I was unable to sleep after you left yesterday, nor did I eat anything. I
have invited you for a conversation today, to serve as a doctor, in order that
I may be able to eat and sleep in the afternoon. You are very lucky, being able
to eat and sleep.
Let's return to our main topic and talk about the problems we discussed
yesterday. Only in this room! There is no tension between us. We have ten
fingers; nine are in accord and one is not. I have said this two or three times;
have you forgotten?
I have reflected on the question raised yesterday. Maybe I misunderstood;
maybe I was correct, and it can be resolved through argument. It appears that
the request for nuclear submarines put forward by the navy'^' can be withdrawn. I had no inkling of this question and learned of it only after asking
them. Some enthusiastic people at the Navy Headquarters—the Soviet advisers
—said that the Soviet Union already has nuclear submarines, which can be
given to China just by requesting them via telegram.
The nuclear submarine is a sophisticated branch of science, involving
classified information. We Chinese are clumsy; things may go wrong when it
is given us.
The Soviet comrades won victory 40 years ago and are experienced, while
we won victory only eight years ago and lack experience, and you have just
raised the idea of joint operation. The question of ownership was raised long
ago. Lenin proposed a lease system; however, it was to capitalists.
* This is the main part of Mao Zedong's talk with Ambassador Yudin of the Soviet
Union to China. Yudin conveyed to Mao Zedong on July 21 the suggestion of Khruschev
and the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee for the "establishment of a joint
submarine fleet" by the Soviet Union and China, and the hope for Zhou Enlai and Peng
Dehuai to go to Moscow for concrete consultations. Mao Zedong immediately responded,
"First of all, the principle must be made clear: Are we to operate it with your help? Or can
it only be joint operation, otherwise you won't help us, thus forcing us into joint operation?"
There are still capitalists in China, but the state is under the leadership
of the Communist Party. You don't trust the Chinese, but only the Russians. The
Russians are superior, while the Chinese are inferior, clumsy, hence the
question of joint operation. Speaking of that, how about putting everything
under joint operation: the army, navy and air force, industry, agriculture,
culture and education? Shall we hand over to you our coastline of over 10,000
kilometers, while we ourselves engage solely in organizing guerrilla forces? You
have had some success with atomic energy, so you want to control others, to
enjoy the right of lease. What other argument do you have?
You used to control Liishun and Dalian, but left later. Why did you
control those places? Because China was then ruled by the Kuomintang.
Subsequently you left of your own accord, because now China is under the
leadership of the Communist Party.
Under Stalin's pressure two spheres of influence were defined—the north
east and Xinjiang—as well as four enterprises under joint operation. They
were abolished afterward at the proposal of Comrade Khrushchev.”'^ We are
thankful to him for this.
You, especially Stalin, have all along distrusted the Chinese, regarding
them as a second Tito, a backward nation. You say the Europeans despise the
Russians; I think some Russians despise the Chinese.
At the most critical junctures Stalin would not allow us to make revolution
and opposed our revolution. He committed a very serious mistake on this
account, just like Zinovyev.'"
Besides, we are dissatisfied with Mikoyan.^' He used to put on superior
airs, regarding us as his sons. He was haughty and arrogant. When he came
to Xibaipo the first time he assumed great airs. He did the same on subsequent
visits. He tried to persuade me to visit Moscow every time he came. I asked
him what for? He replied there must be something to do there. Later on, it
was Comrade Khrushchev who set the topic— to attend a conference and work
out a document.
To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution was our
common cause. I remarked then that the relationship among so-called fraternal
parties was nominal, in fact it was a father-and-son, or cat-and-mouse relationship. I talked about this to Khrushchev and other comrades within a small circle.
They admitted it. Such a father-and-son relationship is Asian, not European.
Those present then were Bulganin,'®" Mikoyan, Kuusinen,'®' Suslov,'®^ and
others. You (referring to Yudin) too, eh? On the Chinese side, Deng
Xiaoping'^" and I were present.
I was dissatisfied with Mikoyan's congratulatory speech at our Eighth
National Party Congress. I purposely absented myself that day to express my
protest. You didn't know that many delegates were dissatisfied too. He posed
as a father, prattling about China's being Russia's son.
China has her own revolutionary tradition. However, the Chinese revolution could not have been victorious without the October Revolution or
Marxism-Leninism.
We should learn from the Soviet experience. We should abide by universal
truths, which are the nine articles in the Moscow Declaration. We should
learn from all kinds of experience, correct or incorrect. Incorrect experience
is Stalin's metaphysics and dogmatism. Strictly speaking, it is not entirely
metaphysics, but part dialectics, with the major part metaphysics. You call it
a personality cult. It is the same thing. Stalin was very fond of assuming airs.
We support the Soviet Union, but not its wrong things. We have not
publicly discussed the question of peaceful transition, not in our newspapers.
We have been very careful, refraining from openly criticizing you, using only
the method of internal exchange of views. I had talked with you before I left
for Moscow. During our stay there. Comrade Deng Xiaoping discussed five
points. We are not going to discuss the question publicly either, because this
would not be in the interest of Comrade Khrushchev, whose leadership should
be reinforced. That we refrain from discussing our views doesn't mean that
they are not the truth.
As for the relationship between our two countries, we are united as one.
This has been acknowledged by our enemies even now. We have opposed
anything that is of disservice to the Soviet Union. On major issues, we are
opposed to attacks on the Soviet Union by imperialism and revisionism. The
Soviet Union does the same.
When did the Soviets begin to trust the Chinese? It began with the Korean
War. Thereupon the two countries began to close up, hence the 156 projects
of Soviet aid.'®' There were only 141 projects during the life time of Stalin;
Comrade Khrushchev added many items.
We keep no secrets from you. You know all about our military, political,
economic and cultural matters; there are more than 1,000 Soviet experts
working in our country. We trust you because your country is a socialist
country and you are Lenin's descendants.
But there used to be some troubles in our relations, chiefly concerning
Stalin. They happened on three occasions; First, the two Wang Ming lines.
Wang Ming was Stalin's offspring. Second, he didn't allow us to make
revolution and opposed our revolution. After the Third International”" was
disbanded he still issued an order, saying that if we do not make peace with

Chiang Kai-shek and carried on civil war, the Chinese nation would face the
peril of destruction. However, we have not been destroyed. Third, when I went
to Moscow for the first time, Stalin, Molotov^' and Beria'®” immediately
launched an offensive against me.
Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar here to look over my essays? Did
I lack self-confidence so much that I wanted you to look over my writings?
Had we nothing else to do? No, we invited you to come and see whether China
represented genuine Marxism or half-genuine, half-sham Marxism.
You spoke a good word for us when you went back. Your first remark to
Stalin was: "The Chinese are genuine Marxists." But Stalin still had doubts.
It was not till the time of the Korean War that he changed his own view and
also changed the doubts about us among the fraternal parties of Eastern Europe
and other countries.
Such doubts were inevitable: First, you opposed Wang Ming. Second,
you insisted on revolution although we didn't allow it. Third, you were so
cocky, coming to Moscow with the demand that Stalin conclude a treaty and
that the Chinese Changchun Railway be returned to you." In Moscow
Kovalyov'®' played host and Fedorenko'®® was the interpreter. I lost my temper
and thumped the table. I said I had three tasks there: eating, sleeping and
emptying the bowels.
An adviser in the Military Academy, giving lectures on battle examples,
allowed only for those of the Soviet Union, not of China or of the Korean
War, confining them to the ten major attacks of the Soviet army.
Why not let us discuss? He would not even allow ourselves to talk! We
fought for 22 years, plus three years in Korea! Please tell the Military
Commission to gather material about this case and hand it to Comrade Yudin
if he needs it.
There are some matters we haven't talked about lest they affect Sino-Soviet relations, especially at the time of the Polish and Hungarian incidents.
When Poland wanted to expel your experts. Comrade Liu Shaoqi suggested in
Moscow that you withdraw some of them, and you accepted this. The Poles
were glad, saying they had got freedom. At that time we could not raise the
question of your experts, lest you suspect we would take the opportunity to
expel them. No, we won't do that, even if ten Polands did so. We need Soviet
aid.
I have advised the Poles to learn from the Soviet Union, urging them to
advance the slogan "Learn from the Soviet Union" after combating dogmatism. To whose benefit would it be to learn from the Soviet Union: Poland's
or the Soviet Union's? Certainly, Poland's first.
We wish to learn from the Soviet Union, but primarily we ought to take
our own experiences into consideration, giving them priority.
A definite term of service could be set for some advisers. For example, no
term has been set so far for the chief advisers to the military and public
security departments. You have neither informed nor consulted us about
changes several times. Take the case of the appointment of an ambassador
—when you, Yudin, are to leave and another person is to be sent to replace
you, will it do not to consult us in advance? This is the wrong way. Moreover,
if your advisers sent to our public security departments just sit in their offices,
what can they learn if the Chinese do not tell them anything?
I have advised you to tour various provinces, have more contact with the
people, and learn more. I have talked to Comrade Yudin many times, maybe
1,000, if not 10,000, times.
The majority of the experts are basically good; only a few have shortcomings. We had shortcomings on our part, failing to brief the Soviet comrades
more on our own initiative. Now we have to correct these shortcomings and
adopt a forward attitude. This time we have briefed them on China's general
line. If once is not enough, then twice, thrice, or even more times.
All the above words arose from the nuclear submarine "cooperative."
Now we have decided to drop it and withdraw our request for nuclear
submarines. Or else we would rather hand over to you all our coastline,
extending from the past Liishun and Dalian. But there mustn't be a joint
undertaking: You do yours and we do ours. At any rate, we shall have our own
fleet; it is not good to play second fiddle.
Circumstances will be different in case of war. Your troops can come over
to our country, and our troops can also go over to your country. If the battle
is fought on our territory, your troops should obey our command; if it is
fought on your territory and our troops are fewer than yours, our troops should
obey your command.
My words may sound disagreeable, and you may call me a nationalist, the
emergence of a second Tito. Should you say so, I can well answer that you
have extended Russian nationalism to the Chinese coast.
It was Comrade Khrushchev who abolished the four companies under joint
operation and the base in Liishun. When he was alive Stalin wanted to set up
a canned food factory in China. I replied, "You provide us with the equipment
and help us build it, and we'll give you all the products." Comrade Khrushchev
praised me for my proper reply. Why now again the idea of a naval
"cooperative"? How would you explain your proposal of a naval "cooperative" to the whole world and to the Chinese people? You may train Chinese

to fight against imperialism while you act as advisers. Or else, we can lease
Lushun—and not only Liishun—to you for 99 years. A "cooperative" involves
a question of ownership, and it will be 50 percent by each side according to
your proposal. You made me so angry yesterday that I didn't sleep a wink last
night. They (referring to the other Chinese leaders present) were not angry,
but only me. If any mistake was committed, I did it alone.
(Zhou Enlai: This is the unanimous opinion of our Politburo.)
In case the matter is not straightened out this time, we can discuss it again,
or let's discuss with you once every day. If it still won't do, I can go to Moscow
to talk to Comrade Khrushchev, or we can invite Comrade Khrushchev over
to Beijing in order to straighten out all the problems.
(Peng Dehuai: Soviet Defense Minister Comrade Malinovsky sent me a
telegram earlier this year, asking to set up a long-wave radar observation station
on the Chinese coast in order to command the submarine fleet in the Pacific
Ocean. The cost would be 110 million roubles, of which the Soviet Union
would shoulder 70 million and China 40 million.)
This request is similar to that for naval "cooperative," which we will be
unable to explain to our people or the outside world; it is politically harmful.
(Peng: Pedroshevsky is also very rude. He is most displeased with our
principles of army building and our non-use of Soviet army ordinances in
individual cases. At an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission Comrade
Ye Fei"® of the Fujian Military Area pointed out that the Soviet troop training
regulations, which are formulated chiefly according to conditions on the
plains, are not totally suitable in Fujian, where mountains are everywhere.
Pedroshevsky was displeased at hearing this, saying bluntly, "You have
insulted the great military science created by the great Stalin." Thereupon the
atmosphere in the conference hall became very tense.)
Some of the above matters have been mentioned before and some not.
You may feel bad, since you have made so much effort to help us, yet we speak
ill of you. Our relationship can be compared to that between teacher and
students. Should the students express their opinions while the teacher may have
some shortcomings? Yes, they should. But this does not mean to oust the
teacher. The teacher remains a good teacher.
You can help us build a navy. You can be our advisers. Why did you raise
the question of half-half ownership? This is a political issue. We intend to
build a fleet of 200 to 300 such submarines.
Speaking of political condition, not even half a finger will be allowed.
Please tell Comrade Khrushchev that if any condition is to be attached there
is no longer anything for us to discuss. He may come if he agrees with me.
and not come if not, as we shall have nothing to talk about. No, not even half
a finger of condition will be allowed.
We can do without aid in this respect for 10,000 years. But cooperation
in other respects can go on; by no means will we fall out. We shall continue
consistently to support the Soviet Union. Our quarrel will be confined to our
rooms.
When in Moscow I told Comrade Khrushchev that you don't have to
satisfy all our demands. Your not giving us aid will compel us to make efforts
ourselves. It will be a disservice to us if you satisfy all our demands.
Political cooperation is very important. If we let you down politically, it
will put you in a fix; likewise, we shall be in a difficult position if you let us
down.
In time of war all our military harbors and airports are at your disposal;
you can come to any place in our country. In like manner, we can go to your
country, go to Vladivostok. We shall return home when the war is over. We
can conclude a wartime agreement on this point in advance, not wait for the
outbreak of war. Moreover, it should be stipulated in the agreement that we
can also go to your country. This clause must be written in, even if we do not
go, as this is a matter of equality. However, this is not applicable during time
of peace, when you will help us build military bases and build the army.
As for operation of a naval "cooperative," we would not have accepted
it even during Stalin's lifetime. I had a row with him in Moscow.
Comrade Khrushchev abolished the "cooperatives" and restored trust.
Raising the question of ownership this time suggests to me the return of
Stalin's practice. Maybe I misunderstand, but I have to make myself clear.
You said yesterday that your inferior conditions made it impossible for
your nuclear submarines to give full play to their strength or develop any
further, whereas China's conditions were much better, with long coastline, etc.
Well, you can start from Vladivostok and enter the Pacific Ocean via Sakhalin
and the Kurile Islands. What excellent conditions!
I am displeased with your remarks. Kindly tell Comrade Khrushchev
exactly what I have said. Don't whitewash my words so that they may be
soothing to his ear. He has criticized Stalin, but now he is reviving Stalin's
practice.
Differences do exist. You may disagree with us in some cases, and we in
some of yours. For instance, are you so pleased with our "Contradictions
Within the Ranks of the People" and the "Hundred Flowers Bloom"?
Stalin supported the Wang Ming line, which caused the loss of over 90
percent of our revolutionary forces. He did not allow us to make revolution

and opposed our revolution at critical junctures. After the victory of our
revolution he still didn't trust us. He was very boastful, alleging that China's
victory was won under the guidance of his theory. Blind faith in Stalin must
be thoroughly exploded. I am going to write an essay before I die concerning
all Stalin did to China, to be published after 10,000 years.
(Yudin: The attitude of the CPSU Central Committee on the various
policies of the Chinese Communist Party is: It is the affair of the Chinese
comrades themselves to solve the problems of China, because they know the
circumstances best. In the meantime, we consider that any comments on the
policies of such a great party as the Chinese Communist Party as to whether
they are correct or not would be indiscreet and arrogant.)
It can only be said that our policies are basically correct. I myself
committed mistakes that resulted in defeat in war, such as the four battles of
Changsha, Tucheng and others. I should be very glad if it is said that I have
been basically correct, because to say that I have been basically correct would
be approaching reality.
As for the building of the submarine fleet, this involves a question of
principle: Whether we are to operate it ourselves with your help or a joint
"cooperative" will be run must be decided in China. Comrade Khrushchev may
come over, since I have already gone to him in Moscow.
There should not be blind faith in anything. For example, one of your
experts said on the authority of a book written by an academician that our
coal of Shanxi cannot be used in coking. Thus it is all finished: We shall have
no coking coal, since most of our coal resources are in Shanxi!
Soviet expert Comrade Sinin, who has worked at the Yangtze River
Bridge, is a good comrade. All along he was denied the opportunity to try out
his method of bridge building in your country. You let him handle neither
large nor medium-sized projects, not even small ones. However, he came to
China and we found that his theory quite stood to reason, so we invited him
to undertake the project, as we were complete laymen any way. His experiment
proved successful at once, and it became a first-class scientific achievement in
the world!
I have never met Comrade Sinin, but I have talked to many leading
comrades in the construction of the Yangtze River Bridge. They all reported
in one voice that Sinin was a good comrade, who used to join personally in
all kinds of jobs with persuasive working methods and did everything together
with the Chinese comrades. The bridge was completed and the Chinese
comrades learned a lot of things. Whoever among you is acquainted with him,
please convey to him my best regards.
Do not create a strained atmosphere among the experts or in the relations
of our two Parties and two countries. I have no such intention. Our cooperation is comprehensive and excellent. You should make this clear to the embassy
staff and the experts and not say that Comrade Mao Zedong has made
complaints, how terrible!
We meant to raise some of these questions a long time ago, but it was not
opportune because conditions were unfavorable with the Polish and Hungarian
incidents taking place and you facing difficulties politically. Such as the
question of experts, we could not very well raise it at that time.
Later on, Stalin became rather agreeable. The treaty between China and
the Soviet Union was signed, aid was given in the Korean War, and the 141
projects were launched. Of course, these were not his personal merits alone,
but the merits of the whole CPSU Central Committee. Therefore, we do not
emphasize Stalin's mistakes.
(From the verbatim record)