Yesterday morning, referring to the document titled “How Marxists Should Approach Revolutionary Mass Movements,” I remarked: “I don’t know which scholar-comrade drafted it, but he seems to have assembled a few machine guns and several mortars and unleashed a torrent of rapid-fire salvos against our rightist comrades at the Lushan Conference.” This question was clarified last night. It was not a Lushan-based comrade who produced it, but rather Comrade ××× in Beijing, together with two assistants, acting out of great zeal and high resolve. The struggle that has erupted at Lushan is a class struggle—a continuation of the life-and-death confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat that has characterized the past decade of socialist revolution. In China, within our Party, such struggles appear destined to persist for at least another twenty years, perhaps even half a century; only when classes are completely abolished will they come to an end. As one set of social conflicts subsides, new ones arises. In short, according to the materialist dialectic, contradiction and struggle are eternal; otherwise, there would be no world. Bourgeois politicians are quite correct when they say that the Communist Party’s philosophy is the philosophy of struggle. The forms that struggle takes, however, vary from one era to another. At present, although the socio-economic system has changed, the reactionary ideas—namely bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologies—that remain entrenched in the minds of a considerable segment of the population cannot be transformed overnight. Transformation requires time, and indeed a long time. Such is the nature of class struggle in society.

It is hardly surprising that intra-Party struggles reflect class conflict in society; the absence of such struggles would be inconceivable. In the past, this point was not fully elucidated, leaving many comrades unclear about it. Consequently, whenever problems arose—such as the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi affair in 1953 or the current cases involving Peng Dehuai, Huang Kecheng, Zhou Xiaozhou, and Zhang Wentian—many were taken aback. This reaction is understandable, since social contradictions tend to emerge gradually, from latent to overt. A deeper understanding of class struggle in the socialist era can only develop through personal experience and practical engagement. Particularly intricate and complex are certain intra-Party struggles, like those involving Gao, Rao, Peng, and Huang. One day they are hailed as “meritorious figures”; the next, they are branded as ringleaders of trouble. “How could this have happened? Could there have been a mistake?” Given people’s lack of awareness of these individuals’ historical trajectories and the complexities and twists and turns of their paths, such bewilderment is entirely natural. We must systematically and accurately explain to our comrades the multifaceted and convoluted nature of these processes. Moreover, when handling such matters, we must avoid simplistic approaches and refrain from treating them as enemy–friend contradictions. Instead, they should be managed as internal contradictions among the people. Policies such as “unity–criticism–unity,” “learn from past mistakes to prevent future ones; cure the sickness to save the patient,” “be strict in criticism but lenient in punishment,” and “first observe, then assist” ought to be employed. Not only should these comrades be retained within the Party, but they should also be kept on provincial committees and the Central Committee; some may even remain in the Politburo. Does this pose a danger? It possibly does. Yet by adopting the proper policies, we can avert it. Their errors fall into just two categories: either they can be corrected, or they cannot. The conditions for correction are entirely adequate. First, all human beings possess a dual nature—both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary elements. To this day, they differ fundamentally from traitors like Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Guotao, and Gao Gang: the former represent internal contradictions within the people, while the latter constitute enemy–friend contradictions. Internal contradictions may escalate into enemy–friend conflicts if the attitudes and policies adopted by both sides are inappropriate; conversely, they can be thoroughly resolved as internal contradictions throughout, provided we address them promptly and appropriately. The following factors are crucial: the oversight exercised by the entire Party and the broad masses, coupled with the significantly heightened political maturity of cadres at both central and local levels compared with the period of the Gao–Rao incident in 1953. Is not the successful struggle waged at the Lushan Conference itself compelling evidence of this? Furthermore, our attitude toward and policy regarding these comrades must be genuinely Marxist and attuned to the specific circumstances—and we already possess such an approach. The possibility of failure to correct their course also exists: they might simply continue to stir up trouble and bring about their own downfall. But even that would not be catastrophic. What harm could it do to add a few more members to the ranks of Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanglong, Zhang Guotao, and Gao Gang? Nevertheless, we remain confident that, with the exception of an extremely small minority akin to Chen, Luo, Zhang, and Gao, all other erring comrades, given sufficient time and under appropriate conditions, will ultimately be able to reform. We must maintain firm conviction in this belief. The Party’s thirty-eight-year history provides ample evidence to support it, as everyone knows. To help these comrades rectify their mistakes, we must continue to regard them as comrades—treating them as brothers—and extend to them heartfelt assistance, granting them both the time needed to correct their errors and avenues for continuing their revolutionary work. We must leave room for maneuver. There must be warmth, there must be spring; we cannot remain forever trapped in winter. In my view, these are matters of paramount importance.