Commentary on the Party Committee of the Hainan Command of the Qinghai Military Region’s Several Opinions Regarding Political Efforts in the Suppression of Rebellion (June 2, 1959) Comrades Ke Cheng and Tan Zheng [1]: This document from the Party Committee of the Hainan Command [2] is a Marxist document of profound guiding significance.
Please forward it in the name of the Central Military Commission to the party committees of the Tibet, Chengdu, and Kunming Military Regions, as well as to the party committees of the suppression forces under their jurisdiction and to local party committees, for study and implementation in light of local conditions.
Mao Zedong June 2 Based on the manuscript for publication.
Second: First send this to Comrades Shaoqi and Xiaoping [3] for review, then pass it on to Ke Cheng for processing. ··Published according to Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Notes [1] Ke Cheng refers to Huang Ke Cheng, who at that time served as Secretary-General of the CPC Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army.
Tan Zheng was then Director of the PLA General Political Department. [2] Refers to the report forwarded on May 28, 1959, by the Political Department of the Lanzhou Military Region of the PLA, containing the Party Committee of the Hainan Command of the Qinghai Military Region’s several opinions on conducting political efforts more broadly and deeply.
The main contents are as follows: First, regarding the arrangement of the two major tasks—suppression of rebellion and production—in areas with heavy rebel activity, priority should be given to suppression, with production arranged accordingly; in areas where the rebellion has been largely quelled but remnants still remain, both production and suppression should be equally emphasized; and in areas where the rebellion has been completely suppressed, while focusing on production, propaganda against the rebels and class education should also be carried out, actively supporting the front lines.
In short, whether production or suppression takes precedence, the two must be integrated and mutually reinforcing.
Second, concerning policy toward surrendered and captured enemies: (1) Strictly different treatment should be accorded to rebels who have laid down their arms and those captured on the battlefield. (2) Except for active counter-revolutionaries plotting rebellion, arrests should generally be avoided; if arrest is unavoidable, it should be conducted openly and sparingly to minimize social disruption. (3) A prompt review of all cases should be undertaken to correct wrongful arrests and convictions, thereby restoring and expanding the influence of the policy. (4) Case inspections should aim to rectify errors and educate cadres, with organizational measures taken only against individuals whose offenses are particularly serious.
Third, regarding mobilizing the masses to fight the enemy: Broadly carrying out political efforts essentially means winning over the people and organizing them to engage in struggle against the enemy.
At present, particular attention must be paid to: (1) Caring for the people’s livelihoods; (2) Strengthening political and ideological work among the masses; (3) Improving the conduct of grassroots cadres; and (4) Allowing the masses to engage in open and legitimate religious activities and respecting Tibetan customs and traditions. [3] Xiaoping refers to Deng Xiaoping, who at that time served as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council.