Conversation with Snow
(October 22, 1960)

Mao Zedong (hereafter referred to as Mao): What year did you leave Yan’an?

Snow (hereafter referred to as Snow): 1939. Generally speaking, I don’t have a very thorough understanding of the situation in the United States. I lived in China for twelve years, and during World War II, I served as a war correspondent in the Soviet Union and Europe. It was only in 1950 that I truly began living in the United States. During this period, America underwent tremendous changes. In terms of technology, these changes have been especially enormous.

Mao: We have significant shortcomings in our research on the United States. The Academy of Sciences should establish an institute, or at the very least a specialized group, to study American issues. There should be a dedicated team focusing on the United States, paying attention to the circumstances of all strata of American society. In addition to the upper levels, we must also take note of the opinions of the middle and lower strata, as you have mentioned.

Snow: Regarding the Taiwan issue, I wonder if the Chairman has seen the intense debate unfolding in the United States? It was a debate between Kennedy and Nixon on the issues of Matsu and Quemoy, as well as U.S. policy toward the Far East.

[Translator's Notes:]
Snow: Edgar Snow (1905–1972), American progressive writer and journalist. In 1936, he visited the revolutionary base in northern Shaanxi and met with Mao Zedong. In 1937, he published *Red Star Over China* (the Chinese translation, published by the Fushe Publishing House in 1938, was retitled *Journey to the West*). After the founding of the People's Republic of China, he visited China three times, in 1960, 1964, and 1970.
[2] Kennedy: John F. Kennedy (1917–1963), a Democrat, at that time a U.S. Senator and the Democratic presidential candidate.
[3] Nixon: Richard Nixon (1913–1994), a Republican, at that time Vice President of the United States and the Republican presidential candidate.

Conversation with Snow
In 1960, Mao Zedong signed an autograph for Snow when they met.

Mao: I’ve seen some of it.

Snow: They debated so fiercely that the names Matsu and Quemoy kept appearing in the newspapers. So someone made up a joke, saying that people had forgotten the names of the two presidential candidates—forgotten they were called Nixon and Kennedy—and thought they were named Matsu and Quemoy.

Mao: They’re using this issue in their election campaigns because Americans are afraid of war. These two islands are too close to the mainland, and Kennedy is exploiting this point to win votes.

Snow: But this also reflects a fact: on this issue, American public opinion is deeply divided. Generally speaking, people have been lukewarm about this election campaign, but this particular issue has aroused immense interest. Because many oppose the current U.S. policy, this is a real problem.

Mao: Nixon has his own ideas. He says these two islands absolutely must be defended. He too is trying to win votes. This issue has added some color to the American election. Nixon went too far in his statements; he spoke as if the U.S. government has an obligation to defend these two islands. The U.S. State Department said there is no such obligation. Whether to defend them or not depends on the situation, and must be decided by the President based on the circumstances at the time. That was the statement made by Eisenhower two years ago.

Snow: Someone raised this question: According to the U.S. Constitution, the new president elected in early November does not take office immediately but must wait until January of the following year. They asked, what if Kennedy is elected, but China moves to occupy Quemoy and Matsu on November 6th? What would happen then?

Mao: That’s how they framed the question?

Snow: Until January of the next year, Eisenhower would still be the president.

Mao: That’s not how we view these two islands. We have made public statements on this issue: we let Chiang Kai-shek hold onto these two islands. We also don’t cut off their supplies. If their supplies run short, we could even provide them with aid. What we want is the entire Taiwan region—Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, including Quemoy and Matsu—all of which are China’s territory. Regarding these two islands, since they are currently in Chiang Kai-shek’s hands, we can let him hold onto them. It seems the people in the U.S. election haven’t checked this information.

Snow: Very likely.

Mao: What is there to argue about on this issue? What we want isn’t just the two islands of Quemoy and Matsu, but the entirety of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. This issue may drag on for a very long time. It has already dragged on for eleven years; maybe another two times eleven years, or even longer, is possible. Because the U.S. government is unwilling to give up Taiwan. Since it’s unwilling to give it up, we won’t attack either. We negotiated with it—first in Geneva, later in Warsaw. As long as it stays in Taiwan, we won’t strike. We want to resolve this through negotiation, not by force. This principle has long been known to the U.S. government. We’re not attacking Quemoy and Matsu either; we’ve made public statements on that before. Therefore, there is no danger of war. The U.S. can rest assured and continue its occupation of Taiwan.

