I have received a letter, which is a representative document. The author of the letter has gathered some materials in our economic work, materials that pertain exclusively to shortcomings. The author is interested only in materials of this aspect; as for materials of another aspect, those pertaining to achievements, it can be said that he takes no interest whatsoever. He holds that since the fourth quarter of 1958, shortcomings and mistakes have been the main current in the Party’s work. He therefore draws the conclusion that the Party has committed the errors of “Left adventurism” and “opportunism,” and that the root cause lies in the fact that the 1957 Rectification and Anti-Rightist struggle did not “simultaneously” oppose the danger of Left adventurism. The basic viewpoint of Comrade Li Yunzhong (he is a deputy director of the State Planning Commission, recently transferred to serve as head of the Comprehensive Group of the General Office of the Northeast Cooperative Zone Committee) is erroneous. He virtually negates everything. He holds that the great smelting of steel by tens of millions of people going into battle caused enormous losses with no benefit whatsoever, that the people’s communes are also mistaken, is extremely pessimistic about capital construction, and, mentioning water conservancy in agriculture, holds that the Party’s errors of “Left adventurism and opportunism” were caused by undertaking water conservancy projects, and he has no favorable assessment of the great water conservancy campaigns carried out by several hundred million peasants under the Party’s leadership in the winter of the year before last and the spring of last year. He is a proponent of the “loss outweighs gain” theory, and in some places is practically a proponent of the “all loss and no gain” theory. These conclusive views of the author are placed in the first paragraph, taking up little space. This comrade’s merit is that he lays his thoughts completely bare. He is vastly different from some other comrades we have seen, who are basically not pleased but dissatisfied with the work of the Party and the people, who estimate achievements very insufficiently and shortcomings excessively, who are intimidated by the present difficulties, who deflate rather than encourage the cadres, who lack confidence or even lose confidence in the future, but are unwilling to speak out their thoughts and views, or speak a little and hold back a little, adopting an evasive and hesitant attitude of “feet about to advance but faltering, mouth about to open but stammering.” Comrade Li Yunzhong is different from these people; he does not conceal his political views. He wrote a letter full of fervor to comrades in the Central Committee, hoping the Central Committee would adopt steps to overcome the present difficulties. He believes the difficulties can be overcome, though it will take a somewhat longer time—these views are correct. The author’s criticism of shortcomings in planning work occupies the greater part of the letter, and I consider it very pertinent. In ten years, there has not yet been a comrade willing and daring to pertinently, analytically, and systematically expose the shortcomings in our planning work to the Central Committee, and thereby seek correction. I have not seen such a person. I know such people exist, but they simply dare not bypass their offices to appeal to higher levels. I therefore suggest that this letter be circulated for reading and debated within Party organizations at both the central level and the local level (provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions), especially within planning organs, and that a correct analysis be made of the merits and demerits, the gains and losses, of the work each has done in the two years 1958 and 1959, so as to facilitate unifying understanding, uniting comrades, improving work, rousing full vigor, advancing courageously, and striving for new great victories in economic work and other work (political work, military work, cultural, educational, and health work, the leadership work of Party organizations at all levels, and work among workers, youth, and women). Since the First Zhengzhou Conference in November last year up to the present Lushan Conference, the Party Central Committee has, under the condition of sufficiently estimating achievements (achievements are primary, shortcomings are secondary), conducted serious criticism of the errors and shortcomings in various major tasks under its leadership. This critical work has now been going on for nine months. It must be seen that this criticism was absolutely necessary and has been rapidly and progressively effective; it must also be seen that this serious and earnest criticism has inevitably brought, and has already brought, certain side effects, namely, deflation for some comrades. Errors must be criticized, and deflation must be prevented. Morale can be roused but not deflated. A person without morale—I do not know what can be done about that. We must uphold what was stated in the record of the Second Zhengzhou Conference in March this year: in a spirit of fervently protecting cadres, guide those who have committed errors or have shortcomings in their work to criticize and correct their own shortcomings and errors. Errors are not to be feared; what is to be feared is unwillingness to criticize, unwillingness to correct, and deflation due to criticism. Attention must be paid to both correcting errors and boosting morale. It must be seen that although criticism and rectification have been underway for several months, all unfinished work must still be carried through to completion; no loose ends may be left. But now a new phenomenon has emerged inside and outside the Party: right-leaning sentiments, right-leaning ideological trends, and right-leaning activities have increased, showing a strong tendency toward rampant attack. This is manifested in many materials distributed to comrades at this conference. This situation has not yet reached the degree of the rampant attack by Rightists inside and outside the Party in 1957, but the sprouts and trends are already very clear and have appeared on the horizon. This situation is of a bourgeois nature. Another situation is of an ideological nature within the proletariat: they, like us, all want socialism, not capitalism—this is the basic point of similarity between us and these comrades. But there are divergences between the views of these comrades and our views. Their mood is somewhat abnormal; they have overestimated the Party’s errors somewhat, and underestimated somewhat the great achievements created by several hundred million people under the Party’s leadership. They have drawn inappropriate conclusions, and their confidence in overcoming the current difficulties is very insufficient. They have unconsciously placed themselves in an inappropriate position, placed themselves between the Left and the Right. They are typical centrists. They are proponents of the “gains and losses roughly equal” theory. At critical junctures, they are unsteady, wavering. We are not afraid of rampant attacks by the Rightists, but we do fear the wavering of these comrades, because this wavering is detrimental to the unity of the Party and the people, detrimental to the whole Party unanimously rousing full vigor, overcoming difficulties, and striving for victory. We believe that the attitudes of these comrades can be changed. Our task is to unite with them and win them over to change their attitudes. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to make a necessary assessment of this kind of dynamic within the Party. It must not be assessed too highly, thinking they have the strength to rock and capsize the great ship of the Party and the people amidst wind and waves. They do not have such great strength. They are a relative minority, while we are the great majority. We are united with the majority of the people (workers, poor peasants, lower-middle peasants, a part of the upper-middle peasants, and intellectuals). The Party’s general line and the principles, policies, and working methods embodying the general line are welcomed by the broad membership, the broad cadres, and the broad masses of the people. But their strength must also not be estimated too low; there are quite a number of them. Before their erroneous views are criticized, accept criticism, and their attitudes are rectified, they will not easily abandon their views—this point must be seen. When the Party encounters major issues, there are debates expressing different views, and some people temporarily waver, standing in the middle, while some stand on the right—this is a normal phenomenon and there is no need for alarm. In the final analysis, erroneous views and even erroneous lines will certainly be overcome, and the majority of people, including those who temporarily waver or even commit line errors, will certainly unite on a new foundation. This is how the thirty-eight-year history of our Party has proceeded. Opposing the Right inevitably produces “Left,” opposing the “Left” inevitably produces Right—this is inevitable. Now is the time to speak of this point. Not speaking of it is detrimental to unity, detrimental to both the Party and the individual. This present debate may prove to be a debate of great significance, just like the various major debates during our revolutionary period. In the new historical period—the period of socialist construction—it is impossible to be without debates, to be calm and tranquil. The Lushan Conference may prove to be a conference of great significance. “Unity—criticism—unity,” “learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure the sickness to save the patient,” are the correct and historically proven effective methods for resolving contradictions within our Party. We must firmly uphold these methods.

These opinions of mine were largely already stated at the plenary meeting on July 23, but some points were not fully covered. I have written these words as a supplement to that speech.