Comments on the Report from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union Regarding Various Aspects of the Soviet Situation Since the Sino-Soviet Talks in Beijing (October 1958)

Comrade Liu Xiao [1] and his assistants are capable of thoughtful analysis. This document [2] may be read. Returned to Mao. Printed according to Mao Zedong’s manuscript.

Notes [1] Liu Xiao was then China’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union. [2] Refers to a report submitted by the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 20, 1958. The report stated that since the Sino-Soviet talks in Beijing, there have been several new developments in various areas within the Soviet Union, some of which merit attention.

First, in the realm of international struggle, the Soviet Union has, in line with the spirit of the joint communiqué from the Sino-Soviet talks, provided a more comprehensive exposition than previously on the issues of peace and war. Following Khrushchev’s return from Beijing, his subsequent public speeches and Soviet press propaganda consistently emphasized our correct stance: that we do not fear war and that peace cannot be begged for. The Soviet Union has made progress in its understanding of the trend whereby the Eastern wind is overcoming the Western wind; however, this understanding remains superficial. There is still an insufficient grasp of the dialectical relationship between war and peace, tension and détente, and a lack of proficiency in handling these dynamics. Concerns persist regarding the suddenness and destructive power of modern warfare, which even continue to dominate their guiding principles.

Second, in relations with China, as the policy orientations of the two countries have grown increasingly aligned, the Soviet Union has been cooperating more closely with China in international struggles. The Soviet Union now possesses a deeper appreciation and higher evaluation of China’s significant role in international affairs and its experience in socialist construction than before. China’s influence has already begun to manifest itself in certain policies, and they have gradually incorporated Chinese experiences. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union still lacks a thorough understanding of our Party’s strategic thinking and tactical approaches, as well as many new developments and ideas emerging in China’s current stage of development. They remain largely unfamiliar with the People’s Commune movement, the transition toward communism, the “no-fee” dining system, and the ongoing promotion of communist ideology.

Third, concerning the struggle against Yugoslav revisionism, the Soviet Union’s current stance generally remains confined to the policy outlined by Khrushchev in his speech at the Fifth Congress of the East German Communist Party: namely, that the Soviet Union will continue to combat Yugoslav revisionism without expanding the existing conflict or further deteriorating relations.

Fourth, the most prominent change in the domestic situation within the Soviet Union is the country’s heightened emphasis on accelerating the pace of construction. Both Khrushchev’s public addresses after returning from Beijing and the Soviet press have stressed the need to seize time and speed up development. The report further asserts that the overall trend of the Soviet situation continuing to evolve in a positive direction is certain. This evolution will primarily take the form of tortuous and gradual changes; however, the rate at which these changes occur will ultimately depend on the interplay of internal and external factors affecting the Soviet Union.