Summary Address for the Conference of
Provincial and Municipal Party Secretaries
Version II
(January [27,] 1957)

Source: Wansui (1969), pp. 81–90. Other Chinese text: Wansui (n.d. 3), pp.
125–129. Available English Translations: JPRS, Miscellany, I, pp. 54–62; URI
(1976), pp. 43–53.

See source notes to texts Jan. 18, 1957, and Jan. 27, 1957(1).

What I am going to say is nothing new. Our achievements must be given
sufficient recognition; we cannot exaggerate [them], but gross underestimates will
lead to making mistakes, even serious mistakes . . . .1
For the last year, our achievements have been the basic [aspect of things]. The
Second Plenum of the [Eighth] Central Committee has already settled this question.2 However, there are still problems in the viewpoints of the democratic
personages and some comrades.3 They maintain that there are many errors and
shortcomings. So it is necessary to talk [about it] again. If the achievements are
underestimated, the cooperatives are bound to be discouraged . . . .
Our principle has consistently been to support the public dining halls and not
the establishment of separate kitchens, but we must provide [people with] food. In
1946, Wang Yunsheng4 in an editorial in the Dagong bao of Chongqing said:
“Don’t establish a separate kitchen.” I said, in that case, “Generalissimo Chiang”
will have to provide [us with] food, but “Generalissimo Chiang” didn’t provide [us
with] food.5 Now we are managing things and [pursuing a policy of] comprehensive
planning with due consideration to all sectors so that everybody is provided for.6
All parties and groups and all the democratic personages are taken care of; even
the Kuomintang people are taken care of. This is in order to mobilize all positive
factors in building socialism. This is a strategic policy. This policy is better and
produces fewer troubles. Unified purchasing and unified marketing is simply a way
of providing food for all 600 million people.7 It provides for both rural households that
are short on grain and urban households that are without grain. Even the counterrevolutionaries get a share of food. Since people have intestines and stomachs, they
must eat. The Soviet Union’s method is not like this; it does not provide for everyone.
[Even with] a comprehensive plan that takes all sectors into consideration, still not all
the students can enter college, but proper arrangements must be made for all of them.
They must be either given make-up studies, or assigned to rural areas, or sent to frontier
regions, or given relief. This idea must be clearly explained to those comrades who are
not clear about it. We cannot let people starve to death. Everybody must be provided
for. This principle will create fewer troubles.

JANUARY — MARCH 1957 / 277

Explore all possible ways to increase production and to practice economy, so as
to resolve difficulties. After all possible ways are explored, difficulties can be
overcome. The bit of difficulty [we are encountering] is no big deal. It is easier to
handle than crossing the marshland during the Long March.8 There were no houses
on the marshland, only open air. After crossing the Dadu River [we didn’t know]
which way to go and explored a thousand schemes and a hundred plans to find a
way out.9 Now we can hardly [say that we] have come up with any schemes or
plans. [Only when you] go one-up on nine hundred ninety-nine schemes [can you
talk about] a thousand schemes; only when you have added one plan to ninety-nine
others can you talk about having a hundred plans.
[Regarding] the international problem, Eisenhower’s letter to Chiang Kai-shek
first dashes cold water on him and then boosts his morale. [Eisenhower] wants
Chiang to stay cool and not be impulsive. [Their] hopes rest on trouble breaking
out in our internal situation.10
An incident occurred over the Suez Canal. This was a strange affair. Nasser
cropped up and wanted to take back the canal; Eden sent troops [to stop him].11
The British bourgeoisie is worldly-wise and is an old hand at trickery and deception.
It does not get into this kind of trouble very often, but this time Eden lost his head,
made a mistake, and gave the Middle East to the United States. The principal
contradiction is with the United States, not with Nasser. All these were tricks used
by the United States to oppose Great Britain. The United States wants to take over
the Middle East. The basic contradiction in the world is the contradiction between
socialism and imperialism. The imperialists are using an anti-Soviet and anti-Com-munist pretext to contend [with each other] for Africa and the Middle East. Two
groups of imperialists are competing for colonies. The biggest imperialist is the
United States, and next come Britain and France. National independence movements have emerged in the colonies. The United States used coercion in dealing
with Japan and Taiwan. It is using both persuasion and coercion in the Middle East.
When they squabble, it is to our benefit.
We are [practicing] “conservatism” and “Right opportunism” and have put 600
million people under our hegemony.12 We won’t retreat a single step from the Elbe
River, or from the thirty-eighth parallel or the seventeenth parallel.13 Beyond these
borders, let them squabble, but we can [still] speak out. Both sides are engaging in
subversive activities—they have [their people] here in our midst (the landlords, the
bourgeoisie, the democratic parties . . . need I mention the convicts undergoing
labor reform?). We have [our people] there in their midst too (the Communist
parties, the workers, and the progressive elements).14 The elimination of classes
requires a very long period of time. Turning capitalists into workers takes decades.
When we say elimination in a basic way, we are referring only to large-scale
struggles. The Soviet comrades are unwilling to probe deeply into this problem.
There are great contradictions within the imperialist [world resulting from] competition over colonies. There are many things that can be done by taking advantage
of its contradictions. This is a strategic guideline.
China’s relations with the United States[:] It would be more beneficial for us to
wait a few years before establishing relations with the United States. The Russian


