Commentary on the Report Concerning the Deployment of Cadres to the Grass-roots Level [1]
(November 15, 1960)
Sichuan
This piece was written on the first page of the report submitted on November 10, 1960, by the Central Five-Person Group for Streamlining Cadre Apparatus and Arranging the Labor Force, regarding the dispatch of 10,000 cadres from central government organs to the grassroots level. The report stated that various units under the central organs had demonstrated strong resolve and swift action in mobilizing these cadres to go to the countryside and the mountains to support agricultural production, thereby rapidly launching a mass movement. According to statistics as of November 9, a preliminary list of 10,176 cadres designated for deployment had been drawn up, accounting for 7.33 percent of all central government cadres. In carrying out this cadre deployment to rural areas, thorough and meticulous political and ideological work was conducted: the overall situation was extensively explained, the principle of agriculture as the foundation was vigorously propagated, and the masses were fully mobilized. On the basis of enhanced understanding, a wave of applications for deployment was set off, with most cadres willingly accepting the assignment and developing lofty aspirations to transform the rural landscape; even those who remained in their original posts benefited from this process. To ensure that the dispatched cadres were politically reliable, in good health, entirely voluntary in their decision, and able to play an effective role upon arrival in the countryside, it was planned that, after the official list was announced, a month would be set aside to organize these cadres for study of the central leadership’s policies and resolutions on rural work. At the same time, each individual would undergo another rigorous assessment and review; anyone found unsuitable would be promptly replaced, and those genuinely unwilling to go would not be forced. It was deemed preferable to send fewer cadres than to compromise on quality. As for the distribution of dispatched cadres, priority was given to strengthening rural areas, while appropriate consideration was also given to other grassroots units. The primary focus of deployment was on regions where agricultural production faced heavy tasks, numerous problems persisted, and the local ranks were seriously tainted. Following their departure, the Party organizations of the cadres’ original units were to maintain close contact with them. Generally, these cadres were expected to serve in the countryside for three years; however, a small number of regular staff members might be rotated according to work requirements. The Five-Person Group’s report emphasized the need for “thorough and meticulous political and ideological work, with extensive explanations of the current situation.” Under the words “extensive explanations of the current situation,” Mao Zedong added highlighting marks and penned a commentary, which constitutes the present text.

Premier:
In the course of explaining the generally favorable situation and studying policy guidelines, there should also be a period dedicated to thoroughly discussing the adverse conditions prevailing in one-third of the country—namely, the presence of counter-revolutionary elements in power, instances of assault and death, declining grain yields, widespread food shortages, the incomplete nature of the democratic revolution, the rampant influence of feudal forces that have grown increasingly hostile to socialism and are actively undermining both the socialist relations of production and the productive forces. Rural work is extremely arduous, requiring a firm will and an unwavering spirit unafraid of hardship; otherwise, it is not advisable to undertake such assignments. Please make your own judgment on this matter.
Mao Zedong
Morning of the 15th
The nation enjoys an overall favorable situation in two-thirds of its territory; yet a dire situation persists in the remaining one-third. Within five months, we must completely reverse this unfavorable state. The Communist Party must possess the capability to achieve such a transformation through five months of concerted effort, striving for a bumper harvest in agriculture in 1961, rectifying all wrongdoing, suppressing evil influences, and elevating righteous principles.