I. On the international situation, we have always held an optimistic view.




Later, this was summed up as "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind."




The United States has now introduced a "full responsibility" system here, simply taking over everything—Kinmen, Matsu, and whatever islands like Dadan Island, Erdan Island, and Dongding Island. I think it will feel comfortable with that.




It has put our noose around its neck; America's neck is hung on our iron noose in China.




Taiwan is also a noose, though a bit farther away.




If it insists on including this Kinmen set, then its head comes even closer to us.




Whenever we give it a kick, it can't run away, because it's tied up by a rope.




I'm now putting forward some viewpoints and offering some observations for your consideration. Don't take them as some kind of decision or law.




If turned into a law, it's dead; but as a viewpoint, it's alive.




Use these viewpoints to observe and analyze the international situation.




First point: Who fears whom more?




I think the Americans are afraid of war.




We are also afraid of war.




The question is, which side fears it more?




This is also a viewpoint, also an observation.




Take this viewpoint, everyone, and observe; after one year, two, three, four years, just keep observing. Is it that the West fears the East more, or that we in the East fear the West more?




In my view, Dulles [2] fears us quite a bit more; Britain, America, Germany, France—those Western countries—fear us quite a bit more.




Why do they fear us more?




It's a matter of strength and the will of the people.




The will of the people is strength; we have more people on our side, and they have fewer people on theirs.




Among the three isms—communism, nationalism, and imperialism—communism and nationalism are relatively close.




And nationalism occupies quite a broad territory, spanning three continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin America.




Even though many rulers in these continents lean toward the West—for instance, in countries like Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, Iran, and others—there are still many among the people, perhaps quite a large number, who lean toward the East.




Only the monopoly capitalists and those most deeply poisoned by them advocate war.




Apart from the monopoly capitalists, the majority of others (not all) are unwilling to go to war.




Take several Nordic countries: those in power are also bourgeois, and they do not want war.




That's how the balance of power stands.




Because truth is held by the majority of the people, not in Dulles' hands; their hearts are more hollow than ours, while our hearts are more solid.




We rely on the people; they are propping up those reactionary rulers.




Dulles is now doing just that, specifically propping up people like "Generalissimo" Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, and Ngo Dinh Diem [3].




I see it this way: both sides are afraid, but they fear us a bit more, and therefore, war cannot break out.




Second point: U.S. imperialism has cobbled together military blocs—what about NATO [4], the Baghdad Pact [5], the Manila Treaty [6]? What exactly is the nature of these blocs?




We say they are aggressive.




They are aggressive; that is absolutely true.




But which direction is their edge pointed now?




Are they attacking socialism or nationalism?




I think they are now attacking nationalism—that is, attacking weak countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and those in the Middle East.




As for the socialist countries, unless, for example, Hungary were defeated, Poland collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Germany also crumbled, and even the Soviet Union had problems, and we had problems too, teetering on the brink—only then would they attack.




If you were about to collapse, why wouldn't they attack?




But now we are not collapsing; we are solid; our bones are too tough to gnaw. So they gnaw on those places that are a bit easier to gnaw, trying to mess with Indonesia, India, Burma, Ceylon [7], trying to topple Nasser [8], trying to topple Iraq, trying to conquer Algeria, and so on.




Now there's great progress in Latin America.




Nixon, as vice president, was unwelcome in eight countries [9], spat at and pelted with stones.




When the political representatives of the United States are met with spittle in the faces of those people, that's contempt for "dignity," a lack of "respect"; in their minds, it counts for nothing.




You're our adversary, so we'll deal with you with spittle and stones.




So, don't take these three military blocs too seriously; analyze them.




They are aggressive, but they are not solid.




Third point: On tensions.




Every day, we call for easing tensions; easing tensions benefits the people of the world.




So, are all tensions harmful to us—is that right?




I don't think that's entirely the case.




Tensions, to us, are not purely harmful without benefit; there is a beneficial side too.




What's the reason?




Because apart from the harmful side, tensions can mobilize people, mobilize the backward strata, and rouse the middle-of-the-roaders to struggle.




Those afraid of atomic war should think it over.




Look at how, with the few shells fired at Kinmen and Matsu [10], I never expected such a worldwide uproar, with smoke filling the sky.




That's because people fear war and fear America stirring up trouble everywhere.




Among all the countries in the world, except for Syngman Rhee, there still isn't a second country supporting the United States.




Maybe add the Philippines, but that's what you call "conditional support."




For example, wasn't the Iraqi revolution caused by tensions?




Tensions do not depend on us; they are created by imperialism itself. But ultimately, they are even more disadvantageous to imperialism.




Lenin stated this viewpoint; he spoke of war, saying that war stirs people's mental state, making it tense.




Right now there is, of course, no war. But such tensions under conditions of military standoff can also mobilize all positive factors and make the backward strata think again.




Fourth point: The issue of troop withdrawal from the Middle East.




The invading U.S. and British forces must withdraw.




Imperialism now tries to cling on there and refuse to leave. This is harmful to the people, but at the same time, it also plays a role in educating the people.




If you want to oppose the aggressor, but there's no concrete target, no bull's-eye, no opposite side, then it's hard to oppose.




Now it has come forward itself as the opposite side, and it clings on, refusing to leave—this serves to mobilize the people of the whole world to rise up against the U.S. aggressors.




So its prolonged delay in withdrawing, on the whole, is not necessarily purely harmful to the people without any benefit, because this way the people can urge it to leave every day: why aren't you leaving?




Fifth point: Is it better for de Gaulle [11] to take office, or worse?




The French Communist Party and the French people should resolutely oppose de Gaulle taking office and vote against his constitution. But at the same time, they must prepare for the struggle in case they can't stop it, when he does take office.




De Gaulle taking office will oppress the French Communist Party and the French people, but it also has its benefits both domestically and internationally.




Internationally, this man likes to be at odds with Britain and the United States; he likes to pick a quarrel.




He suffered hardships before; he wrote a memoir full of insults to Britain and America and spoke well of the Soviet Union.




Now it seems he still wants to be difficult.




France being at odds with Britain and the United States is very useful.




Domestically, he is an indispensable teacher for educating the French proletariat, just like "Generalissimo" Chiang Kai-shek in our China.




Without "Generalissimo" Chiang, six hundred million people could not have been educated; Party education from the positive side alone wouldn't work.




De Gaulle still has prestige now. If you defeat him this time, he hasn't died; people will still think of him.




Let him take office; at most, he might last five, six, seven, eight, ten years—he will collapse.




Once he collapses, there is no second de Gaulle; this poison will be released.




This poison must be released, just like the poison of our rightists—you must let him release it.




If you don't let him release it, he's always poisonous; once released, the poison is eliminated.




Sixth point: The embargo, refusing to do business with us.




What, exactly, are its pros and cons for us?




I think the embargo is hugely beneficial to us; we don't feel that the embargo has any adverse effect.




The embargo has tremendous benefits for our clothing, food, housing, transportation, and construction (smelting steel and iron).




Once the embargo is on, we have to figure things out ourselves.




I've always been grateful to He Yingqin [12].




In 1937, the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, with a monthly allowance of four hundred thousand fabi (legal tender). Since he issued that currency, we relied on it.




By 1940, during the anti-communist wave, it was cut off; it stopped coming.




From then on, we had to figure things out ourselves. What to figure out?




We issued an order saying, with the fabi gone, you, at the regimental level, must come up with your own ideas.




From that point, various base areas launched production campaigns, generating value not just of four hundred thousand yuan, nor four million, nor even forty million—but combined across all base areas, possibly one or two hundred million yuan.




From then on, we relied on our own hands.




Who is today's "He Yingqin"?




It's Dulles, just with a different name.




Now they impose an embargo, so we do it ourselves, launching the Great Leap Forward, shedding our dependency, breaking down superstitions—and that's a good thing.




Seventh point: The issue of non-recognition.




Is it more advantageous to be recognized, or more advantageous not to be?




I say, just like the embargo, it is somewhat more advantageous for the imperialist countries not to recognize us than to recognize us.




There are still over forty countries that do not recognize us, primarily because of the United States.




For example, France wants to recognize us but dares not because the United States opposes it.




There are also other countries in Central and South America, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Canada that dare not recognize us because of the United States.




The capitalist countries that now recognize us total only nineteen; plus the eleven in the socialist camp, that's thirty [13], and with Yugoslavia, thirty-one.




It seems we'll just have to get by with this small number for a while.




Not being recognized, I think, is not bad—it's better. It lets us produce a bit more steel—produce six or seven hundred million tons—and then, some day, they'll have to recognize us.




Even then, they might not recognize us; what does it matter if they don't?




The last point: Be prepared for a war of counter-aggression.




The first point said both sides fear war, so a war can't break out, but when it comes to world affairs, we still need an insurance factor.




Because there's a monopoly capitalist class in the world; I'm afraid they might act rashly and recklessly, so we must be prepared to fight.




This point must be clearly explained among the cadres.