Revolution was in 1917, but [the Soviet Union] established relations with the
United States seventeen years afterward in 1934. At that time the United States
was in an economic crisis, and Roosevelt came to power.
During the Middle East crisis, the Soviet Union sent a letter and all the armed
forces of the United States were put on alert. Who actually is afraid of whom? Both
sides are afraid. Who is more afraid? I tend [to feel] that the imperialists are a bit
more afraid of us [than we are of them], [but even] with this kind of estimate, it
would be dangerous for us to go to sleep and not wake up for three days. We must
also foresee the worst possibility, that the imperialists could go mad.
At the present time it would not be easy for another world war to break out. They
must consider the consequences if [a war] does get started. I told Sukarno that we
are not anxious to join the United Nations nor anxious to establish relations with
the United States.15 [In this way] we will make it [the United States] appear unreasonable both at home and abroad, deprive it of all its political capital, and cause it to become
isolated. Eventually there will be a day when we will establish relations [with it]. When
we establish the relations a hundred and one years from now, [the United States]
will be even more impotent, [but] it will be too late for regrets. Our house will
already have been swept clean. The Four Pests will have been eliminated,16 and
[the United States] will no longer be able to find its friends . . . .17 It will be too
late for regrets. The imperialists have evil intentions. We are not afraid of the
defeated countries. Our principal concern is with the United States.
Sino-Soviet relations[:] There will always be squabbling; we must not think that
there will be no squabbling in this world.18 Marxism is an ideology of squabbles
because there are always contradictions. When there are contradictions there will
be struggle. At present there are a few disputes between the Soviet Union and
China, but they are not great, and we have become closer together and more united
than before. Their methods are not the same as ours. [We] must wait and do some
work on them. In our Party there is a variety of opinions. We must work on the
Party members too. We must talk, hold meetings, and have heart-to-heart talks.
When we went south and crossed the [Yangtze] River, there were many snakes and
many mosquitoes there.19 The weather was hot, and there were no mantou [steamed
buns],20 thus, even though the river was crossed, ideologically we have not made
the crossing. Organizationally we have entered the Party, but not ideologically.
Ideological work is just a lot of trouble, but we should not be afraid of trouble. To
have different ways of saying things within the Party is a common occurrence.
Meetings are held precisely for the purpose of resolving these problems.
Circumstances are stronger than individuals. Circumstances have given our
Soviet comrades no choice but to make some changes step by step. Their old ways
of ruling wouldn’t work at home or abroad. Some use can still be made of the
Twentieth Congress [of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union].21 The imperialists make use of it; Tito makes use of it;22 we, too, can make use of it. We
should help them. However, we must not hurry but should proceed slowly and talk
to them face to face. We shouldn’t use up our trump cards all at once. “The lust for
gain that blinds one’s wisdom”23 is merely the fifty million tons of steel, 300 million
tons of iron, and twenty million tons of petroleum. Yet these things don’t count.

JANUARY – MARCH 1957 / 279

Twice those amounts or ten times those amounts still don’t count. They are no more
than scraps taken out of the earth. When one attains high office, becomes the first
secretary, one may become swell-headed too.24 If one is swell-headed, then one
should be scolded severely. This time Zhou [Enlai] made a sharp criticism [of them]
face to face and argued with them directly.25 Just as nine out of ten fingers are
together and one is apart from the rest,26 the central authorities can also have some
differences with the provincial and municipal authorities. There will always be
contradictions. We should seek common ground and retain differences.27
We must tone down international propaganda a bit. The cultural-work teams
and exhibitions ought to reduce somewhat their excessive propaganda and tuck
their tails in between their legs.28
We must still learn from the Soviet Union. They have many good things which
are worth learning. [But] we must learn selectively. Their advanced and useful
things must be studied, and even their mistaken things must also be studied, [though
in this case] critically.29 We should learn so that we will have in our hands all their
basic things within three five-year plans. We should also learn from other countries.
Zhou’s slogan for going abroad is to seek peace, to seek friends, and to seek
knowledge.30 Knowledge should be searched for everywhere. Searching in only
one place is too monotonous.
Letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is
still correct.31 Truth emerges out of struggle with error. Beauty emerges out of
comparison with and struggle with ugliness. Good deeds and good people emerge
out of comparison with and struggle with evil deeds and evil people.32 Fragrant
flowers emerge from the comparison with and struggle with poisonous weeds.33
Materialism emerges out of the comparison with and struggle with idealism. Many
people hate Chiang Kai-shek, but they don’t know what a bastard Chiang Kai-shek
really is.34 Therefore we should publish the collected works of Chiang Kai-shek.
We should also publish the collected works of Sun Yat-sen and the collected works
of Kang Youwei.35 To prohibit people from coming into contact with ugliness,
error and fallacies, idealism, and metaphysics is a very dangerous policy. It would
cause people’s thinking to deteriorate and ossify; it would make them one-sided
and incapable of facing the world or meeting the challenge of a rival show.36 We
Communists know too little about the opposite side, so we are comparatively
monotonous and can hardly produce any persuasive statements. Neither Marx, nor
Engels, nor Lenin was like this. They all strenuously studied contemporary and
historical matters and also instructed other people to study in a like manner. Stalin
was a bit inferior. He rejected German philosophy (Kant and Feuerbach), and
because Germany was defeated in war he also rejected German military teachings.37 Germany’s classical philosophy is the forefather of Marxism. Stalin was in
reality metaphysical [in his ideas], and he did not recognize the unity of opposites.
In the Dictionary of Philosophy38 they employed a metaphysical way of putting
things. [In it,] war does not turn into peace, nor does peace turn into war; the two
things are separate and unrelated; they are not mutually transmutable; they only
struggle [with each other], but there is no unity. Lenin said that war was an
extension of politics and a special means, and that peace was a result of war. [He


said that] politics was struggle during the time of peace, and that it is during times
of war that peace is fomented and it is during times of peace that war is fomented.38
Stalin misled many people. These people had a lot of metaphysics in their minds
and became rigid in their thinking, thus they committed political mistakes. When
others disagreed [with them] occasionally, they were ostracized. [When one was
deemed a] counterrevolutionary, the only [fate one could meet was that of] death
by execution, and whoever disagreed with the Soviet Union was called anti-Soviet.
But in real life Stalin could not do all things in this way. Stalin didn't execute or
jail everybody. In 1936 and 1937 he killed many people. In 1938 he killed fewer,
and in 1939 he killed even fewer. It is not possible to execute everyone who
disagrees. We, for one, had disagreements with Stalin. We wanted to sign a
Sino-Soviet Treaty, but he didn't want to sign; we wanted the Chinese-Changchun
Railway back,40 but he didn't want to give it up. Even so, it is still possible to snatch
the meat out of a tiger's mouth.

We have not refuted some harmful arguments in the press but have published
some articles that ought not to have been printed. For instance, the article “On
Unavoidability” needn't have been published.41 There is a big theory of unavoidability in “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletar-iat.”42 Who wants to make mistakes? Errors are only known in retrospect. In the
beginning things are always 100 percent correct, but errors will always be made in
implementation. This is historical experience, and our principle is just to make
fewer mistakes. Newspapers should make a reply only after they have become
thoroughly prepared and have fully developed their power of persuasion. If they
are not fully prepared, then there is no need to answer in a hurry. There are some
works that take ten or more years to complete, such as major literary works. Some
mistakes cannot be avoided for a certain period of time. For example, in the past
we exercised very strict controls over what pieces of drama were performed; now,
when we relax them, the demons, monsters, and ogres all come out.43 In the past
you couldn't see them; now it won't harm you to take a look at them. Don't scold
them as soon as they come out; they will not have much impact on the increase in
the production of grain or cotton, nor will they have much impact on finance. A
few plays about love affairs can also be staged. Let the audience make the judgment
and don't be in a hurry to ban them.

Things that occupy a primary and dominant position and for which we must
strive are the fragrant flowers. It is not good to have a whole bunch of stinking
ones. As long as the poisonous weeds occupy [only] a secondary position, they can
do no harm. For example, the Communist Party [should be] in the dominant
position and the democratic parties in the secondary position, again, like [the
relationship between] the nucleus and the electrons. Although the nucleus is small,
it is very heavy. Pulling it apart requires the energy of many railroad engines. On
the other hand, the electrons that surround the nucleus are very light. They are the
liberals; however, it won't work if there are no electrons. This, too, is a unity of
opposites.

