(1) Start with writing reports. Comrades from twelve central ministries have written twelve reports. All Central Committee members and alternate members present at the meeting are asked to read them, discuss them, and make revisions. I was very pleased after reading the articles. The line remains the same line, and the spirit remains the same spirit. But the basis for the targets is insufficient. They only talk about what is possible, without providing the grounds. They say producing 400 million tons is possible, but why is it possible? The targets must be earnestly studied. We must be more solid in our approach. The report on electric power is very well written. Who wrote it—Li Baohua, Liu Lantao? Liu Lantao isn’t here. Without electric power, nothing can be accomplished among those present. Central Committee members should all look at it. It can also be distributed to the party secretaries and factory directors of eighteen key enterprises, so they can all read it and gain an overall perspective. Some articles, after revision, could even be published in newspapers, letting the people know. There’s nothing secret about this. I say we should compress the air, not reduce the air—matter is indestructible. The air is that much; it’s just compressed, turning into liquid or solid form. The issue of overcoming bottlenecks—let’s clarify it further and specify when the bottlenecks can be overcome. When can they be overcome? Next March, April, or May—give reasons and evidence (for example, the two ends of metallurgical equipment—mining and steel-rolling equipment—have not yet overcome their bottlenecks). Regarding machinery compatibility, why can’t it be coordinated? Exactly when can it be fully coordinated? What’s the basis? Discuss it with your second-in-command. Another example: the technology for Western-style furnaces and native iron—when and by what method will it be solved? Another example: what to do about insufficient electric power? Now a way out has been found—self-construction, self-production, self-prepared power plants. Factories, mines, government offices, schools, and army units should all generate their own electricity, utilizing water, fire, wind, and gas (biogas). This is something pioneered in the Northeast. Will all regions adopt the same approach? How much will it solve? Shall we discuss these twelve reports for another two or three days, and then set about revising them? The supplementary evidence must mainly demand solid reliability. Revise the targets again.

Now we have established a practice: focus on things four times a year, with the central and local authorities conducting inspections together and deliberating jointly. Arrange next year’s affairs this year, setting up the basic framework in advance. Next year, tackle it once each in spring, summer, autumn, and winter. This year we had the Nanning Conference, the Chengdu Conference, the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, the Beidaihe Conference, the Zhengzhou Conference, and this Wuchang Conference—that counts as six times. The Nanning Conference was all boastful talk, resolving mutual relationships. The Chengdu Conference had concrete substance, resolving some specific problems. The Wuchang Conference is a continuation of the Chengdu Conference.

(2) On the issue of comrades from provincial, municipal, and autonomous regional party committees writing reports. Comrades from the central ministries have written twelve reports. Comrades from the provincial and municipal party committees—if none of you write any, that won’t do. We must apply a little pressure. Is it possible for each of you to write one? No one says anything. This pressure might kill someone. How about each person writes one next time? Five or six thousand words, or seven or eight thousand words—one-sidedness or comprehensiveness is fine, as long as the first secretary personally does it. Even if not physically writing, one must use one’s brain, speak up, and make touch-ups and fixes. Were the ministers personally involved in writing the reports from the central ministries? The next meeting convenes on February 1 next year. These articles must be submitted before January 25 for review, to be printed and distributed at the meeting, where they can be discussed and revised. The provincial party congresses should hold summary meetings. Too many issues won’t work—if you present a hundred issues, no one will read it. Eliminate ninety-nine, write about a few issues or just one, at most no more than ten issues. There must be prominent points. People have various systems (digestive system, reproductive system…), and local work also has many systems. Therefore, some things can be omitted, some require a brief mention, and some must be highlighted and emphasized.

Our line remains: go all out, aim high, and build socialism with greater, faster, better, and more economical results. The method remains putting politics in command, the mass line, simultaneous development on several fronts, plus combining indigenous and modern methods, and so on.

