The Bourgeois Orientation of _Wenhui bao_ Should Be Criticized
(July 1, 1957)

Source: _Xuanji_, V, pp. 434–439. Other Chinese Texts: _RMRB_ (July 1, 1957), 1;
_Wansui_ (n.d. 3), pp. 179–181; _Xuexi wenjian_, pp. 52–57; _URI_ (1976), pp. 231–235;
_Jiaoyu yulu_, pp. 7–9, passim (excerpts); _Wenyi hongqi_ , 3 (excerpt); _Mao liang_, p.
414 (excerpt). Available English Translations: _SW_, V, pp. 451–456; _URI_ (1976),
pp. 237–242; _PR_, 11:37 (Sept. 13, 1968), 22 (excerpt); _CB_, 897 (Dec. 10, 1969),
28 (excerpt).


  *This is an editorial for RMRB written by Mao. The reader should note the cross reference
  to text June 14, 1957. From the contents of the document, we have some reason to believe
  that text 1957(1), i.e., “Directive on Journalism Work,” was produced around the same time
  as these RMRB editorials of July 1957, and that indeed the directive may have been issued
  in conjunction with these highly critical editorials. Therefore we suggest that the reader
  refer to text 1957(1) when studying these documents of July 1957.
  This document is particularly significant in that it represents Mao’s first and main
  criticism of the so-called Zhang (Bojun)-Luo (Longji) Counterrevolutionary Alliance,
  which he identifies for the first time here. This criticism became a major component
  and benchmark of the anti-Rightist campaign in 1957, much as the campaigns against
  the “Gao-Rao Alliance” and the “Hu Feng Clique” marked the year 1955. For a
  broader description of the problems that existed in 1957 between the state and the
  intellectuals, the CPC and the other political parties, particularly with the China
  Democratic League of which the Zhang-Luo Alliance was seen as a representation,
  and of the involvement of other people such as Zhang Naiqi (see text Jan. 27,
  1957, note 73), see Deng Xiaoping’s “Report on the Rectification Campaign”
  (RMSC [1958], pp. 33–42; available English translation, R. Bowie and J. Fairbank,
  eds. [1971], pp. 341–363). Much scholarship has been devoted to the uneasy
  relationship between the political regime and the CPC, on the one hand, and
  intellectuals, on the other. Most significant among them are J. Grieder (1981) and
  M. Goldman (1981), on the specific subject of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the
  situation in 1957, and the Zhang-Luo affair, one should also refer to R.
  MacFarquhar (1960) and J. Chen (1960).*

Since the editorial department of this newspaper published [the editorial] “The
Bourgeois Orientation of *Wenhui bao* During a Certain Period” on June 14,¹
*Wenhui bao* and *Guangming ribao* have both undertaken some self-examination
on this question.²

The staff at *Guangming ribao* held a number of meetings and seriously criticized
the mistake in orientation of managing editor Zhang Bojun³ and editor-in-chief
Chu Anping.⁴ Once this critical attitude became clear, the standpoint of the
newspaper was fundamentally turned around from Zhang Bojun and Chu Anping’s
anti-Communist, antisocialist bourgeois line to the socialist revolutionary line. This has restored the confidence of the reading public and the newspaper’s
image as a socialist paper. Still somewhat inadequate are the technical aspects of
editing and layout. The technical aspects of editing and layout and the political
aspects of editing and layout are two different things. As far as *Guangming ribao*
is concerned, it is inadequate in the former and more than adequate in the latter.
Problems of technique are totally capable of being corrected. Improving the
techniques of editing and layout and giving the paper a new appearance would
please the readers.⁵ This matter is a difficult one; this paper has long intended to
do this and has made some slight progress, but it is not yet entirely satisfactory.⁶

