Some people sympathize with Tibet, but they only sympathize with the minority, not the majority. Out of one hundred people, they sympathize with a few, that is, those rebel elements, but not with the more than ninety percent of the people.
In foreign countries, there are some people who, regarding Tibet, only sympathize with ten or twenty thousand people, thirty or forty thousand at most.
Tibet proper (speaking only of the three regions of Changdu, Anterior Tibet, and Ulterior Tibet) has a population of about 1.2 million.
From 1.2 million people, if you subtract a few tens of thousands, there are still over 1.1 million people, and some people in the world do not sympathize with them.
We are the opposite; we sympathize with these over 1.1 million people and do not sympathize with that minority.
What kind of people are that minority? They are the elements of exploitation and oppression.
Speaking of aristocrats, both Panchen [2] and Apei [3] are also considered aristocrats, but there are two kinds of aristocrats: one is the progressive aristocrats, and the other is the reactionary aristocrats. The two of them belong to the progressive aristocrats.
The progressive elements advocate reform; the old system is no longer wanted, just get rid of it.
The old system is not good; it is not beneficial to the Tibetan people. First, the population does not flourish; second, wealth does not prosper.
Tibet is a large place, but its population is now too small; it needs to develop.
I have spoken about this matter with the Dalai [4].
I said, you must develop the population.
I also said, your Buddhism, which is Lamaism, I do not believe in, but I approve of your believing in it.
However, can some rules be slightly changed? Among your 1.2 million people, there are eighty thousand lamas. These eighty thousand lamas are non-productive; first, they do not produce material goods, and second, they do not produce people.
You see, as for clergy, Christianity allows marriage, Islam allows marriage, and Catholicism does not allow marriage.
The lamas of Tibet also cannot marry, cannot produce people.
At the same time, lamas should engage in production, in agriculture, in industry, so that they can be sustained for a long time.
Don't you want to believe in Buddhism for all time, forever and ever? I do not approve of believing in Buddhism forever, but if you want to believe, what can be done! We can do nothing about it; whether to believe in a religion or not can only be decided by each individual.
As for the aristocrats, for those revolutionary aristocrats who stand on the side of progress and advocate reform, as well as the middle-of-the-roaders who are not yet so revolutionary, who are wavering but do not stand on the side of counter-revolution, what attitude do we adopt? My personal opinion is: regarding their land, their manors, can we use the method we used for the national bourgeoisie, that is, to implement a policy of redemption, so that they do not suffer a loss.
For example, our Central People's Government can cover their living expenses. You get that little bit from exploiting the serfs anyway, and the Central Government also gives you that little bit, so why must you exploit serfs to be comfortable? I think that the serf system in Tibet is like the manor system of our Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. They are not quite slaves, nor are they quite free peasants; it is a serf system somewhere in between.
The aristocrats sitting on the volcano of the serf system are not secure; every day they feel an earthquake is coming. Why not just get rid of it, have no more of that serf system, no more of that manor system, give up that bit of land, and give it to the peasants.
But what will they eat? I think that for the revolutionary aristocrats, the revolutionary manor lords, and also the middle-of-the-road aristocrats, the middle-of-the-road manor lords, as long as they do not stand on the side of counter-revolution, we should use the policy of redemption.
I'd like to discuss this with everyone to see if it's feasible.
Right now, we are quelling the rebellion, and we cannot yet talk about reform. In the future, when it is time for reform, for all revolutionary aristocrats, as well as the wavering middle-of-the-roaders, in short, as long as they are not on the side of counter-revolution, we will not let them suffer a loss; it will be just like our current method for dealing with capitalists.
Furthermore, we will provide for them for their entire lives.
The capitalists are also provided for for their entire lives.
After a few years of fixed interest [5], you have to continue to provide for them, you have to give them work, you have to give them a salary, you have to give them employment, provide for them for their entire lives.
This way, the peasants (who make up over ninety-five percent of the population) will get land, and the peasants will no longer hate these aristocrats, and the hatred will gradually be resolved.
A Japanese newspaper was clamoring, it published an article saying that the Communist Party has suffered a great defeat on the Tibet issue, that the whole world is against the Communist Party.
If we have suffered a great defeat, who has won a great victory? There must be someone who has won a great victory.
