To enhance farmers’ productive enthusiasm and improve relations between the government and the peasantry, we must begin by reforming the system of ownership. At present, however, we are witnessing equalization, arbitrary reallocation, and compulsory requisition—practices that negate both distribution according to work and equivalent exchange. Even between Zhao Erlu and Wang Heshou there exists a kind of exchange relationship. The law of value and the principle of equivalent exchange operate not only within the communes themselves but also between collective ownership and public ownership; indeed, they govern inter-sectoral exchanges of means of production as well. If people do not eat, how can they excrete? And if they do not excrete, where will the grain come from? After all, bones return to the earth. Nature’s components constantly engage in exchanges, generally on an equivalent basis: big fish eat small fish, and small fish cannot survive without consuming something else. Yet today it is all about equalization, reallocation, and requisition—take what you want with just a single order slip, without any payment. Such practices are profoundly destructive. Banks currently provide no investment for agriculture. I propose increasing annual funding by one billion yuan each year, so that over ten years we could establish ten billion yuan in interest-free long-term loans primarily to support poor production teams. One portion of these funds would be used to purchase large agricultural machinery; after ten years, once the equipment has been nationalized, it would effectively become state capital. But then a sudden wave of equalization, reallocation, and requisition sweeps through, disrupting economic order. Many products end up belonging to the commune rather than to the individual team. The institutional framework set forth in the Sixth Plenary Session’s resolution on the communes has not been implemented at all over the past two and a half months. Measures such as collective welfare programs, communal canteens, and regulated work–rest schedules have yet to be put into practice. Unless we frame the issue differently, the “communist wind” will continue to gain momentum. Why did the Sixth Plenary Session’s resolution fail to halt this trend? Could it really be confined to just Hebei, Shandong, and Henan provinces? Or are the southern provinces somehow morally superior, with a deeper commitment to Marxism? I find that hard to believe.

I suggest you convene a six-level cadre meeting, inviting those who advocate careful accounting to participate. After all, the Communist Party has always been prone to oscillations between extremes.

In addition to the original twelve points, we should add two more: the law of value and the principle of equivalent exchange. We need unified leadership, team-based operations with tiered management and devolved authority; three-level accounting, independent profit-and-loss calculations, appropriate accumulation, rational redistribution, and income distribution determined by the commune, with rewards proportional to effort and recognition of differences. Without addressing these matters, the Great Leap Forward will come to naught. If I do not raise these points, there will be insufficient debate. Over the past few months, many localities have, in effect, undermined the law of value. At last year’s Zhengzhou Conference, this very issue sparked fierce contention, with some even invoking deceased comrades to silence their opponents. Anyone engaging in concealed production or unauthorized private division of crops is invariably practicing equalization, reallocation, and requisition. Since October, farmers have been gripped by profound panic, fearing communism. They have begun surrendering everything—from tables and chairs to benches—and there has been an industrial drive to combat drought, involving the gratuitous donation of scrap metal and other materials. While such measures may be acceptable during wartime, when contributions are made without compensation or for minimal remuneration, they cannot be sustained indefinitely, lest production itself be destroyed.

This year, you should exercise restraint and launch as few “satellites” as possible—such as sports satellites, poetry satellites, or banking satellites.

We must emphasize patriotism, loyalty to the commune, and care for the people. Previously, Hebei proposed the slogan “Manage the household well and grow cotton.” We have revised it to read: “Be patriotic and prosperous; grow more cotton.”

Donglu County’s cotton procurement experience offers three key lessons: accept all sources without question, make no retrospective inquiries, and conduct cash transactions—whomever sells receives the money. This policy applies only once and sets no precedent. Additionally, political leadership should be emphasized, accompanied by drumbeats and gongs.

Each commune should establish a specialized transport team, equipped with improved tools, drawing personnel directly from the industrial front. The size of these teams should be determined by actual needs. Commercial departments at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels should also organize their own transport units.

A balanced allocation of labor across all sectors is essential. Our goal is to achieve equilibrium among agriculture, industry, transportation, and service industries. Within industry, further subdivision is necessary: state-run enterprises, locally run enterprises, and commune-run enterprises are all problematic—for example, in repair shops or flour mills. Raising livestock is best left to production teams or communal kitchens rather than to the commune as a whole.

Has communism been postponed? Indeed, it has. The Sixth Plenary Session resolution spoke of a timeframe ranging from ten to twenty years, contingent upon the fulfillment of five conditions. Some comrades still harbor impatience, hoping to accelerate the process. In my view, the more hurriedly one tries to advance, the less likely success becomes. Proceeding slowly, however, may ultimately lead more swiftly to our objective. Attempting to build communism through “uncompensated” means is untenable. There is only one pig; if you have it, someone else does not. All forms of labor inherently involve equivalent exchange.

An accumulation rate of 18 percent is not low; it should be allowed to vary within a reasonable range.

In the past, chess games were played with a strong emphasis on top-down directives. Now, we need a more balanced approach, taking both higher and lower levels into account.

Who should oversee specialized teams? Specialized teams are needed at every level. Gradually, sectors yielding substantial profits might be nationalized and placed under public ownership. For instance, counties with exceptionally high incomes from fishing in Donghu Lake could pilot public ownership models, establishing one or two such enterprises. Results would be evaluated without seeking publicity if initial attempts prove unsuccessful.

