To nurture new forces—how can we produce good documents without young people?

In the past, didn’t some people say there was no future in the military? The military still has a future. "Train soldiers for a thousand days to use them in a single morning": there is a future in wartime. Even in peacetime, there is a future—you can become a versatile person, specialize in one area while mastering many skills, and learn many useful techniques.

Does shelling Jinmen affect troop morale? Or should we stop? (Answer: The troops are in high spirits.) When individualism flares up again, we’ll give them another round. Do you all approve of our policy in the Taiwan Strait region? Is it very popular? If we want it, we take it all; if not, we take none. We’re not taking just Jinmen. Dulles says the Chinese are hard to talk to and have no interest in Jinmen and Mazu. If Dulles abandons Jinmen and Mazu and leaves, what should we do? Think about it—you are all politicians. One approach is to go and occupy them; we could control half the Taiwan Strait, facilitating north-south maritime transport. Another is not to go, creating a no-man’s land to show our interest is not here but in Taiwan. At that time, there will surely be a lot of public opinion, reluctant to let go. If we don’t go, it’s very likely Chiang Kai-shek will come and occupy them again—that’s even better. We don’t want him to leave. Once we start shelling, Chiang Kai-shek has a reason to stay. He’ll say, "Look, the Communists are still shelling, and we’re withdrawing under fire." How embarrassing for you Americans!

Right now, many cadres and soldiers can’t figure it out—why do we refer to "our side and your side with mutual respect"? Why not strike the enemy’s headquarters? Why do we still agree to supply them "for a solid defense" when they request it? Comrades, you can discuss this. If the enemy in Jinmen really asks us for supplies, that would be a good thing—we can afford to support that handful of troops.

△ During this military industry conference, we can take one day to discuss the situation. In the past, comrades at the People’s Daily couldn’t figure out our policy on Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu, and comrades at Xinhua News Agency couldn’t either. After Premier Zhou’s report and separate studies, they finally got it. At this political work conference, we can have a day of free airing of views and lively debate. This is a political issue, an international situation—without addressing the situation, political work is hard to do. The old routine was: first, talk about the international situation; second, talk about the domestic situation; third, talk about our own unit. In the past, there was some formalism in that, but if we do none of it, that’s not good either. The situation issue should be discussed for at least one day.

△ The four-power joint administration of Berlin was agreed to by Stalin when the German-Soviet war ended and the Soviet Union was utterly exhausted. Ambassador Yudin once told me. In the Soviet-German war, the Soviet Union lost 20 million people, possibly including men, women, old, and young in the war zones. The Soviet Union has a population of nearly 200 million; let’s say there were 50 million able-bodied men, and 10 million of them died in combat. That’s no small matter. For the Soviet comrades, for Stalin to achieve such a victory in those years was already remarkable. Why did Stalin not want us to fight the Kuomintang? Because the Kuomintang was backed by the Americans. On one hand, he exaggerated America’s strength; on the other, he underestimated us. Later, Stalin admitted he was wrong (summer of 1949). He once asked so-and-so whether his words had any influence in China. So-and-so said they had no influence, because what he proposed was neither carried out by us nor could it be. One Communist Party dictating to another—what a strange thing. Because by then there was no Third International anymore. Actually, if Chiang Kai-shek insists on fighting you, what can you do but fight back? … The Americans also fear us—fear we’ll act recklessly, fear we’re not afraid to die. They know the rest—it’s nothing more than hand grenades and so on. They also fear our future. This year, steel output doubles, grain output is so high. If we really get seven or eight years to develop, it will be extraordinary.

△ Dulles fears the people’s communes, and fears them deeply. He’s always studying the people’s communes and scolds us on two points: one is breaking up families, the other is forced labor. These are also issues soldiers care about. Should families be broken up? Is that really an issue? Is labor forced? Like how Chiang Kai-shek forced the common people, or is it voluntary? I’d say it’s basically voluntary labor—the common people see that labor like this quickly increases production. As long as we let them get enough sleep, eight hours a day. If it has to be forced, you’d have to force them not to sleep.

In the past, going to work was laissez-faire—straggling in one by one. We adopted military methods, ready to set out in ten minutes—is that possible? Setting out quickly, neat and orderly. Is it better to be neat and orderly, or better to straggle in one by one? In the past, every household cooked separately—one cooked early, another late—and heading to work took three hours in scattered fashion. Now, eating in a single dining hall and discussing matters makes political and ideological work convenient too. Going to work neat and orderly takes only an hour.

△ At the political work conference, we need to talk about the people’s commune issue and see what problems there are. (Responses from the crowd: housing issues, men and women living separately…) Separate living for a few weeks—if you’re out camping, how can you not live separately? This people’s commune movement is going more smoothly than cooperativization. Moving from individual to collective is harder. Which change is bigger—cooperativization or the current one?

