Comments on Wang Heshou’s [1] Report on Several Issues Concerning the Steel Industry
(October 30, 1958)


This document is very good. Comrade Peng Zhen [2] is requested to have it immediately circulated to the responsible comrades of all relevant units and taken along to Wuchang for distribution to all comrades attending the meeting [3]. This was written by me at the request of Comrade Heshou. I have also separately asked Comrade Zhao Erlu [4] to prepare a similar document. The departments concerned—coal, electricity, petroleum, chemical industry, forestry, building materials, railways, transportation, and others—are to be notified by the Secretariat to each of their responsible leaders to submit such a report. The documents should not be lengthy; what matters is that they clearly identify the problems.


Mao Zedong
October 30, 1958
[1]
Wang Heshou,
who at that time served as Minister of the Metallurgical Industry.
[2]


Refers to Wang Heshou’s report dated October 29, 1958, concerning several issues in the steel sector that required immediate action. The report stated that the mass campaign involving the entire Party and people to boost steel production had been underway for two months. Our observations from this ongoing movement are as follows:


(1) In just two months, we have resolved a fundamental issue in industrial development. Over the past two months, a genuine revolution has been taking place across China’s steel industry—and indeed throughout the entire industrial front. The essence of this revolution lies in launching large-scale industrial construction, particularly in the steel sector, through mass movements under the guidance of political leadership and ideological emancipation. Today, the nationwide drive to produce steel is gaining tremendous momentum, surpassing even the scale of the Huaihai Campaign. What accounts for this? Beyond the ideological groundwork laid at the Nanning and Chengdu conferences, there were two pivotal moments this year: June 19, when Chairman Mao set the goal of doubling steel output, thereby demonstrating the feasibility of high-speed development; and August 16 (the day before the Beidaihe Conference), when Chairman Mao called for secretaries at all levels to take charge and for the whole Party and people to mobilize in support of the steel industry. Two months of practice have shown that, despite numerous difficulties in steel production and construction, as long as secretaries lead and the masses participate, virtually any problem can be swiftly solved. Populations with no prior experience in steelmaking have quickly managed to produce millions of tons of steel; where equipment was lacking, the machinery-manufacturing sector rapidly developed facilities capable of producing tens of millions of tons annually; a steel plant with an annual capacity of over 600,000 tons was built in Shanghai in just over twenty days; a 1,500-cubic-meter blast furnace was completed in little more than four months; and iron ore deposits totaling hundreds of billions of tons were discovered within a matter of months—all without any existing resources. Therefore, the significance of having secretaries at all levels lead the Party and the people in the steel effort extends far beyond merely ensuring this year’s target of doubling steel output; more importantly, it has helped us clarify a fundamental question in industrial development.

(2) Both “small grassroots groups” and “large-scale groups” still need to overcome certain hurdles. At present, the nationwide mass movement to develop the steel industry manifests itself in two forms: “small grassroots groups” and “large-scale groups.” Small grassroots groups should move toward establishing steel bases—that is, building upon existing clusters of iron-making and steel-smelting furnaces by rapidly adding small rolling mills, coke ovens, refractory-materials plants, and other ancillary facilities to form a mini integrated steel complex. As for the “large-scale groups,” the key challenge remains whether they dare to carry out genuine revolutionary change. By “not daring to revolutionize” is meant that, among some cadres in major steel enterprises, the “Magnezit Constitution” (referring to the organizational and technical regulations of the Magnitogorsk Steel Plant in the Soviet Union) is regarded as sacrosanct and inviolable, effectively barring the masses from going beyond those established procedures. In the past, we drew on the experience of Magnezit to counter Japanese operational practices, which enabled us to more than double our output. Thus, the Soviet experience is indeed invaluable, and the contributions made by Soviet experts in boosting our production were truly monumental. However, the masses have continually developed even more advanced methods. We must, therefore, base our reforms on these grassroots innovations and persistently pursue revolutionary change. Consequently, liberating the thinking of cadres in large enterprises and encouraging them to mobilize the masses for revolutionary action constitutes one of the most pressing tasks at present.

(3) There are two possible scenarios for achieving the planned target. Given the current situation, there may be two distinct ways to fulfill the year’s goal of doubling steel output. One scenario envisions provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, and key steel plants all roughly meeting their respective production targets. The other scenario involves reaching the overall doubling target in terms of total output, yet with much of the increase coming from small-scale, artisanal steel production, while the major steel plants fail to meet their original quotas, leaving us short of the necessary finished steel products. We hope to achieve the former outcome; however, there is now a real risk that the major steel plants will fall short of their targets. This is a highly concerning development. If we do not address it, the manner in which we ultimately meet the plan will be far from satisfactory.

(4) What are the critical bottlenecks in pig-iron and steel production at present? For pig iron, the primary challenge is no longer quantity but rather the ability to produce higher-quality iron. As for steel production, there are two major obstacles: first, the technical problem of smelting steel using indigenous iron in open-hearth or basic-oxygen furnaces remains unresolved; second, the quality of steel produced through traditional methods needs improvement. Most of the steel made by these methods can only be forged into relatively small pieces and cannot be cast into larger ingots for further processing into various steel products, thus severely limiting its applications. Without resolving this issue, it will be difficult to advance indigenous steel production. The solution lies in promoting improved indigenous steel-smelting furnaces capable of converting pig iron into molten steel. Some provinces and cities already have small combined open-hearth and converter furnaces that could serve as models for wider adoption.

(5) What should we focus on now in preparation for next year? Next year’s production targets are: 45 million tons of pig iron and 30 million tons of steel. To achieve these goals, we should concentrate on three specific tasks: first, completing and equipping all currently under-construction iron- and steel-making facilities; second, rapidly expanding rolling-mill capacity; and third, urging provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to establish at least one relatively complete medium-sized steel plant this year. With one or more such plants capable of producing finished steel products, we will be better positioned to take the initiative next year.
[3]
Peng Zhen, who at that time served as a Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat.
[4]
Refers to the expanded meeting of the CPC Central Political Bureau scheduled to be held in Wuchang. The meeting took place from November 21 to 27, 1958.
[5]
Zhao Erlu, who at that time served as Minister of the First Ministry of Machine-Building Industry.