(March 10, 1958)


Regulations and rules are one issue; let us take them as an example to discuss questions of thinking—specifically, upholding principles while fostering a spirit of originality.
On the international front, we should maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, all people’s democratic countries, and the communist parties and working classes of various nations, practicing internationalism and learning from the strengths of the Soviet Union and other foreign countries. This is a fundamental principle. However, there are two approaches to learning: one is mere imitation, and the other is to combine learning with a spirit of originality. Simply copying Soviet regulations without adaptation reflects a lack of such originality.


From the Party’s founding through the Northern Expedition period (1921–1927), despite Chen Duxiu’s bourgeois ideology cloaked in Marxist rhetoric, our Party remained relatively vibrant and dynamic. Three years after the victory of the October Revolution, when our Party was established, its members were young people who had participated in or been influenced by the May Fourth Movement. During that time, under Lenin’s leadership before Stalin came to power, class struggle was acute, and our Party too was full of vigor. Chen Duxiu’s ideas originated both from foreign social-democratic parties and from the domestic bourgeoisie. Although errors associated with Chen Duxiu’s line did occur during this period, dogmatism was generally absent.


From the Civil War period until the Zunyi Conference (1927–1935), the Chinese Communist Party experienced three “left” deviations, the most severe of which occurred between 1934 and 1935. By then, the Soviet Union had already triumphed over the Trotskyists, though theoretically only defeating the Debolin school. Many of China’s “left” opportunists had been influenced in the Soviet Union; however, not every individual who had studied there was a dogmatist. Among those in the Soviet Union at the time, some embraced dogma, others did not; some connected theory with practice, while others remained fixated on foreign models. Coupled with the consolidation of Stalin’s rule—particularly following the Great Purge—and the fact that Comintern leaders such as Bukharin, Pyatakov, and Zinoviev, along with Eastern Department head Kuusinen and Far Eastern Department head Mif, were in power, conditions conducive to the formation of dogmatism emerged. Some Chinese comrades were indeed affected, and “left” tendencies gained traction among the youth. At that time, Wang Ming and others concocted the so-called “Twenty-Eight-and-a-Half Bolsheviks”—a group of several hundred individuals who had studied in the Soviet Union. Why only twenty-eight-and-a-half? Because they were excessively “left,” engaging in self-criticism to the point of isolating themselves and narrowing the Party’s base.


Chinese dogmatism possessed its own distinctive characteristics, manifesting itself in military strategy and in the treatment of rich peasants. Given their small numbers, it was decided in principle not to disturb them, making concessions to the peasantry. Yet the “left” faction opposed this policy, advocating that rich peasants’ land be confiscated while landlords should receive none. As a result, many landlords found themselves without food and were forced to take to the hills, forming guerrilla bands. In dealing with the bourgeoisie, they advocated wholesale overthrow—not merely political but also economic annihilation—blurring the lines between the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. They likewise failed to analyze imperialism, regarding it as a monolithic bloc beyond division, all of which supported the Nationalist government.


Following national liberation (1950–1957), dogmatism arose in economic and cultural-educational work. While some elements of dogmatism were imported into military affairs, the basic principles were upheld, so it would be inaccurate to call it full-fledged dogmatism. In the economic sphere, dogmatism was most pronounced in heavy industry, planning, banking, and statistics—especially in the areas of heavy industry and planning—because we lacked understanding and experience. Lacking any alternative, we simply copied Soviet practices. Statistical work was almost entirely plagiarized from the Soviets, and education suffered similarly, with the introduction of systems like the five-point grading scale and the unified five-year primary school curriculum, even disregarding the educational experience of the liberated areas. The same applied to health care, leading to a three-year ban on eggs and chicken soup based on a Soviet article claiming these foods were harmful, later reversed. Regardless of the article’s validity, Chinese officials dutifully followed the directive, placing the Soviet model above all else. Commercial activities were less affected, as central authorities maintained closer contact and issued more directives; light industry likewise saw less dogmatism. The socialist revolution and agricultural collectivization remained largely untouched by dogmatism, since these were directly overseen by the central leadership, which focused primarily on revolution and agriculture during those years, with commerce receiving only limited attention.