△ (When discussing democratic practices in the troops) Only the magistrate is allowed to start fires, but the common people aren’t allowed to light a lamp. In our well-disciplined army, it’s still like this—yet a commune that’s just been started, if there are a few shortcomings, everyone chatters and criticizes. Is that fair? In the past, we had the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention. If you neglect them for three months, they’re completely forgotten, and chaos ensues. Shouldn’t we work on them every day, every week?

Small pots should still be restored. You can stir-fry dishes and cook rice—large collectives, small freedoms! Eliminating all liberalism won’t work.

Rural work cadres with simplistic leadership methods need to be persuaded and educated. In the past, army officers saw hitting soldiers as the last resort when soldiers didn’t obey. Later, we implemented the rule that officers don’t hit soldiers. Many squad leaders then felt at a loss. Through persuasion and education, they gradually changed. With persuasion and education, soldiers can still be led. Didn’t the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Red Army produce a document? Looking at that document now, how could it compare to today’s level of progress? There were so many problems, but they weren’t fully addressed.

A commune leader has to lead 500 people—effectively a battalion. There are men, women, old, and young. It’s not as easy to lead as an army.

Last year’s On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People stated that the First Five-Year Plan established cooperatives, and the Second Five-Year Plan would consolidate them. Now, from 1956 to 1958, plus next year, within four years we aim to get the people’s communes on track. We need to teach cadres to lead these people—men, women, old, and young—managing production, daily life, ideology, morale, and material needs.

Turn the former district and township cadres into commune cadres. With the integration of government and commune, county governments can be abolished, and county-level cadres turned into cadres of the county-level commune federation. The county party committee is essentially the party committee of the county federation, plus cadres sent down to lower levels.

When King Wu conquered King Zhou, he implemented three transformations: organization along military lines, action along combat lines, and life along collectivist lines. Back then, marching from Shaanxi to northern Henan—could everyone cook for themselves? They needed those three transformations. Jiang Taigong served as political commissar, and King Wu was the commander. That was probably still in the slave era. The three transformations were invented by the military. How can you fight a war without organizing along military lines? Armies have always been composed of peasants and handicraft workers. Why can public dining halls be run well in the military but not in villages? Does Guangzhou have public dining halls? Have any deaths occurred? (Zhu Guang answers: We have dining halls, and those who died deserved to die.) Public dining halls don't cause deaths, don't make people thinner—in fact, people even gain a little weight. This definitely can't be a mistake of principle.

I didn’t expect to launch people’s communes this year, nor did I think of setting up public dining halls in the countryside. The imperialists spread rumors, saying all this was my idea.

Some things can be anticipated, but others are very hard to foresee. In 1955, when we drafted the Forty-Point Program for Agricultural Development, who foresaw the "anti-rash advance" in 1956, or that in 1956, with Stalin’s exposure and the Polish-Hungarian incidents, within one or two weeks chaos would erupt worldwide? That was a bad thing, unforeseen. There are many things I didn’t foresee, like this year’s Great Leap Forward. Last September, the Central Committee Plenum revived the slogan of "more, faster, better, cheaper." From last winter to this spring, we launched a massive campaign of manure accumulation and water conservancy construction. As a result, grain output increased by … jin or more, totaling … hundred million jin; after cutting … hundred million jin, it’s calculated at … hundred million jin, with a safety margin. I didn’t foresee this. The people’s communes were also unforeseen. At the Nanning Conference, the Chengdu Conference, the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress, and the Beidaihe Conference, nobody thought of people’s communes. Even in July, I hadn’t considered it.

The issue of doubling steel output—I was chatting about it at the swimming pool with Comrade Wang X X. I said, "Let’s give it a try," and he issued the order. I didn’t expect it to truly double.

Then there’s the change in the military. In January this year, when I spoke with a few military comrades, Comrade Luo Ronghuan said there was a sense of falling behind. The civilian sector had moved forward, but the military still had some problems. For many years, I hadn’t paid much attention to military affairs, but solving problems was actually very easy. The Military Commission held a 55-day meeting, then the military regions, armies, and divisions met, and the problems were quickly resolved. Hasn’t the atmosphere changed now? Isn’t there hope? The eight documents at this political work conference—were they planned last year? I don’t believe so. They emerged precisely on the basis of this year’s developing situation. The Great Leap Forward, cadres serving as soldiers, and the massive development of militias all began after the Beidaihe Conference. In just over a month, Beijing organized dozens of militia divisions. Many things are like this. Many good and bad things can’t be fully predicted in advance—only roughly anticipated.