We are prepared to publish 400,000 copies of Cankao xiaoxi44 so as to publicize
the imperialist and bourgeois things on behalf of the imperialists. The purpose of

JANUARY – MARCH 1957 / 281
this is to put non-Marxist things and poisonous weeds in front of the comrades and
the non-Party people so as to temper everyone. Otherwise they will only know
Marxism and nothing else, and that wouldn’t be good. But [at the same time] we
must strengthen our leadership. It is like a smallpox vaccination which causes
struggle inside the human body and produces immunity. Reading Cankao xiaoxi,
talking about idealism, and publishing the collected works of Chiang Kai-shek are
simply a kind of smallpox vaccination.
Disturbances among the people are well worth studying. This is a new problem.
In the past we struggled together with the people against the enemy. We and the
people formed one side of the contradiction and the enemy formed the other side
of the contradiction. Now45 . . . a problem has arisen, the people look at us with
hostility. We must be prepared for [the fact that] each year a small segment of the
people will create disturbances. As long as we are mentally prepared, we won’t be
caught in a passive situation. Secretaries and their assistants, ministers and vice-ministers, secretaries and deputy secretaries, must regularly discuss this problem
with each other, analyze it, and exchange opinions on it. From my experience this
kind of study is very beneficial. Rakosi and Gero were not mentally prepared for
the events in Hungary.46 The disturbance caused by thirty thousand people in XX
xian was a “great ‘contribution.’ ”47 An amnesty order was issued, and all the
landlord labels were taken off. The xiang authority was toppled. This was tantamount to taking a shot of immunization and a shot of smallpox vaccination. XXX
they gave up the battleground step by step because they were totally unprepared
mentally.48 In the XX forestry school 300 people created a big uproar, but nothing
could be done about it.49 [We] Communists are not afraid of Chiang Kai-shek or
the imperialists, but we are afraid of students making trouble or peasants creating
a disturbance in the cooperatives. This is a new problem. If there are two possibilities, we must plan for the worse possibility. If no disturbances had erupted in Tibet,
there would have been two possibilities: the Dalai Lama either would have run off
to the United States or he would have stayed in India. Even if the Dalai Lama
doesn’t return, the Chinese mainland will not sink into the sea.50 The reasons for
the disruptions are: we have committed economic and political errors; our work
methods are rigid, and there are [still] counterrevolutionary elements around. So it
is impossible totally to avoid disturbances. It is good enough to make no mistakes
of line and to avoid trouble on a nationwide scale. Even if mistakes of line were
made and great chaos [spread over] the entire country, and even if several provinces
and xian were occupied [by the enemy], even up to West Changan Street in Beijing,
the country wouldn’t collapse as long as the military was solid. [As a matter of
fact,] the country might become even more consolidated. We must act like Kadar,51
who could not go to sleep in the Parliament building for one month. We should
have this kind of mental preparedness. It is possible for history to reverse itself and
to repeat itself. The Revolution of 1911 overthrew an emperor, but another emperor
emerged again.52 Will our system be ultimately consolidated? There are two
possibilities: it could be gradually consolidated, or we could make mistakes and
create chaos. If chaos erupts there will always be heroes or great people who will
emerge to take care of the situation. So in the end the system will be consolidated.


How should we deal with disturbances? When disturbances are justified, we
should admit our mistakes and satisfy [the people’s] demands. When disturbances
are not justified, we cannot compromise, and we should criticize them, win over
the masses, and isolate the bad people. Except where violence or murder is
involved, we shouldn’t go around arresting people indiscriminately. We shouldn’t
frustrate the activism of the students. We must guide them step by step. We must
cultivate the art of leadership. When they create disturbances, let them squabble
until they have had enough, for if they have not had enough, they will create more
disturbances later on. Do not be in a hurry to expel bad people; we must strip them
of all their political capital. In XX sixty people were arrested. The handling [of the
situation] there was oversimplified.53 When there was a disturbance in XXX, it was
suggested that [everything] be closed for a vacation.54 In my view there shouldn’t
be a vacation. The vacation should come only after the right or wrong of the matter
has been cleared up, and we should make use of them as a sort of teaching material.
In dealing with the people, we absolutely mustn’t shoot or arrest people lightly.
If one must shoot, one can only shoot a few rounds into the air. Don’t be afraid of
disturbances. If they have a reason, they ought to make the disturbance. If they have
no reason, then the disturbance will not last long. It won’t be like the “December
9” [Incident].55 We, too, emerged through making disturbances in the past.
Each minister and each province and municipality [authority] must study the
ideological trends. In the past you were busy with routine work and did not study
the ideological trends. This is not good and must be changed. We must avoid the
use of military force by all possible means. We mustn’t emulate the method of the
Kuomintang. XX’s method was close to that of the Kuomintang.56 Only when it is
a genuine case of counterrevolutionary uprising should military force be used to
deal with it.
We must strengthen our work and correct our shortcomings. We must strengthen
the political work among workers, peasants, merchants, students, and soldiers.
Now, everyone is busy with routine work and does no political work. This is very
dangerous. Comrade XX always goes to the universities personally and makes
reports;57 everyone ought to go to the schools and make reports. Schools and the
military are the [most] important. Some people say that the political ideology of
the cadres in the military has deteriorated. What are we going to do? We must give
it a good overhaul in [the drive for] increasing production and practicing economy
and in [the campaign of] rectification, so as to strengthen the will of the cadres.
The students of XX want to come to Beijing to present a petition.58 It wouldn’t be
good not to allow them to come. In fact there would be advantages to their coming.
It is good if life is a bit more complicated, otherwise it is too boring. Even in the
game of majong, it is hard to play a hand if you aim at nothing but the best results.59
The Youth League60 must reinforce its work in the schools, and the trade unions
must reinforce their work in the factories. Let the democratic personages criticize
and put up a rival show. There are only two kinds of criticism: the correct criticism
would help remedy our shortcomings; as for the incorrect criticism, the more
incorrect it is the better, since once they take the stage and speak [their fallacies]
will be exposed. Liang Shuming, Peng Yihu, and Huang Yanpei61 have all

JANUARY – MARCH 1957 / 283

criticized us, and later they have made self-examination. [People like] Zhang
Naiqi62 criticized our United Front Department. We gave them a free hand to
criticize, and once they had criticized us they were themselves isolated. After there
was a struggle against the China Democratic National Reconstruction Associa-tion,63 they were still provided with food to eat and were retained in their ministerial
positions. The greater the mistake, the greater the educational significance it has.
Don’t be afraid of their criticism; don’t be like the Kuomintang in fearing criticism.
Criticism must be treated differently according to the differences in circumstances.
In some cases we must take the initiative [in making the attack], in other cases we
will strike only after the enemy has struck and by doing so control the battle. Unity
and struggle; such a struggle will last for a long time. The working class, the
laboring people, and the intellectuals [all] benefit from struggle and are tempered
[by it]. There is a dualistic nature to bad people and bad deeds, and there are some
good effects hidden in them somewhere. Many comrades have not been able to
understand this principle, as is shown in the issue of choosing Wang Ming.64 Bad
events contain good elements, and good events also contain bad elements. To
consider trouble as a bad thing whenever it arises and not to analyze it is a
metaphysical point of view. Last year’s great victory contained negative elements;
we got swell-headed.
We are in the period of reconstruction and do not have sufficient experience
with class struggle (which is partial) and struggle among the people (which is
primary). This is a branch of science that ought to be studied very thoroughly. Even
ten thousand years from now there will still be people who will cause disturbances.
We must gain our experience within the span of three five-year plans.
On the issue of the legal system65—we must uphold the law; we must suppress
counterrevolutionaries; we must affirm achievements.66 To uphold the law is to
uphold socialist law. We cannot undermine the legal system. The law has been
established by the working people. To protect the interests of the working people,
to protect the productive forces, and to protect the economic base, we must uphold
the law. Continue to suppress counterrevolutionaries where the task has not yet
been completed; this should be completed in one year. There seem to be many cases
where there has been suppression [of counterrevolutionaries], but where they have
not been thoroughly mopped up. We must mop them up gradually as incidents
emerge. Affirm past achievements and back up cadres who are [in charge of]
suppressing the counterrevolutionaries. If the democratic personages scold us, let
them scold. We should not be afraid to take action just because they scold us. Those
who dare to make disturbances may become talented and useful people after they
are reformed. Xu Maogong created disturbances when he was twelve.67 Later he
became a prime minister. The mistakes made in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries should be sternly criticized. We should do our work with a free
hand within the bounds of the legal system and not be overly cautious.
Strive for a bumper harvest this year in order to set people’s minds at ease. The
cooperatives can be consolidated. Beginning with the [setting up of] primary-stage
cooperatives,68 it should take us five years to have them all consolidated. Agricul-ture is first and foremost concerned with the problem of feeding 500 million people.