Conversation with Snow
It’s already been eleven years this year. Another eleven, then another eleven—wouldn’t that make thirty-three years? Perhaps in the thirty-second year, the United States will give up Taiwan.

Snow: I suppose the Chairman is waiting until all of Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers have become three-legged men.

Mao: The main issue is the U.S. government, not Chiang Kai-shek or anyone else. Even if Chiang Kai-shek’s people become three-legged, there will still be people in Taiwan, still people with two legs. People can always be found.

Snow: Does the Chairman truly believe that the U.S. position will require another eleven, or even twenty-two years, to change? The situation in the United States is developing very rapidly now, and when change comes, it could happen very fast. Such changes are, of course, linked to external factors. In any case, the situation will change.

Mao: Perhaps. In your articles, there’s a point you made—that our interest in U.S. recognition of China is smaller than our interest in entering the United Nations, as if our desire to join the U.N. is greater. I don’t see it that way; it cannot be put like that. In the United Nations, it is not right for Chiang Kai-shek to represent China. We should represent it, and this should have been the case long ago. However, the U.S. government has organized a majority of countries to keep us out. This is not necessarily a bad thing. We are not in a hurry to enter the United Nations. The ones eager for us to join are other countries, certainly not including the United States. The U.K. now has to follow America’s line. But the U.K.’s original intention might be just as you said—that if we are lawless outside the U.N., it might be better to bring us into the organization to make us abide by the rules. Quite a few countries hope China will behave more properly. You know, we’ve fought as guerrillas and grown accustomed to the wild. So many rules are hard to bear, aren’t they? What losses could we suffer from not joining the United Nations? None. What benefits are there to joining the U.N.? Of course, there are some benefits, but to claim there are many would not be accurate. Some countries scramble eagerly to get into the U.N.; we don’t quite understand that sentiment. Our country itself is like a “United Nations”; one of our provinces is larger than some entire nations.

Snow: I often say the same thing.

Mao: The economic blockade they’ve imposed on us is just like the economic blockade imposed by the Kuomintang back then. We were very grateful to the Kuomintang for their economic blockade. It left us with no choice but to fend for ourselves, which forced each of our base areas to engage in production. In 1937, 1938, and 1939, the Kuomintang still paid us stipends, but starting in 1940, they imposed a blockade. We must thank them; they made us produce on our own, free from dependence on them. Now the United States is also blockading us, and this blockade is beneficial to us.

Snow: I remember in 1939, the Chairman told me: We have eight points for which we must thank the Kuomintang. One point was that because the Communist Party was developing too slowly, the Kuomintang imposed an economic blockade, forcing us to develop faster. Another point was that because our Party’s army lacked enough new recruits, Chiang Kai-shek threw more people into prisons, and so on. Later, the Chairman’s points all proved correct. In fact, the more the people are oppressed, the faster their strength grows.

In 1960, Mao Zedong met with Snow. In the center is Ma Haide.

Conversation with Snow
Mao: That’s exactly the principle.

Snow: In one of your articles, you said: The law of imperialism is to oppose the efforts of colonial peoples to strive for freedom—to make trouble, fail, make trouble again, and fail again. Their blockade of China has definitely failed. But this hasn’t made them abandon that mindset. Now they are plotting an economic blockade against Cuba. I believe this too will fail. It’s hard to understand what outcome they hope to achieve from it, but it seems they still intend to impose an embargo on Cuba.

Mao: Right now, it’s only a partial embargo, which won’t have much impact on Cuba. It could potentially escalate to a full embargo, which would have a more significant effect. But even if they try to strangle Cuba completely, it’s impossible—Cuba has ways out. In any case, Cuba’s current situation is better than ours in Yan’an back then.

Snow: In your lifetime, as you observed the fate of the Chinese revolution, which period felt the darkest to you?

Mao: We did have such times. For example, when we lost battles, we were naturally unhappy. We did lose battles. During the Long March, as our numbers dwindled, we were unhappy then as well. But overall, we felt there was hope, no matter how difficult things became. The main difficulties at that time were not external, but internal. Zhang Guotao creating a split was the greatest difficulty of all. Yet we overcame that difficulty too. Through appropriate policies, we won over the troops led by Zhang Guotao. By the time you arrived, we had already reunited. The forces commanded by He Long were on our side.

