Interjections at a Meeting During the Qingdao Conference
(July 17, 1957)

Source: Wansui (n.d. 3), pp. 192–194.

In the source, this document and the original for text July 18, 1957, as well as text
July 20, 1957, are put together under one heading: Interjections During the Qingdao
Conference. The source indicates that this meeting (perhaps a session of the conference) was held in the afternoon on July 17, 1957. For more on the Qingdao
Conference and its historical importance, and the significance of this and the
following two documents, see text July 1957(1) (“The Situation in the Summer”),
source note.

The Rightists are actually reactionaries. We don’t call them reactionaries, but call
them Rightists instead so as to polarize them more easily.
This year, there was a 1.7 raise, and 0.7 in reserve.1
We are now trying to pass this third gate.2 It will take at least ten more years to
pass this third gate. From history we have inherited a batch of bastards.3 All the
way here [they] have been beating the gongs and the drums.4 What [they say about]
supporting [us] for seven years was all a falsehood; now, at this juncture, they are
cocking their tails.5 Every year, when we convene the people’s congress, or the
political consultative conference meetings,6 we always have to deal with them in
one way or another. When it comes to passing legislation, they all raise their hands;
then, when they go down to make inspections, they find faults, and also promote
organized activities. We expected that at any time some of them would rebel, but
all along we had found no method to expose them. Now that we have proposed

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 639
handling the contradictions among the people,7 and with the rectification, the
leaders of the Rightist elements have cocked up their tails and [come out] opposing
communism and opposing socialism. When you beat down the Monkey King’s tail,
the monkeys on Huaguo Mountain will not be so cocky.8 [We should, therefore,]
grab [them] and reform [them], so as to shift gradually the power of leadership into
the hands of the Leftists and the people who are to the Left of center. In the basic
levels of every province and municipality, [we must] take over the leadership power
that was in the [hands of] the democratic parties9 and the educational circles. We
can give some thought to implementing a Party committee system in the schools,
but we absolutely must lead in the schools. In the past, the power of leadership was
not consolidated; some of the leadership power was in the hands of others, and we
lacked the power of combat, and for a time things were really topsy-turvy. For
example, in Qinghua University, the Party members and the [Communist] Youth
League made up 80 per cent [of the student body].10 The Party’s leadership,
however, was not consolidated. In scientific and technological circles, in the circles
of journalism, of literature and art, of publishing, and even in athletics and sports
and public health circles, there are people on the Left, in the center, and on the
Right. If we do not occupy the leadership roles in [these] battlefield positions, we
won’t be able to promote [a relationship with the] intellectuals. In the past, we
promoted the Five Major Movements and the Three Major Transformations,11 but
we didn’t do so well with the educational circles. In the past, the provincial [Party]
secretaries were afraid of seeing the university professors, but now they have [had
a chance to] see them for a bit and something describable has come out of that.
When we have groped around for a bit more time, things will become even clearer.
Both the enemy and ourselves are not quite on the mark in assessing the political
situation. The enemy, on his side, has miscalculated the political situation; and our
own assessment of ourselves has not been quite accurate. During the period of
contending and blooming,12 [we] felt that our strength was a bit too small, with
regard to the workers, peasants and soldiers—our basic estimate was on the low
side. From the current perspective, among the workers, peasants, Party [members],
and Youth League members, only a few [people] are watery.13 the majority are
good. We, too, were confused by false appearances.
Every time there is a people’s congress or a [meeting of the] political consultative conference, there has to be a struggle. In name, [the Rightists] are on the stage
sharing the political power, and in general they are [supposed to be] following us,
but in fact they are reactionaries, and [their] support is false. When last year, after
the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU,14 we proposed the “Two Hundreds” guideline,15 and then, on top of that, there was the Hungarian Incident,16 they began to
cock their tails. The first ones to perceive the problem were several comrades,
including XXX.17 [They] said that while it was all right to let a hundred flowers
bloom, the [actual] blooming was not so reassuring, and some demons and ogres
had come out of the blooming.18 After Zhou Enlai came back in February, Luo
Longji publicly criticized the premier’s report on foreign relations; that was
unheard of.19 To top it off, there was trouble in several schools, factories, and
cooperatives in the countryside. Then [people] thought the situation was getting


out of hand. In fact, there were just a few people. Even in the universities, nine
fingers remained good; only one went rotten.20 It took only a month or so of the
anti-Rightist [campaign] to get this all out in the open. If we estimated that about
20 per cent of the democratic parties21 [were bad], there were still 80 per cent. In
six or seven months, we will become completely clear about this. All things must
be analyzed; if you analyze, you have a [solid] bottom [to fall back on,] and then
our minds will be at ease.
The enemy also overestimated his own strength, while underestimating the
workers and peasants, and the Leftists. In this the Rightists are like us. It would not
be possible to instigate a Hungary here in China. [As to] blooming and letting go,22
we should still be resolved [about it] or else you just can’t have things [really]
bloom.
In addition, we must take hold of broadcasting, the telephones, telegram and
posts, and telecommunications; we must not allow the democratic parties to
develop [those things]. [As for the] democratic parties, we must take hold of the
Rightists among them and hit [at them] firmly, and, in the midst of the hitting,
establish leadership authority. [We should] take hold of this period and tackle it for
a year. If we get to June next year when there is a reelection of the National People’s
Congress, then, at that time, even if we renominated them, [i.e., the Rightists,] they
would be embarrassed themselves.23 Through the course of opposing the Rightists,
[the membership of the National People’s Congress] is bound to switch over in
substantial numbers. In the localities, political reorganization must begin early next
year, and by March, all the provinces should have done a good job of [preparing
for] the reelection. Our estimate is to hit for a year. However, it is not good to keep
blowing this, and in such a concentrated way, in the newspapers. There are other
things we must do and promote. Although there are many Rightists, the leaders
have already been hit. In striking at the Rightists, the main thing to do is to hit the
leaders. When the leaders are hit, the [rest] will not find it easy to make trouble.
Later we can adopt a policy of [“]peeling the bamboo shoot.[”]24
With regard to some people, such as XXX, XXX, XXX, and XXX, how shall
we hit them?25 XXX is opposed to the people26 but does not openly oppose
communism. He doesn’t make trouble, but he would not change his diehard ways
[either]. Although the Rightists are small in numbers, we must not underestimate
them; with regard to the Rightists, we must peel the bamboo shoot.
The majority among the intellectuals are not Marxists,27 and would not have
much feeling for socialism and the cause of the workers and peasants. However,
they have all these kinds of tendencies. As long as they lean [toward the Left] for
a bit today, and a bit [more] tomorrow, in ten years’ time they will be reformed. A
proposal came from Shandong [Province]: We must do propaganda work with
regard to the anti-Rightist matters among the workers and the peasants. The
landlords and the bourgeoisie all appear to be speaking on behalf of the workers
and the peasants; we must talk about how the Rightists attacked, and how we have
grabbed a batch of Rightists (such as Luo Yiqun in Guangdong [Province]).28
With regard to workers, peasants, and handicraft workers, in general we should
not put the hat of Rightists on them.29

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 641

Is there any hope for cooperativization? There are these well-to-do middle
peasants30 who we had hoped would join the cooperatives slowly and gradually,
but [they joined in a rush, and] we couldn’t have kept them back if we wanted to.
Then when they have joined, [they say] they want to withdraw. Should we allow
them to withdraw? From the perspective of the class line, the small number who
do not wish to be in the cooperatives can be allowed to withdraw. In Linyi Special
District in Shandong [Province], of a million or so households, about ten thousand
withdrew.31 In the past, [that area] had the greatest number of incidences of trouble;
now it is a relatively peaceful place in terms of the province’s [condition]. Don’t
make fun of those who withdraw, and don’t put the hat of Rightists on them. Let
them come [in] later if they wish. In general, those who want to withdraw make up
1 per cent. [Let us] permit those who are willing to withdraw to withdraw; [let’s]
make that our resolution for this autumn, and [let’s] see how [things work out].
How are we going to carry out the rectification in the countryside and in the
factories? We must collect the problems and questions that need to be resolved,
and prepare some opinions. The Central Committee intends to hold a plenum on
August 15, with the [special] district secretaries taking part, to study the problem
of rectification and of the system.32 The Party Congress can be held at the end of
January or February before the Spring Holiday.33
[That people] have the responsibility but not the authority, [the problems of] the
personnel system, and [the problem of] assessing grades and assessing salaries34
are all problems of a political nature, problems of adjusting relationships.
From now on, in the anti-Rightist struggle, we have to hang on to just two words:
“deep” and “transformation.” Internally we must be gentle; toward the enemy we
must be firm and relentless. In the [special] district committee in Xuzhou,35 [for
example], 50 per cent of the basic-level cadres are good. The remaining 50 per cent
can be divided into three categories: Those with light and minor mistakes make up
20 per cent; those with somewhat more serious mistakes and whose hands are not
clean make up 29 per cent; and only 1 per cent are people who have seriously
violated the law and breached discipline. For the first two types they can get
downstairs of their own accord.36 The method would be to hold a few cadres’
meetings to affirm accomplishments and review shortcomings. What is correctly
handling contradictions among the people?37 It’s nothing but the words “mass
line.”38 It simply means that we must never be divorced from the masses, we must
listen to the masses’ opinions, and analyze them. It’s just like swimming; you must
go with the nature of the water. Or one could say this must be like the relationship
of fish to water.39 If the cadre is divorced from the masses, he would not be able to
live. In the past, in the war, among the armed forces we promoted the Three Great
Democracies; why can’t we promote the Three Great Democracies40 in the factories
and in the countryside now? The troops held guns in their hands, and yet they didn’t
damage the cadres’ prestige. Why can’t the xian, district, and xiang cadres [today]
do the same? With regard to the cadres, we must support on the one hand and help
on the other. Mistakes have to be corrected, but we also don’t want to harm the
cadres. Let everyone do a bit of criticism, and then, with one self-criticism, they
should be able to pass the gate. We should teach the basic-level cadres how to pass


the gate. In the countryside and the factories, we cannot adopt the methods in the
urban organizations and the schools; rather, we must adopt the methods of [holding]
three-level [joint] cadres’ meetings, cooperative members’ representatives’ meetings, [Party] branch congresses as well as workers and staff congresses, and so on.
That is, we would use the method [proposed by] Comrade Chen Boda.41 At the
beginning, when Chen Boda promoted his ways in Fujian (Province), the district
and xiang cadres all disapproved; later, however, the majority of cadres got elected.
Elections must not call for guarantees for Party members or Youth League members; what is needed is full and complete fermentation, with the masses making the
nominations. Each province may promote some experience [in this regard].
Factory cadres must go down to the workshops and even to the [workers’]
dormitories [to observe and gain experience].
The relationship between cadres and the masses ought to be a relationship of
reasoning, not [one of] my hitting you and you feeling pain42 or my suppressing
and your submitting; the result of carrying out democracy would be to enhance
[our] prestige, not lower it. In the past, when democracy was carried out in the
armed forces, we won the war.
Where there is virulent counterrevolution, it must be suppressed. Where the
suppression and purging of counterrevolutionaries has not been thorough, we will
have to kill a few people. [When we said] execute fewer people we did not mean
not executing anyone altogether.43 To execute a few people is absolutely necessary.
In the two xian of Xianju and Linhai in Zhejiang [Province], 80 per cent of the
cooperatives were disbanded, and they are preparing to have a million people make
trouble each year—or maybe they should prepare for a bit even more.44 In Changge
xian in Henan [Province], when they built an airport, the peasants were driven
away, and four people were killed.45 This is a remnant of the work style of the
Kuomintang. Some remnants of the work style of the Kuomintang are [in fact quite]
in conformity with realities, [but] we must absolutely rectify [the situation] well,
even though it will take a process to thoroughly rectify well. The rectification this
time—[some] hope to rectify things and set them straight all in one stroke, to settle
the problems once and for all; I don’t believe that can be done. Now we should
expand [our estimates of] the numbers [of people] who are going to make trouble.
Out of 600 million people, we are prepared that each year three million will make
trouble. After the Rightists have made these troubles in these few years, we’ll get
to the bottom, and we’ll no longer have anything to fear. There will be a period
of instability in the transitional period; if we can stabilize the social order generally
in another five and a half years’ time, that would be good. We must always trust
the majority among the masses; what Chen Boda spoke of is not a narrow
experience.

Notes

1. We have not been able to determine what Mao’s frame of reference was here when
he spoke of a “raise” and a “reserve.”
2. On the subject of “passing the gate,” see text June 23, 1950, vol. I, note 8.

JULY – SEPTEMBER 1957 / 643

3. The phrase here is wangba dan. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 25.
4. The phrase here is qiao luo da gu. See text Oct. 13, 1957, notes 7 and 9.
5. See text June 14, 1956, vol. I, note 13.
6. Here Mao appears to be referring to the convening of meetings of these organizations
at the local levels, not just at the national level. The political consultative conference
meetings would be of local chapters of the CPPCC. For the national CPPCC, see text Sept.
21, 1949, vol. I, source note.
7. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note and note 3.
8. Huaguo Mountain (Huaguo shan), or Mountain of Flowers and Fruits, was the place
of origin, of sorts, of the character Monkey King of the classical allegorical novel, Xi you ji
(Journey to the West). The name given for the character in the text here is Sun xing zhe (Sun
the Acarin, or Monk-Acolyte; see text July 9, 1957, note 74); the character is also known by
his name, Sun Wukong. See text Sept. 16–18, 1953, vol. I, note 21, and text May–June 1955,
vol. I, note 7. See also text April 25, 1956, note 40, text July 8, 1957, note 12, and text July
9, 1957, note 74. In the first two chapters of the novel, Sun is described as a puckish, unruly
demon spirit that took the form of a monkey and made himself lord and master of a population
of apes and monkeys at Huaguo Mountain. He is later subdued by the Buddhist “Goddess”
(Bodhisattva) Guanyin, who sends him on the journey as a protector of Xuanzhuang the
Monk. Here Mao is alluding to how the rambunctious intellectuals, as leaders of an unruly
crowd, must also be subdued and tamed so as to be made useful for the socialist cause.
9. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1. See also text April 30, 1957, passim.
10. On the Communist Youth League, see text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74. However, Mao’s
estimate of the preponderance of Communist Party members and Communist Youth League
members within the student body of Qinghua University appears exaggerated.
11. On the “Five Major Movements,” see text Oct. 9, 1957, note 5. On the “Three Major
Transformations,” see text Oct. 23, 1951, vol. I.
12. See text Autumn 1956, note 3.
13. The phrase Mao uses here is shao shu shui. We are unable to pinpoint Mao’s meaning
for shui.
14. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.
15. This refers to the guideline of “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools
contend.” See text Autumn 1956, note 3.
16. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.
17. We are not certain who XXX stands for.
18. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.
19. See text July 1, 1957, note 8. See also text Oct. 13, 1957, note 143.
20. See text Jan. 27, 1957(2), note 26.
21. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
22. The word here is fang, which has a dual meaning of “blooming” (as in bai hua qi
fang) and “letting go” (as opposed to “pulling in the reins,” or shou). On the latter meaning,
see text Mar. 12, 1957, paragraph 14; text April 10, 1957, note 1; text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note
81, and text April 1957(2), notes 4 and 17.
23. The Fifth Session of the First National People’s Congress would be held February
1–11, 1958.
24. The phrase here, which Mao continues to use often in the remainder of 1957, is bo
sun zhengce. A young bamboo shoot has many layers, and a “peeling the bamboo shoot”
policy would be one of exposing things layer by layer.
25. We are not certain who these Xs stand for. However, it is quite possible that Mao
was thinking of Zhang Bojun, Luo Longji, and others in Zhang’s group. See text July 1,
1957, notes 3 and 28.
26. Again, while we are uncertain about this, one might hazard to suggest that XXX may
stand for either Zhang Bojun or Luo Longji.
27. See text Mar. 12, 1957, note 6.
28. We have not been able to find information on Luo Yiqun.


29. See text Dec. 8, 1956, note 33, on the usage of “wearing hats” or “putting a hat on
someone.”
30. See text Mar. 20, 1957(1), note 20.
31. Linyi is in southern Shandong Province.
32. As far as we can tell, Mao’s expectation that the CPC Central Committee would hold
a plenum in August 1957 was not realized. The Third Enlarged Plenum of the Eighth Central
Committee of the CPC was held, however, September 20–October 9, 1957. See text July
1957(1), note 43. This is not the first time that Mao had expressed an anticipation of the
plenum in his writings. See text Mar. 1, 1957, note 37.
33. The Spring Holiday ( _chunjie_ ) or Spring Festival is the New Year’s Day ( _yuan dan_ )
of the lunar calendar.
34. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 1, and text Mar. 18, 1957, note 76.
35. Xuzhou is in the northern part of Jiangsu Province, where Jiangsu shares a border
with Shandong.
36. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 51 for the meaning of “going downstairs.”
37. See text Feb. 27, 1957, source note and note 3.
38. See text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7; text May 2, 1956, source note; and text Nov.
15, 1956, note 45. See also text April 1957(2), text surrounding note 21; text July 1957(1),
note 7; and text July 8, 1957, note 57.
39. See text July 8, 1957(2), note 74.
40. See text July 1957(1), note 27.
41. See text Nov. 18, 1954, vol. I, note 1, and text Jan. 11, 1958, note 32.
42. Here the Chinese character _tong_ (through) may be a typographical error, where Mao
intended to use the homophone _tong_ (hurt, or pain).
43. Mao is referring to the policy on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in
1951. See text May 8, 1951, vol. I.
44. Xianju and Linhai are in the southeastern part of Zhejiang Province. They are about
30 km apart from each other.
45. Changge _xian_ is in central Henan Province, approximately 15 km north of Xuchang.