The manifestations of dogmatism varied, necessitating careful analysis to identify their root causes:


First, we were incapable of independently designing, constructing, or installing heavy industrial facilities; lacking expertise, with ministers often serving as laypersons, we could only copy foreign designs, unable even to discern their quality. Moreover, we relied on Soviet experience and experts to discredit the bourgeois ideologies of China’s own technical personnel. While much of Soviet design proved applicable in China, certain aspects were inappropriate and amounted to crude imitation.


Second, our overall understanding of the economic situation was insufficient, particularly regarding the differences between the Soviet and Chinese economies. Consequently, we tended to obey blindly. Today, the situation has changed: large-scale enterprises can generally undertake design and construction independently, and within another five years, we will be able to manufacture equipment domestically. We now possess a better grasp of both Soviet and Chinese economic realities.


Third, the psychological pressure stemming from superstitious beliefs has been alleviated. Statues of bodhisattvas, many times larger than humans, were intended to intimidate; heroic figures on stage stood out precisely because they defied convention. Stalin, too, was portrayed in this manner. For centuries, the Chinese people had been accustomed to servitude and seemed resigned to remaining so. Even artists depicting me alongside Stalin invariably rendered me shorter, reflecting a subconscious submission to the ideological pressures of the time. Marxism-Leninism, however, upholds equality for all; we ought to treat everyone equally. Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin also constituted a form of pressure, one that most Party members rejected. Nevertheless, some succumbed to it, embracing the campaign against personality cults. While opposition to personality cults is legitimate—there are two types: proper reverence for figures like Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, which we must uphold indefinitely, as truth resides in their teachings; why deny it? We believe in objective reality, and just as a class needs to respect its leader, so too must we honor those who embody truth—the other kind of worship, however, involves uncritical blind obedience, which is unacceptable. The goals of combating personality cults likewise differ: some seek to eliminate unwarranted adulation, while others aim to promote self-worship. The crux lies not in personality cults per se, but in whether what is being revered truly represents the truth. If it does, it deserves veneration; if not, collective leadership alone cannot suffice. Throughout its history, our Party has consistently emphasized the interplay between individual leadership and collective decision-making. Some rejoiced at Stalin’s downfall, driven by personal ambitions to elevate themselves, while others criticized Lenin for his authoritarianism. Lenin famously retorted: “Better that I rule autocratically than that you do.” Stalin greatly admired Gao Gang, even personally dispatching him a car, and Gao Gang sent Stalin congratulatory telegrams every August 15th—a practice still observed today in various provinces. Was it Jiang Hua’s autocracy, or Sha Wenhan’s? Such disputes have arisen in Guangdong, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Anhui, and Shandong. Do not assume peace prevails; the situation remains unstable. “Standing firm on solid ground” may prove illusory, for one day the mainland could sink, the Pacific Ocean transform into land, and we would be compelled to relocate. Minor tremors are frequent, whereas the Gao-Rao affair was akin to an “eight-magnitude earthquake.”


Fourth, we neglected historical lessons, failed to employ comparative methods, and did not learn to identify opposing viewpoints. As I mentioned yesterday, concerning numerous regulations, many comrades fail to consider alternative approaches, select those best suited to China’s specific circumstances, and devise new ones where existing measures are unsuitable. Nor do they engage in analysis or critical thinking, nor compare different options. In the past, we opposed the “Bolshevik” journal published by dogmatists, which claimed absolute correctness and boasted of its own infallibility by focusing solely on flaws while ignoring merits. The “Truth Daily” newspaper, for instance, criticized the Central Soviet Area for five major errors without mentioning a single positive aspect.


