I. Does the People’s Liberation Army suffer from dogmatism? At the Chengdu Conference, I stated that while some elements were indeed adopted from abroad, the fundamental principles underlying our military building have been upheld. Today, there are four prevailing views: one holds that dogmatism is absent; another asserts its presence; a third claims it is widespread; and a fourth maintains it is quite prevalent. To say that dogmatism does not exist would be contrary to fact. The extent of its prevalence must be examined objectively at this session of the Central Military Commission—neither exaggerated nor minimized—and we should adhere to truth while correcting errors. Our policy of learning from the Soviet Union remains unwavering, as it was the first socialist country; however, such learning must be selective. Therefore, we must resolutely oppose dogmatism, eradicate servile thinking, and bury dogmatism once and for all.

II. The Ten Military Principles were formulated during the period of strategic counteroffensive, drawing on the experiences of the Decade of Civil War, the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the early stages of the Liberation War. They represent the synthesis of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of China’s revolutionary warfare. Through their application, we achieved victory in both the Liberation War and the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (though other factors also played a role). These principles remain applicable today and will continue to be useful in many future contexts. However, Marxism-Leninism is not static; it advances with time. Consequently, the Ten Military Principles must likewise be supplemented and developed in light of the actual conditions of future wars, with certain provisions potentially requiring revision.

III. The current situation is very favorable, particularly domestically. We now need to focus on three key areas: grain, steel, and machinery. Comrade ××× called me to report that the five provinces of East China—Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Fujian—are expected to increase grain production by ×× hundred million jin this year. If Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, and Henan are treated as a single unit, and Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan as another, each could likewise add ×× hundred million jin. Even without counting Northeast, North, and Northwest China, total national grain output could rise by ×× hundred million jin this year. Steel production in 1962 may reach between ×× and ×× million tons. Surpassing the United States will not take × years; × or × years should suffice. We can catch up with the Soviet Union within × years, and at most within × years overtake the United States. With adequate supplies of grain, steel, and machinery, and provided there is no war for another decade, the People’s Liberation Army stands a strong chance of significantly enhancing its combat power. By then, Comrade Xiao Jingguang’s aspiration will be realized. While the experience of “millet plus rifles” remains paramount, it would be erroneous to dismiss it simply because new methods have yet to emerge. Of course, remaining mired in the old stage would also be wrong.

IV. It is undeniable that we should learn from the Soviet Union, as it was the first socialist state. We have learned from it in the past, are doing so now, and will continue to do so in the future. Soviet experience falls into three categories: the first consists of valuable lessons that can be directly applied, which we should earnestly absorb; the second comprises mixed experiences, from which we should draw the positive aspects; and the third represents negative examples, worthy of study as cautionary tales. Thus, our engagement with Soviet experience must be selective. The majority of Soviet advisors and experts have been highly dedicated and have rendered great assistance, merits that deserve recognition. We ought to treat them as brothers rather than guests. The vast majority are reliable, with only a small minority presenting issues—a matter of nine parts good to one part bad. Their sole shortcoming lies in their relatively low political awareness. When problems arise, we should engage them in thorough discussions and ask probing questions such as “Why?” We must maintain cordial and cooperative relations while also exercising criticism and engaging in principled struggle. In this regard, the Second Ministry of Machine-Building has set an excellent example by disseminating our General Line to the experts, who have in turn acknowledged the need to learn from us and criticized certain tendencies toward dependency among our own personnel. It is important, however, not to reject everything in the name of combating dogmatism.

V. Our socialist construction proceeds along three parallel tracks. Stalin emphasized only one aspect—industrialization—while neglecting agriculture; he favored centralization over decentralization; and he prioritized large-scale projects over medium- and small-scale ones. We have taken a more comprehensive approach than he did. The Soviet Union has since made improvements in two areas, paying greater attention to agriculture and decentralization. Nevertheless, it still places insufficient emphasis on following the mass line and promoting medium- and small-scale initiatives. Another distinctive feature of our approach is the integration of foreign and indigenous methods. While the People’s Liberation Army pursues modernization through advanced, Western-style techniques, it should also incorporate traditional, homegrown approaches—for instance, the militia system. Over time, these indigenous practices can evolve into more sophisticated, modernized forms. The combination of “millet plus rifles” with modernization holds great promise.

VI. The leadership and working methods of the Central Military Commission must be improved. A practical approach would be to conduct systematic field inspections four times a year, much like local authorities do. Those stationed in Beijing tend to exhibit more bureaucratic作风 and less political acumen (though progress has been made), so this issue warrants particular attention. Criticism from below serves to refine our leadership, and I view such feedback positively—it reflects higher standards and aims to enhance the Commission’s performance. Henceforth, meetings of this kind should be convened annually. Furthermore, future plenary sessions of the Central Committee should more actively include military representatives, similar to how local party congresses typically invite secretaries of prefectural-level committees and above; similarly, secretaries of division-level party committees within the Military Commission should be invited to participate. You mentioned that you had difficulty accessing official documents? This time, we will provide you with broader access. Have any of you served on provincial party committees? (Liu Peiji replied: Eight of us are members of the Fujian Provincial Party Committee.) That matter has now been resolved, as far as I know.

VII. Strangely enough, contemporary schools fail to teach the lessons of China’s own revolutionary wars. Instead, they focus exclusively on the “Ten Great Offensives” conducted by the Soviet Red Army during the latter stages of World War II, even though we ourselves launched dozens of significant offensives that go unmentioned. The primary emphasis should be placed on our own historical experiences, with reference to others only as supplementary material.

VIII. Wang Ming continues to lodge complaints against me in the Soviet Union, accusing me of three things: first, opposing the Communist International; second, fostering a personality cult; and third, compelling over eighty percent of cadres to submit self-criticism. ××× remarked: If the Communist International contained errors, why shouldn’t we challenge them? As someone who once participated in the Communist International, his point is entirely valid. This report by Comrade ×× should therefore be printed and distributed for all to read.

IX. The First Five-Year Plan was endowed with funds totaling ×× billion yuan. Due to our lack of experience and a dogmatic, slavish imitation of foreign models, roughly half of these resources were squandered. Had we managed our finances more prudently, we could have undertaken projects worth ×× billion yuan and accomplished far more than we ultimately did. Nonetheless, this episode yielded valuable lessons and insights.