*Wenhui bao* has written articles of self-criticism and seems to have changed its
orientation; it then wrote a number of news reports and articles reflecting a positive
line. All these, of course, are good. But we still feel this is not enough. It is like in
the case of performing a play: Some actors portray bad characters with great
realism, but when it comes to playing the good characters they just can’t seem to
do too well—their manners and gestures are forced, and are not very natural. This

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 593

is a matter of considerable difficulty [for them]. If the east wind doesn't prevail
over the west wind, the west wind will prevail over the east wind.7 On the question
of line, there is no room for compromise. Among the editors and reporters there
are many who were accustomed to life in the old pattern; it is not at all easy for
them to be transformed suddenly. [However,] since [they are caught] in the general
trend of circumstances, they have to be transformed even if they don't want to. The
change is mandatory; they do not have to be happy about it. [When they] say they
accomplished this easily and pleasantly, it is just an expression of the usual
politeness. This is human nature, and it can be excused. The serious question is [the
problem of] the editorial department of Wenhui bao. This editorial department
assumed command during the period when that newspaper was beset with a
bourgeois orientation. Its heavy baggage cannot be easily thrown off. As to whether
or not there is [someone] acting as an even higher commander [than the editors],
those who attack [the paper] say there is, but those who defend it deny it. Moreover
[this high command] has reportedly been identified; he is Luo Longji of the
Zhang-Luo Alliance.8 Between these two commanders, there is still a third commander—the head of Wenhui bao's Beijing office, Pu Xixiu.9 She is a very capable
woman general. People are saying that [if you put the three together]—Luo Longji,
Pu Xixiu, and the editorial department of Wenhui bao, you will get the Democratic
League's Rightist network within the Wenhui bao.10

The part played by the Democratic League during the course of the contending
of the hundred schools [of thought] and the rectification [campaign] was especially
despicable.11 Its organization, planning, program, and line, all caused it to be
divorced from the people and were anti-Communist and antisocialist. Then there
is the Peasant-Worker Democratic Party12—it was exactly the same. These two
parties played a particularly conspicuous part in this tempestuous period. The
[storm] was stirred up by the Zhang-Luo Alliance itself. Other parties were also
involved in stirring it up, and there were some other people who were also quite
despicable. But they were small in number, and their chains of command were not
as evident. Even among the members of the Democratic League and the Peasant-
Worker Democratic Party, not all, nor even the majority, [were involved in stirring
up the storm].13 Those who summoned the gale and the rain,14 stirred the seas and
made waves,15 made plans behind closed doors, started fires among the lower
levels, formed alliances between upper and lower levels,16 and sought to coordinate
[activities] over all sections of the country, and who counted on the circumstances
and took as their ultimate goal to create general disorder in the nation and to unseat
[the Communist Party] and take its place themselves, to step by step to carry out
their plans until their great cause was accomplished—these were really only a
relatively small group of people—the so-called bourgeois Rightists. Some of them
were fully conscious, the majority were in the dark, and a minority were backbone
cadres of the Right wing, Because they were backbone cadres of the Right wing,
their powers were still considerable even though their number was small. Throughout this entire spring, black clouds have abruptly rolled across the skies of China;
all of them originated from the Zhang-Luo Alliance.

