(July 22, 1958)

After you left yesterday, I couldn't sleep and didn't eat. I invited you here today to talk, and after being a doctor, I can eat and sleep this afternoon. You are very lucky to be able to eat and sleep.

Let's get back to the main topic and discuss the issues we talked about yesterday. Let's discuss it right here in this room! There is no tension between us. We are like ten fingers, nine fingers are the same, and one finger is different. I've said this problem two or three times, have you forgotten?

I thought about yesterday's problem again, maybe I misunderstood, or maybe I am correct, and it can be resolved through debate. It seems that the Navy's request for nuclear submarines [1] can be withdrawn. I had no impression of this issue in my mind, and I only found out after asking them that there are some enthusiastic people in the Navy headquarters, namely Soviet advisors, who said that the Soviet Union already has nuclear submarines, and as long as a telegram is sent, they can be given to us.

Nuclear submarines are a cutting-edge science, with secrets. Chinese people are clumsy, and if we are given them, problems may arise.

Soviet comrades have been victorious for forty years and have experience. We have only been victorious for eight years and have no experience, and you are already proposing joint ventures. The issue of ownership was raised a long time ago, Lenin raised the issue of concessions [I], but that was for capitalists.

China still has capitalists, but the country is led by the Communist Party. You just don't trust the Chinese, you only trust the Russians. Russians are superior people, Chinese are inferior people, clumsy, so the issue of joint ventures arose. If we are to have joint ventures, let's have joint ventures in everything, the army, navy, air force, industry, agriculture, culture, and education, is that okay? Or hand over more than ten thousand kilometers [1] of coastline to you, and we will only engage in guerrilla warfare. You only developed a little atomic energy and want to control it, want concession rights. What other reasons are there?

You controlled Lushun and Dalian, and then left. Why did you control them? Because at that time it was Kuomintang China. Later you left voluntarily, because it was Communist-led China.

Under Stalin's pressure, you created two spheres of influence in Northeast China and Xinjiang, and four joint ventures [I]. Later, Comrade Khrushchev proposed to abolish them, and we thank him.

You have never trusted the Chinese, Stalin didn't trust them very much. The Chinese were seen as another Tito, a backward nation. You say Europeans look down on Russians, I think some Russians look down on Chinese.

At the most critical moment, Stalin did not allow us to make revolution, he opposed our revolution. On this point, he made a big mistake, the same as Zinoviev [2].

In addition, we are not satisfied with Mikoyan. He acts like a senior, treating us like sons. He puts on airs, he's very arrogant. When he first came to Xibaipo in 1949, he was already very arrogant, and he was like that every time he came later. Every time he came, he urged me to go to Moscow, and I said what would I do there? He said, there will always be something to do. Later, Comrade Khrushchev came up with the idea of going to a meeting and drafting a document.

Going to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution is our common cause. At that time, I said that so-called fraternal parties are just lip service, in reality they are father-son parties, cat-and-mouse parties. I discussed this with Comrade Khrushchev and others in a small circle. They admitted it. This kind of father-son relationship is not European, it is Asian.

Those present at the time included Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kuusinen, Suslov [I] and others, and you (referring to Yudin)? On the Chinese side, there were me and Deng Xiaoping [2].

I was not satisfied with Mikoyan's congratulatory speech at our Eighth National Congress [3], so I deliberately did not attend that day to protest. Many delegates were not satisfied, you don't know. He acted like a father, saying that China is Russia's son.

China has its own revolutionary tradition, but the Chinese revolution could not have succeeded without the October Revolution, and it could not have succeeded without Marxism-Leninism.

We must learn from the Soviet experience. We must abide by universal truths, which are the nine points written in the "Moscow Declaration" [4]. We must learn all experiences, we must learn correct experiences, and we must also learn from wrong experiences. The wrong experience is: Stalin's metaphysics, dogmatism. He is not entirely metaphysical, he has some dialectics, but most of it is metaphysics. You call it personality cult, it's the same thing. Stalin liked to put on airs.

We support the Soviet Union, but we do not support wrong things. Regarding the issue of peaceful transition, we have not talked about it publicly, it has not been mentioned in the newspapers. We are very cautious, and we have not publicly criticized you, we have adopted the method of internal discussions. I talked to you before I went to Moscow. During the Moscow period, Comrade Deng Xiaoping talked about five points [I]. In the future, we do not intend to talk about it publicly, because this is not conducive to Comrade Khrushchev, and his leadership should be consolidated. We do not talk about it, not because these opinions of ours are not the truth.

In state relations, our two countries are united. Even our enemies admit this, and it has been the case until now. As long as it is detrimental to the Soviet Union, we oppose it. We oppose the attacks of imperialism and revisionism on the Soviet Union on major issues. The Soviet Union is also doing the same.

When did the Soviets start to believe in the Chinese? It started with the Korean War. From that time on, the two countries began to come together, and then there were the 156 items [I]. There were 141 items when Stalin was alive, and later Comrade Khrushchev added many items.

We have no secrets from you. You know everything about our military, political, economic, and cultural affairs. You have more than a thousand experts working here. We trust you, because you are a socialist country, the descendants of Lenin.

But in our relationship, there have also been problems, mainly related to Stalin. There are three things: First, the two Wang Ming lines [I]. Wang Ming is a descendant of Stalin. Second, he didn't want us to make revolution, he opposed our revolution. Third, the Comintern had already been dissolved, but it still issued orders, saying that if you don't negotiate peace with Chiang Kai-shek and fight a civil war, the Chinese nation will be in danger of extinction. But we did not perish. Third, when I first went to Moscow, Stalin, Molotov, and Beria [2] attacked me.

Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar to look at my articles at that time? Was I so lacking in confidence that I even had to ask you to look at my articles? Did I have nothing to do? No, it was to invite you to come to China to see if China is truly Marxist, or half-true and half-false Marxist.

After you went back, you said good things about us. The first thing you said to Stalin was "The Chinese are true Marxists." But Stalin was still skeptical. It was only during the Korean War that he changed his view, and he also changed the doubts of the fraternal parties in Eastern Europe and other countries about us.

This kind of doubt is inevitable: "First, you oppose Wang Ming; second, you don't want to make revolution, but you have to make revolution; third, you went to Moscow to ask Stalin to sign a treaty, to take back the Chinese Changchun Railway, so arrogant." In Moscow, Kovalev [3] entertained me, and Fedin [4] was the translator. I lost my temper and slammed the table. I said, I have three tasks here: one, to eat; two, to sleep; three, to shit.

There was a Soviet advisor at the military academy who, when discussing examples of warfare, only allowed talking about Soviet examples, not Chinese examples, not Korean War examples, only the Ten Blows of the Soviet Army.

Let us talk about it ourselves! He didn't even let us talk about it ourselves. We fought for twenty-two years! We also fought in Korea for three years! Please have the Military Commission collect this material and give it to Comrade Yudin, in case he plays tricks.

There are some things we didn't say, for fear of affecting Sino-Soviet relations, especially during the Polish and Hungarian events. At that time, Poland wanted to drive out your experts, and Comrade Liu Shaoqi suggested in Moscow that you withdraw some of them, and you accepted, and the Poles were happy, saying that they had freedom. At that time, we couldn't raise the issue of experts, for fear that you would suspect that we were using this opportunity to drive out the experts. We will not drive them out, even if ten Polands drive them out, we will not drive them out. We need Soviet help.

I advised the Poles to learn from the Soviet Union, and advised them to put forward the slogan of learning from the Soviet Union after opposing dogmatism. Who is it beneficial to learn from the Soviet Union? Is it beneficial to the Soviet Union, or is it beneficial to Poland? It is primarily beneficial to Poland.

We must learn from the Soviet Union, but we must first consider our own experience, and base it on our own experience.

For some Soviet advisors, the term of office can be fixed. For example, the chief advisors in our country's military and public security departments have never had a term of office, and they are changed without notifying us or soliciting our opinions. It's like sending an ambassador, if you, Yudin, leave and send someone else, if you don't consult with us, can that work? This approach is wrong. The advisors you send to our public security department sit there, and if the Chinese don't tell them the situation, what can they know?

I advise you to run around to the provinces, contact the people, and learn more about the situation. I have talked to you many times, if not ten thousand times, then a thousand times.

Most of the Soviet experts are basically good, and a few individuals have some shortcomings. We also had shortcomings in the past, and we did not actively introduce the situation to Soviet comrades. Now we must overcome these shortcomings and take a positive attitude. This time, we will introduce the general line of China to them, if it doesn't work once, then twice; if it doesn't work twice, then three times, many times.

These words are all caused by the "cooperative" for nuclear submarines. Now we have decided not to engage in nuclear submarines, and we are withdrawing our request. Otherwise, we will hand over the entire coastline to you, and expand the past Lushun and Dalian. But don't mix them together, you do yours, and we do ours. We must always have our own fleet. It's not easy to have two bosses.

The situation will be different in wartime, your troops can come to our place, and our troops can also go to your place. If the fighting is in our place, your troops should also listen to our command. If the fighting is in your place, and our troops are fewer than yours, they should also listen to your command.

These words of mine are very unpleasant, you can say that I am a nationalist, and another Tito has appeared. If you say that, I can say that you have expanded Russian nationalism to the coast of China.

It was Comrade Khrushchev who abolished the four joint ventures and withdrew the Lushun base. When Stalin was alive, he wanted to build a canning factory here. I replied to him, you give us the equipment and help us build it, and all the products will be given to you. Comrade Khrushchev praised me, saying that I answered well. But why are you now engaging in a naval "cooperative"? How can you explain it to the world if you propose a naval "cooperative"? How can you explain it to the Chinese people? You can train Chinese people to fight against imperialism, and you can be advisors. Otherwise, Lushun, not only Lushun, can be leased to you for ninety-nine years. There is an ownership issue with the "cooperative", and you propose that both sides each own 50%. You made me so angry yesterday that I couldn't sleep all night. They (referring to the other Chinese leaders present) were not angry, only I was angry. If a mistake is made, it is my mistake alone.

(Zhou Enlai: This is the unanimous opinion of our Politburo.)

If we don't reach an agreement this time, we can talk again, we can talk to you once a day. If that doesn't work, I can go to Moscow to talk to Comrade Khrushchev, or invite Comrade Khrushchev to Beijing to clarify everything.

(Peng Dehuai: This year, Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky sent me a telegram, requesting the construction of a long-wave radar observation station on the Chinese coast to command the submarine fleet in the Pacific, requiring a cost of 110 million rubles, with the Soviet Union bearing 70 million and China bearing 40 million.)

This issue is the same as the naval "cooperative", it cannot be explained to the people, it cannot be explained abroad, and it is politically unfavorable.

(Peng: Petroshevsky [I] is also very rude in his style. He is very dissatisfied with our principles of army building, and with our failure to adopt Soviet military regulations in some places. At an enlarged meeting of the Military Commission, Comrade Ye Fei [2] of the Fujian Military Region said that Fujian is full of mountains, and the Soviet military training regulations are not fully applicable, because the Soviet military regulations are mainly formulated according to the conditions of the plains. Petroshevsky was very dissatisfied when he heard this, and said at the time: "You have insulted the great military science created by the great Stalin." When he said this, the atmosphere at the meeting was very tense.)

Some of the above things have been said in the past, and some have not been said. You are helping us so much, and we are saying bad things about you, which may make you sad. Our relationship is like the relationship between a professor and a student. The professor may have shortcomings, should the student offer opinions? Yes, this is not to drive the professor away, the professor is still a good professor.

You should just help us build nuclear submarines! You can be advisors. Why propose the issue of 50% ownership? This is a political issue. We plan to build two or three hundred of these submarines.

When it comes to political conditions, not even half a finger is acceptable. You can tell Comrade Khrushchev that if we talk about conditions, neither of us needs to talk. If he agrees, he will come, if he doesn't agree, he shouldn't come, there is nothing to talk about, not even half a little finger of conditions is acceptable.

On this issue, we can do without assistance for ten thousand years. But cooperation in other areas can still be carried out, and it will definitely not break down. We will always consistently support the Soviet Union. We can quarrel in the house.

I talked to Comrade Khrushchev in Moscow, you don't necessarily have to meet all our demands. If you don't give us assistance, it can force us to work hard ourselves. Meeting all demands is actually not beneficial to us.

Political cooperation is very important. Politically, if we undermine you, it will be difficult for you to handle things; if you undermine us, it will also be difficult for us to handle things.

In wartime, all our military ports and all our airports can be used by you, and you can come to all places. Your places, your Vladivostok, we can also go to. After the war is over, we will come back. Regarding this point, we can first sign a wartime agreement, don't wait until the war starts to sign it, we must sign it in advance. The agreement should also stipulate that we can also go to your place, even if we don't go, we must stipulate it this way, because this is a matter of equality. This is not possible in peacetime. In peacetime, you help us build bases and build the army.

Engaging in a naval "cooperative" is something we would not do even when Stalin was alive. I also argued with him in Moscow!

Comrade Khrushchev abolished the "cooperative" [I] and established trust. This time, raising the issue of ownership reminds me of Stalin's things coming back again. Maybe I misunderstood, but the words must be made clear.

You said yesterday that your conditions are not good, nuclear submarines cannot fully exert their power, and there is no future, China's conditions are good, the coastline is long, and so on. You go out to the Pacific Ocean from Vladivostok via Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, the conditions are very good!

The words you said made me feel unhappy. Please tell Comrade Khrushchev exactly what I said, don't embellish it for me to make him feel comfortable. He criticized Stalin, and now he is doing Stalin's things again.

There are still differences. Some of ours you don't agree with; some of yours we don't agree with. For example, are you so satisfied with our "contradictions among the people" and "letting a hundred flowers bloom"?

Stalin supported the Wang Ming line, causing our revolutionary forces to lose more than 90%. When the revolution was at a critical moment, he did not allow us to make revolution, he opposed our revolution. After the revolution was victorious, he did not trust us. He boasted greatly about himself, saying that China's victory was achieved under the guidance of his theory. We must completely break the superstition about him. I will definitely write an article about these things that Stalin did to China before I die, and prepare to publish it ten thousand years later.

(Yudin: Regarding the various policies of the CCP, the attitude of our CPSU Central Committee is: how to solve the Chinese problems is the business of the Chinese comrades themselves, because they know the situation best. At the same time, we believe that it is rash and arrogant to discuss whether the policies of such a great party as the CCP are correct.)

It can only be said that it is basically correct. I myself have also made mistakes, and due to my mistakes, I have also suffered defeats in the war, such as the four battles of Changsha and Tucheng. If you say that I am basically correct, I will be very happy. It can only be said that I am basically correct, which is close to reality.

The issue of establishing a submarine fleet is a matter of principle: is it that we do it and you help, or is it a "cooperative"? This must be decided in China. Comrade Khrushchev can also come, because I have already been to his place.

We must not be superstitious about anything. For example, one of your experts, based on a book by an academician, said that the coal in Shanxi cannot be used for coking. If that's the case, then we're finished, we don't have coking coal, because Shanxi has the most coal!

Comrade Sining, a Soviet expert who worked on the Yangtze River Bridge, is a good comrade. His bridge-building methods have never been used in your country. They don't let him do large-scale projects, let him do medium-sized projects!

They don't let him do medium-sized projects either, let him do small-scale projects! They don't even let him do small-scale projects. But when he came here and said it, it made a lot of sense. Anyway, we don't understand anything, so we asked him to do it! As a result, it was successful after one experiment, and it became world-class scientific work.

I have not met Comrade Sining. I have talked to many leaders who built the Yangtze River Bridge, and they all reflected that Sining is a good comrade, he personally participated in all the work, his working methods are very good, and he does everything together with the Chinese comrades. After the bridge was built, the Chinese comrades learned a lot. If any of you know him, please send my regards to him.

Don't create a tense atmosphere among the experts, in the relations between the two parties and the two countries, I don't mean that. Our cooperation is comprehensive and very good. You must explain clearly to the staff of the embassy and the experts, don't say that Comrade Mao Zedong has raised opinions, it's terrible.

There are some issues that I have wanted to talk about for a long time, but the situation was not good in the past, the Polish and Hungarian events occurred, and you had political difficulties, so it was not appropriate to talk about them. For example, the issue of experts, we couldn't talk about it at that time.

Stalin was also very good later, he signed a treaty with China [I], helped with the Korean War, and carried out 141 items. Of course, this is not all his personal achievement, it is the achievement of the entire CPSU Central Committee. Therefore, we do not emphasize Stalin's mistakes.