As it now appears, the broad masses of Tibet warmly welcome the suppression of the rebellion. These rebels needed to eat and to wear clothes, and they looted the common people's things everywhere, becoming extremely divorced from the masses. The masses thus greatly support the People's Liberation Army, and support the People's Liberation Army in thoroughly suppressing the rebellion. Surkhang, Phala [2] and others launched the rebellion; they misjudged the situation, and they also misjudged our principles and policies toward Tibet. Our principle, as you know, was no reform for six years, and whether to reform after six years could still be decided according to the situation. After deciding on no reform for six years, we withdrew more than thirty thousand troops from Tibet. The purpose of doing this was to unite them and enable them to make some progress. However, they took advantage of this situation to organize some rebellious elements who had fled from Xikang [3] to launch a rebellion in areas like Lhokha. The purpose of their launching the rebellion, as a first step, was to try to drive out the People's Liberation Army, to scare us away. They fundamentally did not understand our principles, policies, or the combat effectiveness of the People's Liberation Army. This time, in suppressing the rebellion that occurred in Lhasa, only ten companies were used, and the rebellion was suppressed in two days and two nights. In Lhokha, only four regiments were used. Now the People's Liberation Army is adding two and a half divisions in Tibet; one division is in Lhokha, one division is in Chamdo, and half a division is maintaining traffic on the Qinghai-Tibet road. After the fighting is over, a people's self-defense force, fundamentally different from the original Tibetan army, must be organized. With a people's self-defense force, there will be no need to station so many troops, lest the Indian government become afraid. What are your opinions on the issue of reform in Tibet? Does Tibet need reform? (Panchen: I believe it is certain that Tibet needs reform; without implementing reform, Tibet cannot develop. As for how to reform, Premier Zhou once said that it must be carried out in conjunction with the actual situation in Tibet. I hope reform can be implemented quickly.) The specific policies for reform need to be discussed, and they need to be determined. I suggest that you first discuss it with the Nationalities Affairs Commission and Comrade Zhang Jingwu [4] in Beijing, and then discuss it more concretely after returning to Lhasa. I think the people in Tibet can be divided into four types: left, center, right, and rebels. The so-called "right" refers to those who did not take up arms to participate in the rebellion, nor did they flee to India, but whose attitude is very stubborn, who oppose us and oppose reform. For these four types of people, the policies should be different. You stand on the side of patriotism and progress; you are the leftists. Do not be afraid that you will have no food to eat after losing your manors. For the leftists and the centrists, a policy of redemption must be adopted to ensure that their living standards will not be lowered after the reform. You will be treated the same as the capitalists in all the major cities across the country, like Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Xi'an, Lanzhou, and Chengdu, the same as Rong Yiren [5]. Present here today are people from the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce and the China Democratic National Construction Association. When they first began to accept socialist transformation, they were also a bit uncomfortable, but they slowly got used to it, and now they live very well. The policy we adopt toward them is one of firm unity. Besides the capitalists, there are also democratic personages, civil and military officials of the former Kuomintang government, and even great landlords like Liu Wenhui [6]. As long as they are upper-stratum personages willing to cooperate with us, we will absolutely not discard them, nor will we cooperate with them temporarily only to not want them in the future. Toward all democratic parties, intellectuals, and enlightened personages throughout the country, our policy is one of unity. The reason is very simple: only by adopting such a policy will it be beneficial to the people of the whole country. You all participated in this session of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Compared with the 1954 meetings [7], these two meetings, especially the CPPCC meeting, have added many people, and the scope of participants has expanded. We are still preparing to arrange for some more people to be included. You are different from Surkhang and the others; you have adopted a political attitude opposite to theirs. Surkhang and the others have been to Beijing; I have met them. These people have been involved with the British for too long and are already trapped in it, single-mindedly wanting to pursue independence. They planned for a long time; mobilizing the rebellious elements from Xikang to establish a base in Lhokha was their plan. This was also to prepare a line of retreat, so they could flee from there if the rebellion failed. We knew they were mobilizing the rebellious elements from Xikang. We also knew they wanted to rebel. In the past when they made trouble, we did not go to suppress it; we asked them to suppress it, and they thought we were afraid. I remember there was a disturbance in 1956, and they wanted to stage a rebellion then. The