Telegram to Zhou Enlai
(September 22, 1958)
Comrade Enlai:
(1) I concur with your approach regarding the recognition of the Provisional Government of Algeria. Our country must announce its recognition at an early date and immediately begin consultations on establishing diplomatic relations.
(2) Your remarks of 3:00 p.m. on September 22 concerning the operational guidelines for the Kinmen campaign are entirely correct. We should proceed accordingly, placing ourselves in an invincible position and maintaining the initiative throughout.
Mao Zedong
5:30 p.m., September 22
[I]


In a telegram sent by Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong at 1:00 p.m. on September 22, 1958, he stated: “The Provisional Government of Algeria has just been proclaimed in Cairo. Seven Arab countries have already recognized it. The de Gaulle government has threatened those North African nations that have extended recognition, warning them that it may sever diplomatic ties. Prime Minister Abbas of the Provisional Government of Algeria has sent a telegram to the Chinese Premier requesting recognition. The Foreign Ministry proposes to grant such recognition. I intend to convene Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Zhang Wentian, Liao Chengzhi, Liu Ningyi (Jiaxiang is ill), and Zhang Hanfu for discussion. My plan is first for Comrade Chen Yi to meet with Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Antonov to inform him that our country has decided to recognize the Provisional Government of Algeria, without seeking the Soviet government’s position.”


On September 22, 1958, Mao Zedong and Foreign Minister Chen Yi each sent telegrams to Ferhat Abbas, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, and to Mohamed Lamine Debaghine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, notifying them that the Chinese government had decided to recognize the Provisional Government of Algeria.
[2]


Refers to Zhou Enlai’s telegram to Mao Zedong at 3:00 p.m. on September 22, 1958, concerning the operational guidelines for the Kinmen campaign: “Under the current circumstances, the appropriate course of action regarding Kinmen remains to strike without landing, to cut off supplies without aiming for total destruction, thereby keeping the enemy in a state of constant alarm day and night. Coordinated air–sea–artillery operations are indeed difficult to execute effectively and carry the risk of provoking U.S. naval vessels and air forces. Directly launching air strikes against Kinmen would be even less advisable, as it would provide Chiang Kai-shek’s air force with an opportunity to bomb the Chinese mainland. At present, the U.S. military continues to restrain Chiang’s air force from bombing our territory because it remains uncertain where our air force might retaliate—Kinmen or Taiwan. Since the U.S. side still cannot ascertain our intended targets, it is advantageous for us not to encourage Chiang’s air force to launch attacks on the Chinese mainland.”