First Speech at the Supreme State Conference

(September 5, 1958)

The Supreme State Conference met once in February, and now it is September—six months without a meeting. At that February meeting, we talked about going all out, aiming high, and achieving greater, faster, better, and more economical results. We spoke of "great hope"—I wonder if the comrades remember? I made a comparison then: not "moderate hope," still less "little hope," but "great hope." We also talked about appearing among the masses as an ordinary laborer. For all of us sitting here, and many within the Communist Party, achieving this will also require considerable effort. We are the opposite of the Kuomintang; they appear among the people with the attitude of aristocrats, with the airs of lords. We appear among the people with the attitude of ordinary laborers.

At that meeting, we said a few things that were unpleasant to hear, criticizing "craving for greatness and success, seeking quick results and instant benefits, despising the past, and blindly worshiping the future." You say these are bad; I say they are good. Isn't that singing a different tune? Some people felt very comfortable reading those four critical phrases. "The Communist Party craves greatness and success, seeks quick results and instant benefits, despises the past, blindly worships the future—outrageous!" I say, on the contrary, it is perfectly justified. It is not outrageous, but truly justified. Why do some people support that kind of criticism? It is because their understanding of the three sciences—dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Marxist political economy, and the theory of proletarian struggle and proletarian dictatorship—is either not deep or not thorough, or they simply pay little attention to them, and therefore they lack the ability to analyze. What kind of analysis? There is the bourgeoisie's craving for greatness and success, and there is the proletariat's craving for greatness and success—two kinds. There is the bourgeoisie's seeking of quick results and instant benefits, and there is the proletariat's seeking of quick results and instant benefits. "Those who toil for profit are followers of the merchant"—this probably describes one segment of today's bourgeoisie. Those assiduously pursuing profit—they are followers of the capitalists. And what about us? Ours is a different kind of seeking quick results and instant benefits. As for despising the past and blindly worshiping the future, that also differs by class. The bourgeoisie worships the past and despises the future. Old antiques from the past—those are treasures. As for the future, things like communism and socialism—that is just nonsense. Isn't that worshiping the past and despising the future?

Over these six months, great changes have occurred. I think everyone sitting here has changed. My own mind has changed, too. Many things were not anticipated. In February this year, although we spoke of great hope, what was that hope really like? Compared to today's reality, it was still behind.

The domestic situation, as everyone knows, is that class relations and the balance of class forces have undergone tremendous changes. Hundreds of millions of working people—workers and peasants—now feel a sense of clarity in their hearts and are pushing forward with the Great Leap Forward. This is the result of rectification and the anti-rightist campaign. Before rectification, many of our cadres had two characteristics: one was quite a bit of "bureaucratic airs," and the second was a relative lack of political awareness. Weren't we supposed to oppose the five airs? The first of those five airs is bureaucratic airs. Through rectification, although some have not been fully reformed, the majority now appear as ordinary laborers and are integrated with the workers and peasants. People feel that it is truly different from the Kuomintang era. It was not like this before. Because some cadres, in the eyes of the workers, had the wrong attitude; they were acting as officials, no different from the Kuomintang, still weighing down on them. Therefore, some workers were not so enthusiastic in their work. They were not striving for socialism and communism but for the five big items—bicycles, wristwatches, fountain pens, radios, and sewing machines.

