This speech is not a directive. I will first offer a few observations for reference; whether they are correct or not is up for discussion. They are merely raised as questions, a format we have grown accustomed to over the past few years. When did you all get up? Today? I got up yesterday. Everyone here is wiser than I am. You are constantly in touch with reality. I have not been hands-on with military affairs. In recent years, some comrades have criticized the military. But I also bear responsibility. I have tended to focus on one thing at a time. I once advocated this approach, but sometimes it has its drawbacks. Military work has, on the whole, been done well, with achievements as well as shortcomings. It is also my fault for having turned my attention to other matters. There is a book called "The Tale of Xiangshan," which tells the story of Guanyin Bodhisattva. The first page says: "Sing not of heaven, sing not of earth; begin first by singing the Tale of Xiangshan." That is how things always are. These past few days, I have not sung of heaven, nor sung of earth; I have begun by singing a different opera. This is sometimes unavoidable. One cannot perform "The Fisherman's Revenge" and "The Romance of the Western Chamber" simultaneously. For example, how many working days does Hongxiannu have each year? It is said she has two hundred. The rest of the time, she does no work. Although there may be reasons, it still is not very good. A political commissar of the Air Force said that he felt greatly honored to attend this conference and be peripherally involved. Does the Central Committee bear some indirect responsibility? The Military Commission has responsibility, and the Central Committee does too. This is raising a question. This inspection should first examine the Military Commission and its various departments. Do not target the military regions; they can join in the inspection. The more you pressure me, the more comfortable I feel. The Chinese people would not rise up to make revolution without imperialist oppression. People do not make revolution unless pushed. Imperialism oppresses the working people and, in effect, digs its own grave. Of course, your pressure is not imperialism—it is meant as urging. Otherwise, we would not stir. This matter concerns 600 million people and the issue of lasting world peace.

The Military Commission's work over the past few years has been basically correct, but there are major shortcomings, and the responsibility lies first with the leadership.

The domestic situation has undergone many changes. Several hundred million people have risen up to struggle. At this conference, we have distributed documents from Fuchun, Xiannian, Bo XX, the Ministry of Metallurgy, and the First Ministry of Machinery. I hope everyone will read them carefully (they mainly address the Second Five-Year Plan). They deserve careful study. Currently, our country's critical issues are: first, grain; second, steel; third, machinery. First is grain, the most important. If you don't believe it, try stopping the kitchen for three days—will that work? The current slogan is: "Struggle hard for three years, strive for a thousand jin per person" (650 billion jin). This year, we may increase production by 100 billion jin, reaching 470 billion to 480 billion jin. "Struggle hard for five years, strive to reach 1,500 jin per person." When that time comes, our backbones will be truly strong. Second is steel. This year's plan: within five years, strive for 60 million tons, to approach the Soviet Union (70 million tons). Next year, we may surpass Britain. In industry, we must find ways for cadres to go down to the frontlines four times a year and grasp work on four occasions. The military should do likewise. You think I manage too little; you want me to grasp more. A young donkey likes to be ridden, and these young donkeys of the Central Committee also need someone to ride them. Without steel, we cannot manufacture machinery. Steelmaking itself also requires the development of machinery (open-hearth furnaces, rolling mills, etc.). Electricity, petroleum, oil refining, and mining all require machinery. Transportation machinery (cars, trains, ships, airplanes) also needs it, and agriculture needs machinery too (tractors, irrigation and drainage machinery, etc.).

At present, the three crucial issues are grain, steel, and machinery.

