Chuan’s Annotations on the Report Concerning the Suppression of the Rebellion
(June 24, 1958)
[1]
Refers to the report dated June 18, 1958, submitted by the CPC Qinghai Provincial Committee to the Central Committee, the CMC, the Lanzhou Military Region, the party committees of various prefectures and counties, the Qaidam Working Committee, and the Xining Municipal Party Committee, regarding the suppression of the rebellion. The report stated that the counterrevolutionary armed rebellion in the Qinghai region had spread to become a problem of overall significance; all six autonomous prefectures in the province’s pastoral areas had, to varying degrees and at different times, experienced outbreaks of rebellion. Materials gathered from quelling the uprisings and apprehending counterrevolutionary elements demonstrated that the armed rebellion in Qinghai was closely linked to the conspiratorial secessionist activities of reactionary groups in Lhasa, instigated by imperialism. It was orchestrated by imperialist forces and the Lhasa reactionaries. In essence, it reflected both the imperialists’ and Lhasa reactionaries’ plot to split the country and the intense class struggle between socialist transformation and its opponents—a sharp, life-and-death struggle. To secure victory in this struggle, it was imperative to win over the masses, resolutely carry out socialist transformation, truly enable the working people to achieve political emancipation, and thoroughly eradicate the roots of the rebellion. At the same time, the armed counterrevolutionary insurrection must be met with decisive and forceful suppression by revolutionary armed forces.
On March 23, 1981, the CPC Central Committee issued a reply to the Qinghai Provincial Committee’s request report on resolving the legacy issues arising from the excessive expansion of the 1958 anti-rebellion campaign. The Central Committee’s annotation stated:
“It should be affirmed that suppressing the armed rebellions in certain localities at that time was correct. However, due to the influence of ‘leftist’ guiding ideology, the mistake of overexpansion was made, resulting in substantial—indeed, irreparable—political and economic losses for a number of cadres and the general populace. The primary responsibility lies with the leadership. In handling this matter, priority should be given to resolving it politically through thorough and meticulous ideological and political work, eliminating estrangement among the masses, among cadres, and between ethnic groups, guiding all ethnic peoples to keep the overall situation in mind, unite, and look forward. Economically, appropriate condolences, relief, and subsidies should also be provided; yet, given the current difficulties facing the national economy, a complete resolution is not feasible. The most fundamental approach remains to develop production and boost the economy.”

This document is to be circulated by Comrade Ke Cheng (I) to all comrades attending the CMC meeting. At the same time, please have Xiaoping distribute it to the party committees of all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, beginning with Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Tibet, so that everyone may be informed of this matter. The rebellion of the reactionary forces in Qinghai is extremely beneficial, as it presents a golden opportunity for the liberation of the working people. The policy adopted by the Qinghai Provincial Committee is entirely correct. Tibet should prepare to confront a possible nationwide rebellion there. The larger the turmoil, the better. As long as the Tibetan reactionaries dare to launch a full-scale uprising, the working people of Tibet will undoubtedly be able to attain liberation much sooner.
Mao Zedong
Reviewed by Liu, Deng, Peng, and Huang (2). To be handled by Deng and Huang.
[1]
Ke Cheng refers to Huang Kecheng, who at that time served as Secretary-General of the CPC Central Military Commission and Vice Minister of National Defense.
[2]
Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi. Deng refers to Deng Xiaoping, who at that time held the posts of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council. Peng refers to Peng Dehuai, who was then Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of National Defense. Huang refers to Huang Kecheng.