(3) Let’s discuss last night’s issue. Take steel as the key link to drive everything forward. What exactly is the best target for steel? The Beidaihe Conference set it at 27 to 30 million tons, but that was advisory. This time we must decide. Steel at 27 million tons—I approve. At 30 million tons—I also approve. Even more is fine too. The question is: can it be achieved, and is there evidence? The Beidaihe Conference didn’t resolve this issue because it wasn’t mature. Last year, 5.35 million tons, all good steel. This year, doubled to 10.7 million tons of steel—that was a risky plan. As a result, 60 million people were mobilized, everything else had to step aside, leading to extreme tension. In one county in Hubei, a batch of pigs was transported to Xiangyang Prefecture but couldn’t be moved further and were just left there. Xiangyang had a lot of local special products and iron that couldn’t be shipped out, and industrial goods needed by the peasants couldn’t be shipped in. The steel marshal itself couldn’t even get through. The roughly three months of experience since the Beidaihe Conference are very useful to us. Setting next year’s target at 27 to 30 million tons cannot be achieved. Can we lower the target? I propose not doubling again next year, just doubling once—is there certainty about reaching 22 million tons? Two nights ago, I called Li Fuchun, XXX, XXX, and a few other comrades to study whether 18 million tons is certain. The evidence they gave still doesn’t convince me. I’m now standing on an opportunist’s position and struggling for this. Whether my backside gets spanked has nothing to do with you—it’s just that possibly another saddle-shaped curve will emerge in the future. In the past, everyone opposed my ‘rash advance.’ Here today, I’m not opposing anyone else’s ‘rash advance.’ Last night’s discussion seemed to indicate 18 million tons is certain and can be achieved with effort. That shouldn’t be called rash advance. Next year’s good steel at 18 million tons—this year’s 11 million tons of steel includes only 8.5 million tons of good steel. Doubling 8.5 million tons gives 17 million tons. 18 million tons is more than doubling. Can this be called opportunism? If you say I’m an opportunist, Marx will defend me and say I’m not an opportunist. Only if he says so does it count. He’d also say it’s a big rash advance. If it’s not a great leap forward, I won’t accept it. At 18 million tons, I still feel the evidence is insufficient, with many bottlenecks not yet overcome. When you write your articles, you must explain when which bottlenecks will be overcome—the bottlenecks in ore dressing, mining, crushing, smelting, transportation, quality. Some won’t be overcome until next January, February, or March, April, May, June. Now, some places have no stockpiles for the next day (coal, iron, ore). Some factories, due to transport difficulties, currently can’t get ‘food delivered.’ This takes steel as an example; other sectors are all in the same boat. When exactly can some of these bottlenecks be overcome? If there’s no certainty, we have to press downward—15 million tons is also acceptable. If there’s certainty, then 18 million tons; with more certainty, 22 million tons; with even more certainty, 25 million tons, 30 million tons—I’m all for it. The problem is whether there’s certainty. Yesterday, comrades endorsed 18 million tons, saying it’s certain. The Northeast last year had about 3.5 million tons; this year originally planned 6 million, but achieved 5 million. Next year it’s only preparing for 7.15 million tons, yet also says with effort it can reach 8 million. I think if we’re talking about opportunism, that’s the real opportunism. But in the Soviet Union, he’d gain power, because this year is only 5 million tons, next year 8 million—that’s a 60% increase, more than half a times increase—semi-opportunism. North China last year only 0.6 million tons, this year 1.5 million, next year planning 4 million—this year’s increase is 1.7 times. That’s Marxism. Next year planning 4 million tons—how many times Marxism is that? Can you pull it off? Explain your basis: why produce so much next year? East China last year 0.22 million tons, this year 1.2 million (plus bad steel, 1.6 million), next year 4 million, a more than twofold increase. Shanghai is truly proletarian—no coal, no iron, just 50,000 people. Central China last year 0.17 million tons, this year 0.5 million, next year 2 million, a threefold increase. This fellow originally had tremendous boldness, planning for 3 million tons. As long as everyone works hard, overcomes those bottlenecks, it can succeed. No one opposes it, and we’ll hold a celebration rally. Southwest last year 0.2 million tons, this year 0.7 million, next year 2 million, a twofold increase. Northwest last year only 14,000 tons—less than Chiang Kai-shek. This year 50,000 tons—surpassing Chiang Kai-shek. Next year 0.7 million tons, a thirteenfold increase. Is there any opportunism in there? South China last year 2,000 tons, this year 60,000 tons, a thirtyfold increase—Marxism grows higher the further south you go. Next year 0.6 million tons, a tenfold increase.

These figures must be further verified, each with its own evidence. Comrade Fuchun, please verify them: how much this year, how much next year, not just a reckless shout. These figures merely prove it’s not opportunism, with no danger of expulsion from the Party. Nationwide total next year: 21.3 million tons. The problem is whether it can definitely be achieved. We must build in many safety margins. 18 million tons as the first ledger, to be approved at the National People’s Congress, and genuinely struggle for it. We must also make ideological preparations. If we can only produce 15 million tons of good steel, plus another 3 million tons of native steel, I’d also be satisfied.

First ledger: 18 million tons. Second ledger: 22 million tons. Taking this as an example, all departments’ targets must be reduced accordingly. For example, power generation—develop small indigenous clusters, generating for self-use. Where coercion was already used, adopt the method of withholding provisions. Another example, railways: originally planned only 20,000 km in five years, now aiming for 20,000 km in just a few years. Need dictates need, but can so much be built? (XXX: In the first quarter next year, only 2.9 million tons of steel products, plus imports, barely 3 million tons, insufficient for distribution. Request 30,000 tons, can only give 10,000.) Lü Zhengcao, what will you do without steel? (Lü: Can use ductile cast iron.) The Chengdu Conference planned 20,000 km in five years; now in 1958 alone, 20,000 km were built. XXX’s boldness is great. I’m very pleased, but the question is whether it can be accomplished, whether there’s certainty. You must find the basis. What methods do you have? (His method is to have localities build their own.) (XXX: For months we’ve seen only things, not people. Reading the ministries’ reports gave us a shock—couldn’t write.) There’s a contradiction. XXX, you’ve truly resolved it ideologically: the central authorities can boast, but the burden is pressed onto the localities. (XX: The task is the third ledger. Wuhan Steel requires 75,000 tons, totaling 155,000 tons, but the central authorities only give 70,000 tons, so those projects cannot be completed.) Without rice, even the cleverest housewife cannot cook. The peasants have all sorts of ways to resist us. For instance, the district office, just to fill out statistical forms, specially designates a false reporter whose sole job is to fill out these forms. Because higher-ups absolutely demand reports, and reporting too little looks bad. All the way up, the higher-ups believe it’s true, when in fact nothing happened. I think there are quite a few such problems now. This year, are there really 8.5 million tons of good steel—truly existing or just reported upwards? Is there no falsity? What cannot be dispatched upward is false. I think the actual amount is not that large. (XXX, XXX: For good steel, no one dares to report falsely. Small indigenous clusters are unreliable.)

(4) The problem of falsification. The resolution on communes from the Zhengzhou Conference should be revised into a directive, and a separate clause should be added specifically on the issue of falsification. The original two sentences are insufficient—this needs to be a dedicated clause. Placed under working methods, no one will take notice. Now, with all the clamor to "launch satellites" and vie for prestige, who cares about falsification or not? If there isn’t enough output, they just fabricate it. There was a commune that only had a hundred pigs but borrowed two hundred large pigs to impress visitors, then returned them afterward. If you have a hundred, that’s a hundred—if not, accept it; why engage in fakery? In the past, when reporting victories in battle, there were similar instances with prisoner counts. They inflated achievements to boost momentum—ordinary people found it reassuring, while our enemies found it laughable. Later, we opposed it, issuing repeated orders and education on the importance of honesty, and only then did they dare not falsify anymore. But is it really that honest? People’s hearts are not aligned; I think there’s still some falsification. Some people in this world are simply not that honest. I suggest having a frank talk with the county party secretaries and commune party secretaries: be truthful, and do not falsify. If things are not where they should be, so be it—losing face is not a big deal; don’t chase empty prestige. Take literacy campaigns: they claim to wipe out illiteracy in six months or a year. I don’t quite believe even two years; eliminating it by the second five-year plan would be good enough. Or consider afforestation—"greening" every year, yet never actually greening, the more they claim it, the fewer trees we see. They say the "four pests" are eliminated and call it a "four-free village," when in fact it’s a "four-present village." When tasks come from above, they always report completion. In this world, nothing is without falsification; where there is truth, there must be falsehood. Without comparing falsehood, how could truth stand out? That’s just human nature. The serious problem now is not only that lower levels falsify, but that we believe them—from the central government, provinces, and regions down to the counties, mainly the first three levels—and this is dangerous. If we disbelieved everything, that would be opportunism. The masses have indeed achieved results—why would we deny those? But believing falsifications also leads to mistakes. For example, 11 million tons of steel: saying there’s not even 10,000 tons is certainly wrong, but do we really have that much? Or grain—exactly how much is there? XXX, you’re the field marshal, you’ve calculated the accounts. Some say 900 billion jin—does that hold up? (XXX: 750 to 800 billion jin, roughly.) (XXX: Saying 900 billion jin is already a 30% discount.) (Li Xiannian: 750 billion jin is there.) Last year it was 370 billion jin, and this year 750 billion—that’s a doubling; that would be extraordinary. Even if things are discarded, it’s no great loss—matter is indestructible; it just turns into fertilizer. The peasants are very mindful and, I hear, go back for a second harvest.

If we compare, falsification results; if we don’t compare, there’s no competition. A competition method must be set. There must be inspections and tests, like those for export goods, examined under a microscope. How much moisture is in a jin of grain? How many pests? If it doesn’t meet standards, it fails. Economic undertakings must be made increasingly meticulous, deeper, more practical, and more scientific. This is entirely different from writing poetry—one must understand the difference between composing poetry and managing economic affairs. "Holding up Lake Caohu as a water ladle"—that’s a poetic line. I haven’t tried lifting it; perhaps you Anhui folks have. How could it be lifted? Inspections must also pay attention to work style, keeping in mind that some falsification may be undetectable even with checks. Just hold a meeting, and arrangements are made. I hope the central, provincial, and regional levels understand this principle and keep clear heads. Now, generally speaking, achievements reported should be discounted. A 30-70 split—three parts false and seven true out of ten—would that be underestimating achievements? Or show distrust toward cadres and the masses? There must be some distrust, at least no less than 10 percent false, and some cases are 100 percent false. Sometimes, things are reported done before they’re even started. (Jiang Weiqing: The masses know.) What you say about a county or province—the masses only know about their own village. This is the bad kind of falsification. Then there’s the good kind, falsification to be welcomed. For example, underreporting output—this is a contradiction with its merits. Cadres want to overreport, while the common people underreport. The cleverness lies in this. Some areas have suffered losses by overreporting—when higher levels demand more, they say there’s none left. There’s another kind of falsification, also well done, directed against subjectivism and forced commands. A cadre sent down from Zhongnanhai wrote back, saying that the cooperative had ordered the uprooting of 300 mu of corn to plant sweet potatoes, with a requirement of 1.5 million seedlings per mu, but the corn had already grown taller than a person. The masses thought it a pity, so they didn’t uproot; only 30 mu was cleared, yet they reported it as 300 mu. This kind of false report is good. XXX said that in his hometown, on the first day of the lunar new year, they were made to water wheat, forbidden to rest. The common people, with no choice, resorted to fakery: at night they placed lanterns in the fields while actually resting at home. Seeing lanterns everywhere, the cadres thought no one was resting. In a county in Hubei, they demanded day-and-night toil. At night, no sleep was allowed, but the people needed rest. They had children act as sentries; when cadres approached, everyone got up and made a show, and once the cadres left, they slept again. This too is good falsification. In short, such cases are, I think, quite numerous. We must keep clear heads and conduct education—do not be deceived and do not issue forced commands. There’s now an air of only highlighting achievements and ignoring shortcomings; shortcomings are embarrassing, and speaking the truth gets no audience. If you say a cow’s tail grows from its rear, nobody listens; say it grows from its head, and that’s news. By falsifying and multiplying claims, there’s glory. We must educate—make it clear: be honest and aim to do well within a few years. I think that after some years, once things are on track, we can be relatively solid.

Make a list of the key steel projects now under construction or already built, with details by province and quantities. I’d like to revisit our past thinking—perhaps it’s opportunism. We once envisioned 30 million tons next year, 60 million the year after, and 100 million by 1961–62. Now, coming back to it, suppose next year we only achieve 18 million tons and 30 million the year after; after three years of hard struggle, surpassing West Germany to become third in the world would be excellent. In 1961 and 1962, what annual increases? If we add 10 million tons each year, the second five-year plan would reach 50 million tons, or 53.5 million—a tenfold increase over 1957. Would that still be called opportunism? If Marx were to curse us as opportunists, we’d disown him. Needs and possibilities—both are issues. For the five-year plan, several scenarios must be prepared; 30 million tons cannot yet serve as the first scenario until we see next year’s results. If we all work hard, with correct leadership, breaking superstitions, combining indigenous and foreign methods, integrating large, medium, and small scales, and rallying full effort, achieving 30 million tons in five years would be very good; exceeding that, even better. … Overall, the technical barrier and other hurdles—I doubt they’ll be cleared in just one year; it will take at least a year. If they’re all overcome, that’s certainly great. Machine tools: during the first five-year plan, we had 200,000 units; this year, 80,000; next year, 180,000 to 200,000; the year after, 250,000 to 300,000. In essence, the original next-year plan is postponed by one year. With three years’ hard struggle, a total of 800,000 units would surpass Japan. In 1961 and 1962, producing another 600,000 would bring the total to 1.4 million—a jump from 260,000 to 1.5 million, which would be very good. If steel output is only 50 million tons, 1.5 million machine tools aren’t needed; around 1.1 million would suffice.

Steel distribution must be prioritized in this order: first, machinery production (with machine tools at the top, followed by equipment), second, railway and transportation, and third, agriculture.

It is very necessary to lower these projections. Over two five-year plans plus three years, reaching over 50 million tons would give us thirteen years, equivalent to forty years in the Soviet Union. By 1939, in twenty years, the Soviet Union only managed 18 million tons of steel. Our projection of 50 million tons of steel and 1.1 million machine tools would be vastly superior. The reasons: 1) a vast country with a large population, 2) three simultaneous developments as per the Party’s line, and 3) Soviet experience. Without the third factor, it wouldn’t work. In twenty years, the Soviet Union achieved 18 million tons; in thirteen years, we’d reach 50 million tons. Thinking this way, it’s still worth it. There’s a touch of opportunism, but not much—perhaps more realistic.

Agriculture could advance very quickly; with one more year, regarding grain, reaching 1.5 trillion jin would allow the peasants to rest, even take a year’s break. Grain would overflow, though cotton certainly wouldn’t. (XX: In agricultural policy, if grain reaches 1,500–2,000 jin per person, isn’t that enough? To consolidate communes, we need tradable goods, shifting focus to cash crops and boosting commodities.) (Zeng Xisheng: We worry about crop surplus.) (XX: Oil-bearing crops have outlets.) Correct. Hebei can go from 1,100 jin to 1,500; Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Anhui from 1,500 jin to 2,000, and that’s fine. For cash crops, contracts must be signed—right at this meeting. We’ll do business here. Four-level contracts—central, provincial, county, and township—are to be set up, with national provinces dividing responsibilities: bamboo, timber, silk, tea, oil, and hemp—producing more is no problem.

(5) Break superstition, but do not break science as if it were superstition. For instance, humans must eat—this is science and cannot be abolished. No one has proven we can forgo eating. "Zhang Kept Away from Grains" but he still ate meat. Now, not allowing the masses their fill may be because figures are overreported. With 700–800 billion jin supposedly available, yet reluctant to let people eat more—perhaps the reporting was inflated. Those who don’t eat enough are not making leaps. Humans must sleep—that too is science. Animals always rest, and even bacteria need rest. The human heart beats 72 times a minute, over 100,000 times a day. Abolish eating and sleeping, and people will die. Beyond that, much superstition is being broken, but the result is people crushed by machinery. Humans dominate nature, wielding tools to act upon production targets; nature, as the object, resists, exerting a counterforce. That’s a scientific fact. Walking on Earth, it pushes back; otherwise, we’d be unable to walk. Crossing grasslands with little resistance makes for tough going—sinking into mud you can’t climb out; such fields need sand added. Nature’s resistance is a scientific truth—if you dismiss it, it can injure or crush you. The campaign to break superstition carries immense force, encouraging daring thought, speech, and action. But a small part has gone overboard, breaking even scientific truths, which must not happen. Taking just one hour’s sleep as an example: the directive is to break superstition, but science cannot be broken.