There are only people who have suffered a great defeat, but no one who has won a great victory, how can such a thing be? You tell me, what is the outcome of victory and defeat? Supposing we Chinese have suffered a great defeat on the Tibet issue, then who has won a great victory? Can it be said that the Indian interventionists have won a great victory? I think that is also hard to say.
If he won a great victory, why is he weeping and wailing so bitterly, as if he has lost his parents? Do you see if there is any sense in what I am saying?
There is also an American, named Alsop, who writes a column.
From so far away, he seriously wrote an article, saying that a place like Tibet cannot be pacified without two hundred thousand troops, and these two hundred thousand troops would need ten thousand tons of supplies every day, and it is impossible to transport so much there. The mountains in Tibet are incredibly high, and it is difficult for the Communist Party's army to get there.
Therefore, he concluded that the rebel elements cannot be eliminated.
Can the rebel elements be eliminated or not? I think everyone has this question.
Because whether they can be eliminated or not, those who have not been there in person, who have not fought a guerrilla war, will not know.
I will answer here: to quell the rebellion does not require two hundred thousand troops, only fifty thousand troops, one-fourth of two hundred thousand.
Before 1956, we had fifty thousand people (including cadres) there. In 1956, we withdrew more than thirty thousand, leaving just over ten thousand.
At that time, we did indeed seriously announce that there would be no reform for six years, and after six years, if they still did not agree, we could postpone it further; that is what was said [6].
You should know that the entire Tibetan nationality is not 1.2 million, but three million.
What I just mentioned, Tibet proper (Changdu, Anterior Tibet, and Ulterior Tibet), is 1.2 million. Where are the others? They are mainly in western Sichuan, which is the former Xikang [7] region, and also northwestern Sichuan, in places like Zoige, Songpan, and Aba.
These places have the most Tibetans.
Second is Qinghai, with five hundred thousand.
Third is southern Gansu.
Fourth is northwestern Yunnan.
These four regions total 1.8 million.
The Sichuan Provincial People's Congress held a meeting to discuss carrying out some democratic reforms in the Tibetan areas. A rumor was heard, and it immediately spread to the former Xikang region, and some people launched an armed rebellion.
Now, the Tibetan areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan have all been reformed, and the people are armed.
The Tibetans have taken up guns, organized self-defense forces, and are very brave.
If these four regions can wipe out the rebel elements, why can't Tibet wipe them out? You say it's complicated; the former Xikang region is very complicated.
The rebel elements from former Xikang were defeated and fled to Tibet.
When they got there, they raped and pillaged, looting everything in sight.
They needed to eat, so they had to loot, and thus conflicts arose with the Tibetans.
There were more than ten thousand who fled from former Xikang and from Qinghai.
Do these more than ten thousand people need to eat? They do. Where does it come from? They ate from among the 1.2 million people, here and there. Counting from last July, they have been eating for almost a year now.
This time we have struck down the rebel elements and confiscated their guns.
For example, in Shigatse, we confiscated the guns of the local government's armed forces there; Gyantse's were also confiscated, and Yadong's were also confiscated.
In the places where the guns were confiscated, the masses were very happy.
The common people were afraid of three things from them: first was fear of their seal, that is, fear of the official stamp; second was fear of their guns; and third, there was also a legal whip, which the common people feared greatly.
Once these three were confiscated, the masses were all overjoyed, very happy, and helped us move the guns and ammunition.
The common people of Tibet are in extreme misery.
The reactionary serf-owners there would actually gouge out people's eyes, actually pull out their tendons, and even use the leg bones of teenage girls to make musical instruments, and also use human skulls as drinking vessels for wine.
Such utterly savage rebel elements can be completely eliminated. It does not require two hundred thousand troops, only fifty thousand troops, and they can be wiped out clean.
Does wiping them out mean killing them all? No.
So-called wiping out does not mean killing them, but capturing them for education and reform, including reactionaries, people like Surkhang [8].
For people like this who have fled, if they return and repent, we will not kill them.
Let's talk about the opinion of another Chinese person.
This person is in Taiwan, named Hu Shi [9].
He said that, in his view, this "revolutionary army" (that is, the rebel elements) cannot be eliminated.