In April 1956, the “Ten Major Relationships” were put forward, marking the beginning of our own path of development. While the underlying principles aligned with those of the Soviet Union, the content itself was distinctly Chinese. The five key relationships concerned industry versus agriculture, coastal regions versus inland areas, the central government versus local authorities, and the state, collectives, and individuals, as well as defense construction versus economic development. Defense spending should be kept low during peacetime, and administrative expenses minimized at all times.


In 1956, Stalin was subjected to criticism, an event that filled us with both joy and apprehension. Removing the veil of superstition, dispelling pressure, and liberating thought were essential. However, we disapproved of outright condemnation; while they removed his portraits, we continued to display ours. In 1950, my discussions with Stalin in Moscow over the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, the Changchun Railway, joint-stock companies, and border issues, followed a clear pattern: either I would challenge proposals I disagreed with, or he would insist on a particular stance, which I would accept, all in order to safeguard socialist interests. Furthermore, the two “colonies”—Northeast China and Xinjiang—were closed to foreigners, a restriction that has since been lifted. The post-Stalin critique served to awaken those still steeped in superstition, reminding our comrades that even our predecessors had shortcomings, which should be analyzed rather than blindly revered. We should embrace the Soviet Union’s positive experiences and reject its negative ones. By now, we have acquired certain skills and gained a deeper understanding both of the Soviet Union and of ourselves.


In 1957, the “Report on Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” proposed simultaneously advancing industry and agriculture, pursuing industrialization, promoting collectivization, and addressing family planning. That year also witnessed the nationwide Rectification Campaign and the Anti-Rightist Movement—an extensive public critique of our work that profoundly stimulated popular thought.
In 1958, three conferences were held in Hangzhou, Nanning, and Chengdu. Participants offered numerous suggestions, reflected on eight years of experience, and engaged in vigorous debate, yielding valuable insights. The Nanning Conference specifically raised the issue of regulations across State Council departments, concluding that they could and should be revised. One approach involved direct engagement with the masses, while another utilized big-character posters. Another topic was decentralization, which had already begun to take effect: centralized and decentralized governance coexisted, with authority concentrated where appropriate and dispersed elsewhere—this arrangement was formalized at last year’s Third Plenary Session. Decentralization, however, must not resemble bourgeois democracy, which, while progressive prior to socialism, becomes reactionary once socialism is established. In the Soviet Union, ethnic Russians accounted for fifty percent, with minorities comprising the other half, whereas in China, Han Chinese make up eighty-four percent, leaving only sixteen percent for ethnic minorities. Therefore, establishing union republics is not feasible.
China’s revolution succeeded against Stalin’s wishes; the “foreign devils” had declared that no revolution would be permitted. At the Seventh National Congress, we resolved to mobilize the masses, strengthen all revolutionary forces, and establish New China. Our dispute with Wang Ming, which lasted from 1937 until August 1938, centered on ten programmatic points on our side versus sixty on his. Following Wang Ming’s—Stalin’s—logic, the Chinese revolution could never have succeeded. Despite Stalin’s subsequent claim that our revolution was illegitimate, we refrained from defending ourselves; it was only during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea that our cause was definitively vindicated. Yet when we presented the “Report on Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People,” critics dismissed it as unserious and accused us of harboring liberal tendencies, suggesting once again that our claims lacked authenticity. After the report’s publication, The New York Times printed its full text and published an article proclaiming “China’s Liberalization.” The demise of the bourgeoisie seemed inevitable; seeing reeds serve as makeshift boats appeared perfectly natural. However, bourgeois politicians were not devoid of insight. Dulles, upon reading our document, expressed interest and concluded within half a month that China was thoroughly corrupt, while the Soviet Union remained comparatively sound. At the time, though, the Soviet Union viewed our stance as potentially leaning toward the right and issued a note of caution. Consequently, the Anti-Rightist Movement effectively nullified any prospect of “liberalization.”
In summary, the overarching guiding principles are universally true, yet their specific applications vary from country to country and even from province to province. There exists both consensus and contradiction; the Soviet Union emphasized unity while downplaying conflict, particularly the tension between leadership and the led.