Contents of the Five Materials on U.S. Policy Toward China》
3 materials. Among them, the 5 materials on U.S. policy toward China recently published by the United States, as mentioned in the 3rd material, are respectively: (1) The Conlon Report drafted by the Conlon Associates, which is composed of 31 organizations from California. Its main content is to recommend that the U.S. government change its "policy of isolation and containment" toward China, and use a phased method of "exploration and negotiation" to push forward the "two Chinas" conspiracy. (2) The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Committee report. It advocates, for long-term considerations, continuing to adopt a "policy of strength" toward China and carrying on the Cold War. (3) The Johns Hopkins University report. It mainly proposes policies toward China and the Soviet Union from the perspective of the United States' currently declining military position. (4) The Council on Foreign Relations report. It advocates using military force to support foreign policy and continuing to strengthen the Cold War. (5) The talk given by American journalist Snow at a press conference in Tokyo on November 4, 1959. It advocates direct negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to resolve the Taiwan issue.
[4]
This annotation was written next to the title of the material "Certain New Trends in U.S. Policy Toward China After the Soviet-U.S. Talks." This material points out that some new postures have recently appeared in U.S. policy toward China, such as the resumption of the Warsaw talks, the U.S. State Department's three consecutive statements relaxing restrictions on journalists visiting China, and especially the "neutral" attitude recently shown by U.S. Secretary of State Herter on the Sino-Indian border issue, all of which are considered signs of a possible change in U.S. policy toward China. U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek personnel have the following reactions to this new trend from the United States:
(1) U.S. Congressman Zhou Yide believes that for the United States to achieve disarmament, it is imperative to deal with the Chinese Communist Party. (2) The leader of the U.S. Mormon Church, David O. McKay, believes that the United States must pay more attention to China's development under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas also said that if the United States wants to understand the situation in China, "the best way is to go in and deal directly with the Chinese Communist Party." (3) The director of the political section of the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong, Richard L. Sneider, believes that U.S. industrialists and businessmen have a long history of trade with China, and are therefore quite interested in the Chinese market. (4) Former key military and political figures of the Kuomintang government, Li Zongren and Zhang Fakui, believe that both the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States want to win next year's general election by using the peace-seeking method of dealing with Beijing. According to analysis, the main intention of the above series of statements by the United States is: to seize the banner of peace internationally, win over nationalist countries, and continue to push forward its "two Chinas" conspiracy. But it also contains an attempt to leave a way out for expanding contact with China. It is estimated that in the future, the United States may extend more feelers to us, and even use the Warsaw negotiations to conduct some new probes toward us.
[5]
This annotation was written next to the title of the material "The United States Strives to Belittle the International Status of the Chiang Gang and Tighten Economic Control over Taiwan." This material says that in order to push forward the "two Chinas" conspiracy, the United States is strengthening its control over the Chiang gang from diplomatic, economic, and other aspects, and the contradictions between the U.S. and Chiang are deepening daily. The specific manifestations are: (1) The United States strives to belittle the international status of the Chiang gang, to make Taiwan a "small China." Its methods are: (1) Publicly propagating that Taiwan is an independent political unit. (2) Gradually weakening the representative status of the Chiang gang in the United Nations and other international organizations. (3) Secretly instigating its allies to show indifference to Chiang. The Chiang gang strongly resists the above-mentioned U.S. methods: (1) Repeatedly declaring that Taiwan and the mainland are one entity and cannot be separated. (2) Vigorously increasing the number of personnel stationed at the United Nations and trying to restore membership in other international organizations. Next to this point, Mao Zedong wrote an annotation, which is Part Five of this collection. (3) Strengthening overseas missions to stabilize foreign relations. (2) The United States is tightening its economic weakening of the Chiang gang in order to achieve the goal of complete control. The specific methods are: (1) Reducing U.S. aid. (2) Deliberately getting rid of the Chiang gang's public enterprises. (3) Actively fostering local capital in Taiwan. In response, the Chiang gang's countermeasures are: (1) Striving to reduce reliance on U.S. aid. (2) Restricting the infiltration of U.S. capital. (3) Vigorously excluding and striking at local capital. Regarding these 3 countermeasures, Mao Zedong wrote an annotation, which is Part Six of this collection.

Annotation on Circulating the Material 〈How the Foreign Bourgeoisie Discusses the Sino-Soviet Split〉[1]
(January 12, 1960)
Circulate to all comrades[2] for reading and study. There are many wonderful passages in it.
Mao Zedong
January 12th
[1]
This material was published in an internal document compiled and printed on January 9, 1960. It mainly excerpts reports and commentaries from foreign bourgeois newspapers and periodicals over the past year or so concerning the issue of Sino-Soviet relations, summarized into 16 questions. Under the titles of the following questions, Mao Zedong added emphasis marks respectively: One, The Soviet Union fears war, emphasizes détente, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence; China does not fear tension, "does not renounce armed resistance," and opposes "pacifism." Two, The Soviet Union believes "the U.S. government, like its people, desires peace," and adopts a pro-U.S. policy; China "does not trust the United States" and persists in an anti-U.S. policy. Four, The Soviet Union advocates "luring" nationalist countries to "spontaneously move toward socialism" and "refuses to fan the flames of anti-imperialism"; China wants to unite anti-imperialist forces to strike at the United States, supports national liberation movements, and advocates launching revolutionary struggles. Nine, China persists in criticizing modern revisionism, Khrushchev believes there is no need to "swat flies." Eleven, The Soviet Union feels "anxious" about China's Great Leap Forward. Twelve, The people's communes are "a challenge to Soviet leadership."
[2]
Refers to the comrades who were then attending the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in Shanghai.

A Passage Asking Wu Xiuquan to Have the Soviet Ambassador to China Relay to Khrushchev[1]
(January 13, 1960)
Thank you for your letter of January 8, 1960, notifying us that the Soviet Union is preparing to unilaterally announce a reduction of one million two hundred thousand personnel from the Soviet armed forces within the next one and a half to two years. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China supports this step taken by the Soviet Union, which is beneficial to the struggle for world peace and against the imperialist arms expansion and war preparations. We also agree with the assessment in your letter that the imperialist camp is still far from abandoning its frenzied conspiracy to launch a war against the socialist countries, and therefore it is necessary to continue to vigorously strengthen the defense of the socialist camp, expose the war conspiracies of imperialism, educate the peoples of all socialist countries with high vigilance, and consolidate and develop the fraternal cooperation among all socialist countries.
January 13, 1960
[1]
This passage is excerpted from the transcript of a conversation between Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xiuquan and the Soviet Ambassador to China on the evening of January 13, 1960. The transcript also contains the following passage: "I have already delivered Comrade Khrushchev's letter to Chairman Mao Zedong. Chairman Mao just instructed me by telephone to tell the following passage to Comrade Ambassador, and I ask you to relay it to Comrade Khrushchev immediately." Khrushchev was then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.