(June 16, 1958)


We need to start thinking about the international situation. In the past, when we were fighting Chiang Kai-shek, how could we have succeeded without confidence?
If we don’t analyze the situation, we just keep repeating clichés about being pro-American, admiring America, or fearing America.
What is the psychological state of our 600 million people? Have we truly overcome fear? Or are we still a bit afraid? I must admit I am somewhat apprehensive; perhaps you are all one hundred percent Marxists and feel no fear. Peace is preferable, after all—war always claims lives. People naturally hope to die more slowly, but eventually, everyone grows old and must face death. Death is normal; immortality would be unnatural.


If an atomic war breaks out, so be it—it’s not something we desire. Even if everyone perishes, in half a million years conditions will return to what they were, and life will emerge anew. In short, we should discuss the situation thoroughly and without reservation. The world has no beginning and no end. Inorganic matter can transform into organic matter; half a million years is insignificant. Once I remarked that an atomic war might wipe out two-thirds of the global population, yet one-third would remain—isn’t that encouraging? And even if no humans survived, single-celled organisms would still exist in the oceans. Originally, there was little to no life on Earth; it only appeared later. That said, I urge you to debate these matters openly, avoiding pessimism. We should fear neither heaven nor earth; at worst, we might lose our heads.


The central question is: Are both sides equally afraid? It seems likely that one side harbors slightly more fear than the other, though the degree of difference remains unclear. Back in 1946, I argued that U.S. imperialism was a paper tiger—that its apparent strength was illusory and that it was destined to perish. I have often reflected on this issue. Sometimes dark clouds gather in the sky, as when Chiang Kai-shek attacked Zhangjiakou: What would the future hold then? Even if we lost every city, I remained convinced of ultimate victory. During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, I based my strategic calculations on the worst-case scenario—the U.S. occupying the Yalu River. If that happened, I would withdraw to Liaoning Province, but by doing so I would secure the right to deploy troops. My plan was to divide our forces into six columns and penetrate deep into North Korea to launch a counteroffensive against the enemy.


Both sides are indeed afraid, though the enemy fears us more and is somewhat weaker than we are. This has been our assessment, guiding our policy decisions. However, circumstances can change. Overall, the notion that we fear them more does not align with reality.


De Gaulle’s rise to power was both a positive and a negative development. On the one hand, it was troubling that he sought to suppress the Communist Party; on the other, he proved to be a tougher leader than his predecessors. After World War II, France had become rather “soft.” De Gaulle, however, was like an “octopus”—a “soft-bodied” creature with an additional backbone.


I suggest we deliberate whether one side truly fears the other more. Whenever problems arise, it seems our earlier assessments no longer hold true.


The Moscow Declaration addressed the issue of war, given the existence of warmongers. For people worldwide, a dual-track approach is necessary: opposing war while simultaneously preparing for it. We planned to develop an atomic bomb within five years and a hydrogen bomb within ten, with technical assistance from the Soviet Union. At the same time, we needed to explore other avenues, relying primarily on our own ingenuity.


Why talk about peace while also mentioning the danger of war? Doesn’t that seem contradictory? On the contrary, it is entirely consistent. However, such consistency cannot be asserted through sophistry; it must be grounded in sound reasoning. Comrade Shaoqi once discussed the new stage of peaceful democracy in Yan’an, and I wholeheartedly supported that view. [1] De Gaulle became Prime Minister of France in June 1958 and was elected President of the Fifth French Republic in December of the same year. [2] Gao refers to Gao Gang, a former member of the CPC Central Political Bureau, Vice Chairman of the Central People’s Government, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission. His attack on Comrade Shaoqi was, in fact, unjust.


One track represents a peaceful transition, while the other provides for wartime contingencies. Only with both tracks can we move forward steadily.


World wars originate from monopoly capital. When monopolists seek war, they may give rise to war maniacs. Figures like Hitler, Chiang Kai-shek, and Japanese fascists were such maniacs, yet they were ultimately defeated. An atomic war would plunge the world into darkness, but humanity would still have hope after half a million years. Nehru once stated that during World War II, all human beings perished, leaving no one capable of initiating peace talks. I countered that someone could still be found, though he did not believe me. The First World War led to the establishment of the Soviet Union, while the Second World War gave birth to socialist China and other socialist nations, alongside some democratic countries such as India. A second world war would spell the demise of imperialism. Reflecting on this, I realized that my work “On New Democracy” failed to mention that non-communist-led nations—such as India, Indonesia, Syria, and Egypt—could also assert their independence from U.S. influence. It now appears that this oversight was incorrect.


The logic is quite simple, yet it tends to expand when discussed at length. Let us set aside a few days to deliberate further. Even in the event of an atomic war, U.S. imperialism remains a paper tiger. In Yan’an, we numbered just over 7,000 people, whereas Chiang Kai-shek controlled major cities like Shanghai, equipped with tanks, aircraft, and artillery—resources we lacked. So who ultimately emerged victorious? During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, each of our armies had only fifty artillery pieces, while a single U.S. division boasted eight hundred. Despite this disparity, we routed them decisively. In any atomic conflict, repeated blows would ultimately lead to the collapse of the adversary and our own triumph. Judging from the current situation, such a war is unlikely, as U.S. imperialism is riddled with internal weaknesses and widespread opposition from the populace.


The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is deeply unstable. The law of the jungle prevails: big fish eat small fish. All member states are essentially “fish”—all are imperialist powers—and the dynamic remains one of the strong preying on the weak. The NATO alliance epitomizes this pattern.


Our thinking must be clear and well-reasoned. We should appropriately influence fraternal nations. Some countries exhibit an excessive aversion to imperialism, even surpassing Chiang Kai-shek himself, who dared to raid the U.S. embassy—albeit with the intent of seizing documents. Should the United States play the role of the middle ground, or should we? Moreover, the middle ground is vast.


Our policy consists of two components: peace and war. As for peace, it is predicated on the premise that imperialism is a paper tiger. Currently, the middle ground is unsustainable; moreover, economic crises continue to plague its interior. In the past, popular resistance alone could not prevent war, but today war is no longer inevitable.
~：：~ Beans, specialized – ~ tons,．
-
~