They were striving for personal gain. At that time, many people had not awakened; activists were only a minority, and backward elements were quite numerous. After the Communist Party criticized the three bad styles and five airs, they also engaged in self-criticism: Pursuing these five big items was also for oneself, not for society—that was also wrong, right? Their enthusiasm for work then grew. It was the same with the peasants, because cooperative cadres and cadres from the county, district, and township levels worked on experimental plots and integrated with them. A wave of enthusiasm surged. Even in the cold of winter, they worked on water conservancy projects. They knew for whom they were doing things: for themselves, for the collective, for the whole country. As a result of this effort, this year's output can probably increase by nearly 100 percent. That is, it is possible to increase from last year's 370 billion catties to over 700 billion catties. For cotton, last year's output was 33 million dan; this year it is probably 70 million dan, which can more than double. Tobacco leaf output can increase three or four times. Only oil-bearing crops and [missing text] have increased by only half a time, which is still insufficient. Bast fiber crops were neglected before; we did not grasp them firmly. Steel production may double. At the First Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1956, the Premier proposed a Five-Year Plan target of 10.5 to 12 million tons of steel. If we say 10.5 million tons, this year there is the possibility of exceeding it, perhaps reaching 11 million tons. Wasn't the Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development set for twelve years? Starting in '56, through '56, '57, '58, the basics are complete. If we add one more year next year, it will be over-fulfillment. A twelve-year plan, over-fulfilled in four years. These are still estimates; we must also look at the actual results. If this year we achieve over 700 billion catties of grain, and next year it doubles again, that would be 1,500 billion catties. Next year we might not be able to produce that much; if we produce too much, besides human and animal consumption, we haven't found uses for the surplus yet, and problems might arise. But next year it is always possible to exceed 1,000 billion catties. For steel, next year we may exceed 20 million tons. In short, next year we will basically catch up with Britain. Except for shipbuilding, automobiles, and electric power, we will surpass Britain in everything else next year. A fifteen-year plan, basically completed in two years. Who could have foreseen this? It is the result of the masses' drive.

The bourgeoisie and the democratic parties have also changed, and are still in the process of changing. The issue of appearing as an ordinary laborer is a rather serious problem within the democratic parties; it must be approached step by step, without excessive impatience. But the situation is pressing. The situation is people—it is the majority pressing upon the minority. When the majority creates a situation, the minority feels the pressure and must figure out what to do. I have always advocated having opposites; without opposites, no one would make any effort. What are my opposites? Within our democratic ranks, there are many opposites. Besides these, there are those outside our ranks—"landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists"—these are all opposites. The workers and peasants put pressure on us; they say, you are officials, you must do your job well. If you don't do it well, we will rectify you. For example, in the first half of 1955, many common people truly disliked us. Everyone talked about unified procurement, and every household spoke of grain issues. If you said at that time there was no grain crisis, I think you could also say it was a kind of crisis. One reason was insufficient grain; another reason was that the upper-middle peasants were stirring up trouble. The main agitators among them were Communist Party members. They were Party members, but they served as cadres at the county, district, and township levels. They cried, "The peasants are suffering." What they meant by "peasants suffering" referred to peasants like themselves who had large surpluses. According to statistics from Jiangsu Province, among our cadres at the county, district, and township levels, 30 percent were such persons. Every day they cried, "The peasants are suffering," saying there was too much unified purchase and marketing, and they disapproved. This stirred up the peasants; those who originally had enough to eat also said they didn't have enough, using all sorts of methods to make a fuss. Under this pressure, we had to figure out a plan—so we launched cooperativization. The determination for cooperativization was forged precisely at that time. We criticized all kinds of superstitions: saying cooperativization wouldn't work in the later-liberated areas, saying there were no accountants, saying it was possible on the plains but not in the mountains, saying the Han people could do it but not the minority nationalities, and so on. After shattering these superstitions, within a few months, cooperativization was set up. This then influenced the business community; with drums and gongs, whole industries underwent joint state-private ownership. By 1956, some people again felt that perhaps it wouldn't work, that the pace was too fast. It seemed for a while that the Forty-Article Program for Agricultural Development was no longer effective, and the principle of greater, faster, better, and more economical results wasn't effective either. Simultaneously, the Stalin issue arose, the Hungarian incident broke out, imperialism was waging an anti-communist, anti-Soviet campaign—such a tide—and domestically, rightists were brewing their activities. Only through rectification and the anti-rightist campaign were these things reversed. And now? We have turned to a relatively favorable direction. Whether it be the democratic parties, university professors, middle school teachers, people in cultural circles, people in journalistic circles, people in scientific circles,