The Military Commission meeting has run very long, but we must prepare for it to continue even longer—at most a year, at least three months, and at the very minimum one and a half months. After all, the Communist Party has many meetings, while the Kuomintang had many taxes. One of the sixty articles deals with grasping military affairs. Likewise, military matters must be addressed several times each year. In the past, the Central Committee did not pay enough attention, but now it is willing to do so. Now, progress is swift on all fronts, first and foremost at the local level, especially in agriculture. This is to say that the central departments have shortcomings: they have a bit more of some things and a bit less of others—a bit more bureaucratic airs and a bit less political awareness. Since the Nanning, Chengdu conferences, the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, and after the enlarged political conference, there has been great progress. One cannot say they still exhibit "one excess and two deficiencies." Bureaucratic airs have lessened, and political awareness has increased. Some comrades in the military say that among workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants, soldiers rank third and are now lagging behind. If there is some lagging behind, it is due to shortcomings in leadership. Meetings like today's have been held very rarely. In recent years, the main focus has been on agriculture, and we have developed a set of methods. Having resolved that, we later tackled industry and commerce and developed systematic approaches for them as well. Only the "soldier" and "student" fronts are still meeting to address their issues (Kang Sheng: A few days ago, the Chairman said: Among workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants, agriculture has worked out a set of liberated ideas; industry has basically done the same; commerce (finance and trade) has too. Only the military and education have not yet worked out a system, meaning that "soldiers" and "students" are lagging behind, their thinking backward.) Movement has begun. (Kang Sheng: What the Chairman said a few days ago makes sense. Education indeed has not yet developed a Chinese-style system.) A national, popular, scientific socialist education. National—combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the unique characteristics of China; scientific—Marxist dialectical materialism, not metaphysical idealism; popular—following the mass line. Education must integrate with the productive labor of the broad masses. Let us set aside three days for comrades to discuss this issue. What superstitions exactly do we harbor? Why has our thinking not been liberated? This conference has dealt too much with practical matters and not enough with ideological abstraction. The insufficient time for discussion also reveals this problem. Amidst the Great Leap Forward, the masses' thinking and educational work have leapt forward, but our leadership thinking still lags behind. (The Chairman is comparing the military conference with the education conference. The military conference has dealt with far more practical matters and for a longer time, whereas we do not have that many practical issues.) Our conference has a touch of routine-ism. (Their conference will still last another one and a half to two months.) Both fronts are holding meetings. The military's lagging behind is not a complete backwardness; there is a gap in the middle. Perhaps the higher levels lack some enthusiasm, but this is not true of all higher levels. Military cadres have told me, "All fronts are making great leaps forward, but military progress is insufficient, and it makes us uneasy." This is good. After this conference, changes will occur. The military conference must be conducted well, clarifying the principles to achieve a single objective. China has so many people—650 million. Its territory is half the size of the Soviet Union, but it is favorably located mostly in the temperate zone, with a long coastline of 12,000 kilometers. The country's total area is 9.5 million square kilometers. This country has mountains and plains, mountains in the west and plains in the east. This has advantages, creating significant elevation differences for water flow, allowing the construction of dams to harness water power. The bourgeois-democratic revolution happened somewhat earlier than in Russia—forty-seven years ago, counting from the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Russia's occurred from February to October 1917, a very short period. In China, from the Xinhai Revolution to 1949 spanned thirty-eight years. We were backward, but we accomplished the revolution on our own. We sought out Marxism ourselves and integrated the universal truth of Marxism with concrete practice. This is a principle of materialism, and also a principle of dialectics. Theory comes from practice and in turn acts upon practice. What is the universal truth of Marxism? Before the Moscow Conference, we had five points; later, they became nine. This universal truth must be combined with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Integration is essential because China has its own historical characteristics; copying mechanically will not work. We have copied mechanically before. In the Party's history, we once committed the error of dogmatism, which resulted in huge losses. But it also brought many benefits: it taught us lessons and yielded a great deal of experience. Similarly, our enemies also gave us much education, which was also beneficial. Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese imperialism, U.S. imperialism, and so on. Others like Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanglong, and Zhang Guotao—some of these were inner-Party matters. Wang Ming is still in the Party, but where is he heading? We shall see in the future. The thing with this person is that he always falls ill whenever a meeting convenes. If one errs politically, one will inevitably err militarily. I have written pamphlets on guerrilla warfare. The resolution of the Gutian Conference was a summary of the experience of that time, drawing the boundary between bourgeois and proletarian military thinking. Back then, this distinction was not clear. At the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Army, there were two lines within the military. Some comrades were very interested in bourgeois military science and a whole set of bourgeois management systems, believing that laymen could not lead experts. The so-called laymen referred to the military representatives and political commissars at the time who allegedly could not lead the troops. That phenomenon existed in the past, but of course, it does not exist now. Some comrades believed that to lead the military, one must have studied military affairs. Have all of you ever attended military school? No, you have not. This is not to say that comrades who previously spent time in the military were of no use; they played a tremendous role. Without them, the revolution would have been delayed for several years. Captured soldiers also played a role. (In the past civil wars, captured soldiers were also experts.)

If there were shortcomings, everyone shared them. At the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Army, there was an atmosphere of particular interest in bourgeois military science. Although Lin Biao attended an old-style school, he opposed that system and created something new. In reality, the bourgeois military management system was nothing more than a system of beating and cursing. During that period, what kind of thinking favored the old bourgeois military science and management system? It could be called bourgeois dogmatism. Later came the period of proletarian dogmatism during the Wang Ming line, when a foreigner (Li De) opposed luring the enemy deep and the idea of guerrilla warfare, calling it "mountain-ism." They wanted regularization and short, sharp assaults to keep the enemy outside the country's gates. At that time, the old bourgeois dogmatism surrendered to the foreign dogmatism, the proletarian dogmatism. Actually, it was not exactly a surrender, but rather the two kinds of dogmatism cooperated. The result was that they ruined our work, leading to a grand guerrilla migration—the 25,000-li Long March, traversing 25,000 li as if through the earth's center. Other base areas also committed errors. The Central Soviet Area also ended up doing a grand "yangge" dance all the way to northern Shaanxi.

Our Party experienced three "Left" deviation lines and two Right deviation lines. As a result, the military was reduced in size and suffered losses. But this also had benefits: we gained experience. Through the Zunyi Conference, the Yan'an Conference, and the Yan'an Rectification Movement, we adopted the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the sickness to save the patient," persuading the vast majority of comrades to correct their errors. Therefore, one cannot say the military never made mistakes. Precisely because we made mistakes, when Chiang Kai-shek invited us to leave, we left. During the Long March, when the First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces, Zhang Guotao opposed the Central Committee. Later, during the War of Resistance Against Japan, some people committed the error of Wang Ming's Right opportunism for a second time. Had we followed Wang Ming's Right opportunism, we would not be able to sit here in the Huairen Hall today and watch Mei Lanfang's opera.

After the War of Resistance, during the War of Liberation, the entire Party and Army had no fundamental disagreements. At the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in 1938, I spoke of the benefits of guerrilla war: it could build the Party, build the army, and build political power. The 900,000-strong guerrilla forces transformed into four field armies. Primarily, during the War of Resistance and the War of Liberation, we did not act according to foreign dogmas, nor according to bourgeois dogmas. We acted according to our own set of methods, while of course also drawing on foreign experience. Victory was not achieved by following either of the two kinds of dogmatism.

After the victory in 1949, we defeated U.S. imperialism again. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was no small war. Soviet comrades once said that on the Korean battlefield, the power of the enemy air force was something never encountered even on the battlefields of the Second World War. At that time, our air force could not reach the first line (behind enemy lines) or the second line (the 38th parallel); it could only hold the line briefly in the rear. Under those circumstances, defeating U.S. imperialism was extremely difficult. Some say I never participated in a world war. That is incorrect; we have participated in a war more brutal than the world wars. What is the U.S. Army like? It is unclear, but it is certainly not an easy pushover. Therefore, strategically, I regard U.S. imperialism as a paper tiger, but in campaigns and tactics, we must regard it as an iron tiger.

After victory, many schools were established, and dogmatism arose. Inviting so many Soviet experts naturally gave rise to dogmatism. In the end, is there dogmatism or not? There are four views on this: (1) there is none; (2) there is some, but not much; (3) there is quite a bit; (4) there is a great deal. Which one is correct? I ask everyone to discuss this.