First, we don't want to fight, and we oppose it—so does the Soviet Union.




If war comes, it will be because they start it first, forcing us to fight whether we want to or not.




Second, we are not afraid to fight; if they want to fight, we will.




Right now we've only got hand grenades and potato-mashers.




A war fought with hydrogen bombs and atomic bombs is certainly terrible, will cause death—and that's why we oppose it.




But the decision-making power doesn't rest in our hands. If the imperialists are determined to fight, then we must prepare everything: if they want to fight, we'll fight.




That is to say, there's nothing so frightening even if half the population died.




This is stating the extreme case.




Looking at the entire history of the universe, I don't believe we should be that pessimistic.




I debated this issue with Prime Minister Nehru [14]. He said, at that time there'd be no government anymore; everything would be blasted clean; even wanting to negotiate peace, you wouldn't find a government.




I said, how could that be—your government is wiped out by atomic bombs, the common people will just form another government, and then negotiations can resume.




You can't sleep well at night unless you think about matters of the world to their very extreme.




It boils down to people being killed, it boils down to a fear of fighting.




But if they are set on fighting, they will start it, they will use atomic weapons. At that moment, if you fear, they'll fight; if you don't fear, they'll still fight.




Since they'll fight whether you fear it or not, which should you choose?




Is it better to fear, or better not to fear?

It is always dangerous if we fail to rouse any spirit among the cadres and the people. Day after day, they remain gripped by fear.




In my view, we should just set our hearts firmly and fight if we must, and resume construction after the fighting.




Therefore, we are now organizing the militia, organizing it in every people’s commune, turning the entire nation into soldiers.




We must distribute guns—a few million at first, and tens of millions in the future. Each province should manufacture light weapons: rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, and light mortars.




The people’s communes will have military departments, and military training will be carried out everywhere.




We have intellectuals present here. You should also issue a call. Holding only the pen is not enough; we need a pen in one hand and a gun in the other, to be both cultured and martial.




I have eight viewpoints to offer, as a way of looking at things, for your reference when observing the international situation.




Second, let me return to an old topic.




The noose—didn’t we discuss it last time?

Now we want to talk about using the noose on Dulles, Eisenhower, and those warmongers.




There are many places where the noose is being applied to the United States.




In my view, wherever it has set up a military base, it is ensnared by a noose—for example, in the East: South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan; in the West: West Germany, France, Italy, Britain; in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran; in Africa: Morocco, and so on.




In each place the United States has many military bases; Turkey, for instance, has over twenty, and Japan, I hear, has eight hundred.




There are also places where it has no bases but has troops stationed, such as the United States in Lebanon and Britain in Jordan.




For now, setting aside everything else, let us focus on just two nooses: Lebanon and Taiwan.




Taiwan is an old noose; the United States has occupied it for several years now.




By whom has it been ensnared?

By the People’s Republic of China.




The six hundred million people hold a cord in their hands, and this cord is a steel cable that has fastened around America’s neck.




Who caused it to be fastened?

It made the noose itself and put its own neck in it, then tossed one end to the Chinese mainland, letting us grab hold.




Lebanon was recently ensnared—another noose made by the United States itself, which it put around its own neck, with one end tossed into the hands of the Arab nation.




Not only that—it has been tossed into the hands of the great majority of the world’s people. Everyone condemns it; no one sympathizes with it. The people and governments of most countries are holding this noose.




Take the Middle East question, for instance; the United Nations held a meeting.




But the main point is that it has been ensnared in the hands of the Arab people and cannot free itself.




It is now caught in a dilemma: would it be better to withdraw early or late?

If it withdraws early, then what was the point of coming?

If it delays, the noose tightens further and may become a dead knot—how could that be endured?

As for Taiwan, a treaty has been signed there, which makes it different from Lebanon.




Lebanon is still somewhat flexible; there is no treaty—allegedly one party invited and the other simply came, and thus they were snared.




With Taiwan, however, a treaty was concluded—a dead knot.




There is no need here to distinguish between Democrats and Republicans; Eisenhower signed the treaty, and Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet.




In Truman’s time, the forces could come or go at will, without a treaty; Eisenhower concluded a treaty.




This also happened because the Guomindang was panicked and made a request, and the United States was willing—so the noose was fastened.




Are Jinmen and Mazu also ensnared?

In my view, Jinmen and Mazu are ensnared as well.




Why?

Don’t they say that nothing has been decided yet, that they will see what happens if the Communists mount an attack, and will decide then?