He said he is from Huizhou. When the Japanese invaded China, they occupied Anhui, but they did not go to Huizhou.
What was the reason? Huizhou has too many mountains, and the terrain is complex.
The Japanese didn't even dare to go into the mountains of Huizhou, so would the Communist Party dare to go into the mountains of Tibet? I say, Hu Shi's methodology is wrong; his "bold hypothesis" is dangerous.
He makes a bold hypothesis, he reasons, saying that the mountains of Huizhou are small, yet the Japanese did not dare to go, so the mountains of Tibet are much larger and much higher, would the Communist Party dare to go? Therefore, the conclusion: the Communist Party will certainly not dare to go, the Communist Party cannot eliminate the rebel armed forces in that place.
Now we must criticize Hu Shi's methodology. I think he is going to lose; he does not "seek evidence carefully," he only has a "bold hypothesis."
Some people, like some in the Indian bourgeoisie, are a bit different; they have a dual nature.
On the one hand, they are very unhappy, very much against our resolute suppression of the rebellion that began after March 20, very much against this policy of ours; they sympathize with the rebel elements.
On the other hand, they are unwilling to fall out with us. They think that for the past several thousand years, China and India have never fallen out, have had no wars. At the same time, they see that "the flowers fall, do what one may," the flowers have already fallen.
In 1954, China and India signed a treaty [10], the one that declared the Five Principles. They recognized that Tibet is a part of China, is China's territory.
They held something back, they didn't go to extremes.
The British are the most cunning. The British Foreign Secretary, Lloyd, when asked this and that by Labour MPs, he always feigns ignorance, saying: no news, we the British have no contact with Tibet, we have no personnel there, therefore I have no comment.
He always says this.
He also said that we must wait until that person from Tibet comes out, see what he is like, and only then will we speak.
What he means is, after the Dalai comes out, see what he says.
The Chinese Communist Party has not closed the door, saying that the Dalai was abducted, and has also published his three letters [11].
At this People's Congress, Premier Zhou's report [12] will address this matter.
We hope the Dalai will return, and we have even suggested that this election should not only elect the Panchen but also the Dalai.
He is a young man, only twenty-five years old now.
If he lives to be eighty-five, there are still sixty years from now. By that time, it will be the 21st century. What will the world be like? It will have changed.
At that time, I believe he will return.
If he doesn't return for fifty-nine years, in the sixtieth year he might return.
By then, the whole world will have changed.
This is the land of his parents, born here, raised here. Now he is in a foreign country, living at the beck and call of others, with his few guns all confiscated.
Our adopting this attitude is more proactive; we are not going to extremes.
The Premier's report will state the hope that the Dalai will return to the country.
If he is willing to return to the country and can break away from those reactionary elements, we hope he will return.
However, in reality, it seems difficult for him to return now.
He cannot break away from that group of people.
At the same time, his own mood—the last time he went to India, he did not want to come back, whereas the Panchen wanted to come back.
At that time, the Premier persuaded him, and perhaps Nehru [13] also persuaded him, that it was better to return than not to return.
At that time, he was told this: What use would you be in India? You would just be a resident-in-exile, just eating there, detached from the masses, detached from the land and people of your motherland.
Now, we still cannot see that he has the determination to reform.
To say that he wants reform, that he stands on the side of the people, on the side of the laboring people, it seems not to be the case.
Can his worldview be changed? Perhaps it can be changed in sixty years, or perhaps it won't take sixty years.
But for now, it seems it would be difficult for him to return right away.
If he wants to return, he can return tomorrow, but he must carry out reforms, must quell the rebellion, that is, he must stand completely on our side.
It seems that, in fact, this is also very difficult for him to do right away.
However, we are not writing this off completely.

Based on the transcript of the talk preserved in the Central Archives.

Notes
[1] This is the part concerning the Tibet issue from Mao Zedong's speech at the 16th Supreme State Conference. On March 10, 1959, the reactionary upper-strata clique in Tibet, with the support of foreign forces, deliberately sabotaged the implementation of the "Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" and openly declared "Tibetan independence." On the 17th, the Dalai Lama fled to India. On the 19th, the rebel elements launched a full-scale offensive against the People's Liberation Army troops stationed in Lhasa and the central representative organs. The PLA troops stationed in Tibet launched a counter-attack against the rebel armed forces in Lhasa on the 20th and subsequently quelled armed rebellions in other areas, safeguarding national unity and ethnic solidarity.