The [All-China] Journalistic Workers' Association held two meetings. The first


was a negation; the second was a negation of the negation.¹⁷ [Both were held] in
little more than a month, reflecting the speed with which the situation in China was
changing. The meetings were held successfully. In the first meeting, [“]dark clouds
hung over the city walls as though the walls were about to collapse[”] and the
bourgeois reactionary line in journalism was set out.¹⁸ At the more recently
convened second meeting, the atmosphere changed; [although] the Rightists still
stubbornly resisted, it can be said that the majority have found correct bearings.
On June 14, <i>Wenhui bao</i> made a self-criticism and acknowledged that it had
made some errors.¹⁹ Making a self-criticism is good, and we welcome it. But we
think <i>Wenhui bao</i>’s criticism is not adequate. This inadequacy is of a fundamental
nature. That is to say, <i>Wenhui bao</i> has not [really] made a self-criticism at all. On
the contrary, in the June 14 editorial it defended its errors: “We had one-sidedly
and mistakenly understood the Party’s policy on contending and blooming, and we
thought that as long as we unconditionally encouraged contending and blooming
we would help the Party carry out rectification; [we thought that] to publicize more
positive views and carry out countercriticisms of mistaken ideas would affect
[adversely] the contending and blooming.” Is this the way things were? No. During
the spring, <i>Wenhui bao</i> carried out the anti-Communist, antipeople, antisocialist
policies of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, launched reckless
attacks on the proletariat, and ran counter to the policies of the Communist Party.
Its policy was to topple the Communist Party and send the country into chaos so
as to unseat [the Communist Party] and take its place. Were they really “aiding the
rectification?”²⁰ No, that’s a lie; nothing but a deception. Was it wrong to publish
no positive views or only a few during a period of time, and to make no countercriticism of mistaken views?²¹ In the period from May 8 to June 7, this paper
and all other Party papers, carrying out the directives of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China, did exactly that. The purpose was to let the monsters
and ghosts, demons and ogres²² “contend and bloom,” to let the poisonous weeds
grow up tall and full so that the people could see them,²³ and [when they see them]
get startled to find that such things still existed in the world, [then] they would take
action to wipe out these ugly things. This is to say, the Communist Party perceived
that this round of class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is
unavoidable. [We] let the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals launch this
battle; for a period of time the newspapers published few or no positive views; the
reckless attacks of the bourgeois reactionary Rightists were not countered; all Party
organizations in all organs and schools wherein rectification took place did not, as
a rule, counter this kind of reckless attack for a certain period.²⁴ This was to enable
the masses to see very clearly whose criticisms were well-intentioned and whose
so-called criticisms were maliciously intended. This way they could concentrate
strength and wait for the time to ripen when they could launch a counterattack.
Some say this is a secret plot. We say it is an open plan. This is because we had
told the enemy beforehand:²⁵ Only when demons and ogres are allowed out of the
cage can they be destroyed; only if the poisonous weeds are allowed to come out
of the soil can they be pulled out. Don’t the peasants weed several times a year?
After the weeds are pulled out they can be used for fertilizer. The class enemies

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 595

are bound to find the opportunity to express themselves. They are not reconciled
to the loss of their world and to their property being communized.26 No matter how
the Communist Party gives prior warning and publicly informs its own enemy of
its basic strategy, the enemy will still launch the attack. Class struggle is [a fact
that] objectively exists; it is independent of people’s will. This is to say, it is
unavoidable. Even if people will to avoid it, it can’t be done. The only thing to do
is to follow the dictates of the situation and obtain victory. Why do the reactionary
class enemies throw themselves into the net? [It is because] they are reactionary
social cliques; they are blinded by the pursuit of profit,27 and they take the absolute
superiority of the proletariat to be an absolute inferiority. [They believed that] by
setting fires everywhere, they would be able to stir up the workers and the peasants,
and the students would put up big-character posters in an effort to take over the
schools; there would be great contending and great blooming, the situation would
reach the explosive point, the country would be plunged immediately into disorder,
and the Communist Party would be done for. Such was the estimate of the current
situation that Zhang Bojun presented to six professors in Beijing on June 6.28 Isn’t
this being blinded by the pursuit of profit? By profit we mean the seizure of power.
They have quite a few newspapers, and one of them is called Wenhui bao. Wenhui
bao acts according to the reactionary policies we have described above. On June
14, however, it [made an attempt] to deceive the people, making it seem that it was
proceeding with good intentions. Wenhui bao said: “The reason these errors in
understanding have taken place was that in our heads there were still remnants of
bourgeois ideas of running a newspaper.” Wrong! It should have said: “[Our heads]
were full of [bourgeois ideas].” [It] served for several months as a mouthpiece for
the reactionaries in their reckless attack on the proletariat; the orientation of the
newspaper changed to an anti-Communist, antipeople, and antisocialist orientation,
that is, a bourgeois orientation. Would “remnants” of bourgeois thinking have been
adequate to this task? What kind of logic is this? A generalized conclusion was
derived from a specific premise; this is the logic of Wenhui bao. To this day Wenhui
bao remains unprepared to criticize the reactionary news reports that flew in the
face of facts and which it has published in huge quantities, or the many reactionary
opinions that it has printed, or the reactionary editing and layout [techniques], large
amounts of which were used [by it] to serve as a tool for the attack on the proletariat.
Xinmin bao is different.29 It has already made quite a number of relatively
conscientious self-criticisms. Xinmin bao committed fewer errors than Wenhui bao,
and as soon as it discovered its errors it conscientiously corrected them. This
demonstrates the sense of responsibility that the reporters and the people in charge
of this newspaper have toward the people’s causes. As far as the readers are
concerned, this newspaper has begun to show initiative. Where has Wenhui bao’s
sense of responsibility gone to? When will you begin to make the attempt to do the
things Xinmin bao has done? Debts must be paid. When will Wenhui bao begin to
pay these debts? It looks as if Xinmin bao’s self-criticism has presented Wenhui
bao with a whole pile of difficult problems. The readers will ask Wenhui bao when
it is going to catch up with Xinmin bao. At the present time, Wenhui bao is in a
completely defensive position. Before Xinmin bao made its self-criticism, it looked


as if Wenhui bao would still be able to muddle along for a while, but since Xinmin
bao made a self-criticism, things have become difficult for Wenhui bao. Passivity
can be turned into initiative—that means taking Xinmin bao as the teacher and
conscientiously following its example.

We now return once more to the term “bourgeois Rightists.” The bourgeois
Rightists are those anti-Communist, antipeople, antisocialist bourgeois reactionaries of whom we have spoken previously. This is a scientific statement that is in
accord with the facts. They are [only] a handful of people who are found among
the democratic parties,30 the intellectuals, the capitalists, and the young students.
They are also found in the Communist Party and the Youth League.31 This has
become apparent during this stormy period. Although their number is extremely
small, in the democratic parties, they do
have strength and cannot be taken lightly. These people not only talk; they also act.
They are guilty. The saying “one who speaks up should not be blamed” doesn’t
apply to them.32 They are not only [“]those who speak[”]; they are actors as well.
Are they to be punished? At present it appears to be unnecessary because the
people’s state is quite secure and among [these bourgeois Rightists] there are many
prominent figures. We can be lenient and not mete out punishment for them. On
the whole, it’s enough to call them “Rightists”; we need not call them reactionaries.
Only under one condition—that is, if they don’t learn from their mistakes after
repeated admonition, if they continue to carry out destructive activities, and to
break the criminal laws will they be punished. Learning from past mistakes to avoid
future ones, curing the illness to save the patient,33 turning negative factors into
positive ones—these principles are still applicable to them. There is another kind
of Rightists—those who speak but don’t act. They speak in the same way as those
described before but they don’t engage in destructive activities. Toward this sort
of people we must be even more lenient. Their erroneous talk must be thoroughly
criticized; there can’t be any holding back. We should, however, allow them to
retain their own views. All of the types of people discussed above will still be
allowed freedom of speech.34 For a great and secure country to keep a small group
such as this around won’t do any harm once the broad masses [of the people] have
understood their errors. It should be understood that the Rightists are those people
who can teach us with [their] negative examples. In this respect, poisonous weeds
have merit. The poisonous weeds have merit precisely because they have poison
and because they have once spread it forth to harm the people.

The Communist Party will continue the rectification. Each democratic party has
also already begun rectification. After the reckless attacks of the Rightists have
been repulsed by the people, it will be possible for rectification to proceed
smoothly.35

Notes

1. See text June 14, 1957.
2. See text June 14, 1957, notes 1 and 3. The results of these “self-examinations” were
published in the article “Wenhui bao bianji bu de chubu jiancha” (The Preliminary Exami-

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 597

nation of the Editorial Board of the Wenhui bao) in RMRB (July 4, 1957), and in the article
“Guangming ribao zai Zhang Bojun, Chu Anping xuangai zhengzhi fangxiang qijian suo
fan cuowu de jiancha” (An Examination of the Mistakes Committed by Guangming ribao
During the Period in which Zhang Bojun and Chu Anping Insidiously Altered Its Political
Orientation), in GMRB (July 15, 1957). See RMSC (1958), pp. 145–149 and 150–156
respectively.
3. Zhang Bojun (b. 1896) was at this time publisher of Guangming ribao. He was
educated in philosophy at Berlin University and joined the faculty of Zhongshan (Sun
Yat-sen) University on his return to China in 1923. In 1926, he became the secretary of
Deng Yanda, the director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary
Army in the Northern Expedition. Later he took part in the August First Insurrection. In 1927
he joined Deng Yanda and others in forming the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua
geming dang) in Shanghai. This was the forerunner of the so-called Third Party and was
renamed the Provisional Action Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1929. In
1938, Zhang was instrumental in forming the Association of Patriots for National Unification
and Construction (Tongyi jianguo tongzhi hui), and in the formation, in 1941, of the League
of Democratic Political Groups, which became, in 1944, the China Democratic League. In
1947, after the disintegration of the Political Consultative Conference of 1946 (see text Sept.
21, 1949, vol. I, note 2), Zhang and others formed the Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic
Party (Zhongguo nonggong minzhu dang) of which Zhang became the chairman. He was
also the first vice-chairman of the Democratic League. He was a member of the CPPCC
Congress in 1954, and minister of transportation from 1954 to 1958. At the time of the CPC
rectification campaign of 1957, he organized a series of criticisms of the CPC, arguing for
the implementation of “Western-style” democracy in the form of a bicameral parliament, a
“political planning” yuan or senate, and the “mutual supervision” between the CPC and other
parties. More specifically, according to Ciyu jianshi, at the forum convened by the United
Front Department of the CPC on May 8, 1957, Zhang was a vocal critic of the CPC’s policies
and called for a separation of Party power from governmental power. He then organized
further criticism with the members of the Democratic League on May 13, and finally
organized an emergency meeting of “Rightist elements” on June 6. Since his main collaborator in these suggestions was Luo Longji, the CPC later labeled these as the creations of
the “Zhang-Luo Alliance.” For more biographical information on Zhang, see Zhonggong
renming lu, pp. 671–673.
4. Chu Anping (b. 1906) was the editor-in-chief of Guangming ribao at this time. He
was a member of the September Third Study Society (Jiusan xueshe)—one of the major
democratic parties—and of the Democratic League. He was a member of the CPPCC and a
delegate from Jiangsu Province to the First National People’s Congress. He had served
variously as editor on Zhongyang ribao (a KMT organ in Nanjing and later in Chongqing)
and professor at Zhengzhi University and Fudan University. He wrote the critical article
“Dang tianxia lun” (On the Nation as the [Private] Domain of the [Communist] Party) in
1957 and was identified as a member of the Zhang-Luo Alliance. In November 1957, he was
relieved of his GMRB post. For more biographical information on Chu, see URI (1969), I,
p. 193.
5. To understand this reference to the ostensibly picayune criticism of newspaper layout,
see text June 14, 1957, note 2.
6. Here, by “this paper,” Mao is referring to RMRB.
7. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 39.
8. Luo Longji (1896–1965) was at this time a chief correspondent of Guangming ribao.
He was educated at Qinghua University and subsequently in the United States and Britain
at the University of Wisconsin, Columbia University (Ph.D. 1928), and the London School
of Economics. He was at one time the editor-in-chief of the Xin yue (New Moon) magazine.
In 1931, he formed, together with Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) the “Rebirth Society,”
which later was reorganized as the Chinese Socialist Party. In 1935 he became the editorin-chief of the Catholic paper Yishi bao in Tianjin. During the War of Resistance period he


