Comments on the Issuance of the Summary Report on China’s Participation in the East Pakistan International Industrial Exhibition (June 4, 1960) Comrade Shangkun [1]: Please circulate this document [2] to all comrades attending the June meeting in Shanghai [3] for their review. Mao Zedong June 4 Based on the manuscript. Notes [1] Shangkun refers to Yang Shangkun, who at that time served as an alternate member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee. [2] This refers to a report dated May 14, 1960, from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade, and the State Commission for Foreign Cultural Relations. The report stated that over a period of fifty-three days, 750,000 people visited China’s industrial exhibition hall in East Pakistan. The exhibition had a profound impact in East Pakistan. Our experiences in organizing the exhibition were as follows: First, in countries like Pakistan that are members of military alliance blocs, although imperialism and its ruling-class reactionaries continuously engage in anti-communist and anti-Chinese propaganda, the vast majority of the population in such countries either supports China or is not hostile toward it. The broad masses in East Pakistan showed warm and friendly feelings toward China. Second, while some people in East Pakistan had been misled by imperialist propaganda and held skeptical views about China, their perceptions changed significantly after visiting our exhibition. This demonstrates that we should skillfully seize opportunities to actively and realistically publicize China’s achievements in all fields.

Third, the successes of China’s Great Leap Forward not only influenced the Pakistani people but also had a certain impact on their ruling class. Among the middle and upper strata of the national bourgeoisie, many came to admire China’s remarkable achievements attained within a short span of time. Fourth, from the perspective of publicity effects, industrial and agricultural exhibitions of this kind constitute a very powerful means of propaganda. Their distinctive feature lies in their ability to reach out widely to the general public; through the direct viewing of physical exhibits, they are easily understood and accepted by the masses. [3] Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to be held in Shanghai. This meeting took place from June 14 to 18, 1960. 1£¹

Comments on Huan Xiang’s Analysis and Prospects Regarding the International Situation Following the Collapse of the Four-Power Summit Meeting [1] (June 7, 1960) Circulate this to all comrades attending the Shanghai meeting [2]. This document presents a very good analysis. Mao Zedong June 7 Based on the manuscript. Notes [1] In a telegram dated May 28, 1960, Huan Xiang, China’s chargé d’affaires in the United Kingdom, provided an analysis and outlook on the international situation following the failure of the summit meeting among the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The main points were as follows: (1) From the U.S. aircraft’s intrusion into Soviet airspace to the collapse of the Paris four-power summit, nineteen days of tortuous and intense struggle thoroughly exposed the falsehood that “Eisenhower is the ‘Grandpa of Peace,’” and profoundly criticized the erroneous policy that had prevailed internationally over the past year—namely, harboring illusions about Western imperialism and abandoning the struggle. This constituted an extremely powerful and vivid lesson for peace-loving people worldwide and served as a great encouragement for the anti-imperialist and anti-American struggle. (2) Over these nineteen days, the Soviet Union’s policy toward U.S. imperialism gradually shifted from mere conciliation and appeasement to resolute exposure and firm confrontation, primarily due to the U.S. side’s increasingly brazen and aggressive advances. (3) After the summit was adjourned, Khrushchev’s stance suddenly softened again. Judging from this situation, the shift in the Soviet Union’s strategy was mainly a logical outcome of the spy-plane incident itself, rather than the result of a truly comprehensive and profound new understanding of fundamental issues such as the nature of imperialism, war, and peace. Therefore, oscillations and hesitations are unlikely to be completely eliminated for the time being. However, there remains the possibility of a gradual transition. (4) This struggle greatly discredited the United States on the global stage, further undermining its leadership position within the Western camp, exacerbating contradictions among imperialist powers, and causing turmoil and discord within the Western camp. (5) The Soviet Union’s actions also intensified internal confusion and strife among imperialist states. (6) The West is deeply fearful that the impact of this struggle will further strengthen solidarity within the socialist camp, particularly between China and the Soviet Union, and is therefore focusing the spearhead of the Cold War on China, with the primary objective of intensifying efforts to sow discord between China and the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, we must handle matters concerning Sino-Soviet relations with utmost prudence. [2] Refers to the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to be held in Shanghai. This meeting took place from June 14 to 18, 1960.