Organize Our Forces to Counter the
Reckless Attacks of the Rightists
(June 8, 1957)

Source: Xuanji, V, pp. 431–433. Available English Translation: SW, V, pp.
448–450.

This is, according to the Xuanji source (p. 431), an intra-CPC directive drafted
by Mao on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC. For more detail on the issue
of the attacks made by the “Rightist” elements on the CPC at this time—attacks which
apparently prompted Mao’s rather severe indictment here—see text July 1, 1957. In
particular, it appears that it was mainly the actions of a group of intellectuals led by
Zhang Bojun (see text July 1, 1957, source note, note 3, and note 27) that precipitated
this counteraction on Mao’s part. According to information from Ciyu jianshi (p.
209), Zhang’s group held an emergency meeting on June 6, resolving on a platform
of bringing the criticism of the CPC’s policies into the colleges and universities.
In addition to the timing, the importance of this document is that here (probably
for the first time openly and explicitly), Mao called for the democratic parties each
to hold its own meeting to undertake rectification. In other words, Mao is demanding
that the rectification campaign, which had been largely intended as a CPC campaign
(with the participation of people outside the CPC only on a voluntary basis, as
declared by the CPC Central Committee’s directive on April 27—see RMSC [1958],
p. 29, section 3, last paragraph—and possibly with “the help of” people in the
democratic parties), should now be expanded to a wider campaign in which people
in the democratic parties would themselves become targets to be rectified. (See text
May 15, 1957, source note and note 31, and text Mar. 12, 1957, source note.) In light
of the fact that we find no evidence of this being discussed on these terms at a series


of forums (zuotanhui), convened by the United Front Department of the Central
Committee of the CPC, in which the leaders of the democratic parties took part (see
RMSC [1958], p. 30), and that these meetings were held over a whole month's time,
from May 8 to June 3, we are led to the distinct impression that Mao had decided not
to wait for the overly optimistically anticipated results to emerge out of these forums,
but to move ahead of the others in the Central Committee in making the demand
(proposal) included in this document. The fact that his proposal is quite specific in
the steps to be taken suggests that Mao had already given the matter thought for some
time. Furthermore, Mao made it clear that whereas the CPC rectification had been
intended to combat bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism, the rectification
to take place in the democratic parties and among the people at large was to combat
bourgeois ideas.

Approximately fifteen days are enough time for the great contending and
blooming¹ in the [state] organs at the provincial and municipal levels and in the
institutions of higher learning. The reactionaries are making reckless attacks. The
wavering elements among the members of the Party and the League either have
betrayed [us] or are vacillating and thinking about betraying [us]. The activist
elements and middle-of-the-roaders among the broad masses of the Party and
League membership are rising up to oppose them.² They are using big-character
posters as a weapon; both sides are gaining experience in the struggle, and their
members are getting tempered. The number of reactionary elements is no more
than a few per cent; the most active fanatic elements are no more than 1 per cent.
Therefore they are nothing to be afraid of. We mustn't be frightened by a brief
period in which the sky seems dark and gloomy. The reactionaries will go to
factories and schools other than their own to carry on their activities, so we must
make preparations beforehand to prevent their entry. We should convene meetings
of principal cadres and veteran workers in the plants to explain that there are some
bad capitalists, bad intellectuals, and reactionaries in society who are in the process
of making reckless attacks on the working class and the Communist Party and who
are seeking to overthrow the political power led by the working class. They must
remember not to fall into their trap. If some people want to instigate [trouble], they
should be barred from entry [into the factory or school]. If they put up reactionary
slogans in the streets, the masses should be mobilized to tear them down. The
workers should see the overall situation clearly and should not make trouble.
Questions of welfare and wages should not be brought up in this period so that we
can deal with the reactionaries in unison.

Please pay attention to the reckless attacks by the reactionaries within the
various democratic parties.³ Each party should be organized to hold its own forums⁴
in which Leftists, middle-of-the-roaders, and Rightists all participate so that correct
as well as incorrect opinions are all exposed. Reporters should be sent to report on
them. We should tactfully prompt the Leftists and the middle-of-the-roaders to
make statements to counterattack the Rightists. This should be quite effective. Each
party newspaper should prepare several dozen essays to be published one after
another once the high tide [of Rightist attacks] in that area begins to recede. We
should pay attention to organizing the middle-of-the-roaders and Leftists to write
articles, but until the tide recedes, the party newspapers should not publish many