There must be an estimate of achievements versus false reporting. How much is true? We need to discuss it—whether a 30-70 or 20-80 split, take it back to discuss with the prefectural and county party committee comrades. Overestimating falsification leads to distrust of the masses, causing mistakes and discouragement; neglecting falsification also leads to mistakes. This is in general. In specific cases, some are entirely true, others entirely false. For example, literacy campaigns and pest elimination: hordes of illiterates remain, yet they’re reported eliminated; no afforestation occurred, yet it’s reported; "four-present" becomes "four-free," and so on. Analyze: superstition must be broken without exception; truth must be protected. Bourgeois legal rights can only be partially broken—such as the "three styles and five tendencies," excessive disparities, bureaucratic airs, outdated social relations— these must be shattered, the more thoroughly the better. Another part—like wage scales, superior-subordinate relationships, and a degree of state compulsion—cannot yet be broken. Six million people were marshaled to steelmaking; in Fuyang, with 50,000 people and no coal or iron, they still followed the Communist Party’s call without fail. Ordering six million people to make steel carries compulsion, forced by the Beidaihe Conference and four telephone meetings. Such compulsion—mandatory labor assignment—is still indispensable. If reports were free, if people could seek employment at will—some wanting to fish, paint, sing, or dance—if 100 million sang and 100 million painted, would there be any grain left? That would spell extinction. A portion of bourgeois legal rights must be broken, but a portion remains useful in socialism and must be preserved, serving socialist ends. Smashing them to pieces (as in the elimination of counterrevolutionaries during the civil war, when innocent people were arrested and battered) would lead to errors, placing us in a passive position and forcing us to acknowledge mistakes. For the useful part, if smashed and mishandled, we must apologize and restore it. Analyze which parts are useful and which must be broken. In the Soviet Union, what should be broken remains intact, stubbornly. We must break what needs breaking and protect what is useful.

(6) The Forty Articles: It’s best not to revise them this time; there’s no basis now, making them difficult to discuss.

(7) Who will enter communism first? Will the Soviet Union enter first, or will our country? Khrushchev proposed that within twelve years, conditions would be prepared for entering communism. They are very cautious, and we should also be somewhat cautious on this issue. Some say it is possible to enter communism in two, three, four, five, or seven years—is that feasible? If we are to enter, Anshan Iron and Steel should enter first, followed by Liaoning (of its 24 million people, 8 million live in cities), not other provinces. Next would be Lao Ke and Shanghai, but if they still have to wait for others, it cannot be considered an independent advance. ×××, Qin Zhang, and Fan County want to enter—isn't that too fast? Comrade Chen Boda was sent to investigate and said it would be difficult to enter. So far, no prefectures or provinces have claimed to be advanced and want to be cautious; it is only some counties acting as vanguard. How long will it take for all of China to enter communism? No one knows now, and it is hard to imagine—ten, fifteen, twenty, or thirty years? The Soviet Union took forty-one years, plus another twelve, making fifty-three years, and still said they were preparing the conditions. Is China really so formidable that we’ve only had nine years yet already harbor such ambition? Is this possible or not? Considering the interests of the world proletariat as a whole, it would be better for the Soviet Union to advance first. Perhaps on the centenary of the Paris Commune (1971), the Soviet Union will enter communism. What about us in twelve years? It might be possible, but I think it is impossible. Even if we are ready by 1968, ten years from now, we should still not enter. At least wait two or three years after the Soviet Union enters, so as not to cause the Party of Lenin and the nation of the October Revolution to lose face. Originally, it would also be acceptable to be able to enter but refrain from doing so, given our capabilities. Neither announce it nor publish in the newspapers that we have entered communism—wouldn’t that be deliberately falsifying it? That doesn’t matter. Many people think China might enter first because we have found the path of the people’s communes. Here, there is an impossibility, and there is also a "should not." (××: How can one enter communism eating sweet potatoes?) How can one enter with a wage of one yuan? These issues are not convenient for public discussion, but these ideas must be clearly explained within the Party.