taught at Southwestern Associated University in Kunming and left the Chinese Socialist
Party to join the Democratic League. In 1949 he became second vice-chairman of the
Democratic League. He also became the minister of timber industry. In 1957, he became a
vocal critic of the CPC and collaborated with Zhang Bojun in the suggestions for political
change described in note 3. He also suggested that a committee be established under the
NPC and the CPPCC to reexamine the cases of people who had been criticized, purged, or
dismissed, or in any sense labeled as counterrevolutionaries by the CPC. For more biographical information on Luo, see URI (1969), I, pp. 473–474.
9. Pu Xixiu was the wife of Luo Longji. Pu began her journalistic career in the 1930s
as a reporter/distributor for the Xinmin bao in Nanjing (see text April 1957[2], note 46). She
followed the newspaper to Chongqing during the period of the War of Resistance Against
Japan. After the war, she became affiliated with the Democratic League. She also became
an editor/correspondent for Wenhui bao. In 1961 she became the chief correspondent for the
Hong Kong Wenhui bao stationed in Beijing. She was also an alternate member of the Central
Committee of the China Democratic League. Pu was the second of three sisters. Her older
sister, Jiexiu, was a professor of chemistry at Zhongguo daxue (University of China) in
Beijing and a member of the Association for Democratic National Construction (Minzhu
jianguo hui). Her younger sister, Anxiu, was Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai’s wife. During
the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957, Pu Jiexu denounced the “Zhang-Luo Alliance” in spite
of the fact that her sister was married to Luo Longji. For her part, Pu Xixiu was criticized as
a Rightist. It was not until 1959 that the label was removed.
10. The China Democratic League, or CDL (Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng, sometimes
abbreviated as Min meng), was formed under the original name of League of Democratic
Political Groups (Minzhu zhengtuan tongmeng) in 1941 and renamed on September 19,
1944. It was led by Zhang Lan, Shen Junru, Huang Yanpei, Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, Deng
Chumin, etc. (See text Mar. 15, 1950, vol. I, and text June 9, 1957, note 11.) Toward the end
of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the CDL was instrumental in laying the intellectual
foundations for the vision of a multipartisan government for a unified postbellum China.
This became a significant factor in the attempts in 1946 to bring about a negotiated
compromise between the CPC and the KMT. Throughout the stormy years of the Civil War,
the CDL continued to maintain its position on advocating a coalition government—a position
which it had adopted in January 1947 at the Second Plenum of its Central Committee. In
1948, when the CPC appealed to the various political parties to organize a new People’s
Political Consultative Conference, the CDL was one of the first to respond positively. Many
of its members, including people such as Liang Shuming, however, were disappointed at the
military outcome of the Civil War and to the very end hoped to be able to bring about a
peaceful settlement that would result in a coalition government rather than a Communist
regime. This general philosophy persisted, although the CDL, as a body, accepted the
Common Program adopted by the CPPCC in 1949 (see text Sept. 21, 1949, Vol. I, note 3),
which gave the CPC de facto administrative dominance over the state as a whole, if not over
individual political parties. The CDL continued to play an important role in the CPPCC
thereafter. For more on the CDL, see RMSC (1957), pp. 250–252.
11. Although Mao and the CPC seem to be making a blanket indictment of the
Democratic League here, readers should note that the events of 1957 culminated in the
position taken by the Democratic League in which it claimed correctly that it had, within
itself, a struggle between two lines, and that while a substantial part of the CDL membership
and leadership had been swayed by the Zhang-Luo clique, the CDL as a whole had been
able, in the latter half of 1957, to purge itself of the Zhang-Luo influence and rectify itself.
This position was represented by Shi Liang, one of the original founders of the CDL, and
was adopted first in the CDL’s own Report on the Nationwide Rectification Campaign on
September 13, 1957, and again at the CDL’s Conference to Criticize the Zhang-Luo Alliance
held on January 19, 1958.
For some of the claims that the CPC has since made regarding the structural damage
caused by the Zhang-Luo Alliance in such areas as education (i.e., the disbanding of CPC