APRIL — JUNE 1957 / 563

articles representing the correct view.5 (They may publish some articles by middle-of-the-roaders.) The masses must be allowed to make rebuttals in big-character
posters. Meetings of professors should be organized in institutions of higher
learning to make suggestions to the Party, and, as much as possible, the Rightists
should be made to spit out all their poison and have it published in the newspapers.
Let them make speeches to the students, and let the students freely express their
attitudes. It would be best to let the reactionary professors, lecturers, teaching
assistants, and students spit out their poison and pour out everything they have to
say. They are the best teachers. At the appropriate time, we must promptly organize
separate group meetings for members of the Party and the League to distinguish
between different criticisms; [we will] accept those that are of a constructive nature
and will correct our own mistakes and shortcomings, whereas those criticisms that
are of a destructive nature we will refute. At the same time we should organize
some non-Party personages to lecture, to speak for the correct side. Afterward,
somebody holding a responsible position in the Party who is of fairly high prestige
can make an analytical and persuasive speech to change the atmosphere completely. A month or so should be sufficient to complete the entire process if we do
things well. Afterward we can shift to a [“]gentle breezes and mild rain[”] type of
rectification within the Party.6

This is a great political struggle and ideological struggle. Only by thus doing
will our Party be able to assume the initiative, train capable people, educate the
masses, and isolate the reactionaries, putting them on the defensive. In the past
seven years we have taken the initiative in form, but in reality in at least half of the
cases the initiative was phony. The reactionaries faked surrender, and many of the
middle-of-the-road people did not submit to us willingly. But now the situation has
begun to change. We find ourselves defensive in form, but actually we have begun
to take the initiative because we are undertaking rectification seriously. The heads
of the reactionaries have become so inflated that they are extremely reckless; they
seem to be extremely active, but because they’ve overstepped themselves, they’ve
begun to lose the support of the people and have begun to find themselves on the
defensive. Different conditions prevail in different locations; you can apply your
tactics and make your arrangements flexibly.

In any case, this is a great battle. (The battlefield is within the Party as well as
outside it.) If we don’t win this fight, we won’t be able to complete the building of
socialism, and moreover, there is some risk of a “Hungarian Incident” emerging.7
In taking the initiative to launch a rectification campaign now, we are taking the
initiative to [artificially] induce a potential “Hungarian Incident.” We are fragment-ing it and letting it take place and be handled in individual organizations and
schools; we can fragment it into many small “Hungarys.” Moreover, [then] the
Party and the government basically won’t be corrupted and put into disarray; only
a small part will be corrupted and put into disarray (it is just fine for this part to be
corrupted and put in disarray, [it will be like] squeezing the pus out of an abscess),
and this will be extremely beneficial. It was unavoidable. Since there are still
reactionary elements in society, since the middle-of-the-road elements have not yet
learned the lesson that they are now being taught, and since the Party has not yet


received the kind of tempering it is now undergoing, one of these days there surely
would be trouble.
Currently the domestic situation is excellent. We are able to hold together firmly
the workers, the peasants, the Party, the government, the armed forces, and the
majority of students with us. The international situation is very good; the United
States is in a difficult position.8

Notes

1. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.
2. This refers to the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League; see text May
15, 1957, note 4, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74, for the latter.
3. See text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1.
4. A different set of forums, convened by the CPC Central Committee’s United Front
Department, had been held May 8–June 3. See source note.
5. Mao is responding here to the fact that newspaper articles, such as those in Wenhui
bao, had been the chief vehicles for the “bourgeois intellectuals’” attacks on the CPC. See
text July 1, 1957, middle section of paragraph 6.
6. See text Aug. 24, 1956(2), note 29. This paragraph here forecasts the last paragraph
of text July 1, 1957.
7. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.
8. Mao may be referring here to the mounting pressure that the U.S. government was
experiencing from its European allies and Japan on the issue of trading with the PRC. This
pressure had been increasing through March and April 1957. On April 18, Britain’s Foreign
Affairs Under-Secretary Ian Harvey told the House of Commons that Britain would “act on
its own economic interests to bring into line varying trade restrictions with Communist China
and with the USSR.” This forced the U.S. government to announce on April 20 that it had
proposed a review of trade policies “in an effort to meet the views of . . . allies.” It reiterated,
however, that the U.S. would continue its unilateral embargo on all trade with the PRC. In
May, a special NATO committee was formed to discuss the issue. Afterward, at the end of
May, Britain announced a policy to modify its restrictions on exports to the PRC. This
prompted statements of disappointment from the U.S. State Department, and from President
Eisenhower at a press conference on June 5. For more information, see F. Schurmann
(1974), pp. 259–265.