(September 13, 1958)
Premier Zhou, Comrade Huang Kecheng[1]:
The two documents on the situation in Jinmen in recent days and our army's orders (2)[2] that you sent have been received. In addition to executing according to the course stipulated in your orders, it seems there would be great benefit, or at least medium or small benefit, to fire sporadic shells day and night, twenty-four hours a day, especially at night, and especially against Liaoluo Wan[3] within three li, firing sporadic shells (two to three hundred rounds per day), to make the enemy alarmed day and night and have no peace. What are your opinions? On days of large-scale shelling, do not fire sporadic shells. On days of small-scale shelling, that is, firing sporadic shells. It seems more advantageous to shell Liaoluo Wan especially at night, having accurately calibrated the gun positions during the day, and then replicating it at night. Please consult the front line for study to see if this is feasible.
In the Warsaw Talks[1], for three or four days or within a week, carry out a reconnaissance battle, do not lay all your cards on the table. It seems the other side will not lay all their cards on the table either, and will first conduct reconnaissance on us. What are the opinions of you gentlemen Zhou, Peng, Zhang, Qiao (Guanhua)[2]? I wish you success from the very start!
Mao Zedong
September 13, in Wuchang
If you agree, please send the inner letter to Ye Fei and Liu Yalou[3] at the Xiamen Frontline Command for discussion. Do not agree reluctantly. If it is right, it is right; if it is wrong, it is wrong. Inform me of what is practically feasible.

[1]
[1]

--- Notes

Premier Zhou, i.e., Zhou Enlai. Huang Kecheng was then Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Minister of National Defense.
[2]
Refers to the order of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee concerning the shelling of Jinmen at 11:15 on September 11, 1958. The order stipulated: 1. If American warships today continue to provide cover and anchor more than 3 nautical miles from Liaoluo Wan, we will immediately shell the Chiang army transport ships unloading at the Liaoluo Wan pier and the personnel on the pier. Warships not docking, whether American or Chiang's, will not be fired upon. The standard for ammunition consumption in the shelling will be based on the principle of sinking or driving away the Chiang army transport ships and appropriately striking enemy ground targets. 2. Our air force and anti-aircraft artillery units must be practically prepared to deal with bombing by Chiang's aircraft. The air force and anti-aircraft artillery should be well-organized for coordination; if enemy aircraft bomb us, our fighter jets, in order to better seize the opportunity for battle, may enter the airspace over Jinmen to engage in combat, but bombers will still not be deployed today. 3. Under the aforementioned principles, the timing of the shelling and specific issues are for you to grasp on your own. If new situations arise, you should report them immediately so that the Central Committee can be consulted for new decisions.
[3]
Liaoluo Wan, located in the southern part of Greater Jinmen Island, was the pier where the Kuomintang army's ships and boats anchored at the time.


Refers to the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks. On April 23, 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai declared at a meeting of the heads of the eight-nation delegations at the Asian-African Conference: The Chinese government is willing to sit down and negotiate with the U.S. government to discuss the issue of easing tensions in the Far East, especially the issue of easing tensions in the Taiwan region. On July 25 of the same year, China and the United States reached an agreement on ambassadorial-level talks, and the first meeting was held in Geneva on August 1. Thereafter, due to obstruction by the U.S. side, the talks were often sabotaged and interrupted. After the shelling of Jinmen began, they were resumed. In September 1958, the talks were moved to Warsaw.
[2]
Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai. Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, then Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of National Defense. Zhang refers to Zhang Wentian, then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Qiao Guanhua was then Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.
[3]
Ye Fei was then Political Commissar of the Fuzhou Military Region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Liu Yalou was then Commander of the Air Force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.