Snow: How much time each year does the Chairman spend in Beijing, and which places outside Beijing have you visited?

Mao: I spend at most four months a year in Beijing. There are many places I still haven’t been to. You went to Xi’an; I haven’t been there. Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, Yunnan, Guizhou—I’ve been to none of them. Wherever I go, I like to take a look around and talk with workers, peasants, and cadres.

Snow: What are the chances of the Chairman visiting the United States?

Mao: (To Ma Haide) You people in medicine ought to invent a way to extend one’s lifespan. I’m sixty-seven this year. If you could extend my life to ninety-seven, then I’d have hope of visiting the United States.

Snow: I believe the Chairman wouldn’t have to wait until ninety-seven to visit the United States.

Mao: Maybe I’m wrong, and you’re right. I hope I’m mistaken on this point. It’s very hard to predict things in advance. I didn’t imagine that after victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, the War of Liberation would take only four years to win. At the beginning of that war, we only spoke of a protracted war, of its long-term nature, and dared not propose how many years it would take. After fighting for two years, we were confident that the War of Liberation could be won in five years—counting from July 1946. In the end, we won in three years.

Snow: I remember back in Bao’an, I once asked the Chairman how many years it would take for the revolution to achieve victory.

[Translator's Notes:]
[1] He Long and Ren Bishi led the Second and Sixth Army Corps through the Long March. In July 1936, they joined forces with the Fourth Front Army at Ganzi. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission ordered the Second and Sixth Army Corps, together with the Thirty-Second Army, to be reorganized into the Second Front Army, with He Long as general commander and Ren Bishi as political commissar.
[2] Ma Haide (George Hatem, 1910–1988), of Lebanese origin, born in the United States, came to China in 1933 to engage in medical work. In 1936, he arrived at the revolutionary base in northern Shaanxi. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, he served as an advisor to the Ministry of Health.
[3] Bao’an: present-day Zhidan County.

Conversation with Snow

Mao: At that time, there was no War of Resistance against Japan yet.

Snow: I asked: two years? At that time, the Chairman smiled. Then I asked again: five years? Ten years? At that time, the Chairman said at least ten years. I felt at the time that this meant victory would never be achieved.

Mao: You were too impatient. In the end, it took us over twelve years.

China’s past semi-colonial, semi-feudal situation was truly unbearable. We had no industry of our own, we had to import grain, we had to import cotton, and we had to import industrial goods. Seventy percent of the people were very poor—that is, the workers, poor peasants, and hired farmhands. The revolution mainly relied on these people. Another twenty percent were the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the middle peasants and well-to-do middle peasants in the countryside. The remaining ten percent or so were landlords, rich peasants, the urban bourgeoisie, and intellectuals. It was mainly this group that had education in China. About another ten percent or so of the people were literate—the upper petty bourgeoisie and the well-to-do middle peasants. Eighty percent of the people were illiterate in the past. Of course, illiteracy does not mean having no culture. Some of them could make very fine handicrafts. The carvings in this room were probably all done by people who could not read.

Snow: Right, illiteracy does not mean having no culture. I think this is the reason why China has been able to raise the cultural level nationwide so rapidly in just a short decade. Since I returned to China, I have found it impossible to distinguish between peasants, workers, city dwellers, students, and people of so-called bourgeois origin.

Mao: Distinctions still exist. One can only say there has been some change, and living standards have improved somewhat, but there has been no fundamental change yet. I don’t know about the situation of Americans, but Europeans eat dozens of kilograms of meat per person each year. The Chinese basically eat a vegetarian diet; they also eat some meat, but not much. To change this situation will take at least several decades. If it can be changed within this century—that is, within the next forty years—that would be very good. If we add the past ten years, that makes fifty years, half a century. It’s hard to go faster than that.

Snow: What the Chairman just said happens to answer a question I wanted to ask. The changes you have made in the past ten years are extremely great. At the current pace of development, perhaps it won’t take that long. Perhaps I am once again overly optimistic in my time calculations. So I wanted to ask: how much time does the Chairman think China will need to reach the current level of the United States in terms of average annual per capita income? The current average annual per capita income in the United States is two thousand U.S. dollars, which is roughly five thousand Renminbi.

Mao: That is hard to calculate. Whether half a century will be enough, I still cannot answer now. The United States has been independent for 185 years, and its construction took 185 years. Aside from the War of Independence[1], the anti-British war, and the Civil War[2] fought to emancipate the black slaves, you haven’t experienced any wars domestically. Your location is particularly good, the climate and geographical conditions are very good, and two oceans protect you. But the main condition is that you drove out the British colonizers over 170 years ago. There is another condition, too: you did not have a feudal landlord ownership system domestically.

Snow: For the past ten years, you have been living amidst tremendous changes. You feel all this is very natural and do not perceive your own pace of development. My situation is different. After I left China in the 1940s, I have now returned, and to me, these changes are astonishing. When writing my reports, unless I include a lot of background material, it will be hard to make people believe what I have seen.

Mao: There have been some changes, but no fundamental changes yet. China’s changes are mainly in the realm of revolution; in that respect, there has been a fundamental change. As for construction, it has only just begun now. If you describe things as miraculous, people won’t believe you, because it wouldn’t match the facts. For example, I saw some foreign newspapers saying that there are now no flies and no mosquitoes in China. That does not match the facts. So, saying there have been some changes is correct; saying there has been a fundamental change does not conform to the facts. When you say people’s spiritual outlook has changed, that conforms to the facts. The result of revolutionary work has been to liberate people. As for the second revolution, that is, the industrial revolution or economic revolution, the past ten years have been only the beginning.

Our basic situation is one of "poverty and blankness." By poverty, we mean a low standard of living. Why is the standard of living low? Because the level of productive forces is low. What are productive forces? Apart from human labor, there are machines. Both industry and agriculture must be mechanized and must develop simultaneously. By "blankness," we mean that illiteracy has not yet been completely eliminated—not just the issue of literacy, but also the issue of raising scientific levels. There are many scientific projects we have not yet started working on. Therefore, we say we are a country of "poverty and blankness." But compared to the period of Chiang Kai-shek’s rule, we have taken a step forward. Things are better than during Chiang Kai-shek’s time, but the problems have not yet been solved. How much more time is needed? It will take several more five-year plans to basically solve the problems of mechanization and the expansion of industry and agriculture. So, we say China has made progress and some initial achievements, but it has not yet fundamentally changed China’s economic face. Fundamentally changing China’s economic face requires a very long time.

Snow: I’d like to ask another question. In another ten to twenty years, you will reach the goal of industrialization. By that time, due to the widespread application of atomic energy and electronics, the world’s economic foundation will have undergone great changes. Of course, by then, or possibly much earlier than that, China will also have atomic energy. Some Americans believe that China obtaining atomic energy is a matter of the distant future. On the other hand, they also fear that once China has an atomic bomb, it would immediately use it irresponsibly.

Mao: That won’t happen. How can atomic bombs be tossed around recklessly? Even if we had them, we couldn’t toss them around recklessly; doing so would be a crime.

Snow: Although there are currently no peace treaties or agreements between China and the United States, and although some Americans believe the United States and China are actually in a state of semi-war, the peace of the entire world depends daily on China’s sense of responsibility. This sense of responsibility is first and foremost to the Chinese people, and secondly to the whole world, of which China is a part. Do you agree with this formulation?

Mao: Yes. Whether the United States recognizes us or not, whether we enter the United Nations or not, we must shoulder the responsibility for world peace. We will not act lawlessly just because we are not in the United Nations, like the Monkey King wreaking havoc in the Heavenly Palace. We want to maintain world peace and not fight a world war. We advocate that nations should not use war to settle problems between them. But maintaining world peace is not only China’s responsibility; the United States also has a responsibility. Solving the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair—on this point we must insist. Nevertheless, we will not fight. The Americans are there—would we go and attack? We will not attack. After the Americans leave, are we certain to attack? That’s also not certain. We want to solve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means. Many places in our country were resolved by peaceful means. Beijing was resolved by peaceful means, and so were Hunan, Yunnan, and Xinjiang. There is a saying outside that among all the Communist Parties, the Chinese Communist Party is particularly mischievous, doesn’t follow rules, doesn’t reason, and acts recklessly. You’ve been here for a few months; you can’t believe all of that. You mentioned that some people outside say China is a huge military camp and a huge prison. Speaking of Chiang Kai-shek’s China that way, it indeed resembled that—at that time, Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai were indeed military camps. After liberation, through reform and education, China is vastly different.

Snow: I can indeed say that my impression is that China is now vastly different from the past.