing agricultural products from rural areas at unfairly low prices, thereby depriving farmers of equitable compensation and severing the vital alliance between the working class and the peasantry. While this logic is easily understood and articulated, putting it into practice proves far more challenging. Whether all provincial party secretaries possess the requisite resolve to undertake such a comprehensive debt-clearance effort remains to be seen. Moreover, even within a single province, levels of commitment may differ significantly. Some leaders may demonstrate greater determination and succeed in rallying broad popular support, while others may fall short, yielding less satisfactory results. Within a single province, disparities among counties are equally pronounced, reflecting differences in local leadership. For example, in Class I counties, communes, and production teams—representing roughly 30 percent of the total—instances of the “communist wind” were swiftly curbed following the Zhengzhou Conference in 1959. These units recognized the illegitimacy of exploiting farmers and the impossibility of building socialism through coercive means. Consequently, they implemented thorough restitution measures and thereafter refrained from repeating such practices. Other areas, however, failed to act decisively, repeatedly succumbing to the “communist wind.” Last spring, due to incomplete information at the central level, we mistakenly believed the situation was not severe and thus did not take decisive action to rectify it. In retrospect, a special conference to address the “communist wind” should have been convened then. Instead, we lacked a clear understanding of the situation, focused on the wrong priorities, showed insufficient resolve, and employed inappropriate methods—none of which matched the approaches later adopted in Xinyang, Tonghaikou, Baoding, and Lingbao. This underscores the gravity of the issue: it constitutes a major struggle requiring practical engagement and resolute action to diagnose and resolve the underlying problems. Further efforts will be needed after the peak farming season, as many Class I and II communes and production teams still require sustained attention and decisive intervention to ensure lasting reform. In summary, during the War of Resistance and the Liberation War, our investigative work was characterized by seriousness, pragmatism, and a steadfast commitment to reality. Clear situational awareness, strong resolve, and appropriate methods combined to yield effective solutions. Conversely, without a sound policy framework, coupled with a lack of clarity, insufficient resolve, and improper tactics, our efforts would amount to zero. The Zhengzhou Conference rightly affirmed the principle of “neither leveling nor equalization,” endorsing the policy itself while rejecting the notion of non-accountability and non-restitution. Subsequently, the Eighteen Articles of the Shanghai Conference explicitly called for restitution, prompting me to review and approve reports detailing the experiences of Zhejiang and Macheng. In March and April of 1959, I authored over twenty thousand words on this subject. Looking back, I now recognize that mere verbal debates and theoretical discussions are of limited utility. When one side deliberately obstructs your access to accurate information, leaving you in the dark, what recourse remains? At that time, even comrades at the provincial and prefectural levels had yet to fully appreciate the pernicious nature of the “communist wind.” Some argued that the Zhengzhou Conference merely imposed authority rather than persuading minds, leaving a lingering ideological gap and resulting in insufficient resolve and inadequate follow-up.

Industrial operations have begun to reveal certain underlying realities, and this process must continue. We need to shorten the industrial front, particularly in heavy industry and infrastructure construction, while extending the agricultural front and promoting light industry. Beyond coal, mining, timber, and transportation, no new major infrastructure projects should be initiated. Existing initiatives may proceed where feasible, but others should be abandoned; let those that have gone awry remain as they are.

We are currently unable to formulate a long-term plan. Instead, we will focus on another decade—from 1960 to 1969—a period that constitutes a revolution. China has endured feudal rule for centuries, and the democratic revolution has likewise persisted for a considerable span. Without a victorious democratic revolution, there can be no socialism. Building socialism cannot be rushed; hasty, frenzied advances are counterproductive. Instead, progress should unfold in waves. Comrade Chen Boda has suggested that socialist development may follow cyclical patterns: periods of rapid growth interspersed with slower phases, akin to a military march punctuated by extended, intermediate, and brief rests. Balancing work and rest is crucial, and intervals of recuperation are necessary between successive campaigns. This working conference also embodied such a balance, producing few formal resolutions—after all, the Zhengzhou Conference yielded only a single resolution! Ultimately, success hinges on clear understanding, unwavering resolve, and appropriate methods.

Consider the following statistic: last year, West Germany’s steel output reached 3.4 million tons, the United Kingdom produced 2.4 million tons, and West Germany’s output increased by 15 percent compared with the previous year. France’s steel production stood at 1.7 million tons, while Japan’s reached 2.2 million tons. However, these nations have accumulated their production capacity over many decades, whereas we have only been engaged in this endeavor for a few years, yet we have already achieved ×××× million tons. Going forward, we should proceed cautiously and steadily over the next few years, consolidating our gains before scaling up again. Rather than setting overly ambitious targets, we should prioritize enhancing quality, allowing imperialist powers to claim that our Great Leap Forward has collapsed—an assertion that serves our interests better than chasing hollow prestige at the expense of real harm. We must improve quality, specifications, and product variety, elevate management standards, and boost labor productivity. Currently, our labor productivity remains extremely low. In 1957, our workforce numbered just over 24 million; today, it exceeds 50 million, yet we continue to disperse workers unnecessarily. Otherwise, five or six individuals might crowd around a single machine, with only one actually operating it while the others merely watch—such a scenario is untenable. Resolving this issue likewise demands clear situational awareness, strong resolve, and suitable methods.

Comrade Chen Boda once cited statistics indicating that one American farmer can sustain thirty people, a British farmer supports twenty-six, and a Soviet farmer sustains six, whereas in China, the figure stands at just three and a half. Some argue that we could potentially feed four people, but this depends on living conditions—if one consumes only a few taels of rice per day, such a scenario is simply unfeasible.

As for the international situation, I believe it remains favorable. Previously, we had resolved to brace ourselves and prepare for a prolonged confrontation spanning ten years. From the Tibetan unrest two years ago to the present, however, only slightly more than twenty months have passed. During this time, anti-China sentiment has markedly diminished, though it has not entirely disappeared and occasional cold currents still persist. Following the Moscow Conference, the atmosphere has improved somewhat.

This year marks a return to pragmatism. The principle of seeking truth from facts was first articulated by Ban Gu of the Han Dynasty in his historical work, the Book of Han, and has been passed down ever since. Our Party has long upheld this tradition, yet in recent years, our grasp of the actual situation has weakened, likely due to bureaucratic inertia and a growing disconnect from the grassroots. This year, we should visit one factory, one school, one store, one military unit, and one urban people’s commune to gain firsthand experience; otherwise, our work will lack authenticity. Following this conference, I intend to personally embark on a series of investigative missions. In conclusion, we are moving in the right direction, and this effort should involve everyone. Let us refrain from dwelling solely on others’ shortcomings. Every locality faces challenges, and when others take meaningful action, we should welcome and acknowledge their contributions.