Poorer teams should align themselves with wealthier ones, thereby raising their overall standard. Commune-run industries and enterprises must be developed to strengthen the commune’s basic property base. Housing construction should not be abandoned; buildings should be economical, aesthetically pleasing, and practical.

I believe we need to empower commune cadres by openly confronting conservative elements, allowing them to challenge us with arguments rooted in egalitarianism, landlordism, counter-revolutionary tendencies, and conservatism. Ultimately, these challenges merely reflect our own practices of equalization, reallocation, and requisition.

There may be situations where wages cannot be paid.

The commune’s ownership structure comprises three tiers of ownership and three-tiered management, with independent profit-and-loss accounting at each level.

Our primary opposition is to egalitarianism and excessive centralization, which constitute a form of “leftist” adventurism. The An Guo document merits close attention. In previous years, food shortages were mainly driven by affluent middle peasants; this year, however, grassroots cadres have taken the lead. Claims that inadequate propaganda efforts are to blame ring hollow. In truth, as long as equalization, reallocation, and requisition persist, effective propaganda will avail little. The masses perceive that everything must be collectivized and communized. Coupled with smaller communes selling grain while larger ones block payments, this leads to a situation where both money and grain vanish. Some high-yielding brigades even face increased procurement quotas, leaving cadres utterly baffled. As a result, grassroots officials harbor five principal fears: first, equalization; second, being required to report accurate yields and subsequently facing additional tasks; third, having to manage food shortages during the lean season; fourth, suffering personal losses; and fifth… Thus, they act preemptively, seizing grain whenever possible. Their resolve is admirable, supported as it is by widespread popular backing, leading to widespread concealment of output and unauthorized private division of crops.

The documents released at the Henan Conference could be distributed to various localities, withholding them for the first two or three days to create confusion. After four or five days, they could be gradually shared, with certain provisions potentially resolving existing problems.

This conference represents a concrete elaboration and supplement to the decisions of the Sixth Plenary Session.

The spirit of the Shanxi document lies in recognizing and tolerating differences between administrative districts. Rather than hastily eliminating these disparities, the aim should be to dissolve them naturally through the development of production. Allowing such differences to persist now is precisely intended to facilitate their eventual eradication. People’s Communes should promote production and increase accumulation, while providing appropriate support to lagging units. However, imposing uniform wage standards would reduce the income of more advanced districts, thereby diminishing their capacity for accumulation. It would also cause backward districts to neglect sound economic accounting, resorting instead to patchwork solutions—pumping resources from prosperous areas to prop up weaker ones—rather than genuinely supporting poorer communities. By temporarily preserving these differences, we can better foster the accumulation of communal resources and encourage both rich and poor units to maximize their respective potentials. The faster communal accumulation grows, the quicker these disparities will disappear. The key lies in aligning poorer teams with wealthier ones and increasing communal reserves. These two measures together will accelerate overall development. Nevertheless, due to variations in managerial competence and differing levels of productivity among districts, such disparities are likely to endure—a natural consequence of diversity in material conditions and subjective effort. Natural environments and individual initiatives differ vastly. Even within the Earth, temperature gradients exist between its core and surface. The process of eliminating these differences parallels the gradual transition from collective to public ownership, as well as mechanization and electrification—taking anywhere from three to six years. The ownership structures of communes and production teams are intertwined, with mutual overlap and gradual transformation; some teams may be the first to transition entirely to public ownership.

Next year, we should produce one million tons of steel, followed by two million tons the following year, with a portion of the surplus allocated to agricultural mechanization.

A subsidy of one billion yuan should be earmarked specifically for agricultural investment.

Wages are determined by the commune and disbursed through the administrative district. To clarify the extent of the commune’s authority, a detailed ledger should be maintained. This does not imply that the commune’s power is weak; rather, it suggests that authority is granted without corresponding responsibility.

Provinces, prefectures, and counties should each draft a model charter, and every commune should adopt its own charter. Provinces should select two or three outstanding examples to share. Each county should focus on developing a single exemplary charter, while each province should compile a consolidated version. Understanding a commune does not require extensive time; a week is sufficient. Practicality and evidence of overfulfillment are crucial. While these guidelines may seem rudimentary—mere outlines or loose collections of ideas—they nonetheless provide a useful framework. However, presenting nothing at all would be equally undesirable.

Concealed production and unauthorized private division are entirely justified when motivated by parochial interests. We cannot simply turn against five hundred million farmers and grassroots cadres. Concealment of output and vigilance against external interference arise directly from the “communist wind.” The widespread practice of concealing production, standing guard, and sending up smoke signals at night constitutes a form of peaceful resistance. Wearing the “parochial hat” is not universally condemned. Whether a particular stance qualifies as parochial or not depends on context. To address parochialism, we must first critically examine our own shortcomings, then encourage self-criticism among active members, mobilize broad participation in self-reflection, and isolate those who stubbornly cling to parochialism without engaging in self-examination, as well as individuals involved in corruption. By tackling corruption alongside broader organizational rectification, we can delay immediate action and prioritize fostering a positive, proactive mindset.