Noncommodity products make up a very large part of the
picture, and two-thirds
of the agricultural products are for a self-sufficient economy; if the 500 million
people could be self-sufficient, the entire country would be stabilized. Second,
[agriculture] provides the raw materials and markets for light industry. Third,
it is largely a market for industry. The primary markets for [the products of]
heavy industry, such as chemical fertilizers, farm tools, railroads, nearly all
highways, electricity, coal, petroleum, large-scale water conservation projects,
building materials, etc. are in the countryside. The United States does not have
a feudal system, so its market is vast. Fourth, exports are primarily agricultural
[products]. Agricultural products can be turned into foreign exchange and [in
turn] support industry. So [in a sense] agriculture is just industry. Fifth, the
development of agriculture is the primary source of accumulation for the state.
Therefore we must persuade cadres to go to the rural areas; if we want to
industrialize, then we must engage in agriculture.69 A ratio of accumulation must
be worked out. Stalin emphasized accumulation too much, which had a [negative]
impact on industry. What ratio is actually desirable still needs to be studied. In
short, we must make the cooperatives expand reproduction so that we can be
assured of even greater accumulation. We must not drain the pond to catch the fish.70
Agricultural producers’ cooperatives must have economic accounting, utilizing
the law of value to figure out the costs.71 The price of commodity grain should be
raised by 5 per cent at a certain stage. At present there are ten million catties of
commodity grain in the entire country. In twelve years we must produce fifty
million catties.72 As the volume of commodity grain grows, who will still plant it
if the price is too low? I am not saying that the price should be raised right now,
but we have to study our pricing policy.
Accumulation by the cooperatives themselves should increase annually, but it
can’t be too much. Let the peasants eat a bit more. If there is a bumper harvest this
year, the sectors with increases in production can withhold more for the common
reserve funds. Accumulate a bit more in years of bumper harvests so that it will
average out with the years of poor harvests.
Everything is wave-like or spiral-like. Walking, holding meetings, electric
current, sound waves, singing opera, speaking, and writing are all wave-like.73 [I]
support the study of dialectics.

Notes

1. The Wansui (n.d. 3) version adds here: “Hu XX underestimated the achievements of
the land reform [and] issued a self-incriminating edict. [He claimed that] there are no more
landlords. [This] elicited attacks from all sides (from the Catholics, the democratic parties,
and the intellectuals), but now this has been corrected.”
On the term “self-incriminating edict” and on the identity of “Hu XX” (apparently Ho
Chi Minh), see text Jan. 1957, note 37.
2. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 4.
3. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 5.
4. As noted in text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 7 and 8, Wang Yunsheng was in charge of
Dagong bao in Chongqing during the period of the War of Resistance. Wang (b. 1899) was
actually editor-in-chief of the paper. It was under his editorial guidance that Dagong bao

JANUARY – MARCH 1957 / 285

turned pro-Communist. He remained editor and publisher of the paper after 1949 when it
was moved to Shanghai and afterward to Beijing. Since then he has been prominent in
China’s journalistic circles and in international affairs. He was also active in several national
political organizations, such as the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference and the
National People’s Congress. For more biographical information on Wang, see URI (1970),
II, pp. 705–706.
For more on the Dagong bao, and on the expression cited here, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1),
note 8.
5. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 8 and 9.
6. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 6.
7. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 29.
8. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 14.
9. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 15.
10. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 21.
11. See text Sept. 15, 1956(2), note 6, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 16.
12. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source gives the figure “900 million” here.
13. Although the Elbe River flows through much of East Germany, there is a segment
of the river, in its lowest stretches just before it empties into the North Sea, where it
served as a border between East and West Germany. The thirty-eighth parallel and the
seventeenth parallel were the divisions between North and South Korea and North and
South Viet Nam at this time, respectively.
Behind Mao’s statement lies the notion that these three countries were forcibly divided
by imperialism and that their liberation and unification are (at least at the time) uncompromis-able goals of the international Communist movement. They were not specifically mentioned
in the Xuanji version.
14. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 18. We should note, however, that here in the Wansui
(1969) and Wansui (n.d. 3) version, Mao’s words do not contain as keen an ideological and
theoretical connotation as do the words in the Xuanji version.
15. We are not certain as to when Mao communicated with Sukarno, the president of
the Republic of Indonesia at this time, on this subject, but Sukarno had visited China in
October 1956. It appears that the Xuanji V, version of this speech refers to a discussion
between Mao and “an American” at Yanan, instead of to a discussion between Mao and
Sukarno.
16. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 24.
17. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source adds here (in place of the ellipses): “Just as they did [in
the case of] the Soviet Union.”
18. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 26.
19. Mao is referring to the final major military push of the Communist forces in mid-1949
to oust Chiang Kai-shek’s government. In early April 1949, a KMT delegation sent by Li
Zongren, who had assumed the presidency at Chiang’s resignation in late January, negotiated
with the Communists in Beijing for an agreement on the ending of the civil war. On April
20, the terms of the agreement were rejected by the Nanjing government, and on the
following day Mao and Zhu De signed the order to the PLA for a countrywide advance. On
that day, April 21, 1949, the Communist second and third field armies, under the command
of Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi respectively, crossed the Yangtze on a 300-mile front, and two
days later took Nanjing.
20. Mantou, a steamed bun made of wheat flour, is the staple in the diet of the northern
Chinese, as opposed to rice which makes up the standard diet of the central and southern
Chinese. Here Mao alludes to the need for ideological adjustment, just as one has to make
allowance for climatic and dietary adjustments.
21. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note; for cross references here, see text Jan. 18, 1957,
note 21, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 30.
22. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 17.
23. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 29.


24. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 31.
25. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 30.
26. This is a saying of unknown origin, which Mao has come to use frequently to
elucidate, metaphorically, the problem of internal unity. Mao also often says that out of ten
fingers (ten things, or ten ways to look at a situation), not all ten can be bad; there has to be
one, or several that are good, in which case the good ones should be differentiated from the
rest and should be taken as the key to resolving the problem.
27. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 32.
28. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 33.
29. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 34.
30. See note 25. With regard to the last part of this motto, it also implies “seeking
to find out the truth (knowledge) about things.” In other words, the CPC leadership
needed clarification about the rumors about Khrushchev, about the CPSU’s stance on
socialism, on Stalin, etc. that had been circulating for a few months. It also seems as if
there is here an echo of Lenin’s comments, in his essay “Left-Wing Communism—An
Infantile Disorder” of 1920: “For about half a century—approximately from the forties
to the nineties of the last century—progressive thought in Russia . . . sought eagerly for
a correct revolutionary theory, and followed with the utmost diligence and thoroughness
each and every ‘last word’ in this sphere in Europe and America. Russia achieved
Marxism—the only correct revolutionary theory—through the agony she experienced
in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice . . . devoted
searching, study, . . . verification, and comparison.” So it seems that Mao’s suggestion
is that if China’s grasp of the correct revolutionary theory must be attained and affirmed,
it must be done in the context of learning the truth and the lessons of the Soviet Union
(in the contemporary context of the experience of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU).
For Lenin’s statements quoted here, see V. I. Lenin, Selected Works (1971), III, pp.
352–353.
31. See text Autumn 1956, note 3; for cross references here, see text Jan. 18, 1957,
Version I, note 15, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 3 and 35.
32. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version II, text surrounding notes 36, 37, 38 for comparison
with the text here. See also text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 40, and text Feb. 27, 1957, note 87.
33. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 38, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 41.
34. The derogatory term that Mao uses for Chiang Kai-shek in this document is wangba
dan, an intensely insulting expression, literally meaning a “turtle’s egg,” and metaphorically,
a “whore’s son.” This was purged, we think, when the “official version” of Xuanji, V was
published. See text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 25.
35. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 42.
36. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 57.
37. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), notes 45, 46, 47. The Wansui (1969) and Wansui (n.d. 3)
version is much more direct and blunt here in its criticism of Stalin than the Xuanji, V version,
although many of the same expressions are used. Where the Xuanji, V version says “Stalin
had a lot of metaphysical [ideas], . . . he only talked about the struggle between opposites,
but not about the unity of opposites,” the Wansui (1969) and Wansui (n.d. 3) version
pointedly states: “Si-da-lin shiji shang shi xing-er-shang xue, bu chengren duili tongyi”
(italics added)—i.e., “Stalin was in reality metaphysical [in his ideas], and he did not
recognize the unity of opposites [italics added].”
38. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 50.
39. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 52.
40. See text Dec. 31, 1952, vol. I, note 1.
41. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 56.
42. See text Jan. 18, 1957, note 22, and text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 58.
43. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 54.
44. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 55.
45. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source adds here (in place of the ellipses): “classes will soon be

