Come to Beijing to negotiate. The conditions we proposed were the same as those France is currently offering you—complete disarmament and surrender. Since he refused to accept these terms, we crossed the Yangtze River and liberated mainland China. Therefore, we must find ways to severely weaken de Gaulle and force him to sit down at the negotiating table.

(III) We fought for twenty-two years and once suffered a major defeat, during which our army of 300,000 was reduced to just over 20,000. However, we eventually turned things around, primarily due to a shift in policy. In fact, what we waged was less a military war than a political one. Hence, paying close attention to policy matters is essential. The key lies in how to unite our own forces, win over the majority, and disintegrate the enemy. In the past, our scope of repression never exceeded 5%, usually staying below 8%. During the eight-year war against Japan, we captured Japanese soldiers but killed none of them. On the contrary, we neither mistreated nor humiliated them, nor did we take their belongings; instead, we focused on educating them. I suggest that your own scope of repression should also be kept relatively narrow—around 5% to 10%, whether targeting French or Algerian nationals. We had traitors among us in China, and you have collaborators here as well. Collaborators come in different degrees: some are deeply guilty, others less so, and distinctions must be made. Only a very small number should be executed; some can be sentenced to forced labor. As for the French prisoners we capture, extensive ideological work should be carried out on them. Each year, we might apprehend several hundred or even thousands. Those who have been properly educated would be released, while those who remain unreformed would stay for further education before being gradually sent back. Of course, some of those released might return to fight again, only to be recaptured and reintegrated into the cycle of education and release. Over time, this builds trust, and when they return to the battlefield, they will lay down their arms. By adopting such an approach, we broaden our base of support while narrowing the circle of those targeted, thereby increasing the number of people sympathetic to our cause. It is also crucial to provide long-term, regular education to lower-level cadres, helping them fully grasp the importance of winning over the majority and dismantling the enemy.

As for China’s experience, which aspects may be applicable to you and which may not, that depends entirely on your own assessment. You possess your own unique circumstances, and we certainly do not wish for you to simply copy our methods.

--- Notes

Photo courtesy of the archives
On September 30, 1960, Mao Zedong met with Ferhat Abbas, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.