people in engineering and technical circles, or the bourgeoisie (industrialists and businessmen)—in short, the overwhelming majority have either already changed their stand or are advancing toward changing their stand. There are still a minority who have not changed; left, center, and right still exist. Classes still exist. To say that classes no longer exist now and that class struggle has already been eliminated—this viewpoint is probably incorrect. I say it is like smoking opium; once addicted, it is not easy to quit. That bourgeois ideology, and also feudal ideology, are so easy to quit—I don't believe it. It must be quit gradually, and the situation must press people, and they must see facts. One Yangtze River Bridge can convince many people. Without the Yangtze River Bridge, they wouldn't believe. Once the Yangtze River Bridge was built and many people went to see it, they believed. This year, 11 million tons of steel; next year, 25 million tons of steel; after three years of bitter struggle, 50 million tons of steel the year after next; grain increasing from 370 billion catties to 1,500 billion catties. I am still speaking of a possibility; effort is required. What exactly will things be like then? There are two possibilities: one is achieving it; the other is achieving a bit less, not reaching that much. Under these circumstances, with daily toil, will large numbers of people die, or change from fat to thin, or fall ill? These things do happen; there are some injuries and deaths; some do become thin; some do fall ill. But these are isolated cases. For the majority, I think the opposite is true: first, they do not die; second, they do not become thin, but rather gain some weight, and they do not fall ill. Especially once the four pests are eliminated, diseases will greatly decrease. When peasants labor, they are disciplined; they are militarized, and their drive is enormous. Once public canteens are introduced, time is saved as there is no going back and forth. They save grain, firewood, funds, and furthermore, they save a large amount of time. This is the experience of Xushui County. In scientific and technological circles, there has also been great progress. The "generals" are being "checked" fiercely—that is, students checking teachers, lecturers and assistant professors checking professors, researchers checking institute directors. There is one scientific research institute called the Institute of Materia Medica, established in Shanghai. The director, Zhao Chenggu, had a skill: he could extract a medicine from a certain Chinese plant that could treat high blood pressure. But this old gentleman simply wouldn't tell anyone about it, and he wouldn't produce it either. The young people in his institute had no way out; they were frustrated, so they did it themselves. As a result, after struggling for who knows how many days and nights, they succeeded, and were able to extract that medicine. Incidents like this are not limited to just one institute; there are quite a few.

Among university professors, quite a few lag behind their students—they cannot compete with students when it comes to compiling lecture notes or drafting syllabi. The students, after several sleepless days and nights, work collectively to get things done. I heard that in the literature department of a normal university, a class of twenty-six students wanted to compile a history of literature. They toiled day and night for four days, read 290 famous Chinese and foreign literary works, and produced an outline of literary history. This is a situation where circumstances compel progress—it is pressure. If young people do not pressure the older generation, the older generation will not make progress. This pressure gives the older generation a way forward; they have no choice but to advance. Of course, not all young people are good; there are also bad ones. Among the youth, there are slackers, daydreamers, and even thieves, but generally speaking, it is like "piling firewood—the later corners rise to the top." We must acknowledge this.

Regarding the international situation, we have always held an optimistic view. Later, it was summed up as "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind."

The United States has now introduced a "big contracting" system with us here, simply taking over Jinmen, Mazu, and whatever other islands like Da Dan Island, Er Dan Island, and Dong Ding Island—everything. I think they will be comfortable now. They have walked into our noose; the Americans' necks are caught in the iron noose held by us Chinese. Taiwan is also a noose, though it is a bit farther away. If they want to include Jinmen and the rest, then their heads will be even closer to us. Someday I might kick them, and they won't be able to escape, because they are strangled by the rope.

I am now putting forward some points and opinions for your consideration. Do not take them as a decision or a law. If it becomes a law, it is dead; as an opinion, it is alive. Use these perspectives to observe the international situation.