JANUARY — MARCH 1957 / 287

eliminated, and we must be engaged in promoting construction; the counterrevolution will
soon come to an end and there will no longer be any enemies [for us]. Although there are
[still] imperialists out there, they have not made a move. That is why . . . ."
46. For information on Rakosi, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 68. Erno Gero became
first secretary (and thereby de facto leader) of the Hungarian Communist Party in July
1956. He was instrumental in introducing the armored units of the Soviet Union to suppress
what had developed into a rebellious action against the Hungarian government, and the
Communist Party which dominated it, in October 1956. (See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 27.)
47. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source identifies XX as Linru xian in Henan Province.
48. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source identifies XXX here as “At Shijiazhuang.” See text Jan.
18, 1957, Version I, note 12.
49. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Gansu [Province].”
50. See text Nov. 15, 1956, note 55, and surrounding text.
51. Janos Kadar, a centrist leader of the Hungarian Workers’ Party who, in the early
stages of the Hungarian Incident (see text Jan. 18, 1957, Version I, note 13, and text Jan.
27,1957[1], note 60), supported Imre Nagy’s premiership. Later, alarmed by Nagy’s rapid
radicalization of Hungarian internal and foreign policy, Kadar and others, including Ferenc
Munnich, negotiated with the Soviet Union, bringing on the cessation of the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Hungary, the crushing of the pro-Nagy forces, and eventually the
installation of a new government under Kadar’s leadership.
52. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, two attempts were made to restore a
monarchy in China. One was by Yuan Shikai (see text July 14, 1956, note 4) in 1915–1916,
and the other was by Qing loyalists, under the leadership of Kang Youwei and the warlord
Zhang Xun, to place Aisin-goro Pu Yi (formerly the Xuantong Emperor) back on the throne
in 1917. From the other version of this speech (text Jan. 27, 1957[1], see note 65), it is clear
that Mao was talking about Yuan Shikai.
53. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Gansu [Province].”
54. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source identifies XXX here as “Shijiazhuang.”
55. The December 9 Incident, known as the yi er jiu shijian or the yi er jiu yundong,
refers to the large-scale protest movement that took place beginning on December 9, 1935
in Beijing in response to the formation of the Qi-Cha (Hebei and Chahar) Political Affairs
Council, which signified a served as a front for the Japan-sponsored so-called Northern
China Independence (Self-Government) Movement, whose import was to split territories
already overrun by Japan’s invasionary forces away from the control of China’s government.
For a more detailed discussion of this incident, see J. Harrison (1972), pp. 261–264. Here
the Wansui (n.d. 3) source has yi er jiu yundong (i.e., placing a period between the character
yi and the character er), which would render the phrase, in translation, as “January 29
Movement.” We believe this to be a typographical error.
56. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Gansu [Province].”
57. This appears, from information in texts Jan. 18, 1957, and Jan. 27, 1957(1), to refer
to Deng Xiaoping. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source has XXX here.
58. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source identifies XX here as “Sichuan [Province].” See text
Nov. 15, 1956, Version II, note 42. From information in text April 1957 (see text surrounding note 30 in that document), we know that students from Guangdong also wanted to go to
Beijing to petition.
59. The metaphor that Mao uses here is that of achieving a hand of “one color” (qing yi
se) in the popular Chinese game of majong. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 12.
60. See text June 30, 1953, vol. I, source note. See also text Feb. 27, 1957, note 74.
61. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 73. The name of Huang Yanpei was not mentioned
in the Xuanji, V version. For more on Huang, see text Feb. 17, 1951, vol. I, source note.
62. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 73.
63. The China Democratic National Reconstruction Association, whose Chinese title is
often abbreviated as “Minjian” (for Zhongguo minzhu jianguo hui), was one of the “democratic parties” (see text Sept. 21, 1949, vol. I, note 1). Its membership was primarily made


up of intellectuals and national bourgeoisie. The reaction of the association to the “socialist
transformation” of the economy and the increasing state takeover of economic enterprises
in 1956 was by no means a positive one. The struggle Mao mentioned here refers to a struggle
targeted not specifically against the association but against some of its members. The struggle
against Liang Shuming, an influential member, going back as far as mid-1953, was
particularly severe. The association, unlike the Democratic League, was not banned. See
also text Dec. 8, 1956, note 7, and text Nov. 1951-Mar. 1952, vol. I, note 7.
64. See text Aug. 12, 1953, note 20, and for cross reference here, see text Jan. 27, 1957(1),
note 76. The issue of electing Wang Ming (and others such as Li Lisan) to sit on the CPC Central
Committee, as an example of how certain “bad” elements, too, must be allowed to have their
place in the system, was a subject addressed by Mao in the speech at the First Session of the
Preparatory Conference for the Eighth CPC Congress. (See text Aug. 30, 1956.)
65. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 84.
66. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 10.
67. Xu Maogong (a.k.a. Xu Shiji) was a famous general of the early Tang dynasty (circa
A.D. 600). In the general situation of chaos and uprising at the end of the preceding Sui
dynasty in A.D. 618, Xu joined Li Mi, one of the strongest leaders of the mutually contending
rebel forces. Later Xu joined the Tang forces and aided Li Shimin, who later became the
Emperor Taizong, in conquering the other forces that were vying for the kingdom. Later,
Xu was given the honor of bearing the family name of the emperor, and thus became better
known in history as Li Ji. In the mid-seventh century he also commanded the Tang army in
conquest of what is today Korea.
68. See text Oct. 15, 1953, vol. I, note 2.
69. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 85.
70. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 86.
71. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 87.
72. The Wansui (n.d. 3) source has XXX for these figures in both cases.
73. See text Jan. 27, 1957(1), note 88.