The issue is that there are 110,000 Guomindang troops—95,000 on Jinmen and 15,000 on Mazu. As long as those two contingents remain in place, they have to concern themselves.




This is a matter of their class interest and class sentiment.




Why are the British and the Americans so solicitous toward the governments of some countries?

They cannot see a man dying without lifting a finger to save him.




Yesterday Vice Admiral Bickley, commander of the Seventh Fleet, took personal command; and that fellow Smoot, who recklessly sounded off and displeased both the State Department and the Defense Department—that gentleman—was also there directing operations together with Bickley.




In short, you are ensnared.




If you want to free yourself, you have to take the initiative and gradually extricate yourself.




Isn’t there such a thing as an extrication policy?

There was an extrication policy in Korea, and now I think an extrication policy for Jinmen and Mazu is taking shape.




Your crowd truly wants to disengage, and there is also public opinion demanding disengagement.




To disengage means to slip out of the noose.




How can they do that?

By having those 110,000 troops walk away.




Taiwan is ours; that is a point on which we can never make concessions—it is an internal matter. Our dealings with you constitute an international issue.




These are two separate matters.




Your combining, as the United States, with Chiang Kai-shek—this compound can be broken down.




Like electrolyzing aluminum or copper, as soon as you apply an electric current, don’t they separate?

The Chiang Kai-shek side is an internal issue, and your side is a diplomatic issue; the two must not be confused.




Right now, in the five continents—excluding Australia—the United States wants to dominate four continents.




First, North America, which is mainly its own territory, and where it has troops; then Central and South America, where it has no garrisons but claims to offer “protection.”




Add to that Europe, Africa, and Asia—mainly Europe, Asia, and Africa—with the main force in Europe and Asia.




With so few troops and such wide dispersion, I don’t see how it could wage such a war.




Therefore, I have always felt that its main aim is to dominate the intermediate zones.




As for places like ours, unless there is major chaos in the socialist camp and it is absolutely certain that the Soviet Union and China would completely collapse the moment it makes a move, I don’t think it would dare to come.




Apart from our camp, it wants to dominate everything: Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia.




There is also Australia, which is linked to it by a military treaty and obeys its orders.




Does it serve its purposes better to gain influence in these areas under the banner of “anti-communism,” or by truly opposing communism?

Truly opposing communism means sending its troops to attack us and the Soviet Union.




I say, no one would be that foolish.




It only has a few troops that it shifts back and forth; when the Lebanon incident arose, it shifted troops from the Pacific, but when they reached the Red Sea area and the situation looked unfavorable, they hurried back and landed in Malaya, ostensibly to rest for a few days—seventeen days without a word.




Then one of its own journalists announced that they were overseeing the Indian Ocean. That immediately aroused opposition from everyone in the Indian Ocean region.




As soon as we began shelling over here, there were not enough troops, so it sent more here.




Securing earlier disengagement from places like Taiwan would be more advantageous to the United States. If it insists on clinging there, let it remain ensnared there; it does no great harm to the overall situation, and we will continue our Great Leap Forward.




As for the tension, perhaps a few more words can be said.




You create tension, thinking it benefits you?

Not necessarily. The tense situation mobilizes world opinion, and everyone condemns the Americans.




Over the Middle East tension, everyone condemns the Americans.




Over the Taiwan tension, again everyone condemns the Americans; relatively few condemn us.




The Americans revile us, Chiang Kai-shek reviles us, Syngman Rhee reviles us. Perhaps a few others revile us, but mainly these three.




Britain is a vacillating party; militarily, it does not participate, but politically, I hear it is quite sympathetic.




Because Britain has the Jordan problem. If it showed no sympathy, then if the Americans withdraw from Lebanon, what would Britain do in Jordan?

Prime Minister Nehru issued a statement basically in line with our position, supporting the return of things such as Taiwan to us, though he hoped for a peaceful resolution.




This time, among the Middle Eastern countries, take Iraq for instance—every day they trumpet their welcome. The United Arab Republic in particular—this is a good thing.




Because when we take such actions, the pressure that the Americans exert on them there is lessened.




I think we can tell the people of the world openly that the tense situation is more unfavorable to the Western countries, unfavorable to the United States.




Where does the advantage lie?

What benefit does the Middle East tension bring to the United States?

What benefit does it bring to Britain?

It is, rather, more favorable to the Arab countries, more favorable to the peace-loving peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the other continents.




To whom exactly does the Taiwan tension bring greater advantage?

Take our own country, for instance. Now our whole country is mobilized. If the Middle East events mobilized thirty to forty million people to demonstrate and hold rallies, this time we can probably mobilize three hundred million people. They will be educated and toughened in the process.




This is also good for unity among the various democratic parties. With all parties having a common goal to strive for, those who previously harbored grievances or resentment or who were criticized may feel somewhat relieved.




And so, as we keep working at it in this way, through all sorts of efforts, will we not all become members of the working class?




Thus, the tense situation that imperialism itself creates turns out, in the end, to benefit the several hundred million of us who oppose imperialism and to benefit all the peace-loving people, classes, strata, and governments of the world, in my view.




They ought to think it over: America is always up to no good, baring its fangs and brandishing its claws.




Of its thirteen aircraft carriers, six have shown up; among them are some that huge, said to be 65,000 tons. They say they will assemble 120 ships, the mightiest fleet.




It would be all the same to me if you became even stronger; I would welcome it if you concentrated all four of your fleets in this place.




Those things of yours are utterly useless anyway. Even if you concentrate them all here, you still cannot come ashore.




The characteristic of a ship is that it stays in the water; it cannot land on a shore.




All you are doing is putting on a display here. The more you fight, the more the whole world will know that you are in the wrong.

[3] Syngman Rhee, then President of South Korea, i.e., the Republic of Korea.

Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963), then President, Prime Minister, and Minister of National Defense of the "Republic of Vietnam."

[4] Refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In April 1949, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, Iceland, and Canada signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington.

On August 24 of the same year, the treaty entered into force, and the North Atlantic Treaty military bloc was established.

Greece and Turkey formally joined the organization in 1952; the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; and Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999.

[5] Refers to the Baghdad Pact Organization, a military bloc organized by the United Kingdom and the United States to control the Middle East and contain the Soviet Union.

Established in November 1955 under the Baghdad Pact, it was renamed the Central Treaty Organization in August 1959.

Its member states included Turkey, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Iran, and Pakistan, with the United States participating as an "observer."

After the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in July 1958, the new government formally announced its withdrawal in March of the following year.

With growing differences among member states on a series of international issues, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey also announced their withdrawal in March 1979. The organization was dissolved on September 28 of the same year.

[6] Refers to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (i.e., the Manila Pact Organization).

On September 8, 1954, instigated by the United States, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, also known as the Manila Pact, in Manila, the capital of the Philippines.

This was a military alliance treaty, stating that "self-help and mutual aid" would be used to "resist armed attack."

The treaty included a "Understanding" proposed by the United States, interpreting "aggression and armed attack" as "applicable only to communist aggression."

The treaty also designated Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam as its "protection areas" through a protocol.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was established when the treaty entered into force on February 19, 1955.

The Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, adopted at the Geneva Conference in July 1962, did not recognize its so-called protection over Laos.

Beginning in 1967, France refused to send an official delegation to the organization's ministerial council.

On November 8, 1972, Pakistan announced its withdrawal.

The organization announced its dissolution in June 1977.

[7] Ceylon, present-day Sri Lanka.

[8] Gamal Abdel Nasser, then President of the United Arab Republic.

[9] See Note [5] on page 406 of this volume.

[10] In July 1958, supported by the United States, the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan clamored for a "counteroffensive against the mainland" and continuously shelled coastal villages and towns in Fujian Province.

To severely punish the Kuomintang forces and oppose U.S. violations of China's sovereignty, the Fujian front-line units of the People's Liberation Army were ordered on August 23 to begin shelling the Kuomintang forces' Kinmen Defense Department, artillery positions, and other military targets, blockading Kinmen Island and cutting off the Kuomintang forces' supplies.

In early September, the United States heavily reinforced the Taiwan Strait area, sending warships and aircraft to directly escort Kuomintang transport vessels, flagrantly intruding into China's territorial waters.

To counter the U.S. acts of aggression, the People's Liberation Army front-line units conducted comprehensive shelling against the Kuomintang forces on Kinmen and their naval vessels at sea on September 8.

By January 7, 1959, a total of seven large-scale shelling operations, thirteen air battles, and three naval battles had been conducted, shooting down or damaging thirty-six Kuomintang aircraft, sinking or damaging seventeen naval vessels, and killing or wounding over 7,000 Kuomintang troops.

[11] Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970), then Prime Minister of France.

Elected President of the Fifth French Republic in December 1958.

[12] He Yingqin (1890–1987), native of Xingyi, Guizhou.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as Chief of Staff of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government and concurrently Minister of Military Affairs.

[13] The nineteen countries mentioned here refer to those that had established diplomatic relations with China at the time: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon (Sri Lanka)