Conversation with Japanese Delegates of the Special Committee
on the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations
(April 21, 1957)

Source: “Mo Takuto shuseki to-no kaidan hokoku” (A Report on a Conversation
with Chairman Mao Zedong), in Nihon Shakai-to ho-chu shinzen shisutsu-dan
hokoku-sho (Report of the Japanese Socialist Party’s Delegation of a Friendly Visit
to China), published by the Special Committee on the Normalization of Sino-Jap-anese Relations of the Japanese Socialist Party and the International Bureau of the
Japanese Socialist Party (n.p., May 1957).

The delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party, led by Asanuma Inejiro, the General
Secretary of the Party, visited China from April 10 to April 22, 1957. The meeting reported
here took place on the evening of April 21, (from 10:30 P.M. to midnight), at Qinzhengdian,
Zhongnanhai, Beijing. Present at this meeting, on the Chinese side, were also Zhou Enlai,
Zhang Xiruo, Xu Deheng, Ye Jizhuang, Liao Chengzhi, Qiao Guanhua, Lei Renmin, and
Xiao Xiangqian.
There is no Chinese translation or version of this conversation. We also know of no full
report in English on this conversation. It was briefly reported in the press release “Mao
Considers PRC-Japan Peace Pact,” in Kyodo (Tokyo) (April 22, 1957, noon edition). This
press release is translated in FBIS, Daily Report (April 22, 1957), LLL 1–2. An abbreviated
transcript of this conversation, containing only the dialogue between Mao and Asanuma,
the leader of the Japanese delegation, is also found in the book Nit-chu no kokko-kaifuku
(The Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations), pp. 120–139. This last information is
provided for us by Helmut Martin, our German collaborator; no further publication data
of the book has been provided. For a joint communiqué issued by the Zhongguo renmin
waijiao xuehui (Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Relations) and the Japanese
Socialist Party’s delegation during this vist, see RMSC (1958), pp. 421–422.

Mao: How many of you are here for the first time?
Sada: About five of us have been in China before.
Mao: Then, we are old friends. I have been aware of the name of Mr. Asanuma,
the head of the delegation, for some time.
Asanuma: At the general meeting of the Socialist Party in January, we resolved
that there are not two Chinas, and that Japan must restore normal diplomatic
relationships with China. Ever since we came to your country on the twelfth day
of this month, we have met and talked with various people, and visited many places.
I thank you for your hospitality.
Chairman Mao’s autobiography¹ and essays are being published in Tokyo. I was
deeply moved by reading your autobiography. Although Japan has carried out
reforms for democratization, I regret to say that it is still under American control.
We are determined to work hard, and will soon assume control of [our] government

APRIL – JUNE 1957 / 491
[for ourselves]. Since we [are bound to] employ democratic and peaceful means,
the task is an arduous one.
Mao: I thank you, and welcome you all.
Asanuma: We have exchanged views with [the Chinese people] since [April]
12, and believe that we have learned what we wanted.2 [The head of the delegation
introduced its members to Mao].3
Mao: I agree with your opinion. We can be called friends. Many of your ideas
found in the [Socialist] Party’s platform are in agreement with our views. It is
imperative that China and Japan should maintain friendly relations, and it is
important to assert that there is only one China.
Are there any problematic views in Japan that argue there are two Japans?
Japan must recover Okinawa.4
Another point on which we agree with you is that Asian and African countries
must be united.
The Japanese Socialist Party is a powerful force. The principles of the socialist
parties in Asia, such as in Burma, India, and the Arab nations, do not completely
coincide with those of the social democratic parties of Western Europe. [The
principles of] the Asian parties are more correct than those of European parties.
Therefore, your assertions can obtain approval from a wide range of peoples
overseas.5 The day will inevitably come when you take over your own government.
Please fight for that goal.
Asanuma: I would like to ask your views on two or three points. First of all, we
have learned that our thoughts on Japan’s restoring normal relations with China
are mostly shared by the Chinese. Japan is under American control; there are
American military bases there. We have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
These are the obstacles to the recovery of normal diplomatic relations with your
country. Upon our return to Japan, we would like to initiate a national movement
toward full independence. We wish to state that the Taiwan problem is a Chinese
concern and needs to be resolved by the Chinese.
We have been to Badaling today to see the Great Wall.6 Since it was tiresome
to climb with shoes, I took them off. Only then did I manage to reach the top. My
point is that a goal can be achieved, if efforts are exerted.
Mao: I agree with you completely. The peak that cannot be climbed with your
shoes on can be conquered if you take them off. The Taiwan issue is a difficult one.
It may take a long time before this problem is solved. This is an obstacle confronting
both China and Japan. It may be unavoidable that [progress] be delayed. We must
exert our efforts [to make progress], but at the same time we should be prepared
for the delay. In Taiwan affairs, the problem is not with Chiang Kai-shek, but with
the United States. Japan’s difficulty is also [the presence of] the United States. The
questions concerning relationships with the United States should be tackled not
regionally but on a worldwide scale. The United States has established a network
of military bases throughout Japan. They have bases not only in Japan but in many
other places of the world. If Japan wishes to get rid of these military bases, you
need friends and assistance from all quarters.
Japan is a powerful nation—Japan can win independence first. Japan is one of


the ten or so industrialized nations of the world. China is not yet one of them.
Neither is India. Our nation is not yet industrialized. [Unlike us,] a nation like Japan
can never be under foreign rule for a long time.
China’s strength can be increased, but not right away. However, we are hopeful.
China’s growth in strength should be of benefit to Japan. China’s capacity for trade
has not yet developed. Being a poor nation, what commodities do we have to trade
with Japan? After, say, seven, eight, or ten years, it may become possible for China
to do a greater amount of trade with Japan. We may be able to ask for Japan’s
cooperation in developing Chinese mines, for example.
Zhou [Enlai]: That can be done soon, if Japan can break away from the trade
embargo, (i.e., the Cocom restrictions.)7 The question here is of course the attitude
of the United States.
Mao: It would be fine if Japan could provide the capital and develop Chinese
mines, and promises to hand back the mines to the Chinese after some years. This
way, China could provide coal and iron ore [to Japan].
Asanuma: Japan is also under American control on the economic front. This
must be taken into consideration. We are now buying from the United States coal,
iron, rice, and soybeans. We would like to realize the economic exchange between
Japanese industries and China as soon as possible.
Mao: Japan has advanced industrial and agricultural technologies, while China
is rich in natural resources. If we can cooperate, both nations can prosper by all
means. I hope for that day to come as soon as possible.
States must cost more than buying from China, correct?
Sada: Not necessarily. [However,] we wish to engage in long-term, stable trade
at proper prices. We wish to persuade the public that trading with China is more
profitable.
Mao: If Chinese products are more expensive, there won’t be any buyers.
Asanuma: Change is gradually taking place in the thinking of Japanese capitalists. There is a rising demand among the people [for expanded trade with China].
Japan’s National Diet, as well as more than fifty prefectural assemblies, have
adopted resolutions for promoting trade with China. This has become a national
consensus of the Japanese people.
Mao: It is good that a public consensus has emerged.
Yamahana: The strength of the consensus has grown so much that the conservatives can no longer ignore it.
Mao: I am by no means saying that you should not carry out business with the
United States. China is just one trade partner. You should trade with many
countries.
Asanuma: We hope to expand the trade with Asian countries.
Mao: Japan needs to approach the Asian and African countries with greater
effort. For example, it seems that its relationship with Indonesia has yet to be fully
developed. [The Indonesian people] still fear Japan. There are many nations in Asia
that are afraid of China, but they are also afraid of Japan. They are concerned that
China will invade their country, maybe not now, but sometime in the future; that
while China may not be aggressive in this generation, it may be so in the next

APRIL – JUNE 1957 / 493

generation, etc. Such fears are also directed toward Japan.
Once, my Indonesian friend8 asked me if Japan would become an aggressor
[again]. What is your thought on this?
Katsumata: What was Chairman Mao’s answer to that question?
Mao: I said, “World conditions may have changed much, and it will not be easy
to launch an invasion. As a result of Japan’s military expansion in the past, the
Japanese people have suffered hardships. Without the militarist expansion, how-ever, the Japanese people would not have been able to learn the lesson. Japan’s
occupation of more than half of the territory of China helped us. Naturally, it was
an unhappy circumstance, yet it aroused the consciousness of the Chinese people.
Militarism awakened us. It also awakened the Japanese people.9
Asanuma: Japan has adopted a new constitution and has renounced war, in its
ninth article.10
Mao: I once read the Japanese constitution. It is a fairly good document under
the circumstances. I suppose the movement for revising the constitution is not too
strong.11
Asanuma: As a result of the lower house elections last year, the liberal forces
have come to occupy one-third of the seats in both houses, making the revision [of
the constitution] impossible. Recently, we were requested by the government to
participate in the Committee on the Study of the Constitution. Our party rejected
the invitation. The demand for revision comes from overseas as well.
Mao: Does that mean the United States?
Asanuma: That is correct. People [in Japan] are offended by the fact that the
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty controls [the fate of] Japan, in spite of the presence of
such a constitution.12 There are more than 600 military bases in Japan. In opposition
to their continued existence, there has been bloodshed among the Japanese them-selves at Sunagawa in recent months.13 Hoping eventually to check the military
bases, the movement against the unequal treaty14 is growing strong.
Some of the people assert that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty must be main-tained due to the parallel existence of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.15 The
present world structure relying on the military alliances of great powers does not,
I believe, provide a real security and peace. What is your thought on this?
Mao, directing the question to Premier Zhou Enlai: Have you ever discussed
this problem?
Premier Zhou: One of our principles is that of a collective security treaty.16 We
have been consistent in advocating this. Another important element is the Sino-So-viet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, whose goal is to oppose the revival of
militarism. The most important object is to check the exploitation of militarism [by
a third party]. This is what is important. This treaty differs from the one that Chiang
Kai-shek had signed.17 In other words, we oppose the American exploitation of
[Japanese] militarism. Therefore, if Japan can achieve full independence, we can
sign a mutual nonaggression treaty with Japan.
Mao, talking to Premier Zhou: I agree with you completely. We can conclude
a mutual nonaggression treaty. Once Japan becomes fully independent of the
United States, when there is no possibility of a militarist revival, and no likelihood


of exploitation of it by outsiders, in other words, when there exists no danger of
aggression, Japan and China can sign a nonaggression treaty. Under those circumstances, the military clauses of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance
can be revised, as they would have become obsolete.
Hozumi: Based on our past experience, the Japanese people have little confidence in nonaggression treaties. What Premier Zhou is saying, I believe, is a treaty
that would positively create peace. It is possible to sign a Sino-Japanese peace and
security treaty, before the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is abandoned. Such a development might facilitate the abolition of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
Mao: That is possible. If the Japanese government agrees to it, the Soviet Union
may not object either. This, however, cannot be handled by private organizations.
Only at the intergovernmental level would this be possible.
Asanuma: The Japanese people are determined to defend the peace constitution.¹⁸ So we feel that we must cooperate with other groups that aspire to peace.
At present, the possession of military force by the two camps causes some concern
[to us] in this regard. What do you think of disarmament?
Mao: I am for the complete abolition of armed forces. A police force is sufficient.
I am in favor of full disarmament. There is no complication about it. Military
buildup is costly, and threatens the common people. It also hinders economic
construction.
Asanuma: Japan is located in a valley between the American and the Soviet piles
of atom and hydrogen bombs. The United States has recently brought a nuclear-armed corps into Japan. Japan has thrice been baptized with atom and hydrogen
bombs: Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Bikini Island.¹⁹ Another test at Christmas Island
is confronting us. A massive opposition movement is awakening in Japan. The
attitude of the conservative government is changing, too. The Yoshida cabinet
stated that the tests were inevitable, but the Hatoyama cabinet sent an encouraging
message to the Nagasaki meeting last year.²⁰ The Kishi cabinet has sent a special
envoy to Great Britain appealing for the cancellation of the test on Christmas Island,
thus expressing its opposition.
Our wish is that the big powers conclude a treaty that bans the manufacturing
and the testing of atom and hydrogen bombs.
Mao: I agree with you.
Premier Zhou: I support your opinions.
Mao: This is the only way. There is no better way.
Sone: Only yesterday there was a large demonstration in Japan. The test at
Christmas Island has the same impact on Japan as the Russian test.²¹ The first thing
we hope to see is a signing of a test-ban treaty by Great Britain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union. Until then, we wish that all tests be postponed.
Premier Zhou: The Soviet Union has already proposed the halting of tests.
Mao: The Soviet Union has proposed the halting of all tests, before moving on
to signing agreements banning the deployment and the manufacturing of atom and
hydrogen bombs, including mutual inspection.²² If Great Britain wishes to carry
out a test, they should do it in their own country. They have no need to bring it [the
bomb] to Asia and test it. The organizations in China that aspire to peace support

APRIL – JUNE 1957 / 495
your movement. The British activities are
disturbing to us. It may be best that we take this opportunity
to Great Britain. All peoples in Asia dislike the atom and
are [together with] the Japanese [on this issue].
Narita: The utilization of atomic energy in Japan is limited only to peaceful
goals. China’s Five-Year Plan also calls for peaceful utilization. This, as I understand it, means that it will not be used as arms. I hope that is the case.
Mao: Besides that [issue], there is a problem of the American presence. Even if
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is abolished and Japan achieves full independence,
and even if a peace treaty is concluded between Japan, the Soviet Union, China,
and other Asian nations, this problem [of American presence] will not be solved.
The United States would still exist even then.
We can of course advise the United States, but they would not necessarily listen
to us. The presence of the United States is an objective fact.23
I believe that your Party’s [the Socialist Party’s] course is a correct one. You
are taking the line of pursuing friendship with Asian and African countries, instead
of aligning yourselves with West European states. Japan once entered into an
alliance with European countries. The pact with Great Britain was a peace treaty,24
while the current one with the United States is an unequal treaty. The only way out
for Japan now is to be dissociated from the United States, and instead to go into
peaceful and friendly relations with Asian nations.
The United States has atom bombs. What happens, if they call for a war? We
will have to defend ourselves after all. In that event, we will need to be united into
one force and defend ourselves against the United States with our utmost efforts.
Things will be fair, if the Americans listen to us, but it is possible that they would
not. The Soviet Union has already proposed an end to testing atom and hydrogen
bombs. It is now up to the United States. The question is what should we do if the
United States would not stop testing.
Naturally it is best if the Americans listened to us and concluded a treaty with
us. One new phenomenon of the world after the Second World War is the expansion
of American force. U.S. military bases exist not only in Japan but also in Taiwan,
Western Europe, and other Asian and African regions. It is clear that they intend
to build military bases wherever possible. Of course they have the atom and
hydrogen bombs. China, Japan, and India may have atom and hydrogen bombs in
the future, but by that time the Americans would have far more than they do today.
The Soviet Union now holds a [comparable strength].
The best policy is [for everyone] not to own any bombs. The second best option
is for us to have what they have. The worst condition is where they alone own them,
while we do not.
War is not possible now, as both the Soviet Union and United States possess
[atom bombs]. If the United States alone owned the bombs, it would threaten other
nations, and force them to become subservient to the United States.
Let us now look at where the United States stands at present. (1) There is the
Pan-American Treaty in Central and South America.25 (2) There is the Tripartite
Treaty of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, which is aimed at


defending [these areas] against Japan.26 (3) There is the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,
aimed against China and the Soviet Union. (4) There is the Baghdad Treaty,
[affecting] Southeast Asia.27 (5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization exists in
Europe.28 Moreover, the “American hands” can be counted in tens and hundreds,
and they control many parts of the world, including South Korea and Taiwan.
Katsumata: We in Japan legislated a basic atomic energy act that limited its
usage to nonmilitary purposes. I hope that you will understand our intentions.
Peaceful use of atomic energy means that [the atomic industry] must be open to
public [inspection] and cannot conceal any secrets. I believe India could agree with
our view. We plan to propose this idea first in Asia.
Mao: That is fine. We have no money, or other economic resources. It takes a
lot of capital and electricity [to develop the atomic industry], but we have neither
of them.
Narita: We hope that you will restrict it to peaceful use, when you have sufficient
economic resources [to develop it].
Mao: It depends on how the United States would react.
Narita: This may be idealistic talk, but I believe big nations have a responsibility
[to do this]. This is what the Japanese believe.
Mao: I agree with you fully.
Narita: I hope that you will put it into practice by all means.
Mao: Although China has a military force of three million men, it is like having
no defense at all in the face of the United States’ atom and hydrogen bombs. We
are in the same situation as Japan is. So we are against the atom bombs. There is a
chance to ban their use.
There was a pact in the past banning the use of poisonous gas, and consequently
it was not used during the war. Thus it is possible to ban atom bombs. It may be
beneficial to think what it would be like in the Third World War.
Liao Chengzhi:29 In a book titled Sen-kyuhyaku rokujyn nen [The Year 1960]
by Tsuji Masanobu, the author tells us that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union
would vanish from the world in the Third World War. A conference [of the
remaining countries] would be convened in Hong Kong [according to Tsuji].
Sada: Japan’s full independence will not be possible unless we achieve economic self-reliance. We came here to discuss the possible ways of incorporating
the two nations’ economic plans. We have already met with members of the State
Planning Committee, and [we have also met] with Lei Renmin30 and found out that
such a scheme is necessary as well as achievable. I hope that you will review the
contents of our discussions, and promote Sino-Japanese economic cooperation as
China’s national policy. Naturally, for it to succeed, we must get rid of Cocom.
Cultural and technological exchange is also necessary. Especially in terms of
agricultural relations, I think Japan can learn from China’s cooperativization
movement, and China can learn from Japan’s technology. Japan has some established ties with the United States in the industrial sector, but it has none in
agriculture. The technological exchange in this area, therefore, can be performed
effectively.
Premier Zhou [to Mao]: We would like to send several specialists to Japan to

APRIL – JUNE 1957 / 497
survey [the situation]. I think summer is the best time for this to be done.
Mao: What is the outlook? Can they go?
Premier Zhou: The Japanese side says they would do their best to make it
possible.
Mao: That is fine. Let us send them by all means.
Hozumi: Along with Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, what we need is the
establishment of mutual economic cooperative systems among Asian nations. This
was approved in theory at the Bandung Conference31 but has not made any
progress. The Asian peoples’ anxiety is that American capital and Japanese
technology will come together to establish a dominant economic position in Asia.
We would like to promote cooperative economic activities among the Asian
nations.
Mao: That is fine. I hope that you improve your relationships with Asian
countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.
Katsumata: We promise that we will send forty agricultural engineers to your
country. We made this promise yesterday at the Department of Agriculture and
Land Development.
Mao: We would like to coordinate these plans with China’s Five-Year Plan
through studies on both sides. There is another point [I would like to make], namely
about the power of the people. The people’s power is our best guarantee for
overcoming the enemy. What is the power base of the Socialist Party, for example?
Having no [power over the] government and atom bombs, you rely on the people.
In terms of financial strength, your Party controls no large bank.
Why was our Party able to secure control of the government? How could we
wage a war against an army supported by a foreign nation? Because we had the
strength of the people. While in Yanan, all we had were a few worn-out guns. The
Kuomintang, on the other hand, had an army of over four million, and the support
of the United States. Nonetheless, we were the victors.
The British forces in India were powerful, and rich with capital, yet they had to
withdraw their forces from there. That was the result of the people’s movement.
Nehru chased away the British by relying on people’s strength.
One can draw a conclusion from this. Although the United States is abundant
with iron and steel, and has atom bombs, we can be superior to them once the
peoples of the world become united. The Americans have a bad reputation in
political matters, and the peoples [of the world] do not support the American
[causes].32
Sada: May I ask you about the secret of solving the domestic contradictions
reported in the newspapers,33 and also about the possibility of a third United Front
between the Communists and the Kuomintang?34
Mao: This is extremely simple and clear. In short, the class struggle is already
resolved. The so-called class struggle consists of the fight against the Kuomintang,
against imperialism, and against feudalism, and [the struggle] of socialist transformation. Most of these struggles have been completed successfully.35
Here is one contradiction—once the class struggle was over, a new struggle
began. Namely, it is the fight against nature, and to construct [the country] with the


united effort of 600 million people. For the purpose of [national] construction, the
relationship among people must be defined, and rearranged [to meet the demands]
properly. The method of class struggle cannot be used toward this goal. A peaceful
method, using persuasion, has to be adopted. There may arise various problems
where there are some discontented people. The solution should be found not in
repression, but in persuasion.³⁶ There are numerous difficulties, for example, in
cooperatives, factories, and schools. Problems exist between the masses and the
government. The government is suffering from bureaucratism.
Some officials are used to the class struggle of the past, and try to solve problems
through repressing the masses in spite of the peace existing among classes. They
do not help the masses in solving problems, nor do they attempt to persuade them.
This explains why discussions on a wide variety of subjects are necessary in and
out of the Party, and in the mass organizations, particularly in questions concerning
ideology, because ideologies cannot be treated crudely. One cannot coerce people
as to what they can believe and what they cannot. Among our staff, some still
employ coercive measures, and many people are uncomfortable with it. Whether
or not one believes in Marxism depends on one’s consciousness, and cannot be
forced. Persuasion works—an enthusiastic persuasion. An example is that one
cannot push a religious person into abandoning religion through oppression.
There is a formula in China. One begins with a desire for unity, works through
criticism and struggle, reaches a new basis, and achieves a new unity.³⁷ This is the
formula by which the contradictions among the people can be resolved. The process
[of the formula] is difficulties-criticism-unity.³⁸ We employ the unity of the entire
people to fight a new struggle against nature and for [more] iron, steel, and coal.
This is simple reasoning.
Asanuma: I saw at the Agricultural Exhibit [a display of] Chairman Mao’s
words: “Water conservancy is the basis of agriculture.” The transformation of
nature is an ideal of socialism. We hope that we can end the struggles among
peoples, nations, and classes, and proceed to fight against nature.
Mao: I agree with you.
Asanuma: We must end war, and achieve peace, in order to do that.
Mao: We now have two slogans, “Let a hundred flowers bloom,” and “Let a
hundred schools contend.”³⁹ There are some comrades who do not understand
them. So persuasion is needed.
If one intends to develop science and technology, there is no other way but to
encourage free competition and active debate. The Chinese Communist Party is a
massive, strong party. Once it does not function well, this scares the people. When
people are scared of a party, that is bad. The tensions in and around the Party must
be relaxed, and reason has to prevail after thorough debate. Only then, the Party
and the people can come together, and the Communist Party and democratic parties
can come closer to one another.⁴⁰ The people’s fear would disappear, and they may
begin to communicate with the Party. I suppose you would agree with this
reasoning.
Asanuma: I guess the difficulties emerge after you win [control of] the government.

APRIL – JUNE 1957 / 499

Mao: That is right. Once you get hold of the government, the problems become
much tougher. Be careful when you win [control of] the government.
Sada: We will learn from your country when the time comes.
Mao: Not everything is going well here. It would take a long time [before things
get settled]. Only after [such a long period] will those things that concern us be led
to the right paths. Such is the current political situation in China. [However,] we
have hope.

The socialist system enables us [to have hope]. There is a good possibility for
China’s economy and science to make progress.
Asanuma: Thank you for your discourse on these various topics.
Mao: I sincerely wish that your party platform will be achieved.
Asanuma: We are an opposition party with no right of independent diplomacy,
but we would like to make the points of agreement [that we have achieved today] public.
Premier Zhou: Fine. I can consent to that.
Mao: Please do as you see fit.

Notes

1. The word “autobiography” must have been used here loosely by Asanuma, and simply
refers to the biography written by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (originally published
by Random House, 1938; rev. ed. Grove Press, 1968), and possibly secondary stories of
Mao’s life available in the Japanese language.
2. In fact, according to the source, the Japanese delegation arrived in Hong Kong the
morning of April 11, and in China proper, at Guangzhou, in the evening of the same day.
Major groups of Chinese people with whom the delegation had met before their meeting
with Mao, which came on the last day of their sojourn, were members of the Zhongguo
renmin waijiao xuehui (Chinese People’s Association for Foreign Relations), the Chinese
and Japanese press corps, Premier Zhou Enlai, the State Economic Planning Committee of
the State Council, members of the CPPCC, and the mayor of Beijing Municipality and his
staff. The delegation, besides visiting a number of institutions, also held discussions with
Chinese representatives on the subjects of the fishing industry, trade, agricultural technology
exchange, and electrical and electronics technology exchange.
3. According to the source, the members of the Japanese delegation were: Asanuma
Inejiro (leader, General Secretary of the Japanese Socialist Party), Katsumata Seiichi
(chairman, Special Committee of the Japanese Socialist Party on the Normalization of
Sino-Japanese Relations), Sada Tadataka (director of the International Bureau of the
Japanese Socialist Party), Sone Susumu (director of the Entrepreneurial Planning Bureau of
the Japanese Socialist Party), Hozumi Shichiro (director of the Foreign Relations Bureau of
the Japanese Socialist Party), Yamahana Hideo (vice-chairman, Special Committee of the
Japanese Socialist Party on the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations), Narita Tomoki
(vice-chairman, Policy Review Committee, and director, Bureau of Party Operations,
Japanese Socialist Party), Sasaki Ryosaku (codirector, Bureau of Party Operations, Japanese
Socialist Party), and two secretarial attendants, Komeyama Yuji and Sato Takumi.
4. Okinawa is an island group in the center of the Ryukyu chain some 550 km SSW of
the southernmost part of Japan. The Kurile Islands and the Ryukyu Islands were both
occupied by the Japanese and used as bases for launching its Pacific and Southeast Asian
offensives in the Second World War. In April 1945 American troops launched an amphibious
counteroffensive against the Ryukyus, and through bitter fighting consolidated their conquest of Okinawa in June. It was the occupation of Okinawa that made the massive air
offensive of the American bomber forces on the Japanese islands themselves in May–August


1945 possible, and which, as much as the dropping of the atom bomb, brought Japan to its
knees. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union occupied the Kurile Islands and the U.S.
occupied the Ryukyus. On January 29, 1951, the Liberal Party in Japan issued a call for the
returning of both island chains to Japanese control. In 1954, the U.S. returned to Japan the
Amami Islands in the northern section of the Ryukyu chain but continued to hold onto
Okinawa Prefecture. A popular movement was mounted in Japan for the return of Okinawa
and the cessation of millions of Japanese nationals being held under foreign rule. In 1969,
the reversion of Okinawa to Japan was promised in a few years, and on May 15, 1972,
President Nixon announced the reversion of the remaining Ryukyu Islands, including
Okinawa, to full Japanese sovereignty.
5. The Japanese text here is extremely confusing and elusive. The reader must be
cautioned that there are at least three layers of filtering between Mao's original words and
the English translation here, namely, from the Chinese to the Japanese interpreter, the
Japanese recording of the conversation, and the translation of this into English.
6. Badaling is in the northwestern part of Beijing Municipality.
7. Cocom refers to the trade embargo that the United States and its allies set up against
the Communist countries, including the PRC, after the Korean War. The term Cocom stands
for "Coordinating Committee."
8. This probably refers to Sukarno, who visited China in October 1956. There is no
further information on this particular point regarding Japan in what might have transpired
in Mao's conversation with Sukarno, but for other topics see text Jan. 27, 1957(2), text
surrounding note 13.
9. Mao is, of course, referring to Japan's militaristic posture in the 1930s extending
into the 1940s. This military expansion started in Korea and northern China with the Mukden
(Changchun) Incident of 1931 and, with the establishment of the Kanto Army in Manchuria,
led to the Lugouqiao Incident (also often known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on July
7, 1937, which triggered China's War of Resistance Against Japan. See also text May-June
1955, vol. 1, note 55.
10. This refers to the constitution adopted by the Japanese Diet on May 3, 1947. It was
adopted as an imperial amendment to the Constitution of 1889. In February 1946, General
Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and head of American
forces occupying Japan, had his staff draft a new constitution for Japan. It was this draft that
was adopted, with minor modifications, in 1947. Article 9 of the constitution specified that
"the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right." For a brief description of
the constitution, see E. Reischauer (1978), pp. 105-107.
11. Mao and Asanuma are here referring to the Japanese conservatives' attempt to mount
a movement to have the 1947 Constitution amended to make clear the sovereignty of the
Emperor, and to remove the limitations on the development of a military defense force (these
limitations were collateral to Article 9).
12. This refers to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Pact signed by the two governments
on September 8, 1951. This was a separate but corresponding treaty to the peace treaty
signed by Japan and forty-eight other countries in San Francisco on the same day. The terms
of the mutual security pact, which allowed U.S. troops to remain indefinitely in Japan and
required Japan not to permit any other nation to have military bases or authority in Japan
without U.S. consent, were insisted on by the U.S. government as a price for ending outright
political as well as military occupation. The opposition parties in Japan were generally
opposed to this pact, and it caused a major political crisis when the issue of its renewal was
raised in 1960.
13. In February 1957, there was a mass demonstration in Sunagawa against the presence
of the U.S. military base there. The demonstrations that followed raised the issue of the
constitutionality of the maintenance of the self-defense forces and the presence of U.S. troops
in view of the provisions of Article 9 of the constitution. The issue was first raised in the
lower courts but became entangled there in technical interpretation. It was not until 1959
that the Sunagawa case was settled.

APRIL – JUNE 1957 / 501

14. Asanuma is invoking a term that historically referred primarily to the treaty systems
imposed by the Western imperialist powers on the nations of Asia and Africa in the
nineteenth century. These treaties were often concluded after the Western powers had
militarily subjugated or threatened the Asian or African nation in question. The terms, such
as the opening of Chinese ports to Western trade at unfair fixed tariffs advantageous only to
the Western power(s), extraterritoriality rights for Western nationals, protection for Western
religious and cultural encroachment, or even outright ceding of territory leading to colonization, as with Hong Kong, were, in the main, established without reciprocal advance of
interests to the other side. Thus the term “unequal treaty” has been used for the entire
category.
15. See text Jan. 2, 1950, vol. I, note 1.
16. There was, to our knowledge, no broad-based collective security treaty existing at
this time. Zhou appears to be alluding to the Chinese preference for such a broad multilateral
agreement for peace rather than a plethora of bilateral agreements between the United States
and regional powers. This therefore probably refers to the principles of peaceful coexistence
among Asian and African countries proposed by China (via Zhou Enlai) at the Bandung
Conference of April 1955. (See text April 27, 1955[2], vol. I, source note, and also text Jan.
28, 1955[2], vol. I, note 1.)
17. Chiang Kai-shek concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1945 delineating each
country’s rights in Manchuria and China’s northwestern provinces. This was also called the
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. It is different from the treaty referred to here, signed on
February 14, 1950, by the Soviet Union and the PRC. One primary concern of the earlier
treaty was the possible revival of Japanese militarism. (See early part of note 1, text Jan. 2,
1950, vol. I.)
18. The term “peace constitution” derives from the content of Article 9 of the 1947
Japanese Constitution (see note 10).
19. The United States tested its atom bombs in July 1946 on the Bikini Island area of
the South Pacific. This caused considerable unrest in Japan as the memories of the use of
atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 were still vivid.
20. We are not sure what Mao means by the “Nagasaki meeting.” Our conjecture is that
it is most probably a reference to the annual Japanese commemoration of the atomic bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and national mourning for the victims of those bombings. These
annual commemorations are usually held on the anniversary of the August 6 Hiroshima
bombing. The anniversary of the Nagasaki devastation is August 9.
21. This appears more likely to be a reference to the Soviet Union’s breakthrough in
hydrogen-bomb testing in 1954 than to the first Soviet atomic explosion of September 1949.
22. Seen from the perspective of 1957, one could say that since the early post-World
War II years, there have been major differences between the Soviet and U.S. approaches to
nuclear weapons test control and disarmament. The United States, under the so-called Baruch
Plan, which was presented to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, favored a course
of action that would first establish control over the manufacturing of weapons and then bring
disarmament by a scaling down process, under United Nations supervision. The Soviet
Union, fearing that its own scientific and technological catch-up efforts would be curtailed
by such a plan, and that in the end, especially in the event of the arms control plan, the United
States would be left with a technological monopoly, favored, under a plan proposed by
Andrei Gromyko, a “disarmament first, control second” approach. More immediate to Mao’s
statement here, the Soviet Union had made a disarmament proposal in the United Nations
General Assembly on November 17, 1956. On December 16, 1956, the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution on disarmament sponsored by the United States, Britain,
France, and Canada. The USSR opposed it. On January 14, 1957, during the Eleventh
General Assembly Session of the United Nations, another U.S. proposal was put forward,
once again opposed by the Soviet delegation, but with a softer line. At the same time, the
Soviet Union moved a resolution similar to its own proposals of November 1956. On
January 25, the U.S. proposal was adopted as a twelve-nation resolution (notably Yugoslavia