[2] Panchen refers to Panchen Erdini Qoigyi Gyaincain (1938-1989), from Xunhua, Qinghai. He was one of the religious and political leaders of the former local government of Tibet. At the time, he was Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC and Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region.
[3] Apei refers to Apei Awang Jinmei, born in 1911 in Lhasa, Tibet. At the time, he was Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region.
[4] Dalai refers to Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, born in 1935 in Huangzhong, Qinghai. He was one of the religious and political leaders of the former local government of Tibet. He once served as Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, and Honorary President of the Buddhist Association of China. He fled to India in 1959 when the reactionary upper-strata clique in Tibet launched an armed rebellion.
[5] Fixed interest was a form of redemption for the means of production of national capitalists after China implemented joint state-private ownership of entire trades in capitalist industry and commerce. That is, regardless of the enterprise's profit or loss, the state uniformly paid the capitalists a fixed interest (generally 5% per annum) annually based on the value of their private shares determined by the inventory and appraisal of assets at the time of the joint ownership. The payment of fixed interest began in 1956 and ceased in September 1966.
[6] On December 30, 1956, in a conversation with the Dalai Lama, Zhou Enlai said that Chairman Mao had asked him to tell him that it could be confirmed that reform would not be discussed at all within the Second Five-Year Plan; after six years, if reform were possible, it would still be decided by the local government of Tibet based on the situation and conditions at that time.
[7] Xikang refers to Xikang Province, which was abolished in 1955. At the time of its abolition, its former jurisdiction was incorporated into Sichuan Province.
[8] Surkhang refers to Surkhang Wangqing Gelei, who once served as a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region. He was one of the instigators of the 1959 armed rebellion by the reactionary upper-strata clique in Tibet.
[9] Hu Shi (1891-1962), style name Shizhi, from Jixi, Anhui. In 1919, he published the article "More Study of Problems, Less Talk of 'Isms'," opposing the spread of Marxism, and also proposed the research method of "bold hypothesis, careful verification." He went to the United States in 1948 and later to Taiwan.
[10] On April 29, 1954, the governments of China and India signed the "Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India" in Beijing. The agreement explicitly established the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the guiding principles for relations between the two countries and, on this basis, established various specific measures to promote trade and commerce between the Tibet region of China and India and to facilitate mutual pilgrimages by the peoples of the two countries. The main contents were: mutual establishment of trade agencies; traders and pilgrims from both sides conducting trade and making pilgrimages according to custom at designated locations and traveling via certain passes and routes; and provisions concerning the transit of diplomatic and official personnel and nationals of the two countries. The agreement came into effect on June 3, 1954, with a validity of eight years, and expired in June 1962.
[11] Refers to the three letters written by the Dalai Lama on March 11, 12, and 16 to Tan Guansan, Acting Representative of the Central Government in Tibet and Political Commissar of the Tibet Military Command, published in the People's Daily on March 30, 1959. The letter of March 11 said: "Yesterday I decided to go to the military command to see the theatrical performance, but because of the incitement of a few bad elements, and the monks and lay people who did not understand the truth followed them and obstructed me, it was truly impossible for me to visit, which made me feel ashamed and speechless, filled with anxiety, and in a state of not knowing what to do." It also said: "The reactionary bad elements are carrying out activities that endanger me under the pretext of protecting my safety." The letter of March 12 said: "Regarding the serious incident of yesterday and the day before, which was created in the name of protecting my safety and which sowed discord between the central and local authorities, I am trying my best to deal with it." The letter of March 16 said: "Although the internal and external situation here is still very difficult to handle, I am using skillful means to draw a line between the progressive and the anti-revolutionary people among the government officials. Once, after a few days, there is a certain number of reliable forces, I will go to the military command in a secret way."
[12] Refers to the "Report on the Work of the Government" that Premier Zhou Enlai was about to deliver to the First Session of the Second National People's Congress.
[13] Nehru (1889-1964) was the Prime Minister of India at the time.