First point: who fears whom more? I think the Americans are afraid of war. We also fear war. The question is which side fears more. This is both a point and an opinion. Please take this view and observe—over one year, two years, three years, four years—keep observing like this. Ultimately, is it the West that fears the East more, or do we in the East fear the West more? In my opinion, Dulles fears us a bit more, and Western countries like Britain, the United States, West Germany, and France fear us a bit more. Why do they fear more? It is a matter of strength and the will of the people. The will of the people is strength. We have more people on our side; they have fewer on theirs. Among the three -isms—communism, nationalism, and imperialism—communism and nationalism are relatively close. And nationalism holds quite a wide territory, spanning three continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Even though many rulers in these continents are still pro-Western—such as Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and Iran—there are many among the people who are pro-East, possibly quite a lot. It is only the monopoly capitalists and those most deeply poisoned by them who advocate war. Apart from the monopoly capitalists, the majority (though not all) of others do not want war. For example, in several Northern European countries, those in power are also the bourgeoisie, and they do not want war. That is the balance of power. Truth is in the hands of the majority, not in Dulles' hands. Their hearts are more hollow; ours are more solid. We rely on the people; they maintain those reactionary rulers. Now Dulles is engaged in this kind of thing—he specifically props up people like "Generalissimo Chiang," Syngman Rhee, and Ngo Dinh Diem. I think it is like this: both sides fear, but they fear us a bit more, so war cannot break out.

Second point: U.S. imperialism and its military blocs—NATO, the Baghdad Pact, the Manila Pact—what is the nature of these groups? We say they are aggressive. That they are aggressive is absolutely true. But which way is their edge pointed now? Is it an attack on socialism, or on nationalism? I think it is now an attack on nationalism—on the weak ones like Egypt, Lebanon, and those in the Middle East. As for the socialist countries, unless, for instance, Hungary had failed, Poland had collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany had also collapsed, even the Soviet Union had run into trouble, and we too had problems, tottering on the brink—then they would attack. If you are about to fall, why wouldn't they attack? But now we have not fallen; we are solid. This bone is too hard to gnaw on, so they gnaw on those places that are easier to gnaw—meddling in Indonesia, India, Burma, Ceylon, trying to topple Nasser, trying to topple Iraq, trying to conquer Algeria, and so on. Now there is great progress in Latin America. Nixon, as Vice President, was unwelcome in eight countries, spat at and pelted with stones. The American political representatives were met with spit in the face—this is contempt for "dignity," a lack of "courtesy." In their minds, they count for nothing. You are our adversary, so we respond to you with spit and stones. Therefore, do not take these three military blocs too seriously; we must analyze them. They are aggressive, but they are not solid.

Third point: regarding tension. Every day we call for easing tension. Easing tension is beneficial to the people of the world. So, is tension always harmful to us? I don't think so. This tension is not purely harmful with no benefit to us; there is also a beneficial side. What is the reason? Because in addition to the harmful aspects, tension can mobilize people, mobilize the backward strata, and mobilize the middle forces to rise up and struggle. When people fear atomic war, they have to think. Look at the few shells fired at Jinmen and Mazu—I never expected it would stir up such a worldwide storm, with smoke billowing everywhere. This is because people fear war and fear that the United States will cause trouble everywhere. Of all the countries in the world, apart from one Syngman Rhee, there is currently no second country supporting the United States. Maybe the Philippines can be added, with what is called "conditional support." Take the Iraqi Revolution, for example—wasn't it caused by tension? Tension is not determined by us; it is created by the imperialists themselves, but in the final analysis, it is even more disadvantageous for imperialism. Lenin made this point—he was talking about war. He said war mobilizes people's mental state and makes them tense up. There is certainly no war now, but this kind of tension in a situation of armed confrontation can also mobilize all positive factors and make the backward strata think.

Fourth point: the issue of withdrawing troops from the Middle East. U.S. and British invading forces must withdraw. But the imperialists now want to stay there and not leave. This is unfavorable to the people, but at the same time, it also serves to educate the people. If you want to oppose the aggressors but have no object, no target, no antithesis, it is hard to oppose them. Now they have come forward themselves as the antithesis and are clinging on, refusing to leave, which plays a role in mobilizing people all over the world to rise up against the American aggressors. So, their delaying the withdrawal, on the whole, may not be purely harmful with no benefit to the people, because this way, people can press them every day: why don't you leave?

