To Comrade Peng Zhen. Slightly revised. [1] [1] [1]
Mao Zedong
April 28
Chuan
Mao Zedong’s revisions to the draft resolution mainly involved changes to individual words and phrases.

The People’s Liberation Army Suppresses the Rebellion, as Dear as Family Chuan
(April 28, 1959)
[Xinhua News Agency dispatch, Beijing, the 28th] The counter-rebellion operations in the vast region south of the Yarlung Zangbo River and north of the Himalayan border line have basically concluded, achieving a great victory. This has been accomplished through the combination of the local masses’ enthusiastic support for the counter-rebellion war and the People’s Liberation Army’s heroic fighting. The reactionary American reporter Alsop said that counter-rebellion is impossible, requiring 200,000 troops, 10,000 tons of supplies daily, with roads blocked for repair and a lack of tools, hence counter-rebellion is hopeless. The head of Taiwan’s reactionary literati, Hu Shi, said that during China’s War of Resistance Against Japan, in Hu Shi’s hometown, the Huizhou Prefecture area of Anhui Province, the mountains were not very high and the waters not very deep, yet the Japanese dared not go there. Tibet’s terrain is particularly high and complex, with places like the Himalayas and the Yarlung Zangbo River (only navigable by skin boats in a few small sections); how could the Communist Party possibly fight the rebel army? Here Hu Shi has put into practice his so-called “bold hypothesis,” but one cannot see his so-called “careful verification.” Bold indeed, but the mind is also very crude. The reactionaries of the whole world, represented by Hu Shi, have forgotten one thing: Japan fought China, counter-revolution fought revolution; China suppresses the rebel bandits, using revolution to fight counter-revolution. The two are completely opposite, and the outcomes of victory and defeat are distinctly different. Tibet’s terrain is very high, the air rather thin, which has also frightened many sympathizers with the Tibetan people and delighted the majority of the world’s bourgeoisie. The former say, there may be some difficulties; the Han people helping the Tibetans carry out the counter-rebellion war and social reforms is necessary, but difficulties are bound to be many. The latter say, it definitely won’t work, or at least it will be protracted. Friends, enemies, you are all wrong. If the foe could go there, why can’t we? This roof of the world covers a total of 120,000 square kilometers with a population of 1.2 million. The inhabited places are in the hills and valleys, not very high, only over 3,000 meters above sea level; why can’t people live there? Before the rebellion, we had only 20,000 people there, distributed at several key points across 120 kilometers, including both military personnel and working staff. After the rebellion, we added two and a half divisions and a group of cadres, only a little over 20,000 people. Together with the previous total, it is 50,000 people, equivalent to one-fourth of the 200,000 that Alsop deemed necessary. Among the cadres, there are nearly 10,000 young Tibetan cadres, who are brimming with drive. After the counter-rebellion, we must organize self-defense armed forces of the Tibetan working people, a minority being regular forces and the majority being militia not detached from production. By then, leaving one division of the People’s Liberation Army will suffice, and the main force can be withdrawn. Our Indian friends have no reason to be afraid. We are extremely busy with our own family affairs; do we have the leisure to meddle in others’ business? Moreover, as Communists, we are in principle not permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of others. But we also ask you not to meddle in affairs north of the Himalayas, and it would be best to make less noise. Noise is useless. If you clamor, we are bound to clamor; is it that only the magistrate is allowed to set fires, while the common people are forbidden to light lamps? Here is a document, a report to Beijing from the Political Department of the 134th Division of the People’s Liberation Army, [1] which recounts how the masses helped in the counter-rebellion.

[1] This refers to a report sent on April 20, 1959, by the Political Department of the 134th Division of the People’s Liberation Army to the General Staff, the General Political Department, the Tibet Work Committee of the CPC, and others. The report stated that since our division began advancing into Shannan on April 6 and 7, the residents seen along the way, except in a few areas, have been basically stable, and the basic masses have greatly welcomed our army’s quelling of the rebellion. The masses bitterly hate the rebel bandits and long for liberation. This further proves that the rebellion in Shannan was still a matter of the upper strata. From the analysis of available materials: First, the basic masses, through the contrast between the profound disasters brought by long-term reactionary rule and the fact that our army has served the people in every way during its eight years in Tibet, have raised their consciousness, and the majority lean toward our Party and our army. Second, progressive elements among the middle and upper strata, influenced by our Party’s united front work over the years and the prosperity of the motherland, mostly did not participate in this rebellion. Third, ordinary headmen, most of whom had previously fled, are now gradually returning after our Party and army’s propaganda. Because officers and soldiers were given relatively thorough education in policy and discipline, since our division entered Tibet this time, most units have observed policy and discipline and gained the trust of the masses. However, there have also been some shortcomings, such as binding key rebel elements too tightly when sending up prisoners, which have been dealt with seriously on a case-by-case basis.