The Party's history includes two kinds of dogmatism: one is bourgeois military science and management systems; the other is the proletariat's uncritical acceptance of foreign military science and management systems. We have struggled against and overcome both.

After liberation, dogmatism has emerged again. Does it exist? I think there is a little. The degree can be studied. To say there is absolutely none is not appropriate. Copying foreign things uncritically is to underestimate ourselves and lack self-confidence. Some say one should study my military science. I have none. I have only written a few articles. At that time, I was full of indignation; without that indignation, I could not have written them. Wang Ming returned from the Soviet Union advocating the theory of quick victory. (He wrote an article claiming the War of Resistance would be won in four years.) At the time, there were two theories: quick victory and national subjugation. Within the Party, we mainly criticized the theory of quick victory. In dealing with the Kuomintang, we mainly criticized the theory of national subjugation. Those were articles written for the moment. Now, I don't understand the current system. Millet plus rifles: I saw that and participated in it, even carrying a rifle during the Xinhai Revolution. Later, after the North-South peace talks, I became a layman.

Our army has two traditions: one is a fine tradition, the other an erroneous tradition. One is a Marxist tradition; the other is a non-Marxist tradition.

This meeting needs to make some decisions — one major one and several dozen minor ones, just like the Chengdu Conference (which had over thirty). We should seek truth from facts and reason things out. Everyone should speak up, and everyone should speak from the heart. We also encourage speaking candidly about matters (being frank and having heart-to-heart talks). Speak openly about the work. Some people fear that if they speak up, they will be made to wear tight shoes. What is there to fear about wearing tight shoes? Is the Communist Party afraid of wearing tight shoes? In the past, all Chinese women wore tight shoes. Three-inch golden lotuses did not stop them from giving birth to 450 million people. What is there for Communists to fear? What does it matter if we have to wear dozens of pairs? I laid out five principles at the Chengdu Conference. Execution is certainly out of the question. We advocate heart-to-heart talks, and I am opening my heart to you. Offending some people is inevitable. In short, we must plant a banner. If it is not red, then white or gray will be planted instead. Do not over-scrutinize every word before speaking. It is fine to speak up. My speech today is also just casual talk; writing it out as a prepared script would be difficult. The goal is unity — the unity of the entire Party and the entire army. To achieve unity, the issues must be made clear. Otherwise, there will be no true unity. Soldiers should be forthright; heart-to-heart talks are needed to attain unity.

Why must we strive for unity? To buy time. It would be best if we could avoid war for ten years. From 1918 to 1939, there were twenty-one years without war. If World War III follows that twenty-one-year timeline, we still have eight years left. In that case, I can surpass Britain in just three years, or perhaps around next year. With seven more years, I can surpass the United States. Right now, Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan is very small, yet he still swaggers and often sends out aircraft. If I had 150 million tons of steel, then just a puff of breath from me would send him packing. Now, even thunderous declarations leave him unmoved. In another seven years, with a powerful industry, the Soviet Union will have 70 million tons, while I will have 60 million tons. By 1967, we can surpass the Soviet Union and draw near to the United States. In ten years, we can surpass the United States (we have the confidence to do so). By then, missile industries and perhaps even atomic bombs may be within reach.

The troops must hold one meeting each year. Keep a clear direction in your hearts; do not be muddled. Make things clear to Xiao Jinguang. The navy is important, but it is not yet capable, though there is great hope. Next year we may reach 25 million tons of steel, but it is hard to say for sure. Who would have thought that one mu of wheat could yield 4,500 jin? Grain output this year could increase by 100 billion jin. Some comrades estimate the increase at 130 billion jin. I estimate an increase of 100 billion jin is assured; I do not object to 130 billion either. In short, when the nation is strong, the military inevitably becomes strong. In seven years, we may draw near to the United States; in ten years, surpass it. Let the entire Party and the entire army unite and strive toward this goal.