Fifth point: is it good or not that de Gaulle comes to power? For now, the French Communist Party and the people should resolutely oppose de Gaulle coming to power and vote against his constitution, but at the same time, they must prepare for the struggle after he takes power if the opposition fails. De Gaulle taking power will oppress the French Communist Party and the French people, but there are also advantages both externally and internally. Externally, this man likes to make trouble with Britain and the United States; he likes to argue. He suffered hardships before and wrote a memoir in which he thoroughly cursed Britain and the United States while speaking well of the Soviet Union. It now seems he will still make trouble. France making trouble with Britain and the United States is very beneficial. Internally, he is an indispensable teacher for educating the French proletariat, just like our "Generalissimo Chiang" in China. Without "Generalissimo Chiang," you cannot educate the 600 million people; positive education by the Communist Party alone is not enough. De Gaulle still has prestige now. If you defeat him now, he is not dead yet, and people will still think of him. Let him take power; at most, he might last five years, six years, seven years, eight years, ten years—he will collapse. Once he collapses, there will be no second de Gaulle; the poison will have been released. This poison must be released, just like the poison of our rightists—you have to let them release it. If you do not let them release it, they always harbor poison; once released, the poison dissipates.

Sixth point: the embargo—not doing business with us. What exactly is the impact of this on our interests? Is it better for capitalist countries to do more business with us or less business? Now business is being done, but little. I think the embargo is of immense benefit to us; we do not feel there is any disadvantage to the embargo. The embargo is greatly beneficial to our clothing, food, housing, transportation, and construction (steelmaking and ironmaking). With the embargo, we have to come up with our own solutions. I have always been grateful to He Yingqin. In 1937, when the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, we received 400,000 fabi each month. Since he introduced the fabi, we became dependent on it. By 1940, during the anti-communist upsurge, it was cut off and stopped coming. From then on, we had to think of our own solutions. What solutions did we come up with? We issued an order saying the fabi was gone, and you should figure it out on your own, taking the regiment as a unit. From then on, each base area launched production campaigns, generating value not just 400,000 yuan, not 4 million yuan, and not even 40 million yuan—combined across all base areas, it could amount to 100 or 200 million yuan. From then on, we relied on our own hands. Who is today's He Yingqin? It is Dulles, with a different name. Now they impose the embargo, so we do things ourselves—launch the Great Leap Forward, shed our dependency, and break down superstitions. That is good.

Seventh point: the issue of non-recognition. Is it more advantageous for us to be recognized or not to be recognized? I say, like the embargo, it is somewhat more advantageous for imperialist countries not to recognize us than to recognize us. There are still more than forty countries that do not recognize us, and the main reason is the United States. For example, France wants to recognize us but dares not because the United States opposes it. Other countries in Central and South America, Asia, Africa, Europe, as well as Canada, all dare not recognize us because of the United States. The capitalist countries that currently recognize us total only a dozen or so. Together with the eleven in the socialist camp, that makes thirty, plus Yugoslavia, thirty-one. I think we can get by with just that many. Let’s produce 300 million tons of steel—even better, 700 million tons—and 3,500 hundred million jin of grain. How many years will this take? I think about fifteen years should do it.