Dob-dobs [8] wanted to enter the city, and I said, let them enter the city; if they want to fight, let them fight. This time, when the rebellious elements from Xikang entered the city, when the Dob-dobs entered the city, our attitude was, if you want to do it, then do it. What else could be done? We talk peace with them every day, but they won't have it! Two opposing political attitudes! You are different from them; you stand on our side. There are also the centrists, who are wavering. And there are the rightists, who have not fought against us. As long as they do not fight against us, there is still room for maneuver, and you must do work on them. It is better for you to do work on the centrists and rightists than for us to speak. It is not easy to live a life divorced from the people; one will not suffer a loss by standing on the side of the people. Farmer, how do you say it in Tibetan? (Interpreter: In Tibetan it is called "miser.") If the misers rise up to struggle against you, are you afraid? As long as you stand on the side of the people, we can explain it clearly to the misers and tell them not to struggle. Liu Wenhui was not struggled against. We can tell the misers to take the overall situation into account and not to settle old historical scores. This can set many people's minds at ease. As for the rightists, whether they need to be struggled against a bit, it is hard to say. We regard you as leftists; you can persuade the centrists, tell them the world is going to change, and ask them to have a better attitude toward the misers. There are three benefits for them in doing so: first, they will have political status; second, their living standards will not be lowered; and third, they will be exempt from being struggled against. Now, you are all state cadres, people's deputies, and respectively Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Vice Chairman of the CPPCC, and a member of the CPPCC Standing Committee. In Tibet, you also have positions and work. As long as you cooperate with the Tibetan people and speak of democracy, you will certainly have your political status, your living standards will not be lowered and will be the same as in the past; this point will be guaranteed by the Central Government. Those who had a bad relationship with the misers in the past should improve it a bit; like Liu Wenhui, the workers and peasants no longer struggle against him. This is the first step, taking the democratic path. The second step is to take the socialist path. The Han areas and minority nationality areas like Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang have all taken these two steps. Your place will first take the democratic path; after the fighting is over, peaceful reform will be carried out. Regarding religion, our policy is very clear; it is the policy of freedom of religious belief. It seems that religious monasteries also need to undergo reform. Some people in the monasteries participated in the rebellion and cooperated with the rebellious elements; this situation exists in Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and other places. In a place in Qinghai, probably Xiangride, a temple was smashed by the masses during the reform. Cadres went to stop it, and the masses even clashed with the cadres. The monasteries in other places were all protected by us. The people's government has always protected religious monasteries. There were some lama temples on Mount Wutai that the peasants wanted to smash during the land reform. I passed through there and stopped it. Now, the local people's governments are organizing the rebuilding of the smashed temples. You must be mentally prepared. After the reform, there may be a period when the number of lamas decreases. Some lamas will want to return home, but it is not that they no longer believe in Buddhism. Of course, the elderly will still be willing to stay in the monasteries. You should broaden the scope of your work; both the Buddhists in the monasteries and those not in the monasteries are under your leadership. As for how to reform the religious monasteries, I think you should consider a method. When the Dalai [9] came to Beijing last time, I had a talk with him, and we talked very well. He assured me that he would definitely take the socialist path and implement reform upon his return, but it seems he is still in a state of contradiction. The people below him, like Surkhang, Trijang [10], and Phala, are all very bad. The Dalai has such a very bad environment. These people are pulling him outward, in a direction of opposing the Central Government; on the other hand, he is also an intelligent man, and he can think that after he leaves Tibet, leaves the people, and leaves the motherland, it will be difficult to proceed. He revealed this thought in the three letters he wrote to Tan Guansan [11]. The Dalai, now one possibility is that he will return, and one possibility is that he will not. Recently, the news released by Indian newspapers is that he wants to return. However, the Dalai's two statements [12] are completely against the Central Government, against the great family of the motherland, and demand Tibetan independence. In this way, the Dalai has blocked his own path back. In my view, the Dalai's statements are the work of Surkhang, Phala, and others, and at the same time have the consent of certain people in India. If the Dalai agrees with these two statements, he cannot return. To return, he must change his attitude, take a stand against these two statements, and support the Central