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 599

Party committees in middle schools and universities) in 1957, see Ciyu jianshi, pp. 67–68.
The documentary sources of these claims made in Ciyu jianshi are not made known, but they
are partially reflected in several CDL-issued essays. For these essays and others mentioned
earlier, see RMSC (1958), pp. 93–108.
12. The Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party, or CPWDP (Zhongguo nonggong
minzhu dang), came from the genealogy of a number of predecessors—the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua geming dang), formed in 1927, which became the Provisional
Action Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo guomindang linshi xingdong
weiyuanhui) in 1929–1930, which became the Chinese Action Committee for National
Liberation (Zhonghua minzu jiefang xingdong weiyuanhui) in 1935, which finally became
the Chinese Peasant-Worker Democratic Party in February 1947. It joined in the formation
of the League of Chinese Political Groups (the forerunner of the Democratic League) in 1941
and became a participatory organization of the CPPCC in 1949. (See note 3.) What is
significant here is that while both Zhang Bojun and Luo Longji were prominent members
of the CDL, Zhang was also the chairman of the CPWDP. In the spring of 1957, the CPWDP
held a National Work Conference at which it expunged from its charter the statements
regarding its acceptance of the leadership of the CPC and the guidelines of Marxism-Lenin-ism. For a review and “self-criticism” of sorts of the CPWDP regarding its actions and
positions in 1957, see RMSC (1958), pp. 123–127. See also text Apr. 1957(2), note 37.
13. See note 11.
14. The term Mao uses here, hu feng huan yu, is derived from the first chapter (hui) of
the classical novel San guo yanyi (Romance of the Three Kingdoms). In its original context
it referred to the magical powers of a mage of the Daoist sect, Zhang Jiao. It has come to
connote the ability, and the tendency, of someone to create a storm in the realm of human
affairs, or to make great and terrible things happen.
15. The expression here, tui tao zuo lang, appears to be a variation of the more common
aphorism tui bo zu lan, which is derived from the chapter “Zhi dao” (The Way of
Governance) in Zhuzi quanshu (The Complete Book of Master Zhu [Xi]). The meaning is
“instead of allaying troubles and calming things down, to abet them and make them even
more serious.” The variation here appears to bear a keener edge than the original, since its
second half, zuo lang, links it to the common saying xing feng zuo lang, meaning “stirring
up waves.”
16. The term for “forming alliances” is chuanlian here. The expression originally
referred to the work that was done by CPC cadres in the 1940s, as the land reform program
was launched in the Shanxi-Chahar-Henan border region (revolutionary base) and in the
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia base area. This emphasized the method of going deep among the
peasant masses, hearing their grievances and sympathizing with their sufferings, “striking
roots and making contacts, or alliances” (zhagen chuanlian), i.e., linking up with the
peasants, especially the poor peasant masses, and then doing ideological mobilization and
education work among them to increase their political awareness and win them over to the
side of land reform. This term, especially as in the full form zhagen chuanlian, became very
popular during the Cultural Revolution, at the height of which many Red Guard groups were
roaming the country “making revolution.” These were mobile and unstable groups of people,
and zhagen chuanlian became a euphemism for their itinerant style of political action; since
they were fairly rootless, they considered themselves primarily in terms of “sinking roots”
among the masses. Meanwhile, their work of propagating and expanding the Cultural
Revolution was seen (by the participants) as an effort in the revolutionary education of the
masses (especially the rural, peasant masses), thus connecting them historically to the zhagen
chuanlian types of the 1930s and 1940s. The meaning in the document here, however, is not
quite as laudatory and positive. Mao seems to be using it to refer to clandestine and covert
alliance forming.
17. This refers to the meetings held on May 16, 1957, and June 24, 1957, respectively. Both meetings were convened in Beijing by the Research Department of the
All-China Journalistic Workers’ Association and the journalism departments of Beijing