. . . Many people say industry is remarkable and very difficult, that science is extremely hard—this, too, is a kind of superstition. Don’t believe in that. We will catch up with Britain in 15 years; basically, we can catch up in two years. This refers to the total figures, not per capita. To catch up with Britain per capita, in terms of iron and steel alone, we would need 300 million tons. Britain has a population of 50 million and produces 22 million tons of steel. With our population of 700 million, we would need 300 million tons of steel. Just now I mentioned 700 million tons; to go from 300 million tons to 700 million tons means doubling it and then some. That might take 15 years, perhaps a bit more. Things in this world are strange—once you start doing something, you produce a lot; either there is none, or there is plenty. Don’t you believe this? For example, we fought a war for 22 years. For 21 of those years, we did not achieve victory, but in the 22nd year—that is, in 1949—we achieved nationwide victory. It is called a sudden change. It’s the same with grain: we worked on it for eight years, and despite all the efforts, there was still only a small amount. In 1949, grain output was 210 billion jin. Last year it was 370 billion jin. After eight years under our direction, it increased by only 160 billion jin. Yet this year alone, it may increase by over 300 billion jin, possibly reaching 400 billion jin. After eight years, we still hadn’t found the right path, hadn’t learned how to do it properly. That was also because the system hadn’t been reformed—individual farming, early cooperatives—and we hadn’t carried out the rectification and anti-rightist campaigns. The same goes for iron and steel: for decades, there was only a small amount. Chiang Kai-shek had only 40,000 tons of steel—even that was left over from Zhang Zhidong. Two things are of the utmost importance: first, grain; second, steel. With steel, we can make machines. Then all kinds of machines can be made: machines for mining coal, machines for opening mines, machines for generating electricity, machines for refining petroleum, transportation machines like trains, ships, and airplanes, machines for the chemical industry, machines for constructing buildings, and agricultural machines—all require steel. Therefore, grain is the first priority, steel is the second priority, and with machines added, these are called the Three Great Marshals. Once the Three Great Marshals take command, there is hope for victory. There are also two vanguard officers: one is railways, the other is electric power. I’ve digressed—let’s return to the question of non-recognition. That they do not recognize us, I think, is not bad; it’s rather better. It allows us to produce a bit more steel—maybe 600 or 700 million tons. By that time, they will surely have to recognize us. Even at that time, they might still not recognize us, but what does their non-recognition matter?

The last point is to prepare for a war of counter-aggression. The first point explained that both sides fear fighting and that war cannot break out, but we must still take out an insurance coefficient for world affairs. Because there is a monopoly capitalist class in the world, and we must fear that they might act recklessly and wildly, so we must be prepared for war. This point must be thoroughly understood among the cadres. First, we do not want to fight, and we oppose fighting, as does the Soviet Union. If there is to be a fight, it will be because they strike first, forcing us to fight back. Second, we are not afraid to fight. If they want to fight, we will fight. At present, we only have hand grenades and yam bombs. A war with hydrogen bombs and atomic bombs is certainly terrible—it would cause many deaths—so we oppose fighting. But the power to decide this does not lie in our hands. If the imperialists are determined to fight, then we must prepare everything and fight. That is to say, even if half of the people die, it is nothing to be afraid of. This is speaking in the most extreme terms. In the whole history of the universe, I do not believe we need to be so pessimistic. I once debated this issue with Nehru. He said that at that time there would be no government—everything would be completely destroyed, and even if you wanted to negotiate peace, you would not be able to find a government. I said, how could that be? If your government is eliminated by atomic bombs, the common people will rise and form another government, and then peace negotiations can take place. If you don’t think about the extreme possibilities in world affairs, you will lose sleep. In the end, it is only about people dying; in the end, it is only about being afraid to fight. But if they are determined to fight, they will strike first, and they will use atomic bombs. At that moment, if you are afraid, they will fight; if you are not afraid, they will fight. Since they will fight whether you are afraid or not, which should you choose—is it better to be afraid, or better not to be afraid? To live each day in fear, not mustering a little spirit among the cadres and the people—that is very dangerous. I think it is better to steel our resolve: if they want to fight, then we will fight, and we will rebuild afterward. Therefore, we are now organizing the militia. People’s communes are all organizing militia units; the whole people are soldiers. Guns must be distributed—initially a few million rifles, and in the future, tens of millions. Each province will manufacture light weaponry: rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, light mortars. The people’s communes have military departments and will conduct exercises everywhere. There are cultural workers present here today; you must also issue a call. Relying solely on the pen is not enough; you must hold a pen in one hand and a rifle in the other, embracing both culture and martial spirit. These are eight viewpoints, offered as a perspective for your reference when observing the international situation.