Government. For the Dalai to get out of that environment, to leave Surkhang, Trijang, Phala, and others, it is very difficult to think of a way; this all depends on his personal will, on him finding a way himself. We have left room for maneuver; we still elected him as a Vice Chairman of the NPC, and the position of Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region is also being kept for him. By leaving room for maneuver, our position is very proactive. The other traitors can also return, but they must change their attitude. When they return, they can no longer be Kalons [13], otherwise there would be no difference between them and you. Trijang and others have committed crimes; they are leaders of the rebellion. We are not prepared to adopt the method of killing; we will preserve their lives and slowly change their minds. But they cannot be allowed to continue running affairs, because they are traitors. You must unite well with Ngawang Jaltso, Sherab Gyatso, Huang Zhengqing [14], and others, for a common purpose, to handle the affairs of Tibet well. Tibet must develop; its population, culture, economy, and politics must all develop. The entire operating expenses of the Tibet Work Committee and the Military Region are completely covered by the Central Government and are not paid from the local financial revenue of Tibet. For matters that Tibet is unable to undertake, the Central Government can also help. Tibet still has to collect taxes; the expenses of the xika, dzong, qikyab [15] and the government of the autonomous region must be sustained by the people. The Tibetan people are intelligent and hardworking. After the social system is reformed, Tibet may develop very quickly. Your cause has hope and a future. Those who have fled to India have no hope and no future. You can visit all parts of the country. Some people can go back first, and some can go back later. In short, the country is changing year by year, and the development is great. This year is the tenth anniversary of the founding of the country; in another ten years, it will be built even better. You are state cadres; do not only concern yourselves with the affairs of Tibet, but also care about the affairs of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chengdu, Xi'an, and Lanzhou, and care about the affairs of the whole country. You have positions in the Central Government and usually work in Tibet; in the future, you can come to Beijing often. When you come, do not stay for long; a few weeks will be enough. When transportation is convenient, you can travel back and forth more. The Dalai told our comrades that he feared his life was in danger. He told Comrade Chen Yi [16] that he was mainly afraid of Surkhang and Phala. The Dalai knows that the Communist Party will not persecute him to death. He is afraid of Surkhang because Surkhang and others poisoned his father. With people like them around, the Dalai's life is not guaranteed. Of the ten thousand or so people who fled to India, I think they will become divided. A portion will resolutely oppose the motherland, and a portion will feel they have no way out and will hope to return. Of course, this will take time; for example, after ten years, the younger ones among them, who were deceived, will want to come back. Toward them, a welcoming attitude should be adopted.

Announced an uprising in Peng County, Sichuan in December 1949.
In 1959, was then serving as Minister of Forestry.
[7] Refers to the First Session of the First National People's Congress held in Beijing from September 15 to 28, 1954, and the First Plenary Session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held in Beijing from December 21 to 25 of the same year.
[8] Tiebang lama is the common term for the monastic post of Gekü in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries.
[9] Dalai, i.e., Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, see Note [4] on page 46 of this volume.
[10] Trijang, i.e., Trijang Lobsang Yeshe, once served as a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. One of the instigators of the armed rebellion by the reactionary upper strata group in Tibet in 1959.
[11] See Note [11] on page 47 of this volume.
[12] Refers to the two statements issued in the name of the Dalai Lama in India on April 18 and 22, 1959, the main content of which was to advocate for Tibetan independence.
[13] Kalön, Tibetan language, an official in charge of the former local government of Tibet.
[14] Ngawang Jiatso (1894–1968), from Garzê, Sichuan, was then Vice President of the Buddhist Association of China and Vice Governor of the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. Sherab Gyatso (1883–1968), from Xunhua, Qinghai, was then President of the Buddhist Association of China. Huang Zhengqing (1903–1997), from Lihua (now Litang), Sichuan, Tibetan name Lobsang Tsewang, was then Vice Governor of Gansu Province and Governor of the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.
[15] Xika, Tibetan language, the name of a rural grassroots organization below the Zong (equivalent to a county-level local administrative division) or equivalent to a Zong in the former local government of Tibet. Jikyab, Tibetan language, a first-level local administrative official post in the former local government of Tibet, in charge of the affairs of its subordinate Zongs, with a jurisdiction equivalent to a prefecture.
[16] Chen Yi (1901–1972), from Lezhi, Sichuan. Was then Vice Premier of the State Council and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs.