The meeting went well, and some comrades delivered good speeches. (×× specifically invited the Chairman to review the speeches of several comrades. The Chairman read the speeches of comrades such as Zhang Zongxun and Liu Yalou.) Comrade Zhang Zongxun's speech was very good—I approve of it. It was the four-level cadre meeting of the Training Directorate that pressured him into writing it, which shows that a little pressure can yield excellent results. There is only one point I disagree with, and that is when Zhang Zongxun said he made mistakes because he did not study Chairman Mao’s works well. That is incorrect. Rather, it should be said that it was mainly due to a low level of Marxism-Leninism. Comrade Yalou’s speech was also acceptable this time. This shows that comrades in the military have competence and can produce written work. It would be best to organize some comrades at the army and division levels to speak and write, because they are engaged in practical work, are in touch with the grassroots, and what they write can integrate theory with practice. The content of the meeting should be rich and varied, and should also introduce advanced experiences from work. In articles and speeches, do not criticize the Soviet Union. Dogmatism is an issue with our learning, not a question of whether the Soviet Union is advanced or not.

From its inception, our military has seen a struggle between two lines of army-building. The Gutian Conference contested this somewhat, but it did not convince the comrades who held erroneous views, and some comrades still cling to the mistaken line to this day. Comrade Xiao Ke suffers not only from dogmatism but also from warlordism, with bourgeois thinking, dogmatism, and feudal ideology.

In war, following the Soviet military manuals to the letter will not work—we must develop our own manuals. I wonder just how much Marxism-Leninism there really is in the Military Academy and the Training Directorate. Marxism-Leninism is meant to be a guide to action, yet they recite it as dogma. If Marx and Lenin were alive, they would surely criticize them for being dogmatists. Now the dogmatists advocate copying the Soviet Union—pray tell, whom did the Soviet Union copy back then? There is a chapter in the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress concerning technological reform; viewed in light of today’s developments, it was phrased inappropriately, as it overemphasized reliance on Soviet assistance. Securing Soviet assistance is very necessary, but the main thing is still self-reliance. If one overemphasizes reliance on Soviet aid, then pray tell, on whose aid did the Soviet Union rely back then?

The Great Leap Forward in industry and agriculture has shattered superstition. We can catch up with Britain in × years, and overtake the United States in × to × years. Next year our steel output will reach ×× to ×× million tons. It is said the Northeast can produce ×× million tons by 1962—this is the result of the Rectification Campaign. The Nanning Conference and the Chengdu Conference broke down superstition and liberated thinking, leading to a great leap in industry. Military training has been going on for over eight years now, yet not even a single combat manual has been produced. This time we must gather comrades with rich work and combat experience and produce our own combat manual. Some say that when Soviet advisor comrades notice we are not copying them, they offer opinions or become displeased. Well, we can then ask these comrades: Do you copy China? If they say no, we can say: Since you don’t copy, neither do we.

Why did ×× not do well after the revolution’s victory? Apart from failing to deeply review the earlier phase and insufficiently absorbing historical lessons, first, they clung superstitiously to old things and old dogmas; second, they were superstitious about foreign dogmas and the Soviet Union; third, they were superstitious about themselves. This person is very active in work, very diligent and responsible, but their orientation is wrong and they are politically not strong enough. This conference is mainly about smashing the slave mentality, burying dogmatism, and using the rectification method of extensive airing of views and free debate to break down superstition, raise ideological awareness, and absorb lessons and experiences. The primary goal is to educate the entire Party and the entire military, uniting the whole Party and whole military. Therefore, at the conference, persons can be criticized by name, but I suggest that when drafting the resolution, so long as we distinguish right from wrong and clarify the issues, the names of comrades who made mistakes need not be written. The resolution of the Gutian Conference did not include names, after all!

×× is mainly superstitious about foreigners, harbors feelings of inferiority, has not shattered superstition, and does not take oneself as the mainstay. Even a cooperative nowadays must pay attention to summarizing its own experience, or else it will fall behind. Five cooperatives in Xinzhou, Hubei Province, did rather well, while Macheng lagged somewhat. Yet Xinzhou did not pay attention to summarizing its own experience, whereas Macheng sent people to Xinzhou to learn, combined that with their own experience, summarized it, and promoted it. As a result, Macheng’s work raced to the forefront. In the past, when the military fought battles, wasn’t it also by summarizing the experience gained from below, then training the troops, and then fighting again? In all our work, we must pay attention to summarizing good experiences and spreading them.

The Soviet Union defeated the intervention of fourteen imperialist powers—that was long ago. The Soviet Union has the experience of the Second World War. We defeated Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese imperialism, and U.S. imperialism; we have a wealth of experience, more than the Soviet Union. Dismissing our own experience as worthless is wrong. (Lin Zong interjected: Our experience is very rich; we must not toss gold away as if it were yellow earth.) We must take ourselves as the mainstay while learning from the advanced experience of others. At the same time, we must study the situation of the enemy and of friends. In the past, we did study the circumstances of the enemy, friends, and ourselves. Then translate materials from the United States and Japan. In the future, the United States will not be able to wage war in the East without relying on Japan. Therefore, we must thoroughly study the situation in Japan. We should learn from the experience of the Soviet military. Equipment and technology are constantly developing and changing; learning the technical experience of the Soviet military must also be done from a developmental perspective. In the past, the Russians greatly feared Napoleon, because he led his troops all the way to Moscow, and ultimately the Russians defeated him. So the Russians often proclaim they were even more formidable than Napoleon. Currently, the materials (operational plans, concepts?) produced by Soviet advisors all depict offensive actions, all victories—there is no defense, no defeats. This does not conform to reality. Some say that summarizing the experience of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea is empiricism. We should realize that the Korean War was a major war; we defeated U.S. imperialism and gained invaluable experience that absolutely must be summarized. As for them calling us empiricists, then we will say: Your copying of Soviet materials from the Second World War is also empiricism.

Comrade Xiao Ke’s mistakes are serious. In the past there was no such opportunity to hold such a large meeting; now that the opportunity has arisen, we can dig out the roots of dogmatism.

Regarding learning from the Soviet Union: internally we say “learn critically,” but to avoid misunderstanding, externally we still say “learn analytically and selectively from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union.” However, the most important thing is that learning from the advanced experience of the Soviet Union must absolutely be combined with our own original creation. The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism must be integrated with China’s practice; one cannot eat pre-cooked meals. Relying on ready-made meals will lead to defeat. This point must be clearly explained to the Soviet comrades. Learn from the Soviet Union—we did so in the past, we do so now, and we will do so in the future—but learning must be combined with our concrete situation. I asked them: We are learning from you, but where did you learn from? Why can’t we create originally? Soviet experts have now undergone a change—there has been a shift since the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union and the Zhukov incident. (Chief Chen interjected: According to returned Soviet comrades, they also say: “We came bringing our experience, and we went back carrying your experience.”) This illustrates that the Great Leap Forward situation has not only inspired the Chinese people but has also inspired the Soviet comrades. (Lin Zong said: In politics, such as Party leadership, political work, and fine traditions, our military has its own system. Our Party’s level of Marxism-Leninism is very high; needless to say about the Chairman. The Chairman once said that the editorials we write are of a higher standard than those in Pravda. On questions of the superstructure. On issues of military science and strategy. We have a systematic, comprehensive set of theories. Lenin died too early and had no time to address this issue; Stalin did not have a systematic, comprehensive set. There’s no need to learn from the Soviet side. On tactical matters, learn half and don’t learn half: their tactical thinking and their view of the masses are problematic. Half-learn means learning the use of the navy, army, and air force, combined arms coordination. Half-not-learn means, for example, on tactical thought we have Chairman Mao’s, so don’t learn theirs. Technical sciences and modern war organization must be studied, but also studied using our mass-line methods. Before people like us have passed away, we should organize a group of cadres to thoroughly develop our system and pass it on.) That’s good.

Li Shimin, Cao Cao, and the like—they all knew how to fight wars. China did have some things in the past. Comrade Kai Feng once said that The Art of War by Sun Tzu contains no Marxism-Leninism. I asked him if he had read it, and he could not answer. It is thus clear that reaching a dogmatic conclusion without having read The Art of War by Sun Tzu is improper. (Lin Zong interjected: The Art of War by Sun Tzu does contain materialism and dialectics. It is a collectively authored work, with contributions from Sun Tzu, Sun Bin, Cao Cao, Du Yu, and others.)

Shattering superstition was raised at the Chengdu Conference. In the four months since, it has developed rapidly, and especially after the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress, it has been carried out comprehensively nationwide. Take Anshan, for example: the original plan was to produce ×× million tons of steel, but that has now changed; by next year it may reach ×× to ×× million tons of steel. They are also integrating large, medium, and small-scale operations, combining indigenous and foreign methods. According to a letter from Comrade ××× from the Northeast, the Northeast could produce ×× million tons of steel during the Second Five-Year Plan. With steel, with modern industry, modern national defense industries will be much easier to develop. I am in favor of producing more light weapons to arm the vast militia. (Lin Zong interjected: The militia is very important.) In the past, people looked down on us mainly because we had little grain, steel, and machinery. Now that we have produced results, let everyone see.

The development of the navy merits study. Comrade Liu Daosheng’s speech draft proposed building ×× ten thousand deadweight tons in ten years—that is too little; it would be best to build ×× ten thousand tons. By 1962, we could produce ×× to ×× million tons of steel. Why so much steel? We will need to trade with foreign countries, requiring ocean-going vessels, and can also build warships and aircraft. We have Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines to our east. If the enemy drops atomic bombs on Beijing or Shanghai, we too must retaliate. We must consider active defense and also the problem of pursuit after smashing the enemy. We must also consider the problem of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea. Currently, the Pacific Ocean is not actually pacific. Only when it is managed by us in the future will it truly be a “Pacific” Ocean. (Lin Zong interjected: In × years, we absolutely must build large ships and prepare to land in Japan, the Philippines, and San Francisco.) How many more years will it take before we can build ships? By 1962, we will have ×× to ×× million tons of steel and ×× ten thousand machine tools, so our production capacity will be enormous.

Previously it was thought the military had a large surplus, but now it’s only over × million; should we consider further reductions? Last year’s reduction of ×× hundred thousand, keeping ×× hundred thousand, was proposed by me. The situation is different now.

I plan, at the next symposium, to specifically address issues such as the reorganization of troops and the question of cadres.