(When discussing the need to see two possibilities in any issue) The bad thing is nothing more than fighting a world war and dropping atomic bombs. We don’t have a single one. Another bad thing is a split in the Communist Party, into two or three central committees. Some provincial party committees splitting into two is possible—doesn’t Guangdong have a provincial party secretary who wants to split? Is there still a danger of our country being destroyed? If we’re unprepared, we’d be passive. Lenin never shied away from this; he often said: either victory or destruction. There are still imperialists this big, and this issue hasn’t been resolved globally. Either the imperialists perish or we do. The 12 socialist countries, China and the Soviet Union included, share a common fate. In any case, there are two possibilities: one is victory, the other is temporary destruction, partial destruction. Nursing homes and public dining halls could also partially collapse. That’s not bad—the failure of these parts has benefits; we can learn lessons from it.

If you’re prepared for collapse, you won’t collapse, or at least the collapse will be less severe. You can carry out rectification and education. If you’re not prepared for collapse, that’s dangerous.

Commune members have the freedom to withdraw. We didn’t write this into the resolution this time. Factory workers can switch factories. Anshan Steel is so huge—if a worker wanted to set up an Anshan Steel on his own, that’d be very difficult.

What I’ve just described might seem inconsistent with arguments like "the east wind prevails over the west wind" and "imperialism is a paper tiger." It’s still consistent.

Because everything has two possibilities: consolidation or collapse—nurseries, nursing homes, communes, even provincial party committees and the People’s Republic of China. Total collapse won’t happen; we can always engage in guerrilla warfare, and we still have militias in hand. We could go back to Yan’an, or head to Sichuan, to Yunnan. I’ve talked about this with democratic personages, and they just smile. I told them, "You need to prepare—will you stay in Beijing to run a preservation committee, or come with us to fight guerrilla warfare?" This might seem inconsistent with the idea that U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger. But a paper tiger doesn’t mean it’s already dead; without a fight, it won’t die. If King Wu hadn’t conquered King Zhou, King Zhou wouldn’t have fallen. Imperialism is still alive. Through struggle, it eventually dies. Struggle is required—there will be twists and turns, and things won’t be without storms.

There are two possibilities: one is not letting the enemy land. If they do land, we can defeat them. Or even if they land and occupy only a small part of the territory, that cannot be called the collapse of the People's Republic of China. In the Soviet-German war, German troops reached Moscow and the gates of Leningrad, but that wasn’t the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it was dangerous. The second possibility must also be factored in—there will be losses, partial and temporary.

The ruling classes of the U.S., Britain, France, and West Germany are at odds, which is advantageous for us. The bourgeoisie is divided into two parts: there are contradictions between the Western bourgeoisie and Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno. The quarrels in the Western world do not carry a revolutionary character; Nasser’s anti-imperialism is revolutionary, but while opposing imperialism, their own countries still have reactionary elements, like the right wing in Indonesia.

Looking at all national factors together, the element of consolidation comes first. It’s possible there won’t be a war for seven, ten, or fifteen years, but we can’t write a guarantee—there’s still a one-percent danger, which is why the Moscow Declaration included this risk.

A live tiger can transform into a dead tiger, an iron tiger into a tofu tiger. Consider both possibilities. Saying "the east wind prevails over the west wind" and "all imperialism is a paper tiger" becomes clear once you do. All of you here are basically healthy, but that doesn’t mean you won’t catch a cold once a year. Both sickness and health must be taken into account.

Are you prepared for these possibilities I have raised? There was a Party secretary from a prefectural committee in Henan who turned pale when he heard me say that the People's Republic of China still faces the danger of collapse. It would not be good if everyone remained unvigilant. U.S. affairs are managed by Dulles. Dulles is the political director of the U.S. government—its political commissar, or commissar and director of the political department. If any of you here were to become the Secretary of State of the United States, things would be much easier. Our translation of Dulles’s position as "Secretary of State" is incorrect; it is actually "State Secretary." The title does not matter; in reality, Dulles is Eisenhower’s political commissar, Eisenhower’s soul. Dulles is a "good man" who has done many "good deeds," greatly benefiting the unity of the proletariat and the struggle against imperialism. If he had not landed in Lebanon, where would we have found such vivid material to educate the people of the world? As soon as we fired the cannons, he brought naval fleets from everywhere, "concentrating a great many fleets in one place"—as Dulles said at the Paris conference. We had not anticipated that firing the cannons at Kinmen would stir up the whole world like this.

My speech also has two possibilities: some may agree, some may disagree—it can be discussed. A person also has two possibilities: to live on, or to die. The Guangzhou Military Region transported a great deal of supplies with a thousand trucks within three months—that is a good thing—but there were ×× casualties. Had you thought of that beforehand? A county Party secretary was injured; did he expect it beforehand either? Partial, temporary losses must always be prepared for at any time. After three months, there must always be some progress; can we keep going like this forever?

During the war in Korea, when studying the situation, there were times when we felt we didn’t have many ideas. Wasn’t a division partly eaten up at the 38th parallel? Wasn’t that a live tiger? It can devour people. Tactically and in concrete work, absolutely never underestimate the enemy; you must never relax your vigilance in the slightest.