A Comment on Some Opinions Concerning the Political Struggle to Win Over the Enemy in the Suppression of the Rebellion[1]
(June 2, 1959)

Comrades Kecheng and Tan Zheng[1]:
This document from the Party Committee of the Hainan Command is a Marxist document with profound guiding significance. Please forward it in the name of the Military Commission to the Party Committees of the Tibet, Chengdu, and Kunming Military Regions, and further to the Party Committees of the subordinate units suppressing the rebellion and local Party Committees, for study and adoption in light of local conditions.
Mao Zedong
June 2
This document should first be sent to Comrades Shaoqi and Xiaoping[2] for perusal, and then sent to Kecheng for handling.

--- Notes

[1] Refers to the report forwarded on May 28, 1959, by the Political Department of the Lanzhou Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army, originally from the Party Committee of the Hainan Command of the Qinghai Provincial Military District, concerning some opinions on carrying out the political struggle to win over the enemy more extensively and deeply. The main contents are: 1. On the arrangement of the two major tasks of suppressing the rebellion and production. In areas where the task of suppressing the rebellion is relatively large, suppression of the rebellion should be the primary focus, and production should be arranged under this premise; in areas where the rebellion has basically been quelled but remnant bandits still exist, production and suppression of the rebellion should be given equal emphasis; in areas where the rebellion has been completely quelled, while grasping production, it is also necessary to carry out propaganda for the struggle to pacify the remnants and class education, and actively do a good job of supporting the front. In short, whether production is primary or suppression of the rebellion is primary, the two should be integrated and mutually promote each other. 2. On the policy issues concerning the enemy who have surrendered or been captured. (1) Strictly different treatment should be accorded to bandits who surrender and those captured on the battlefield. (2) Except for active counter-revolutionaries plotting rebellion, it is generally best not to make arrests; when arrests are absolutely necessary, they should be made openly and sparingly to reduce social upheaval. (3) Carry out a review of cases as soon as possible, correct wrongful arrests and wrongful judgments, and restore and expand the influence of the policy. (4) Case reviews should aim at correcting mistakes and educating cadres; only individuals with particularly egregious circumstances and serious errors should face organizational handling. 3. On the issue of mobilizing the masses for the struggle against the enemy. Carrying out extensive political work to win over the enemy is, in essence, winning over the masses and organizing the broad masses for the struggle against the enemy. At present, attention must be paid to: (1) caring for the livelihood of the masses; (2) strengthening political and ideological work among the masses; (3) improving the work style of grassroots cadres; (4) allowing the masses to conduct open and legitimate religious activities, and respecting the customs and habits of the Tibetan people.


[1] Kecheng, namely Huang Kecheng, then serving as Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. Tan Zheng, then serving as Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army.
[2] Xiaoping, namely Deng Xiaoping, then serving as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council.