--- Notes

Commentary on the Second Report of the Gansu Provincial Party Committee Concerning Implementation of the Central Emergency Directive Letter [1] (November 20, 1960) 1. It is worth reading; it should be read. Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript. 2. Comrade Chen Boda [2]: This document [3] is hereby submitted for your review; please return it after you have read it. Mao Zedong, 7:00 a.m. on November 20, printed from the manuscript. Notes [ ] refer to the CPC Central Committee’s Emergency Directive Letter of November 3, 1960, “On Current Policy Issues in Rural People’s Communes.” See note [1] on page [ ] of this volume. [2] Chen Boda was at that time an alternate member of the CPC Central Political Bureau, Director of the Central Political Research Office, Deputy Minister of the Central Rural Work Department, and Mao Zedong’s secretary.


[3] In its report dated November 5, 1960, addressed to the Central Committee and the Northwest Bureau, the CPC Gansu Provincial Committee stated that the province’s three-level cadres’ conference commenced on November 6. Building upon recognition of the achievements made since the Great Leap Forward, the conference conducted a serious examination of the provincial committee’s shortcomings and errors in implementing the central authorities’ policies and guidelines concerning rural people’s communes. According to materials disclosed during the first few days of the meeting, the “communist wind” characterized by equalization and arbitrary reallocation was quite widespread and severe throughout the province. At all levels—province, prefecture, county, and commune—as well as in various sectors including industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and the military, there was widespread equalization and reallocation of resources from communes and production teams. Of the province’s 560 communes, 29 percent were heavily affected by this “communist wind,” while only 1 percent had not been impacted. In areas where the “communist wind” blew most strongly, the initiative of grassroots cadres and the broad masses in production was severely undermined: draft animals and labor power declined markedly, cultivation became increasingly crude, sown acreage shrank, and yields fell, thereby seriously disrupting agricultural production. Compared with the “communist wind” of the winter of 1958, a salient feature of the recent wave has been the large-scale equalization and reallocation not only of production means and labor but also of some of the communes’ members’ living necessities—particularly during the extensive establishment of communal canteens, when considerable quantities of housing, cooking stoves, and utensils were requisitioned. The fundamental reason why the “communist wind” has once again swept through the region following last year’s reckoning lies in the ideological and cognitive deficiencies among cadres, especially in the provincial committee’s implementation of the central authorities’ policies and guidelines. During the discussions, participants examined four prevailing mentalities: (1) an impatience to rush ahead toward higher stages of development; (2) an inability to correctly grasp the relationship between policy and tasks; (3) the view that “left” is preferable to “right,” preferring to err on the side of the former; and (4) a mechanical, rote application and blind promotion or execution of policies. Following these deliberations, it was agreed that there is but one criterion for judging the correctness of any policy or guideline: the objective outcomes observed in social practice. The practice of whipping up the “communist wind” constitutes not merely methodological and stylistic errors but also a grave deviation in direction. The primary means of rectifying these errors, therefore, are to draw lessons from experience, to educate cadres, and to rigorously implement the central authorities’ policies and guidelines.