(October 5, 1958)
In order to thwart the U.S. plot for a “ceasefire” and “withdrawal of troops,” preventing it from escaping the noose, and in order to deepen and widen the contradictions between the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek, whether we should at present recapture Kinmen and Matsu, or allow them to remain under Chiang’s control, is a question we must now consider and decide, as to which course would be more advantageous for the future struggle.
Of course, the early recapture of Kinmen and the Matsu Islands would greatly benefit us by removing the direct threat to Fujian’s coastal areas, opening up maritime traffic, promoting economic development along Fujian’s coast, and boosting the morale of the people nationwide and our own armed forces. Achieving this would indeed be a major victory for us. However, if we compare this immediate gain with the long-term benefits of temporarily keeping Kinmen and Matsu tied tightly within the noose—by leaving them under Chiang’s occupation—and integrating their liberation with that of Taiwan into a single, unified solution, it seems preferable to postpone their liberation and let Chiang’s forces continue to hold them.
To break the U.S. ceasefire scheme, I can still organize another large-scale operation like those in the past, when necessary.
[1]
This document consists of two parts: the first contains Mao Zedong’s revisions to the draft directive issued by the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee regarding the current military campaign against the coastal islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and others; the text printed in Song typeface represents additions and revisions made by Mao Zedong. The second and third sections are two additional passages added by Mao Zedong to the directive.
Be flexible and take the initiative.
This document is simultaneously sent to the secretaries of the party committees of all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, as well as to the leading officials of each military region. Recipients are requested to maintain strict confidentiality.
Chuan
Refers to the Central Military Commission’s Directive on the Current Military Campaign Against Coastal Islands Such as Kinmen and Matsu, issued at 24:00 on October 5, 1958. The directive states:
Since August 23, our army’s artillery bombardment and blockade of Kinmen have achieved significant military and political victories. The situation since the start of the shelling has become extremely complex. Under intense military pressure from us, the Chiang Kai-shek clique is in a state of panic; however, under the cover of U.S. naval and air forces, they continue to frantically transport supplies to Kinmen and Matsu, striving to hold these islands at all costs and seeking to involve the United States in every possible way. Although the U.S., following our shelling, has continued its military provocations against us and actively aided the Chiang Kai-shek group, it remains wary of being drawn deeper into the conflict. The U.S. is currently maneuvering with a conditional withdrawal plan from Kinmen and Matsu, attempting to extricate itself from the current predicament where it is caught between advancing and retreating. The possible schemes of the U.S. include:
First, concocting a so-called “ceasefire” ploy to prevent Chiang’s forces from withdrawing from Kinmen and Matsu, or to limit their withdrawal to only part of these islands; second, compelling Chiang Kai-shek to abandon Kinmen and Matsu and concentrate his remaining troops on Taiwan, thereby trading the loss of Kinmen and Matsu for legal recognition of his rule over Taiwan, thus realizing the conspiracy to create “two Chinas”; third, if absolutely necessary, providing cover for and forcing Chiang’s forces to withdraw. To counter these maneuvers, the Military Commission has decided to ease the military pressure on Kinmen and Matsu, allowing Chiang’s forces there to survive. Accordingly, artillery fire directed at the various islands of Kinmen will be suspended for a certain period, resuming only sporadic harassing strikes.
Wen
Gu
Ge
Zhao
【
Bu
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Letter to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng Regarding the Suspension of Artillery Fire and the Publication of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”
(October 5–6, 1958)
Comrades Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng:
Regardless of whether U.S. aircraft and warships provide escort, on October 6 and 7 our forces shall not fire a single shot; even if the enemy opens fire upon us, we shall not return fire. Instead, we will stand down, observe the situation for two days, and then reassess. The air force must maintain defensive readiness but shall not venture out to sea. One further point: during these two days, no public statements are to be issued, as the evolving circumstances still require careful evaluation. Please implement these instructions immediately, or forward this letter directly to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu.[1]
Mao Zedong
8:00 A.M., October 5
After processing, this document is to be submitted to the Premier for review.
[I]
Peng Dehuai was then a member of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Minister of National Defense, overseeing the daily operations of the Commission. Huang Kecheng served as Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission and Deputy Minister of National Defense.
[2]
Ye Fei was at the time Political Commissar of the Fuzhou Military Region of the People’s Liberation Army, while Han Xianchu held the post of Commander of the same region.

Letter to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng Concerning the Suspension of Artillery Fire and the Publication of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”
Peng and Huang, please relay the following to Han and Ye:
Yesterday I suggested refraining from issuing a statement and waiting two days to see how things unfold. After further reflection, however, I concluded that it would be better to make a public announcement first. Thus, the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” has been drafted.[1] This document is about to be released; I request that the Fujian Frontline Broadcasting Station broadcast it multiple times. Thank you!
Mao Zedong
2:00 A.M., October 6
Forward immediately to Kecheng for processing.
[I]
Peng refers to Peng Dehuai; Huang to Huang Kecheng; Han to Han Xianchu; and Ye to Ye Fei.
[2]
This refers to the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” drafted by Mao Zedong and prepared for publication in the name of Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai.