Talks at the Beidaihe Conference (Draft Transcript)

Date: 1958-08-17
Source: Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward
        (Harvard University Press, 1989), ed. Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, Eugene Wu

---

reference figures; [we] should be fairer [and] more correct [with our figures]. Let's take three days [to work on it]; Comrade [Li] Fuchun¹ will be responsible.
The second problem: the problem of iron, steel, copper, and molybdenum [production] this year. Steel [production] has to double from the 5.3 million tons of 1957; [but] there's a danger that we may not be able to reach [the target] of 11 million tons, [and] the key problem is iron. Now we² have all made telephone calls [and] mobilized [people], but [those in the localities] must still be sure to return [those] phone calls to confirm.
The third problem: Comrade XXX³ will be in charge of agriculture next year.
The fourth problem: Chen⁴ and Li⁵ will be in charge of water conservancy next year.
The fifth problem: the problem of agricultural collectivization; [we have] printed a copy of Henan's regulations for the experimental operation of people's communes.
The sixth problem: [Li] Xiannian⁶ will be in charge of commercial purchases and distribution this year (including the handling of this year's grain). Grain production will probably reach XX hundred
universities as noted in John Bryan Starr and Nancy Anne Dyer, *Post-Liberation Works of Mao Zedong: A Bibliography and Index* (Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, Univ. of California, 1976), item 244, and translated in *Current Background* 888 (Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General), p. 8. Mao's wild romanticizing of the Yan'an experience and his equating dining halls and a non-monetary economy with “communism” are startling aspects of this speech and reflect his terminological laxity, exemplified also by the loose terms and inaccuracies noted in Text 3.
¹Li Fuchun, Chairman, State Planning Commission.
²Presumably the Center.
³XXX: presumably Politburo member Tan Zhenlin who took charge of agriculture during the GLF; see *Origins* 2, pp. 82–5.
⁴Chen: Almost certainly Chen Zhengren, Deputy Director of the State Council's 7th Office, which was in charge of agriculture and forestry, and chairman of the National Water and Soil Conservation Commission. Chen, a former private secretary to Mao, had emerged as one of the Chairman's agricultural trouble-shooters in 1955, when he became a deputy director of the CC's Rural Work Department and apparently played a major role in the collectivization drive; see *Origins* 1, p. 18.
⁵Li: almost certainly Li Baohua, a vice-minister at the Ministry of Water Conservancy (later the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric Power) from the founding of the PRC. Li was the son of Li Dazhao, one of the intellectual leaders of the early communist movement and an important influence on Mao.
⁶Li Xiannian: Minister of Finance.
million catties this year, per capita XX catties. Strive to reach XX catties per capita next year [and] XX catties the year after. Whether or not this will reach 2,500 to 3,000 catties [per capita], [we'll] discuss later. Can we indefinitely develop grain [output]? I think it's not going to be easy to exceed 3,000 catties [per capita].
The seventh problem: the problem of education. Comrade XXX⁷ is writing an article. Once a resolution is [made], it'll be printed and distributed.
[296] The eighth problem: the problem of cadres participating in manual labor. Officials, no matter who, whether big or small, including us here, all should participate in manual labor as long as they're [physically] able, excepting [only] those too old or too weak. We have millions of officials; adding [those] in the army there are more than ten million. [We] don't even have a clear idea as to exactly how many officials. Cadre children number in the tens of millions, and [they are] in a favored position [from which] to become officials. When one has been an official for a long time, it's easy to get separated from reality [and] the masses. The construction of the Ming Tombs Reservoir has been completed; many people went to the reservoir to perform manual labor for a few days.⁸ Can [we] do manual labor for one month a year, making assignments according to the four seasons of the year? Workers, peasants, and commercial personnel are all able to combine manual labor and [their ordinary] work; everybody should be like that. If other people can do manual labor, is it acceptable that our officials should not? And then there are all those many cadre children. In the Soviet Union, graduates of agricultural colleges don't want to go to the countryside. Isn't it absurd to run agricultural colleges in the cities! Agricultural colleges should all move to the countryside. All schools should run factories. Even the Tianjin Conservatory is running a few factories; [that's] very good. Participating in manual labor is easy [for cadres] at the county and township levels, [but] it's hard to manage [for those] at the level of the Center, provinces, and prefectures;⁹ [they] probably can't operate a machine! How is
⁷XXX: almost certainly Lu Dingyi, alternate member of the Politburo and director of the CC's Propaganda Department. His article “Education must be combined with productive labor” was published on 1 September in *Hongqi* (Red flag), No. 7 (1958).
⁸Mao himself had led his senior colleagues to work there in May to symbolize the importance he placed on manual labor.
⁹Mao uses the abbreviation *zhuan* for *zhuanqu* or prefecture (literally: special district), an
it that people who can eat with chopsticks and write with brushes
can't operate a machine? Is it easier to operate a machine or to climb
a mountain?
The ninth problem: the problem of the labor system. It should be
worked out by the Ministry of Labor.
The tenth problem: the problem of sending tens of thousands of
people to the border regions.10
The eleventh problem: the problem of maintaining technological
security.
The twelfth problem: the problem of the international situation.
It was I who raised this problem, because everywhere people are asking whether there'll be [another] world war. What to do if [the war]
starts? What exactly is the nature of the Western military bloc? To
whose advantage is a tense [international] situation? Is it better for
the United States and British forces in the Middle East to withdraw
soon or to stay a bit longer?11 Embargo or not embargo—to whose
advantage would it be?12 Is it advantageous for the United Nations to
recognize us or not to?13 In the last analysis who fears whom? Who
fears whom more? These questions have not been completely
resolved even within the party. Some say, “The east wind prevails over
the west wind”; but it’s clear that [the east wind] has not prevailed,
otherwise how dare the Americans and British land in the Middle
East? [Our] views are not unanimous on this problem: both within
and outside the party there’s fear of the West, there’s United States-phobia. Who fears whom more? [I think] perhaps it’s the West that
fears us a bit more. There are three “isms” in the world: communism,
imperialism, and nationalism. The latter two are both capitalist. One
is national capitalism, the other is [297] the capitalism which
oppresses other people—imperialism. Nationalism was originally the
rear base of imperialism; but once it opposes imperialism, it becomes
our rear base. India and Egypt both practice [nationalism], but [their
position] is more to our advantage. If our two “isms” stand together,
[our] strength will be greater. Both sides have atom bombs; [but] the
might of the people is greater on our side, so there won’t be a war.
But a war is still possible, [so] we had better be prepared to fight. It’s
hard to predict monopoly capitalism. If they want to fight, is it better
to fear fighting or not to fear it? Steel yourselves; be implacable
towards the enemy; fight with all your might; destroy first and reconstruct later. Let’s say clearly it’s better not to fear a fight.
As for the three groupings of imperialism,14 in our propaganda we
say that [imperialism] is an aggressor because it launches aggression
against nationalism and socialism, but [we] should not see this as anything that alarming. It will only attack us under one circumstance:
that is, if we’re in great disorder, and are overthrown by counterrevolutionaries. The Hungarian counterrevolution has already been suppressed; they dare not return. The socialist camp is consolidating,
with 70 to 80 million tons of steel our China will be consolidated. As
for those imperialist treaties, they’re not so much for offense as for
defense. They are organizations suffering from calcification like lungs
afflicted by tuberculosis and shouldn’t be taken too seriously. The
Baghdad Pact sprang a leak; its center collapsed, and in a [single]
morning Iraq was turned around. Communist ideology can infiltrate;
I quite appreciate XXX’s15 saying that they fear our penetration. The
imperialist military blocs are [protected] by] walls of thin boards,

administrative division between the provincial and county levels not laid down in the 1954
state constitution but in widespread use in 1971, the term *zhuanqu* was replaced by the
term *diqu*. See Theodore Shabad, *China's Changing Map*, rev. ed. (New York, Praeger, 1972),
p. 29.
10Presumably Mao is referring here to the nascent program to transfer unemployable urban
youth to the countryside, including border areas. In fact, this program was set aside in 1958;
see Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages* (New Haven, Yale
Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 34–6.
11A Middle East crisis had erupted after a coup in Iraq on 14 July, which had resulted in the
replacement of the pro-Western monarchy by a radical leftist regime and the collapse of the
anti-communist Baghdad Pact (later reshaped as the Central Treaty Organization). In the
aftermath of the coup, the Western members of the Pact, the USA and Britain, had landed
forces respectively in Lebanon and Jordan to safeguard the pro-Western regimes there
(neither of which was actually a member of the Pact). The crisis unleashed a flurry of diplomatic activity, with the Soviet leader Khrushchev calling for an emergency summit meeting and the Chinese press advocating the dispatch of “volunteer” armies (something like the
“Chinese People's Volunteers” in the Korean War, only presumably this time coming from
the USSR). So great was Sino-Soviet disagreement on this issue that Khrushchev flew
secretly to Beijing for talks with Mao at the end of July. (See *Origins* 2, pp. 92–96.)
12Mao is referring to the Western embargo on trade with the PRC, total in the case of the
US.
13Mao is referring to the fact that at the UN, Taiwan held the Chinese seat.
14Mao presumably means NATO, the South East Asian Treaty Organization (formed in
1954) and the now defunct Baghdad Pact.
15XXX: possibly Liu Shaoqi, or someone almost as senior with a right to voice opinions
on foreign policy, to whom Mao might think it obligatory to be mildly flattering.
standing on shaky foundations. NATO is relatively more consolidated; it's keeping the intermediate zones in order. They have no
chance of keeping us in order, so [they] do it to the intermediate zones.
[They] also give each other a hard time: the British and the Americans
keep France in order, [and] restrict West Germany.16 In our propaganda, we say that we oppose tension and strive for detente, as if
detente is to our advantage [and] tension is to their advantage. [But] can
we or can't we look at [the] situation [the] other way round: is tension to
our comparative advantage [and] to the West's disadvantage? Tension is
the West's advantage only in that they can increase military production, and it's to our advantage in that it will mobilize all [our] positive
forces. On the morning of 14 July the lid was taken off Iraq. Tensions
can [help] gain membership for Communist parties in different countries. [It] can [help] us increase steel as well as grain [production]. It's
better if the United States and Britain withdraw from Lebanon and Jor-dan later [rather than sooner]. Don't make the Americans seem kindhearted people. Every extra day they stay is an additional advantage to
us. [We can] capitalize on the United States' mistakes, and make an
issue of it. American imperialism will become a target of public criticism, but in [our] propaganda [we] can't talk like this. We still have to
say [they] should withdraw immediately.
[298] As for the embargo, the tighter the better; the longer the
UN refuses to recognize us the better. We have experience [in this].
During the anti-Japanese war, Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin17
refused to give us supplies or money. We raised [the slogan of] unity
and self-reliance, developing production on a large scale. The value
[of our production] was more than 400,000 yuan. We even had cotton-padded clothes to wear, many more than what He Yingqin gave us.

16Mao's remarks here reflect an analysis that emerged in 1964 as his theory of the two intermediate zones (between the two superpowers), one consisting of third world countries, the
second of Western countries other than the USA. At that time, encouraged by de Gaulle's
recognition of the PRC in defiance of the USA, Mao focused particularly on France; but
this passage indicates he had long derived satisfaction from tensions between that country
and the "Anglo-Saxon" powers. See King C. Chen, ed., China and the Three Worlds (Lon-don, Macmillan, 1979), p. 3. For a suggestion of an earlier origin of the intermediate zone
theory, see Warren Kuo, ed., A Comprehensive Glossary of Chinese Communist Terminology
(Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1978), pp. 99–100.
17Gen. He Yingqin (1890–1987) served as Chiang Kai-shek's Minister of War (1930–44). He
was also chief-of-staff (1938–44) and subsequently army commander-in-chief (1944–6). In
September 1945 he accepted the formal Japanese surrender in Nanjing on behalf of the
Nationalist Government. See BDRC 2, pp. 79–84.

It was like that then, so it's to our advantage now to have various
countries put an embargo on us. It would be best if [they] recognized
us seven years from now. Divide seven years into three periods: struggle hard for three years, [then another] two years, [then still another]
two years. By that time, we produce from XX to XX million tons of
steel. To have an enemy in front of us, to have tension, is to our
advantage.
The thirteenth problem: the problem of communist education in
the villages this winter and next spring.
The fourteenth problem: the problem of cooperation [xiezou].
The fifteenth problem: the problem of deep ploughing. Currently
the main orientation in agriculture is the problem of deep ploughing. Ploughing deeply is like [creating] a big reservoir for water and a
big cistern for manure, otherwise no amount of water and manure
will work. In the north [we should] deep plough [to a depth of] over
a foot [chi], in the south to 7 or 8 inches [cun], then apply manure in
different layers so as to enhance the granular structure of the soil.
Every granule is both a small reservoir, [and] and small manure cistern. Deep ploughing brings water above ground into contact with
underground water. Close planting is based on deep ploughing; otherwise it is useless. Deep ploughing helps weeding. Digging up roots
in turn helps eliminate insects so that one mou of land [can produce
as much] as three mou. Now each person nationwide has three mou
of land. Once we go down [to the grass roots], [we] can increase production. What's the use of planting that much land? In the future we
can use one-third of the land for afforestation, and after a few years
again decrease the acreage [for grain] by another mou [per capita]. In
the past [we] weren't able to afforest the plains, but by that time [we]
will be able to. Without deep ploughing there's no such possibility.
[Our] views on population should change. In the past I said that
[we] could manage with 800 million. Now I think that one billion
plus would be no cause for alarm. This shouldn't be recommended
for people with many children. When [people's] level of education
increases, [they] will really practice birth control.
The sixteenth problem: the problem of fertilizer.
The seventeenth problem: the problem of the people's militia.
The coordinating regions [xiezou qu]18 or the larger provinces can pro-

18Mao is almost certainly referring, as in problem 14, to the seven economic coordinating
duce small arms, such as rifles, machine guns, light artillery, and so
forth; [they] arm the militia, establish large cooperatives, [and then]
everything is under one roof: industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and military affairs.19 Producing that many guns is probably a
waste, since we are not at war [299]. [But] a little waste is still necessary. “Everyone a soldier”20 helps boost morale and courage. Sing
more of Mu Guiying, of Hua Mulan, and of Sizhou fortress, sing
less of Zhu Yingtai.21 In another six years there will be a gun for a
quarter of the population, nationwide [we’ll] need 100 million guns;
everyone will be given a score or more of bullets, which should all be
used.

19 AUGUST

The [provincial party] first secretaries must personally grasp industry.
“Unified [i.e., centralized] planning, management by levels; priority construction projects; branches and leaves supporting each
other.”22 The Tianjin prefecture has set up a steel mill of 40,000 tons
capacity. This is their priority [project]. [Lower] levels [of management] are under centralized planning, a small portion, or two out of
ten, of the total projects will be under the management of the Center
(both investment and profits can be the Center’s business); the majority,
regions (jingji xiezuo qu) to which mysterious reference began to be made in the press in
1958, but which thereafter received scant attention; see Audrey Donnithorne, China’s Eco-nomic System (London, Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. 20. From post–Cultural Revolution publications, however, we learn that these regions were set up on 1 June 1958; see Fang Weizhong, ed.,
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dashi ji (1949–1980 nian) (Economic chronology of the
People’s Republic of China (1949–1980)) (Beijing, China Social Sciences Publishing House,
1984), pp. 213–4.
19Interestingly, Mao still refers here to large cooperatives rather than people’s communes as
he does in his next speech two days later. Even more oddly, there is no suggestion in this
speech of the momentous change in the countryside that was about to be ordered. Yet
Mao’s image of the large cooperative corresponds to the blueprint for the communes.
20“Everyone a soldier” was the name of a current campaign to enlarge the militia.
21Mu Guiying, a fictional heroine of the Northern Song dynasty, commanded troops in
defeating invading Liao forces. Hua Mulan, a folk heroine, in male disguise took up arms in
her father’s place and fought brilliant battles. Sizhou fortress in Sizhou county, now in
Anhui province, was the site of the defeat of a female water demon. Zhu Yingtai is the main
female character in a popular romance, which ends with her suicide.
22These slogans exemplify Mao’s attempt during the GLF to encourage the maximum possible initiative at the lower levels without sacrificing an overarching central guidance.

or eight out of ten, will be assigned to local regions for management.
By 1962 [we’ll] produce XX tons of steel. How to manage at that
time, [we’ll] have to wait and see. Where we should put our priority
[projects] will depend on where [we find appropriate] conditions.
Decentralization without dictatorship will not do. If we are to pursue speed, Wuhan Steel [Mill] can go a bit faster; [but] if all counties
and communes champion “steel activism,” it will be disastrous. [We]
must have control; [we] cannot talk only about democracy. [The
ways of] Marx and Qin Shihuang have to be combined.23
The entire party running industry, each level running industry,
[but] all must be under unified planning; [and] there definitely must
be priority [projects]. There [must be] branches and leaves. Whatever
does not impinge upon priority [projects], people at large can run;
[but] those which do must all be centralized. Each level should run
only those things it is able to; it’s not necessary for every APC to produce steel. APCs should mainly process grain, produce indigenous fertilizer, repair and produce farm tools, and dig small coal mines. Only
when you don’t do everything, can you then do something.24 Every
coordinating region must have a [complete] set [of economic activities],25 but the provinces should divide up the work properly [among
them], and not [try to] run every kind [of project themselves]. How
much grain, [and] how much steel should each province produce?
Eventually every province should produce and consume its own
[products]. No province should think of selling [its products] elsewhere while planning to receive some allocations from the Center.
Fujian [province] produced XX thousand tons of steel. Where should
it be used? Big steel mills belong to the Center; small- and medium-sized [mills] can be run by more or less every province.
Decentralization of power to the localities: Every level (province,
prefecture, county, township, APC26) should have power. The sub-
23For Qin Shihuang, see Text 18, n. 5.
24Mao is clearly referring here to the Daoist concept of “no action” (wu wei) although he
says bu wei. A literal translation of the sentence would be: “Only when there is no action,
then there is action.” But Mao clearly means selective action rather than no action at all.
25Mao was here, as often, concerned with local self-reliance and self-sufficiency, particularly
in the event of war and invasion. Conscious that total self-sufficiency in an industrializing
economy is impossible to achieve at a very local level, he seems here to see the economic
coordinating regions as the smallest independently viable units. His long-term vision, however, seems to be self-sufficiency at very local levels.
26The final term in his list is simply she, which could refer to either an APC or a com-stance and scope [of that
levels, but do not divide
All levels should gradually strengthen their planning [system]. Pro-duction and distribution in APCs should also gradually be brought
under unified management. It won't do not to have tight planning
and organization. Grain production [300] should also be [well]
planned. Should so many types of potato be planted next year or
not? Do [we] want to plant so much cotton or not? [If we] strive hard
again next year, and get the per capita gain [figures] up to XX catties,
then [we'll] see [what next.]
A socialist state is a tightly organized network. In ten thousand
years [there'll be] many people, many automobiles; [we'll] have to line
up even to go shopping (shang jie). [There'll be] many airplanes, [and]
it won't do not to have control of air traffic. When monkeys were
evolving into human beings, there was much freedom; later there was
less and less freedom. On the other hand, humanity [experienced] a
major liberation, consciously taking control of the cosmos, uncovering limitless forces.
[We] must eradicate the ideology of bourgeois right. For instance,
competing for position, competing for rank, demanding overtime
pay, high salaries for mental workers and low salaries for physical
laborers—these are all vestiges of bourgeois ideology. “To each according to his worth”28 is stipulated by law; it's also bourgeois stuff. In the
future should [we] ride automobiles according to rank? [We] do not
necessarily need specially [assigned] automobiles. It's OK to make
some allowances for the old and infirm; for the rest there should be
no ranking [for automobiles.]
Do [we] need to strive hard for grain production next year or not?
[We] do, indeed. Struggle arduously for three years, storing up one
year's worth of grain (500 catties per capita). [But we] can reduce [the
output of] sweet potatoes a bit.
All plans should be made public; there should be no concealment
of production. It won't do not to have control over prefectures,
mune. At this stage in the Beidaihe conference, APC seems more likely, especially since
communes and townships tended to coincide.
27 Presumably Mao is concerned here to prevent central enterprises' being starved for raw
materials and so is prepared to have them under centralized allocation.
28 Mao does say “worth” (zhi).
counties, and townships. [If] you can't transfer things, then [transfers]
must be enforced by administrative orders. From now on, [performance] appraisal [among localities], must be by comparing assignment
[fulfillment, technological creativity, work methods, organizational
discipline, [social] order, and responsible dictatorship. [But] only
can [you] practice dictatorship.
At present, iron can't be transferred [out of localities], neither can
steel; [there exist] hundreds of thousands of governments—how outrageous!
[We] still need to talk about current affairs. On the domestic
front, [we] need to talk about [taking] the whole nation as a big commune [da gongshe]; on the international front, [we] need to talk
about the possibility of the imperialists launching a war. With the
whole nation as a big commune, it's impossible not to have priority
[projects]; it's impossible not to have unified planning. From the Center [down] to the APCs, there must be unanimity. There must be
flexibility; but flexibility has to do with the branches and leaves, it
can't impinge upon the main trunk. Next year's target of XX million
tons of steel must be fulfilled; this year's XX million tons of steel
must be guaranteed.
When the provincial [party] secretaries return home, [they]
should immediately establish proletarian dictatorship [with] effective
regulations: one chief for each region, one head to a province. “Every
injustice has its perpetrator, every debt has its debtor.”29 [Someone]
from an APC in Handan [Hebei] drove a cart to the Anshan steel
[mill] and wouldn't leave until given some iron. In every place [there
are] so many people roaming around uncontrolled; this must be
banned completely. [We] must work out an equilibrium between
levels, with each level [301] reporting to the next higher level—
APCs30 to the counties, counties to the prefectures, prefectures to the
provinces—this is called socialist order. A Center, too, has only one
head. The Center's head for steel is Wang Heshou31 and the head for
machinery is Zhao Erlu.32
The Center's plans [should] be formulated with [the participation
29 I.e., someone has to be responsible: “the buck stops here.”
30 See n. 26.
31 Wang Heshou: Minister of the Metallurgical Industry.
32 Zhao Erlu: Minister of the 1st Ministry of Machine Building.
of] all provinces and cities; provincial level plans should be formulated with [the participation of] prefectures and counties. Perhaps
[things] can't be resolved in one sitting, [so we] must talk a few more
times.
Now on the problem of the people's communes: What should
they be called? They may be called people's communes, or they may
not. My inclination is to call them people's communes. This [name]
is still socialist in nature, not at all overemphasizing communism.
They're called people's communes, first, [because] they're big and,
second, [because] they're public. Lots of people, a vast area of land,
large scale of production, [and] all [their] undertakings are [done] in
a big way. [They] integrate government [administration] with commune [management] to establish public mess halls, and private plots
are eliminated. But chickens, ducks, and the young trees in front and
behind a house are still private. These, of course, won't exist in the
future. [If we] have more grain, [we] can practice the supply system;
[for the present] it's still reward according to one's work. Wages will
be given to individuals according to their ability and won't be given
to the head of the family, which makes the youth and women happy.
This will be very beneficial for the liberation of the individual. In
establishing the people's communes, as I see it, once again it's been
the countryside that's taken the lead; the cities haven't started yet, [because] the workers' wage scales are a complicated matter. Whether in
urban or rural areas, [the aim] should be the socialist system plus
communist ideology. The Soviet Union practices the use of high
rewards and heavy punishments, emphasizing [only] material incentives. We now practice socialism and have the sprouts of communism. Schools, factories, and neighborhoods can all establish
people's communes. In a few years big communes will be organized
to include everyone.
In Tianjin municipality one million people could have participated in manual labor yet did not. In the second FYP period,
mechanization can finally be basically realized. Only with mechanization can the labor force be completely liberated.³³
[There must be] centralized power on major issues; decentralized
³³Mao appears to be voicing contradictory attitudes here: On the one hand he is reproaching Tianjin citizens for not participating in morally therapeutic manual labor; on the other,
he is anticipating with pleasure the eventual liberation of the work force from manual labor.

power [applies to] minor issues [only]. Once the Center makes a decision (the Center and the localities decide jointly), each locality
should implement that decision; implementation also means making
decisions, but not in violation of principles. Party committees
should take the responsibility of investigating work [as it is carried
out]. These [points] still need emphasis. Centralized power is the
main trunk; decentralized power is the branch and leaves. On the one
hand there's policy-making; on the other, there's investigation [of
results]. The special small group for steel must carry out a check-up
every ten days. After you've returned [home from this conference],
do nothing else but concentrate on industry for a few months. With-out giving up something, [you] can't specialize. Without a specialization, [you] have no priorities. The grain problem has been basically
solved; high output satellites should not be given too much attention.³⁴ Imperialism oppresses us; [and so] within three, five, or seven
years [302] we must build our country into a great industrial power.
For this goal we must concentrate our strength on building up [our]
large-scale industrial base; [we must] grasp the main things; [and] as
for things of secondary importance, [if we] don't have enough capability, then get rid of some. It's just like pruning cotton plants for the
growth of cotton bolls. Will this hurt the initiative of the lower
levels? [If] APCs³⁵ don't produce steel, [then] they can produce something
else. Who produces and who does not produce iron and steel must be
on the basis of a decision. [We] must issue an emergency order requisitioning iron and not allowing it to be dispersed. The plans of
medium- to large-sized steel mills must be fulfilled, [and we must]
strive for overfulfillment.³⁶ In a specified period, only a few things
can be done. [If] you want to sing *Xiaoyaojin*,³⁷ then you cannot sing

³⁴After the launch of the Soviet Sputniks in 1957, high achievements were often called
launching satellites in China. In this passage, Mao is referring to APCs or communes claiming massive outputs. Such claims were commonly the grounds for emulation campaigns
that resulted in enormous exaggerations, a typical feature of the GLF which Mao seems
here to be anticipating.
³⁵The text does say APCs, not communes, here and in a few subsequent instances. The
translation is literal each time.
³⁶At this point, Mao clearly hoped to fulfill his extravagant steel target from the output of
regular steel mills. It was only in October, when this aim could be seen to be unrealistic,
that the mass steel campaign started. See *Origins 2*, p. 44.
³⁷*Xiaoyaojin* is the name of a Peking Opera. Although its story has nothing to do with the
discussion here, Cao Cao, one of Mao's favorite characters from *Romance of the Three King-*
other operas at the same time. [We] must drive home the principle
“only when you don’t do everything, can you then do something.”
We must go all out for the next two years on [the production of]
iron, steel, copper, aluminum, molybdenum, and other nonferrous
metals. It won’t do not to go all out. Steel [targets] must be fully met;
iron can be a little less, [but we] must also strive to fulfill [that target].
When [we] sent people to Vietnam, I said [to them, “You should
cherish and protect every tree and every blade of grass in Vietnam.
That’s not [just] the business of Ho Chi Minh, but global business,
the business of [all] laboring people. Attacking the enemy is also Ho
Chi Minh’s business [but equally] global business, [and] the business
of [all] laboring people. [If you should] die in battle there, then be
buried there.” In the future we’ll establish a global committee, [and]
make plans on global unification. Then wherever grain is short, we
will supply it as a gift. But [this will be] possible only when the
opposing classes are eliminated. Now each of the two classes has its
own plans. in the future [we’ll] achieve [the goal of] from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs; there’ll be no distinction between what’s one’s own and what’s another’s; [and when we]
help a place that’s in dire straits, [we] won’t ask for even a single
penny. [We’ve] fought wars for so many years, so many people have
died, yet no one asked for compensation for losses. Now construction is also a fierce battle, struggle desperately for a few years, [and]
after these few years [we] will still have to struggle. But at least all this
kills fewer people than fighting wars. [We] can’t count time by the
clock [or,] how could [we be] considered to have superior morality?³⁸
Hebei province has estimated that teenagers of fifteen could graduate
from university after [a further] fifteen years; with part-work, part-study, people’s consciousness will be raised. Too great a reliance on
material rewards, with high rewards and heavy punishments, won’t
do. We won’t hand out any medals from now on. Officers should go
down [to the ranks] to be [ordinary] soldiers: those who’ve had no

³⁸Mao appears to mean it is ignoble to keep a minute profit-and-loss account in human
transactions.

experience of being soldiers should have the experience; it’s also good
for those who have had the experience to do it again. Division and
army commanders should go down to be under the command of
squad leaders for three months, then come back to be division and
army commander in Yunnan [province] who spent a few months as an ordinary soldier, getting to
understand the soldier’s life and mentality. That’s very good. Some
say that cadres [should] participate in manual labor for two months
[a year]; even one month would be fine. It’s beneficial for us to be as
one with the workers [393]; our feelings will change, [and this] will
influence some tens of millions of cadres children. Cao Cao’s condemnation of Emperor Xian of the Han as “born in the secluded courts,
raised at the hands of ladies” was justified.³⁹ As long as everyone struggles hard with all their might, with all their effort, in three [or] five
years, we’ll have achieved something.
It won’t do for the [economic] coordinating regions not to engage
in politics; they must engage in some politics. In the past some people said that coordinating regions only do economic [work], not politics. I think [we] still need politics in command; only when [our]
thinking is unified can [we] run the economy well. Grasp planning
with politics in command. To establish big communes, to have
unified planning, to have priority construction [projects], [and] to
get rid of some branches and leaves, that’s [all] politics.

21 AUGUST, MORNING

[If] priority [projects] can be guaranteed, next year XX to XX million tons of steel [and] XX tens of thousands of machine tools can be
[produced]; completion of these will be a victory. Therefore, we
must struggle with all our might. [We] must stress [this point] once a
week; [since we] still have over a dozen weeks [left this year], it
should be stressed over a dozen times. At the conference of [party]
secretaries for industry and on factory party committees on the 24th
[of this month], [we’ll] see whether there can be any certainty [of
fulfilling our targets]. [We’ve] given repeated injunctions that whoever

³⁹Cao Cao was a leading Han general who controlled North China as that dynasty disintegrated into three parts in the third century AD. This quotation comes from the Peking
Opera, Xiaoyaojin; see n. 37.
refuses to hand over their iron will be disciplined. [For those] practicing dispersionism: first, warning; second, record a demerit; third,
relief from duty while remaining in office; fourth, dismissal; fifth,
probation within the party; sixth, expulsion from the party.⁴⁰ Other-wise it will be disadvantageous [to the fulfillment of the plan]. I'm
afraid there's a danger of not fulfilling the plan of producing XX million tons of steel. I asked Wang Heshou in June whether or not steel
[production] could be doubled. It was I who brought up the subject;
[if the plan] can't be realized, I will have to make a self-criticism.
Some people don't understand that failure to produce XX million
tons of steel is a serious matter affecting the interests of the people of
the entire nation.
[We] must work hard, with all our might. In Shanghai over
100,000 tons of scrap steel were resmelted. [We] should retrieve scrap
steel in a big way. Those railways that are temporarily of no economic value, such as the Ningbo and the Jiaodong lines, can be dismantled or moved to [economically] important places. First of all,
[we must] guarantee [production of] metallurgical equipment, blast
furnaces, open-hearth rolling mills, electrical machinery, major railways, priority engineering [projects], lathes, and cranes. [We] must
make it clear to the cadres and the people that only by first guaranteeing a number of important tasks can [we] obtain [ten thousand
years of happiness. Every injustice has its perpetrator, every debt has
its debtor; a province can have only one head: [I'd] like to see
whether [you] agree or not. If [you] agree, then permit no one to
roam around uncontrolled. [You] can still make a few adjustments
outside the state plan between various coordinating regions and
between provinces. There are still 133 days, 19 weeks [left in the
year]; pay special attention to it once every week, take good charge of
it.
Our people are very disciplined; this has impressed me profoundly. During my visit to Tianjin [304] tens of thousands of people gathered around me, [but] at a single wave of my hand everybody
dispersed. There are 29,000 households with a population of 130,000
in Xiuwu county, Henan, and [they] have established a big commune
with four levels: commune, wings, squadrons,⁴¹ and action groups
[*zhandou xiaozu*]. Being big, [communes] are easy to manage and
easy to incorporate into the [general] plan. With the concentration of
labor force and land management, [you acquire] a different [level of]
capability. When the crops double at the autumn harvest, the masses
will realize the advantages. [We've] drawn water up hills from the
Tiao River in Gansu [province]; the completion of such a large
project is the result of the party's leadership and the people's communist spirit. Why is the enthusiasm among the people so great? The reason is that we take little from the people; [and] unlike the Soviet
Union, we don't use a system of obligatory sales. We are one party
with one “ism” [and] the masses support us. We have become one
with the masses,⁴² and since the great rectification [of 1942], of one
heart. The Hongan experience is a [good] model.⁴³
[Our] comrades must be made to understand that [the theories of]
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on the relations of production consist of the interrelationships among three elements: the system of
ownership, the interrelationships [among the people], and distribution. They have heard about these ideas but have not begun to understand them. I don't think economic theory has clarified this
properly. The Soviet Union, too, has failed to resolve this matter
since the October Revolution. The interrelationship among the people when laboring is the important element in the relations of production. To stress relations of production and not stress [human]
interrelationships is impossible. Equality among people will not automatically emerge following the transformation of ownership. If
China fails to solve the relationship between people, the Great Leap
Forward will be impossible.

⁴⁰These six sanctions, which are part of the CCP rectification process, are detailed in Fred-erick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and Decline of Party Norms,*
1950–1965 (Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1979), pp. 33–8.
⁴¹“Wings” (an air force formation) and “squadron” underline the militarization ethos of the
early commune movement.
⁴²*Women yu renmin dacheng yipian*: Mao’s key populist phrase became ubiquitous in the
Cultural Revolution and contrasts nicely with the equivalent phrase used by the managerial
elite—*miqie de lianxi qunzhong*, or “intimately link with the masses.” For an example of
this second term, see Liao Mosha, et al., eds., *Yi Deng Tuo* (Commemorating Deng Tuo)
(Fuzhou, Fujian Peoples Publishing House, 1980), p. 109.
⁴³Hongan county in Hubei province pioneered the experimental plot movement. Cadres
transferred to the grass roots experimented with new methods of cultivation on small plots.
This system was lauded for two reasons: it united cadres and masses, and aided output, thus
combining redness and expertise. The CC had publicized and promoted the experimental
plot system since February 1958. See *Origins* 2, pp. 346–7.
After the transformation of the system of ownership, bourgeois
right still exists, such as the system of ranks [and] the relationship
between leaders and the masses. Since rectification, the system of
bourgeois right has been almost completely destroyed; leading cadres
no longer lead by virtue of their power and prestige [or] bureaucratic
airs, but [instead] rely on serving the people, seeking benefits for
the people, and on persuasion. [We] should consider the question of
eliminating the wage system [and] restoring the supply system.⁴⁴ The
army of the past had no salaries, no Sundays [off], no eight-hour
work system; superiors and subordinates were as one; officers and
soldiers were as one; the army had become one with the people,⁴⁵
[and thus] we were able to mobilize tens of thousands of people.
This communist spirit is very good. If human beings only live to eat,
isn't that like dogs eating shit? What meaning is there [to life] if
[you] don't help others a bit, [or] don't practice a bit of communism?
[If] the wage system is eliminated, there will be, one, food to eat—
nobody will die—two, physical health. When I was in Yan'an I wasn't
very healthy, but once Hu Zongnan⁴⁶ launched his attack, six of us—
I, the premier [Zhou Enlai], Hu XX, Jiang Qing,⁴⁷ and so on—
moved into a two-room cave dwelling [and my] health got better. In
Xibaipo,⁴⁸ too, I had [only] a small [305] house. Since coming to
Beijing my housing has become better and better, [but] my health
has deteriorated; [I come down] with the flu more often. Since the
Great Leap Forward, [my] health has improved again. One night in
three or four, I stay up all night. We should put into practice some of
the ideals of utopian socialism. The life of Protestant Puritans was
very hard. Sakyamuni who created Buddhism was also a product of
an oppressed people.⁴⁹ The Buddhist “Sutra of the Six Patriarchs” of

⁴⁴For a discussion of the public promotion of Mao's views on bourgeois right by the Shanghai propagandist Zhang Chunqiao, see *Origins* 2, pp. 106–8.
⁴⁵Literally: *dacheng yipian*, the same idealistic phrase used above, see n. 42.
⁴⁶Hu Zongnan (Hu Tsung-nan) was a leading KMT general. His forces captured Yan'an on
19 March 1947 after CCP forces had slipped out. See Jacques Guillermaz, *A History of the
Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1949* (New York, Random House, 1972), pp. 398–400.
⁴⁷Hu XX: almost certainly Hu Qiaomu, then Mao's political secretary, who was in the
group that left Yan'an with the Chairman. Jiang Qing: Mme. Mao.
⁴⁸Xibaipo: a village in Pingshan county in the Jin Cha Ji border region in southern Hebei,
where the 7th CC held its 2nd plenum in March 1949.
⁴⁹The Buddha was, contrary to Mao's assertion, the scion of a princely house.

the Tang dynasty records that the monk, Huineng,⁵⁰ from Hebei,
was illiterate but very knowledgeable; while doing his missionary
work in Guangdong, he affirmed the emptiness of everything. It was
Idealism through and through, [but] he highlighted [the role] of subjective activity, a great leap forward in the history of Chinese philosophy. Huineng dared to negate everything. Someone asked him,
“Will we reach the Western Paradise after death or not?” He replied
“Not necessarily so. [If we] all reached the Western Paradise, what
about the Westerners?” He lived in the period of Tang Taizong; his
theories prevailed during the time of [Empress] Wu Zetian. In the turbulent years at the end of the Tang dynasty people had no spiritual
sustenance, [and his theories] became very popular.
Marx's thinking on equality, democracy, persuasion, and on the
interrelationships among people, [and] becoming one [with the
masses] have not been brought into full play.⁵¹ The people's relationship in labor is a relationship of equality and a relationship of becoming one [with each other]. The Soviet Union didn't do well [on this
point] after the October Revolution. The old system of [hierarchical]
rights was not completely destroyed; [as a result] mental labor is
divorced from physical labor, [and] education is divorced from
production. Lenin once said [the Soviet Union] should abolish the
standing army [and] instead should arm the people. [As long as]
imperialism exists, there remains a need for a standing army. But the
hierarchical system [and] the relationship between officers and soldiers in the Soviet armed forces have been influenced somewhat by
the Tsarist period. The majority of Soviet Communist party members are cadres' children; ordinary workers and peasants are not
admitted [to party membership]. That's why we need to find our
own road. We must thrust cadres' children in among the masses;
[they] should not enjoy the advantage of being in a favored position.
Our army officers [should be] like the division commander in Yun-nan [who served as] a soldier for one month in the year; I think this

⁵⁰For a discussion of the life and teachings of Huineng (638–713), the Tang dynasty's sixth
Chan patriarch, see Kenneth Ch'en, *Buddhism in China* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press,
1964), pp. 353–7. Either Mao or the editor of *New Mao Texts*, vol. 2, got his origins wrong,
for Huineng was from Hubei, not Hebei.
⁵¹An alternative reading would be: “Marx's thinking on combining equality, democracy,
persuasion, and the interrelationships among people has not been brought into full play.”
is a good method. Perhaps [we] should extend this [practice] everywhere; then our army will be forever invincible.
Red Flag will publish the regulations of Chayashan Commune.⁵²
Other places need not necessarily copy them; [they] may create various patterns. [We] should give [this] some good publicity; let ten or
more people in each province do the publicity. [In their organization], big communes [da she]⁵³ should integrate the natural environment, population, and [local] educational levels. Comrade XXX⁵⁴ in
Hebei got together ten or so people to promote the communist ideological work style, and they were all quite enthusiastic about it. You,
too, should do this kind of promotion when you return to your
posts. Since entering the cities, some have commented that we have a
“rural work style” or a “guerrilla work style.” This [criticism] is bourgeois ideology corroding us. We have cast aside some of our [306]
good things; the rural work style has become unpopular; cities
demand regularization [of procedures]; government offices [yamen]⁵⁵
proliferate; [and we] have become distant from people. [We] should
become one [with the people], use persuasion and not coercion. This
has been [our tradition] for years: How is it that now they have
become problems? It is because [we] have become divorced from the
masses [and] have become privileged. We have always advocated
unity between superiors and subordinates, unity between officers
and soldiers, unity between the army and the people, support the government [and] cherish the people, support the army [and] give preferential treatment to the families of revolutionary martyrs. The
supply system was more equitable, clothing was more or less the
same; but since entering the cities, this has changed.⁵⁶ After going

⁵²*Hongqi* No. 7 (1958), pp. 16–22. This commune in Henan province was more often
known by the second half of its full name: Chayashan Sputnik Commune.
⁵³Mao’s occasional use of the term *da she* suggests that the final decision on the appropriate
name for the new organization had not yet been finalized, despite his own stated preference
for “people’s communes.”
⁵⁴XXX: possibly Hebei’s recently appointed governor, Liu Zihou.
⁵⁵*Yamen* is a pejorative term used here instead of equivalent communist terms; it projects a
powerful image of corrupt and useless local government in China before 1949.
⁵⁶Mao is idealizing the degree of Yan’an egalitarianism, as we know from the famous case
of Wang Shiwei, whose 1942 polemical essay, “Wild Lilies,” pilloried the party for “instituting three classes for clothing and five levels for food.” While Wang was purged as an “absolute egalitarian,” most Yan’an observers agree that material distance between superiors and
subordinates did not begin with the CCP’s entry into major cities around 1949. See Simon
Leys, *Chinese Shadows* (New York, The Viking Press, 1977), pp. 124–6.
through [the 1957] Rectification, the masses said the Eighth Route
Army⁵⁷ has again returned. Clearly [it] had earlier disappeared. It is
precisely the cities that should carry out the “rural work style and
guerrilla practices.” Chiang Kai-shek’s ghost remains in the cities; the
bourgeois stink is influencing us; [and] when we meet them face to
face, [we] want to cut our hair, shave, assume a gentleman’s air, and
put on a bourgeois style—really distasteful. Why shave? Isn’t it good
enough to shave and cut your hair four times a year?⁵⁸ A secretary of
the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, Zhou Hui, says when he
worked in a county, he could be one with the masses; when he
worked in a prefecture [party] committee, he could still be close to
the masses; [but] in the three years since he’s been on the provincial
committee, it’s been hard [for him] to find the cadres and the masses.
Last year’s rectification produced changes. In the past, millions of us
steeled [ourselves] through class struggle in communist fighters supported by the masses. [We] practiced the supply system, led a communist life—this was a Marxist style of work as opposed to a
bourgeois style of work. In my view, the rural work style and guerrilla practices are, after all, better. In twenty-two years of war we were
victorious: Why is it that building communism doesn’t work? Why
do [we] have to use a wage system? This is a concession to the bourgeoisie; [we are] allowing the rural work style and guerrilla practices
to be used to belittle us, [and] the result is the development of individualism. The emphasis on persuasion and not coercion has also
been forgotten. Should the cadres take the lead in restoring the supply system or not? In the old base areas of North China [we] conducted tunnel warfare, [so] all [the cadres] in the north have been
steeled through war. Hebei adopts militarization [because] it’s used
to this pattern. Many places in the south were not steeled through
war, [so] the life style of cadres who grew up there is somewhat different. The cadres of the 25,000 *li* Long March have even produced
some bad eggs, for example, XX [and] XX. XX is very backward in
[his] consciousness, very secretive; it’s hard to see what he’s thinking.
It seems that the [party’s] Control Commission hasn’t been effective;

⁵⁷The 8th Route Army was the wartime appellation of the communist forces. It is used by
Mao to signify the untarnished original virtue of the communists prior to their capture of
power and entry into the corrupting cities.
⁵⁸The average Chinese man does not shave every day and generally gets himself shaved
when he has a hair cut.
even Gao Gang [and] Rao Shushi⁵⁹ were not “controlled.” [The commission] merely checked on the “Qingsen No. 5” (rice) in Hunan
and Hubei. [What] really worked was the 1,400-man conference of
the Military Affairs Commission this time.⁶⁰
We have already destroyed the system of bourgeois right to a great
extent, but not thoroughly enough yet. [307] [We] must continue
working a bit. Don’t immediately advocate the abolition of the wage
system, but in the future it will be eliminated. [We] must stress the
rural work style and guerrilla practices, participating in manual labor
one month a year, [and] going down to the countryside in groups [to
do so]. Lenin wrote an article on his visit to a worker’s family on the
eve of the October Revolution. The worker could find no bread;
later he did and was very happy, [saying] “This time I finally found
some bread.” Lenin only learned of the importance of bread from
this. [If] our cadres participate in manual labor one month a year and
become as one with the people, it will greatly influence their state of
mind. This time [we] must restore our military tradition—the tradition of the Red Army, the Eighth Route Army, [and] the PLA—the
tradition of Marxism; [and] we must get rid of bourgeois ideological
work styles. We may be a bit “uncouth,” but [our ways] are genuine
[and] most civilized. The bourgeoisie appear a bit more civilized,
[but] in reality they’re hypocritical and uncivilized. Restoring the supply system seems like “retrogression,” [but] “retrogression” means progress, because we’ve retrogressed since we came into the cities. Now
[we] must resume our forward march [and] take the lead [in getting]
the 600 million people to adopt the communist work style.
The people’s communes contain the sprouts of communism.
When products are bountiful, we will implement communist [distribution] of grain, cotton, and edible oils. By that time morality will
have greatly improved. Labor will no longer require supervision;
even if [you] want someone to rest, he won’t. The Jianhua Machinery
Plant practices the “ba wu.”⁶¹ In the people’s communes, [people]

⁵⁹For Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, see Text 1, n. 10.
⁶⁰This meeting took place 27 May–22 July 1958 and was designed in part to restore some
of the Yan’an ethos to the PLA; see Origins 2, pp. 66–8.
⁶¹*Ba wu*: lit., eight have-nots. This term is obscure, but one Chinese respondent who was
a high school student during the GLF partially recalls learning a chant, “The Eight Prole-tarian Points” (*bage wuchanjieji zhuzhang*), the first point of which was “poor” (i.e., *yi
qiong er* . . .). *Ba wu* would not be an unusual contraction, just as *si hua* is the contraction
for *sige xiandai hua* (the four modernizations slogan).

practice cooperation in a big way, bringing [their] own tools and
food. The workers beat drums and gongs [and] don’t ask for piece-rate wages. All of these are the sprouts of communism, [and they]
destroy the system of bourgeois right. I hope everyone will publicize
[this] way of looking at the problem, read the two relevant documents, and publicize the actual situations in which there is increasing growth of the elements of communist morality.
In the past during the revolution numerous people died without
asking anything in return. Why can’t it be like that now? If we can eat
without paying for it, this will be a tremendous change. Probably in
about ten years our production will be very bountiful [and the
people’s] morality will be very noble; [then] we can practice communism in eating, clothing, and housing. Eating without paying in public mess halls is communism. In the future everything will be called
a commune. [We] won’t say factories; for instance, Anshan Steel Mill
will be called Anshan Commune. Cities and villages will be called
communes, [and] universities and neighborhoods will establish
communes.⁶² Townships will be integrated with communes, [local]
government will be integrated with commune management; temporarily [we] put up two signs. Set up a “department of the interior” (ad-
Administrative section) in the people’s communes to administer registry
of birth and death, marriage, census, [and] civil administration.

[308] X X X⁶³

Some people ask, “should there still be flexibility after centralization?” Flexibility is still needed. Apart from the guarantee of XX million tons of steel, flexibility is permitted. [This is] like fruit trees or
cotton plants that need pruning, [while] others do not. Centraliza-tion is needed mainly in [the production of] steel and in machinery.
Allocate XX million yuan to stimulate [production] so that the vitality of the APCs will have something to aim at. XX million tons of
steel should be guaranteed for the state, leaving the remaining XX
million tons of steel to be used by the provinces, prefectures [di], and
counties at their discretion; if [we] can surpass [the target] a bit, all

⁶²Yet, when Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan wanted to establish the Shanghai Com-mune in 1967, Mao ridiculed the idea; see *Wansui* (1969), pp. 666–72.
⁶³Three Xs, the meaning of which is unclear, appear at the top of 2:308.
the better. Plans can't be completely accurate; [it's] impossible for everything to be planned ahead of time: Some things are difficult to anticipate; blindness is unavoidable; there may be a little chaos, but the achievements would be great, unprecedented. We didn't pay atten- tion to this in the past; now the whole party should manage it. The first secretaries should grasp industry in their right hands and agricul- ture in [their] left hands. Party committees at all levels should have several secretaries.

21 AUGUST, AFTERNOON

The problem of grain policy for 1959: Should our effort be greater than this year's or be about the same? [I believe] the greater the effort we make, the better. [Our effort] next year should be still greater than this year. Don't worry about a bumper harvest containing [the seeds of] famine, don't diminish your efforts for fear of overproduction.64 But there should be a rhythm to production. At present, the inten- sity of labor is very high; the peasants must be allowed to have proper rest, two days a month, one day a fortnight. During the busy season, rest a little less; at other times, rest a little more. [Those] liv- ing relatively far away from the work site can eat and sleep [there], so as to save on commuting time and have more rest. This point should be written in the documents but not be talked about too much.65
There's plenty of grain, but edible oils are still insufficient. The production of grain, cotton, and edible oils should all be increased, [and] the key is deep ploughing. This year most [places] didn't plough deeply, and close planting has also been insufficient. [Of course], planting so closely that no air gets through is no good, either. Only by ploughing deeply [can you] plant closely, conserve water, store manure, and kill insects.

(XX interjected: Close planting above ten million plants may fail, though five million should pose no problem; large scale close plant- ing will create experience.)

64This is an obscure passage.
65It was not only 9 Nov. that *RMRB* warned openly that peasants had to get more rest.

[Chairman:] Some of the problems in the theory of political econ- omy and historical materialism should be written afresh. We've solved a theoretical problem in Marxism. First take care of agricul- ture, while at the same time taking care of heavy industry. The argu- ments Khrushchev had with Molotov were precisely over too much heavy industry. We take a road opposite to that of the Soviet Union: [we] first take care of agriculture in order to facilitate industrial devel- opment; [we] first take care of the green leaves, then the red flowers. What's wrong with this approach? It seems some questions need reinterpretation. Economic [309] theory and historical materialism require new development and amplification. The three aspects of the relations of production, [namely] the system of ownership, the inter- relationship among workers, and distribution all have yet to be brought into full play. The collective farms and handicraft coopera- tives in the Soviet Union are still under collective ownership. Why haven't they introduced the system of ownership by the whole peo- ple? Ownership by the whole people [means that things] belong not just to the Center but to all the people. In the past, [our] system of ownership was expressed in the ownership of Wang Heshou and Zhao Erlu; this is the way of the Soviet Union. At present, we can't even manage twenty-eight provinces, municipalities, and autono- mous regions66 except to hold four conferences a year. We did even less in the past, merely issuing some directives and reporting on devel- opments. Now 20 percent is controlled by the Center and 80 percent by the localities. Provinces should also decentralize power, even down to the individual enterprises which should also have prescribed jurisdiction and independence. The Shijingshan Steel Mill has respon- sibility [baogan] for investment. It can raise production from 600,000 tons to 1.3 million tons [per year]; in the second state it can produce 3 million tons. What's the reason? Is there some trick to this? Think about it. [It's simply that] the initiative of the masses has come into play. When Wang Heshou was in charge it was actually the dictator- ship of the planners. Here's a problem for you all to ponder. In my opinion this is a problem to do with the people [and the motiva- tions] which are the same as in national independence [movements]. Activism in independent India is higher than it was under American

66At this time 26 provinces plus Beijing and Shanghai were directly under the Center. (Tianjin was demoted to sub-provincial level, 1958–67).
[sic] rule; once there is independence, there is more activism. Of
course, this has manifested itself in class struggle. In the neighborhoods, factories, and popularly run [minban] schools, progress has
been made in a transformation from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people.
The problem of the struggle between flexibility [huo] and “inflexibility” [“si”]. The struggle between “flexibility and inflexibility” will
exist ten thousand years from now; [should we] control “inflexibility” or not? No inflexibility won’t do; overly inflexible control won’t
do, either; [and] absolutely no inflexibility also won’t do. If the [target for] steel for 1959 is XX tons, XX tons [of it] must be inflexible
and XX tons is flexible; if [the target is] XX tons, then [something
like] XX tons is flexible; if XX tons is surpassed it can be allocated
[like] edible oils; [if you] have more, eat more; less, then eat less. This
is flexibility. Guaranteeing priority projects is what’s inflexible; what’s
outside the priority projects and won’t impede the priority projects
is what’s flexible. Implementing a responsibility [system] in a big way
contains both inflexibility and flexibility; everybody should keep an
eye on this. Inflexibility and flexibility are expressed in terms of centralization and decentralization; both are needed. The responsibility
system is expressed in this unity of the contradiction between inflexibility and flexibility. This is the principle of centralizing power on
major issues and decentralizing power on minor issues. After all,
who’s in charge of the Center? To what extent should we centralize
power on major issues? Is it enough to have only a [State] Economic
Construction Commission?68 Is it possible to establish [both] an
Industrial Production Commission [Gongye shengchan weiyuanhui]
and a Basic Industrial Construction Commission [Gongye jijian
weiyuanhui]?69 In the final analysis, “every injustice has its perpetrator.”70 Contracts and responsibility for tasks [baogong baogan] [will]
give people something to strive for. We talk about the six points on
discipline as a war of nerves, [310] primarily [meant] to scare people,
not to send them to jail; just as long as people don’t break the law,
that’s fine.71
The problem of the superstructure in historical materialism is the
problem of political power; it’s already been solved. The people’s
communes integrate government [administration] and commune
[management]. Gradually political power will disappear there. Esti-mate one scoundrel for every few people in the people’s communes
and so dictatorship is exercised. Sentencing 1.3 million criminals to
remolding through labor from a population of 600 million is not
really very many. The army in the past said it was backward; but
since [they] met in [that] conference, the interrelationships [among
their people] have improved and a new atmosphere emerged. At the
moment, the army is holding conferences everywhere; the Great
Leap Forward in the army is starting; [it] can do all kinds of things.
By taking one-third of [its] time to engage in politics, culture, and
manual labor, will the army’s military training be affected? Not only
will it not be affected, but it will be improved. Public Security and
the courts are in the midst of rectification, too. This business of law,
it won’t do to be without it, but we have our own way—investigation
and research settle problems on the spot and mainly through
mediation—or is the way of Upright Judge Ma[rx] better?72 Since the
Great Leap Forward, everyone’s been engaged in production, blooming and contending in a big way, and freely writing big character posters, so they haven’t had time to break the law. In dealing with thieves
it won’t do not to rely on the masses.
(Liu XX73 interjects: In the end [do we] rule by law or rule by people?

67In 1958, Mao promoted a dual system of dependable steel targets and higher targets to be
striven for. See Origins 2, pp. 165–70. In this passage, the inflexible amount is the dependable target and the flexible amount is the difference between the dependable target and the
target to be striven for. We have scrupulously retained the Chinese editor’s use of quotation
marks with regard to huo and si.
68It is unclear whether Mao is being loose in his terminology or simply forgetful. There
was no body called the Economic Construction Commission. The passage could also possibly be rendered “[State] Economic and Construction Commissions,” but in February
1958 the State Construction Commission had been abolished and its functions taken over
by other bodies, including the State Economic Commission.
69Here Mao may have been airing alternative ideas of central government restructuring currently under top-level debate. No body with either of these titles existed, but in November
1958 a State Capital Construction Commission (Guojia jiben jianshe weiyuanhui) was
created, presumably because the abolition of the State Construction Commission was now
felt to have been a mistake.
70See n. 29.
71See n. 40.
72This is an obscure passage. Mao seems suddenly to realize that perhaps Marx, whom he
respects, might not approve of his preference for an unstructured system of justice.
73Liu XX: unidentified, possibly Liu Shaoqi.
Judgments are dependent on people; laws can function only as references in the conduct of business. If everyone acts according to the
decisions of the Nanning conference, the Chengdu conference, the
second session of the Eighth Party Congress,74 and the Beidaihe conference, then . . . The Meilin company in Shanghai practices two sets
of laws [shuang fa];75 as soon as it's published in the newspapers, [it
will be] adopted nationwide.)
[Chairman:] [We] can't rule the majority of the people by relying
on law. The majority of people [can be ruled only] by relying on the
cultivation of [good] habits. The army's reliance on rule by law didn't
work; what's actually worked has been the 1,400-man conference.
Who could remember so many clauses of a civil code or a criminal
law? I participated in the formulation of the Constitution, even I
can't remember [it]. Han Feizi76 advocated rule by law; later the Con-fucianists advocated rule by men. Each of our draft resolutions is
law; holding conferences is law, too. Observing public security regulations is possible only when people have cultivated good habits. [If
this] becomes public opinion [and] everyone becomes conscious [of
it], then communism is achievable. The great majority, some 90 percent, of our rules and regulations are created at the departmental and
bureau [level]. Essentially we do not rely on these; mainly we rely on
resolutions, holding conferences—four held annually—and not on a
civil code or a criminal law to maintain social order. The National
People's Congress and the State Council in conference have their
ways, and we rely on our ways. This has to do with the superstructure.
The impact of ideology, world view, methodology, newspapers,
culture, and education is enormous. The more bourgeois freedom is
destroyed, the more proletarian freedom there is. The Soviet [311]
Union didn't completely destroy bourgeois freedom, [and] consequently hasn't fully established proletarian freedom. Our revolution
in politics and ideology has been relatively thorough: the cadres
74These three major meetings had all been held earlier in 1958 and were crucial in the development of the GLF; see Table 4.
75The exact nature of the Meilin company's legal procedures is obscure; possibly the company used persuasion and mediation initially in cases of rule-breaking and punishment by
the rulebook only when all else failed.
76Han Feizi (fl. 3rd century BC): a leading philosopher of the Legalist school of statecraft.
participate in production and become one with the masses, [and]
rules and regulations have been thoroughly reformed. This is precisely the complete destruction of bourgeois freedom, [and] the
enthusiasm of the workers has been soaring. These questions are
touched upon ever so slightly in a few sentences in [the text on] political economy.
[On] the problem of distribution: Wage grades among Soviet
cadres are too numerous and the gap [between the cadres and] the
workers and peasants is too wide. The peasants are obliged to sell
their [grain], shouldering 48 percent of the burden [of the state's economic investment], which has restricted agriculture from developing
for forty years. We only take 5 to 8 percent (aside from indirect obligations), thus storing wealth among the people. “With ample grain,
how can army provisions be insufficient?” When Khrushchev came
[to power] he talked only of how much grain the state must have, but
not of how much to produce. We are the ones who talk about production. People know that we are in the end [doing so] for them, so
[their] enthusiasm is very high. Some say, “With a big country and a
large population it's hard to get anything done.” It depends on what
methods [you] use. As long as the methods are right, even with an
additional billion or more people, we can easily get things done. Our
method is big contending and blooming, and the exercise of self-management. We obey the truth; if truth is on the side of the subordinates, [then] the superiors obey; if the soldiers are wiser than the
officers, [then] the officers obey the soldiers; if students can compile
textbook materials better than the teachers, [then] the teachers obey
the students. The compilation of teaching materials needs the “three-in-one combination” of activist elements in the party, and among students and teachers. [We must] sort out the bourgeois monopoly in
science, field by field, and achieve our own breakthrough. The director of the Research Institute on Traditional Medicine in the Academy
of Sciences, Zhao Chenggu, was able to extract herbs (from snake
root grass [shegen cao]) for treating high blood pressure, but all along
he refused to tell others [how]. Young scientists refused to admit
defeat, and after a few days of struggling, they got it as well. There-fore we should pay special attention to young scientists so as to isolate these professors. This is a fierce kind of struggle, so it may take a
few years.
Now, on to the importance of ideology: Ideology is the reflection
of objective reality. It concerns itself with the [economic] base and
serves that base. Reform the system of rules and regulations. Holding
conferences is making ideology; [this] Beidaihe conference is making
ideology. At last year's [CC's] Third Plenum, this year's Nanning
conference, the Chengdu conference, and the Party Congress, [we]
put forward the slogan of doing away with superstition; it's had quite
an impact. The Great Leap Forward was possible only because of this.
Incorrect reflection of objective reality is very harmful. Eight-legged
essays⁷⁷ and the thoughts of Confucius have been passed down for
thousands of years; there are people who'd eat the shit and dirt the
Dalai Lama offers⁷⁸—idiotic in the extreme. Zhang Daoling had
every worshipper donate 5 *dou* of rice; [anyone] donating 5 *dou* of
rice [312] could then eat [for free]. [But] the Celestial Master Zhang,
introduced to [the people of] Jiangsu, changed for the worse.⁷⁹
There's a pattern in the consumption of grain: Both big and small eaters should eat 3 *dan*, 6 *dou* a year. Let them eat to their heart's content. Xue Rengui ate 1 *dan* of rice every day, but this is rare.⁸⁰ In
running the public mess halls, we can [let the people] take [food] to
eat at home. The provision of free meals can be gradually adopted.
[We won't] decide on it for the time being. Whether or not [we]
adopt it in 1959, [we'll] see next year, and also whether clothing can
be free, too. Eating without payment may not have to wait until the
third FYP.⁸¹ The dormitories for workers and staff should be
arranged in proper proportions. Large dormitories are better than
small houses. The vestiges of bourgeois right cannot be completely

⁷⁷A tradition of classical scholarship, this type of essay had long been excoriated by Mao as
the reflection of bureaucratism; see *SW3*, pp. 50, 53–68.
⁷⁸Even in a closed party gathering, this slighting reference to the Dalai Lama at a time
when he was still formally in good standing with the PRC government is unusual.
⁷⁹Zhang Daoling, also known as Zhang Ling, was a Daoist priest in the 2nd century AD
who founded the so-called “Southern School.” He personified the transformation of
ancient Daoist principles and doctrine into a religion with a magic-making priesthood.
Regarded as a miracle worker, he came to be called “Celestial Master” (*Tian Shi*); but his custom of asking dues in rice also brought him the sobriquet “rice-thief” and his teachings
“The Way of the Five Pecks of Rice.” See Holmes Welch, *Taoism: The Parting of the Way*
(Boston, Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 113–4.
⁸⁰The Tang general, Xue Rengui, was said to have been a great trencherman; see also Text
3, n. 48. Mao’s point appears to be that with grain production increasing mightily, even if
rationing were ended, individual grain consumption would not increase very much except
in rare cases.
⁸¹The 3rd FYP was due to start in 1963.

eradicated; [therefore] university professors can eat better than students. Henan cultivates 8 billion square meters of land and doubles
its grain output. If Henan can do it, the whole country should do it.
Next year will be the tenth anniversary of the founding of [our]
state. [Should we] propagandize this in a big way or in small way?
Since we'll be propagandizing for the Chinese people, and to motivate them, we need not consider impressing foreign countries. Actu-ally foreign countries will be affected. If [we propagandize] in a big
way, should we invite foreigners or not? [If yes, then] how many
should [we] invite?
When [you] return from this conference, tell your comrades in the
army, officers must serve as soldiers one month a year, beginning
with a few officers. Once someone starts, others will want to do it.
Once there's one October Revolution, the whole world wants to
make revolution; once one APC produces 1,000 catties [of grain] per
*mou* [of land], the entire nation will want to do the same. [After all,]
does the minority obey the majority or the majority obey the minority? It's always been the majority obeying the minority, because the
minority [has always] reflected the opinion of the majority. When
you came to this conference, wasn't it because of a notice from Deng
XX?⁸² Isn't this the majority obeying the minority? Darwin's theory
of evolution and Copernicus' theory of the solar system were each
created by a single individual; others all followed. Marx [and] Engels
both reflected objective laws or the opinions of the majority. The formula for protein has not yet been discovered, [but] the 167 types of
reactive dyes have. The world's first, marsh gas, is H₄C; farts are H₂S;
gypsum is calcium sulphate. From this perspective, the opinion of
the minority reflects the opinion of the
majority.
Xushui county in Hebei province is working on militarization,
combatization, and disciplinization.⁸³ These three slogans may or
may not be raised. Organization need not necessarily conform to regiments, battalions, companies, platoons and squads; brigades, detach-

⁸²Deng XX: Deng Xiaoping as party General Secretary would have been formally responsible for issuing the notices ordering the attendance of officials.
⁸³This slogan in expanded form was altered to “Organize along military lines, work as if
fighting a battle, live in the collective way”; see Kuo, *Communist Terminology*, p. 432; Hong
qi, No. 7 (1958), p. 15; T. A. Hsia, *The Commune in Retreat as Evidenced in Terminology and
Semantics* (Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1964), pp. 29–35. Despite the key nature of
this slogan, Beijing translators did not agree on an English version at first; cf., official trans-ments, and teams will also do.84 Actually it’s a problem of labor
organization and democratic management. Imperialism has spread rumors
about this development, but we’re not afraid of it. Coercion and
orders, of course, are not good, but a bit of coercion is also necessary.
This is discipline. Your commune is good. We are going to Beidaihe for this conference [313]
is a case in point. War communism in the Soviet Union was a system
of collecting surplus grain.85 We’ve had twenty-two years of military
tradition, [and] the supply system is our war communism. [If] we
practice communism among our cadres, not including the common
people, then they will be affected. Engels said that many things start
in the army, and indeed they do. [When] we went from the cities to
the countryside, we united with the semiproletariat to form the
party and the army. We ate from the same pot, no deference, no salaries. This was the communist supply system. Since coming into the
cities, [we’ve] acquired an inferiority complex. The old ways no
longer worked. [We] want woolen garments, [we want] to shave, and
we want the cadres to become intellectualized. The salary system has
negated the supply system. Garments are divided into three colors
and grain into five grades, and we have followed the mass line insufficiently in the cities. From liberation until 1952 it was still all
right. The years 1953–1956 mainly reflected China’s bourgeois ideology. The second [problem] has been our indiscriminate imitating of
the Soviet Union. In the past we were compelled to have bourgeois
advisors. We were unaware of the concept of bourgeois right. [We
have] hundreds of millions of peasants, 7 million industrial workers,
over 20 million cadres and teaching personnel. As the sea of the bourgeoisie has risen up to our chests, it has drowned some. Liu Shaotang
has become a rightist, [but] Yao Wenyuan’s not bad, better than Liu-shahe.86

Once the draft Resolution on the People’s Communes is issued,
every county [must] conduct tests at one or two selected points. It is
not necessary to get [them] fully under way immediately. Neither do
you have to start with regiments, battalions, companies, platoons,
and squads. [But] there must be leadership and [we must] proceed
with the planning in a systematic manner. It won’t do not to start
now; that would be to commit an error. The increase in the size of
private plots, livestock being raised mainly by private individuals, big
cooperatives having to establish small cooperatives, and so on, were
concessions to the rich peasants. It was all right to go through this
stage; it was not an error of principle. In the conditions of that time
[such measures] even had a certain positive significance.87 [But] now
it has again been negated. One or two pigs may be raised by private
individuals. The bigger the commune, the better. The characteristics
of the people’s communes are one, big, and two, public; most important is that many cooperatives combine into one big commune. The
several comments in *Socialist Upsurge in the Countryside*88 said big
cooperatives were good; mountain areas could establish big cooperatives, too, [in order to] develop a diversified economy and to ensure
all-round development. [However,] establishing slightly small cooperatives to begin with also had its advantages. The youth and women
are happy about the [new] wage system. The rationale of increasing
private plots and so on were all proposed by the [party’s] Rural Work
Department.89 As early as 1955 I recommended establishing big
cooperatives. Establish 15,000 to 25,000 communes nationwide, [averaging] 5,000 to 6,000 households or 20,000 to 30,000 people per
commune—rather large and convenient for running industry, agricul-

lations of *Hongqi* and *RMRB* editorials in *Communist China, 1955–1959: Policy Documents*
*with Analysis* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press), pp. 458, 462. Mao would again mention
these “three transformations” in his 6 November speech to the Zhengzhou conference, see
Text 18, n. 6.
84“Brigades” and “teams” (here *da dui* and *xiao dui*) were the terms eventually universalized.
85“War communism” lasted from 1918 to 1921.
86Liu Shaotang was a prominent young communist writer who fell from grace because of
criticisms he made during the Hundred Flowers; see Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in*
*Communist China* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), esp. pp. 194, 231–6. Yao Wen-yuan, the future bugler of the Cultural Revolution, appears to have caught Mao’s eye during
the Anti-Rightist Campaign; see *Origins* 1, p. 396; see also Lars Ragvald, *Yao Wen-yuan as*
*a Literary Critic and Theorist: The Emergence of Chinese Zhdanovism* (Univ. of Stockholm
published doctoral dissertation, 1978). Liushahe was a Sichuanese poet purged in the Anti-
Rightist Campaign. Mao had mentioned him in his Hundred Flowers talks; see Text 1, n. 5.
87Mao has been describing the measures adopted to achieve peaceful collectivization in the
early and mid 1950s.
88The full title of this collection of essays on collectivization edited by Mao and published
in January 1956 was *Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside* (*Zhongguo nongcun de shehui-zhuyi gaochao*). Mao seems to be concerned here to demonstrate the consistency between
his views of late 1955, when he completed his editorial note to this book, and August 1958.
89This is a dig at the then head of the department, Deng Zihui, who was criticized in 1955
for being too cautious on collectivization.
ture, commerce, education, [314] and] military affairs [side by side],
as well as farming, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production
and fisheries. With this way [of doing things], I think in the future a
few large cities will be dispersed; residential areas of 20,000 to 30,000
people will have everything; villages will become small cities where
the majority of philosophers and scientists will be assigned. Every
large commune will have highways constructed, wider roads of
cement or asphalt, with no trees planted [alongside] so that airplanes
can land—they will be airports. In the future, every province should
have a couple of hundred airplanes, averaging two planes per township. Large provinces will set up their own factories for aircraft construction.⁹⁰
Each area need not implement communization according to
Xushui [county's] methods. Each area [should] have the three slogans
(militarization, combatization, disciplinization). The general regulations of five Star Commune⁹¹ will be published in *Red Flag*, [and] in
the main they can be followed; each area should use them as a reference [in their own] implementation.

30 AUGUST, MORNING
The people's communes have been set up as a result of the masses' initiative; it wasn't us who advocated it. We advocated uninterrupted revolution, eradicating superstition, liberating thought, and daring to
think, daring to speak, daring to act; [and] the masses have risen [to
the occasion]. [We] did not anticipate this at the Nanning conference,
or the Chengdu conference, or the second session of the Eighth Party
Congress. The spontaneity of the masses has always been an element
inherent in communism. First there was utopian socialism, classical
materialism, and dialectical [theories] by Marx and
others. Our people's communes have been
developed on the basis of the APCs; they've not come into being
from nowhere. We need to understand this clearly in order to system-
⁹⁰This utopian vision seems redolent of Sun Yat-sen's earlier visions of the industrialization
of China; see C. Martin Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen, Frustrated Patriot* (New York, Columbia
Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 23–6. In addition, it was clearly the source of Mao's colleagues' extravagant claims; see, for instance, Tan Zhenlin's description of communism in *Origins 2*, p. 84.
⁹¹*Wu xing gongshe* must be a misprint for *Weixing Gongshe* (Sputnik Commune) whose regulations were indeed published in *Hongqi*, No. 7 (1958), see n. 52.
atize this question. The characteristics of the people's communes are
one, big, and two, public. [They have] vast areas of land and abundant resources [as well as] a large population; [they can] combine
industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and military affairs, as
well as in farming, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production
and fisheries—being “big” is terrific. [With] many people, there's lots
of power. [We say] public because they contain more socialism than
do the APCs, [and they will] gradually eradicate the vestiges of capitalism. For example, the eradication of private plots and private livestock rearing, the running of public mess halls, nurseries, and
tailoring groups so that all working women can be liberated. They
will implement a wage system and agricultural factories [in which]
every single man, woman, old person, and youth receives his own
wage, in contrast to the former [system of] distribution to the head of
the household. Direct payment of wages is much welcomed by the
youth and by women. This eradicates the patriarchal system and the
system of bourgeois rights.⁹² Another advantage of [communes']
being public is that labor efficiency can be raised higher than in
APCs.
Currently there are 700,000 APCs nationwide. It would be best to
establish big APCs of 10,000 people or 10,000 households. [315]
Henan advocates 2,500 households or so in each; that's all right, too.
This is a new problem, but once you disseminate the news, explain
the reasons, [then] perhaps in only a few months—through the
autumn, winter, and spring—it could be accomplished, more or less.
Of course, it will still require a transition period to achieve a wage system and free meals, perhaps a year; for some places perhaps three
years. In [our] draft resolution there's a passage [about its taking] one
to two or four to five years or even a bit longer to make the transition
from the system of collective ownership to the system of communist
ownership—almost the same as in the factories—that is, public ownership of all eating, clothing, and housing. The Soviet Union still
encourages the construction of houses by private individuals. We will
eliminate private housing in the future.
The problem of making things green, of afforestation: beautifica-
⁹²Mao's pro-feminist ideals for ending patriarchal domination via the commune system did
not come to pass. His comments here fall squarely in the utopian tradition of Chinese
thought.
tion of the landscape, the cities, and countryside—all [should look] like Zhongshan Park or the Summer Palace. It’s not good that Zhong-shan Park does not produce grain. China has just started its construc-tion. [We] must think how the construction can be done more rationally and better. Some say, “In the cities, unlike in the country-side, factories take up too much land.” In China there are 3 *mou* of land per person, but 2 *mou* would be sufficient for us. [If] the produc-tion per *mou* is raised in a few years, [then] one-third [of the land] can be used for planting trees, one-third for grain, and one-third allowed to lie fallow. If the production per *mou* is 1,000 catties, as much as today’s “satellites,”⁹³ [then] one *mou* will equal 40 *mou* or 80 to 90 *mou* [in output], so why then plant so much? Planting trees must be done in a planned way. Sowing the land must be planned. The French have made their streets, houses, and boulevards very beauti-ful. If capitalism can do it, why can’t we? [We] should do it in a more orderly manner. In an antithetical couplet praising the West Lake, Kang Youwei⁹⁴ said, “I have not found gardens like this, touring the four continents.” Actually, why tour the four continents? Once we start the greening process, [you] will be able to tour the whole country—why must you visit the West Lake? In the West Lake the water is shallow; the trees aren’t good either. Housing must be arranged well. It can’t be done in a big way this year. [We] can make a start on a few this year, some next year. If [we can] produce XX cat-ties of grain [per capita] (perhaps XX catties this year, double that next year), then we can go ahead with our plans for transforming [places] into parks, making things green, animal husbandry, and hous-ing, and so forth. I took a look in Hebei and Henan to see what they meant by making things green. How can it be called afforestation without trees? True afforestation, I think, can only be carried out in a big way when [we produce] several thousand catties of grain per cap-ita so that one-third of the land can be taken out for planting trees. Agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry are interrelated and inter-active.
There are still many problems about the people’s communes, as yet unknown, so that continued study is still needed. There is already [a set of] regulations; the twenty-four articles of Henan’s

Sputnik Commune, its “constitution.” Once it is [316] published, many will respond to the call throughout the nation. Can the people’s communes make the transition from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people in the next two or three years (next year and the year after)? As for implementing state ownership of land, the wage system, and establishing agricultural factories, there’s a document that says the transition to communism will start from the third FYP; I added [or the] fourth or fifth FYP. One document says next year will be the decisive year. This is well said. To double grain [production] again, to produce XX to XX tons of steel and to strive for XX tons, that’s a big battle. [We] still can’t rest; the machines can’t rest. There are still four months [left in] this year. I made a mistake: it would have been better to have paid attention to [this matter] a month earlier. [I] raised the subject on 19 June, but failed to [suggest] any concrete measures. Everyone went off to work on the plans. Their enthusiasm is worthy, but [attention] to production this year has slackened. I didn’t do well; the responsibility is mine, not yours. From 21 August there were still nineteen weeks or 133 days [left in the year], not a day more, not a day less. Now another ten days have passed. [It’s] quite dangerous. [We] must have emergency mobilization. I have doubts about whether we can fulfill [our targets]. I’m a “tide-watcher.”⁹⁵ Can we [fulfill our targets] by 1 January next year or not—I’m up in the air about it. If we fail to [fulfill] our targets, then, one, the wrong subject was raised in the wrong way and, two, the work was not paid close enough attention to, and those were my mistakes. When the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry estimated in its briefing report a production figure of 9 million tons, I said, “Be quick about it! Double it—why procrastinate?” I asked many people about producing 11 mil-lion tons [of steel]; they all said it was possible, there was hope. [The tar-get for] 1956 was even more solid [but] the actual increase in production was not much, only XX catties [of grain].⁹⁶ Whether it’s

⁹³Mao is referring here to trailblazing production areas rather than to the Weixing or Sput-nik Commune.
⁹⁴For Kang Youwei, see Text 1, n. 22.

⁹⁵Mao is being ironic. This was the term he had used as the 2nd session of the 8th Party Congress to criticize those who were reluctant to commit themselves one way or the other on the GLF; see *Origins 2*, p. 57.
⁹⁶This sudden comparison of the reliability of the 1958 steel target with the setback to the 1956 grain target seems strange, and possibly the editor has mistaken *dun* (tons) for *jin* (cat-ties). On the other hand, Mao had hoped for a breakthrough in grain production in 1956 to consolidate and justify collectivization, and the failure to achieve it may have rankled and made him worry that the GLF would not achieve a breakthrough either. Mao is also, of course, safeguarding himself from appearing wildly optimistic.
realistic or not [to aim for] 11 million tons of steel this year, I have
doubts. It only counts when we see it. “[The work in] iron and steel
is not yet completed. Comrades should continue to exert themselves.”97 Next year [we’ll produce] XX tons, increasing another XX
tons the year after; struggle hard for three years [i.e., 1958–1960] to
obtain XX tons—then the foundation will be laid. In a further two
years, that is by 1962, [if we] produce XX to XX tons of steel, [then
we’d] be close to XX tons. How many tons of steel [should we have]
for a population of 700 million? One ton per capita, I think; make it
700 million tons. Grain production could be half the figure for steel;
make it 3,500 billion catties.98 Grain produce should be diversified, it
shouldn’t always be the good old sweet potato.
The first precondition for communism is plenty; the second is to
have a communist spirit. Once an order is issued, everyone automatically goes to their work, idlers are few or none. Communism
does not differentiate between superiors and subordinates. We have a
twenty-two year history of war communism, with no salaries, [which
is] different from the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union [it’s] called
the system of surplus grain collection. We didn’t [317] practice that.
Ours was called the supply system, [in which] army and civilians,
officers and men are equal, [and there are also] the three great democracies.99 Originally we divided up the leftovers from the mess and
had small subsidies. After we came into the cities, it was said that the
supply system was backward, guerrillaism, a rural work style, [and]
that it couldn’t boost initiative, nor stimulate progress. [They]
wanted to establish a salary system. [They] endured for three years,
[and] in 1952 the salary system was established. [They] said bourgeois
ranks and rights and such were very fine and called our old supply
system a backward method, a guerrilla practice that affected activism.
In effect [they] turned the supply system into a system of bourgeois
right, [thereby] promoting bourgeois ideology. Did initiating the
25,000 *li* Long March, the Land Revolution and the War of Libera-tion rely on salaries? Two to three million people during the anti-
Japanese war, from four to five million during the War of Liberation
lived a life of war communism, no Sundays [off]—didn’t [they all]
risk their lives? The party, the administration, the army, the
civilians—numbering several million—all were together with the
masses, supporting the administration and loving the people. The
party, the administration, and the army under a unified leadership
had nothing “to spend,” but [with] unity between officers and men,
and between the army and civilians, and the support for the administration and love for the people, [we] drove off the Japanese devils
and defeated Chiang Kai-shek. Nor did [we] have anything “to
spend” when we fought the United States. Can it be said [we did all
this] because we handed out salaries? Now [we] have something “to
spend,” issuing salaries according to rank, dividing [them into] generals, field rank officers, and junior officers; but some of them have not
even been in battle. Whether or not they’re any good has yet to be
tested. The result is divorce from the masses; the men don’t love their
officers, and the masses don’t love their cadres. Because of this we’re
not much different from the Nationalist party: our garments are in
three colors, our food is divided into five grades, even the desks and
chairs of our offices are ranked; [and so] the workers and peasants
don’t like us, saying, “You’re officials—party officials, government
officials, military officials, commercial officials”—so many officials,
how can there be no “isms”?100 Too many bureaucratic airs, too little
politics, so bureaucratism emerges. Since the Rectification [Campaign] we have been rectifying bureaucratic airs and putting politics
in command. [Since then] the cases of competing for rank and scrambling for special treatment have not been many. I think [we should]
get rid of this thing. The salary system does not have to be abolished
immediately, because there are professors. But [we should] prepare
for it in one or two years. Once the people’s communes are established, [this] will force us gradually to abolish the salary system.
Since we came into the cities, [we have been] under the influence of
the bourgeoisie. [When] we launched a campaign, it was a really
Marxist practice and a democratic work style, [but] they branded us
[as using] “rural work style” and “guerrilla practices.” “Guerrilla practices” are capitalists’ words. [It was] probably during the period from

97This appears to be an adaptation of a passage from Sun Yat-sen’s will: “The work of the
revolution is not yet completed. Comrades should continue to exert themselves.”
98This figure translates into 1,759 million tons by 1962, which compares with a 1957 production of 185 million tons and a Beidaihe projection of 350 million tons for 1958. It is not
clear whether the editor mistook the figures or Mao mistook the possibilities.
99Democracy in military affairs, politics, and economics.
100Mao is presumably referring to the three sins combatted in the previous year’s Rectifica-tion Campaign: bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism.
1953 to mid 1957101 when they did things together with the bourgeoisie, local tyrants, and evil gentry [that they began to] straighten
their clothes, sit properly, and study the bourgeois style—having haircuts and shaves, shaving three times a day—all learned from the same
source. Just after Liberation, [318] in 1950 and 1951 when we were
performing Yangge,102 we prevailed over the bourgeoisie. They dared
not say anything. Later the Yangge became unpopular, [it was] said
there was nothing to it. Mei Lanfang103 appeared; [the opera] Yu
Zhou Feng104 prevailed over the Yangge, and shaving had to be done
once every three days. What was truly Marxist stuff became unpopular. Now it’s back again: “rural work style” and “guerrilla practice”
are Marxist work styles. Thus, speak of equality, the equality
between officers and men, and between the army and civilians, and
no Sundays [off]; the common people say, “The old Eighth Route
[Army] has come back.” They are seeing the Eighth Route Army of
the past again.
I asked Comrade Chen Boda to compile a book, *Marx, Engels,
Lenin and Stalin on Military Affairs*. I have read one or two chapters.
One of the quotations says that from ancient times many things
started in the army. Our communism, as well, started in the army.
China’s party is a very special party. Through several decades of battle, it always practiced communism. During the eight years of the
anti-Japanese war and four years of the war of self-defense, the masses
witnessed our hardships [and] supported us at the front. There were
no wages; [they] brought their own food. In battle people died; even
so they supported us the way they did. Some say [that] egalitarianism
produces idlers. In the past twenty-two years, how many idlers have
been produced? I haven’t seen many idlers. Only grade-ism105 produces idlers. What are the reasons? Primarily, putting politics in command, class struggle, beating

101In mid 1957 the bourgeoisie was counterattacked in the Anti-Rightist Campaign.
102Yangge were dramatized combinations of folk songs and peasant dances used by the
CCP in Yan’an in the 1940s. For the significance of this dramatic form in propaganda and
its importance for Mao, see David Holm, “Folk Art as Propaganda: The Yangge Movement
in Yan’an,” in Bonnie S. McDougall, ed., *Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in
the People’s Republic of China 1948–1979* (Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1984), pp. 3–35.
103For Mei Lanfang see Text 3, n. 66.
104One of the most popular plays in Mei Lanfang’s Peking Opera repertoire. In the act usually performed, there is much dancing, for which he was widely acclaimed.
105I.e., worrying about one’s rank in the cadre scale.

a common goal, and suffering on behalf of the majority of the people. Now [we] struggle with imperialism abroad, and at home our
main struggle is with nature. Our goals are also clear. We’re now
engaged in production and construction. Whom do our more than
10 million cadres throughout the land serve? [They serve] the happiness of [all] the people, not just a few. Today, if one invents something, one is given 100 yuan, which in the end will produce laziness
and strife, but not activism.106 Were the many creations and inventions of the past bought with money? Piece-rate wages are not a good
system. I don’t believe the adoption of the supply system will make
people lazy, inventions fewer, or activism lower. Because decades of
experience prove otherwise. The sources [of our problems] are twofold: one is socialism, which has been borrowed from Elder Brother
[the Soviet Union], and the second is capitalism, which is home born
and bred.
In some places the people’s commune have adopted a military
organization with divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies,
and in other places they have not; but “Organize along military lines,
work as if fighting a battle, live in a disciplined way,”107 this three-transformations slogan is very good. This is a great industrial army,
capable of increasing production, improving life, providing rest;
capable of learning; and capable of engaging in military democracy.
It seems as soon as [we] talk of the military, we just exclude democracy, but democracy—namely the three great democracies in military
affairs, in politics, and in economics—originated precisely in the military. In battle everyone helps each other. [When] officers oppress soldiers in our army, it’s a violation of our discipline, it’s a disgrace. The
“three transformations” in the commune are very good. In the past
few years we have learned this stuff, first from the bourgeoisie which
is indigenous, second from the proletariat—our Soviet Elder Brother.
Luckily, it hasn’t been long, so the roots are not deep; revolution is
ing Japan, beating the reactionaries, sharing

106Mao’s contempt is given added bite by the relative paltriness of the sum he quotes. In
fact, when the Academy of Sciences set up a system of science prizes in 1955, the sums
involved—10,000 yuan for first prize, 5,000 yuan for a second, and 2,000 yuan for a third—
were extremely attractive by comparison with a 350 yuan salary range for the highest paid
scientists. See Richard P. Suttmeier, *Research and Revolution* (Lexington, Lexington Books,
1979), pp. 61–2.
107This is the full version of the slogan mentioned by Mao in his speech on the afternoon
of 21 August; see n. 83. However, Mao (or his editor?) is still referring to discipline rather
than collectivism to describe the desirable life style.
still easy to make. Since [the] 1957 Rectification, various kinds of rules
and regulations have almost all been discarded, [and] much of the
bourgeois stuff has been jettisoned. This time the army is going to
hold a conference to eliminate “spending.”108 We’ve written a resolution on cadres participating in manual labor: the members of the
Center must [do] a month a year; other cadres will [need to do] more,
excluding the old and infirm. How can it be as little as a month when
you plant an experimental field? A division commander in Yunnan
went down to be an [ordinary] soldier in a company. I think many
“commanders”—army commanders, division commanders, and so
on—all ought to serve as soldiers for at least a month [a year]. In the
first year, it’d be best [to do it] for two months. They must obey the
commands of squad leaders and platoon leaders. Every year you command you for one month? Some were [ordinary] soldiers once, but
have not been for many years. Now they should become soldiers
again for a while. Civilian cadres should participate in manual labor
for at least one month a year. During the construction of the Ming
Tombs Reservoir, even many ministers participated in manual labor.
Learn agriculture one year and industry another. Learning them in
turn, one is bound to master these two skills. Militarizing the
people’s communes is not militarization in a bourgeois manner.
There is discipline and democracy; the interrelationship is one
between colleagues, persuasion rather than coercion. Manual labor
needs strict discipline.
As the whole people [begins] to run industry, a certain amount of
chaos has temporarily appeared, [because] the boundaries [of authority] are not yet clearly drawn. At this conference, industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and the army have all been topics; but
the priority is industry, the whole party and the whole people running industry. From now on the [provincial] first secretaries will be
enlisted in the field of industry. In the past we enlisted them in the
field of agriculture; [we] used agriculture to repress industry, checked
[industry’s] king. Agriculture has taken off; it’s on track, [but] not
industry as yet. Industry must be the focus. Some say, “Sleep on the
work sites and sleep beside the machines. Only that way will it get
off the ground; it won’t work if we do not sleep beside the
machines.” The three provinces in the Northeast focused on industry
in the past, but they have not done well in agriculture. The North-east should pay attention to industry, on the one hand, and pay attention to agriculture, on the other. Other provinces and autonomous
regions must focus on industry. Next year is the year of the decisive
[320] battle and the most important thing is to direct industry, particularly steel and machinery. With steel and machinery, digging coal,
producing electricity, everything will be easy. They are called “Mar-shals” for a reason.109 We must grasp this and actively, not inatten-tively. When we are tested in the future, it will be on this. The six
[rules of] discipline [are]: first, warning; second, demerit; third, relief
from duty while remaining in office; fourth, dismissal; fifth, probation within the party; sixth, expulsion from the party, but without
imprisonment as imprisonment wastes labor power.110 These rules
are all a war of nerves, [we] can’t do without them. They are penal in
nature. Nine of our fingers stand for explaining, relying on politics,
and conscience; [only] one finger is for discipline. Marxism doesn’t
depend on punishments. [Once you] depend on punishments to get
the job done, [you] commit errors. Our party has consistently relied
on persuasion, education, as well as class struggle. For instance, XX,
XXX, Gu Dacun,111 Sun Zuobin112 and whatcha-ma-call-it Labalay-efu113 in Xinjiang, in all only a few dozen people, such a small minority, just one finger of ten. If you can’t persuade them, they deserve

108Presumably Mao means the abolition of wages and salaries and the readoption of the supply system in the PLA.
109The military title, *yuanshuai* or “marshal,” was given to priority products during the
GLF.
110See n. 40, above.
111Gu Dacun had been exposed as a rightist at the 2nd session of the 8th Party Congress,
but was allowed to retain his CC membership, partly as a result of Mao’s intervention; see
Klein and Clark 1, pp. 449–50; *Origins* 2, pp. 358–9.
112Sun Zuobin, a senior official in Northwest China in the early 1950s had been dismissed
from the party earlier in 1958 for promoting “local nationalism;” see Klein and Clark 2, pp.
780–2.
113Labalayefu: jibberish which sounds like a Uygur name. Possibly, Sepollayev (Saifula-yefu), party secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 1956–8 and today one of
the Vice-Chairmen of the Region’s NPC Standing Committee. Sepollayev at that time
favored USSR-style Soviet “Republics”—perhaps too decentralized a plan after Gao Gang’s
“mutiny” attempt in 1953–4. Mao often confused Uygur names, as in his July 1957 speech
at Qingdao where, according to a Uygur from China, Zhou Enlai had to correct him on one.
punishment. Exhort and warn [them first]; in emergency cases there
could be summary dismissal. XXX114 is a rightist in the army (but not
counted among the rightists) XXX is a local rightist; Wang Ming115 is
also a rightist. Why elect Wang Ming to the Central Committee?
Because he’s a senior party member, [he’s] worked for many years,
[we] can’t let him off the hook so easily. He must serve [on the Central Committee]. You don’t want to serve; I want you to serve. [Don’t
think] everything will be all right if you don’t serve as a member of
the Central Committee. His modus operandi is to take sick whenever there is a conference. Letting him be [a member] has its benefits.
It’s also good for XXX to be a member. Either he changes or not, [in
which case] sooner or later he’ll be expelled [from the party]. This is
the relationship between persuasion and discipline.
The problem of life and death, not the “death” of corpses, but
inflexible and flexible control. It won’t do not to have [this kind of]
acceptable for our steel target of 11 million tons to be short a single ton. This is “inflexibility.” Next year’s
[target of] XXX to XX tons: [we should] strive for XX tons, of which
XX tons are “inflexible” or “inflexible steel.” Beyond that, XX to XX
tons are flexible, placed under the disposal of the localities. Some
comrades fear there will be no flexibility. Complete flexibility won’t
work; there must be inflexibility as well as flexibility, unified planning and decentralized management. All levels [should] run industry,
and all people [should] run industry. There are priorities; there are
branches as well as leaves. Only when a tree has a main trunk can
there be branches and leaves. Human beings rely on their backbone,
they are vertebrates and superior animals. Dogs are superior animals
quite capable of understanding human nature, but the only thing is
that they don’t understand Marxism, they don’t understand steel
production—more or less like capitalists.
[321] [Our] next conference will be held two-and-a-half months
from now. We’ll hold a small conference in mid November in the
South. It won’t be as long as this one, because we still won’t be able to
summarize [our work] then. After October there will still be about a
month’s time [before the next conference]; there’s still time to grasp
matters.
I would like to ask that the book, *Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin*
on *Communism* (Stalin didn’t do very well), be printed in every province and widely distributed for everyone to read. It’s very enlightening, although there are still some inadequacies, because of the
limitations imposed by conditions in [the authors’] times. They had
little experience, so naturally their views are vague and inexplicit.
Don’t think the ancestors all fart fragrant and fart no foul farts.
[When you] talk about the future, there must inevitably be some
vague spots. The Soviet Union has had forty-one years of experience;
we’ve had thirty-one years. We should break free of superstition.
On eliminating the four pests:116 We can focus on this during the
National Day holidays, the New Year, and the Lunar New Year. The
less we have of these four pests, the better for us; because these four
pests harm the people and directly affect the health of the people.
[We] must wipe out various kinds of diseases on a large scale. At one
place in Hangzhou, only one person took sick last year. The rate of
attendance [at work] exceeded 90 percent. [When] the physicians
have nothing to do, they can go till the fields and do research. The
day China eliminates the four pests [we] should hold a celebration.
[It] should be recorded in history books. The capitalist states have
not done it; those so-called civilized [states] still have many flies and
mosquitoes.

114Just possibly this XX refers to a young writer in the General Political Department of the
PLA, Bai Hua, whose purge as a rightist in 1957 was mitigated by the intervention of Mar-shal He Long and General Xiao Hua; see Richard Kraus, “Bai Hua: The Political Authority
of a Writer,” in Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek, eds., China’s Establishment Intellectuals (Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1986), p. 187.
115See Text 1, no. 10.
116See Text 15, n. 2.