joined the other sponsors of the proposition). These developments were most certainly in
the back of Mao’s mind as he made the statement here. In addition, he might have had some
idea of the state of Soviet thinking on the subject at the time. On June 14, 1957, the Soviet
Union made another proposal which included a two- or three-year moratorium on nuclear
testing, and supervision by an international commission using instrumental detection stations
on the territories of the nuclear powers. This appears to be Mao’s frame of reference here.
It should be noted that throughout 1957 the terms of proposals and counterproposals on
disarmament were very much in flux, and in these writings of Mao’s, in which he would
refer to the subjects of disarmament and nuclear test bans quite often, the specific conditions
and references were also changeable. For a more detailed view of the subject as a whole,
from the perspective of U.S. diplomats and participants in the process, see Keesing’s
Research Report (1972), and G. Seaborg (1981).
23. The Japanese text here, if literally translated, is very awkward and fatuous: “The
continuing presence of the United States in the world is the result of the objective power of
existence.”
24. This refers to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902—the first modern military pact
signed on equal terms between a Western and a non-Western nation. It is probably
worthwhile to note that the term “peace treaty” is not quite accurate as a description of this
pact.
25. This appears to bring in both the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty, adopted
by the Inter-American Conference at Rio on September 2, 1947, which provided for mutual
assistance against aggression within a defense zone from Greenland to the Antarctic, and
the Charter of the Organization of American States, established at the Ninth Pan-American
Conference at Bogota on April 30, 1948.
26. This was signed on September 1, 1951.
27. It is obvious that there is some confusion here. The Baghdad Pact, signed in February
1955, was a defense alliance between Turkey and Iraq and was soon joined by Britain, Iran,
and Pakistan. From 1955 to 1957, the United States supported the Baghdad Pact but did not
join it. In June 1957, the U.S. joined the military committee of the pact. It was reorganized
as the Central Treaty Organization in August 1959, and the U.S. still remained outside the
circle of full members. It is difficult to see, however, how the Baghdad Pact affected
Southeast Asia. We believe that either Mao himself or the transcriber of this conversation
made a mistake and confused the Baghdad Pact with the Manila Pact, or that Mao had spoken
of both the Baghdad Pact and the Manila Pact and the two were telescoped together in the
transcription. The Manila Pact, also known as the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
and Organization (SEATO) was signed on September 8, 1954, and was engineered by the
U.S. to forestall further Communist gains after the defeat of France in Indochina.
28. For NATO, see text Feb. 12, 1955, vol. I, note 5.
29. See text Sept. 4, 1956, note 7.
30. Lei Renmin (b. 1912) was, at this time, vice-minister of foreign trade. In September
1951, Lei had become a vice-minister in the Ministry of Trade, which at the time was
responsible for domestic commerce as well as foreign trade. In April 1952, Lei was a member
of the PRC delegation to the Moscow International Economic Conference. The China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade was formed in May 1952, and Lei became
a member of the council, subsequently becoming the vice-chairman in 1954. When in
August 1952 the Ministry of Trade was divided into the ministries of Commerce (domestic)
and Foreign Trade, Lei became a vice-minister in the latter ministry. He served in the post
until the mid-1960s, frequently as acting minister in the absence of Ye Jizhuang. Lei is known
particularly as an astute and capable negotiator in international trade matters, and shined at
the Geneva Conference in 1954 (see text July 23, 1954, vol. I, note 1). From March to May
1955, Lei headed a Chinese trade delegation in Japan. For more information on Lei, see D.
Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 472–473, and Zhonggong renming lu, pp. 827–
828. See also text Jan. 18, 1955, vol. I.
31. See text April 27, 1955, vol. I, source note.

APRIL - JUNE 1957 / 503

32. Here again the Japanese text is very elusive. The translation is the best approximation
of what it might have meant.
33. This refers to the contradictions in opinion with regard to the Hundred Flowers
Campaign in China since late 1956. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), and text Feb. 27, 1957.
34. See text April 16, 1957.
35. Here Mao is referring to, and discussing at some length, the proposition that class
struggle, as a particular stage and form of the socialist revolution, had basically come to an
end. This proposition was made at the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956. See texts Feb.
27, 1957, source note; text Mar. 17, 1957(2), source note; text Mar. 18, 1957; and text Mar.
20, 1957(1), source note and note 7. It should be noted that this is probably the first time
that Mao brought this subject into a discussion with “foreigners.”
36. See text Feb. 27, 1957, section 1.
37. See text Feb. 27, 1957, note 22.
38. This appears to be an unusual manner of expressing the slogan that is conventionally
rendered as “unity-criticism-unity.” In the absence of a Chinese version of this conversation,
it is impossible to ascertain if Mao made this semantic deviation himself, or if the deviation
occurred in the translation to Japanese. See preceding note.
39. See text Autumn 1956, note 1.
40. For democratic parties, see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1; the “coming together”
that Mao speaks of here is the goal and responsibility of the United Front Department; see
text Feb. 18, 1951, vol. I, note 13.