University and the People's University. (The second meeting was sponsored also by the
journalism department of Fudan University.) The first was attended by journalists from
Beijing, Shanghai, Liaoning, and Shanxi. The second was attended by journalists from
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei, and Liaoning. The nature and outcome of the two
meetings were drastically different. At the first meeting, the control of the CPC over its
own papers and its dominant influence over other papers and magazines, the monopolization of the Xinhua News Agency "for purposes of class struggle directed by the
Communist Party," and the absence of autonomy for the non-CPC organs were severely
criticized. At the second meeting, it was the positions taken by the first meeting that
were reversed and repudiated. The "bourgeois ideology in the journalistic front" was
criticized. Hence Mao's characterization here of "negation" and "negation of the
negation." Mao is obviously stretching out the philosophical meaning of these terms
somewhat. For a description of the philosophical significance of these terms, see text
Jan. 1957, note 25.
18. This line, heiyun ya cheng cheng yu cui, is derived from the poem "Yanmen taishou
xing" (Ballad of the Governor of Yanmen) by the Tang-dynasty poet Li He, describing the
precarious conditions of a border fortress besieged by invading forces. Here Mao is reflecting
on his own description of the situation in the spring of 1957, contained in the last sentence
of the preceding paragraph.
19. Mao might have been referring to a self-criticism that was held as a discussion. The
results of such a self-criticism, as far as we can tell, were not published until July 4. (See
note 2.) This is reinforced by Mao's next statement here that the Wenhui bao's editorial on
June 14 defended itself rather than admitted its "error."
20. See text June 8, 1957(3), note 3.
21. See Mao's criticism of RMRB, in text April 1957(1).
22. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.
23. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 38.
24. See text June 8, 1957(2), paragraph 2, middle section.
25. On this subject of people feeling that they were, or fearing that they might be, trapped
by their "contending," see text surrounding text April 1957(2), note 9.
26. The Chinese terms that Mao uses here are wangguo and gongchan. The first of these
phrases literally means to lose one's country, and generally refers to the state of a people
whose country has been conquered by another. Here Mao seems sarcastically to be referring
to the losing (on the part of the bourgeoisie) of control over the state. Gongchan is the term
for communism. Here Mao again seems somewhat sarcastic and seems to be referring not
to "communism" itself, but to the bourgeoisie's fearful image of communism, that is, forced
egalitarianism and sharing of property, or communization, through the method of confiscation. See also text June 15, 1953, vol. I, note 6.
27. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 29.
28. On June 6, 1957, Zhang Bojun convened a meeting at the CPPCC's Cultural
Club which was attended by six academicians, all of whom were leading members of
the Democratic League. They were Zeng Chaolun (deputy minister of higher education),
Fei Xiaotong (deputy director of the Central Institute of Ethnic Studies; see text July
1957, note 23), Huang Yaomian (professor at the Beijing Normal University), Wu
Jingchao (professor at the People's University), Tao Dayong (professor at Beijing
Normal University), and Qian Weizhang (vice-president of Qinghua University). For
descriptions of this meeting, see Zhonggong renming lu, p. 672, and Ciyu jianshi, p.
70. The "anti-Rightist" struggle was launched, in a way, two days after this meeting
was held, on June 8, by the publication of the RMRB editorial "What Is This For?" (See
text June 8, 1957).
29. See text April 1957(2), note 46.
30. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
31. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.
32. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 4; see also text June 9, 1957, note 2.

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 601

33. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.
34. See text June 9, 1957, paragraph 9.
35. See text June 8, 1957(2), paragraph 2, last section.