Remarks Made While Hearing Reports on Reform and Pacification in the Garzê and Liángshān Autonomous Prefectures
reason, without holding past actions against them; those who previously held positions in the government or consultative bodies would retain their posts and be allowed to continue working. Those who distinguished themselves in suppressing the rebellion would also be rewarded.”
Mao: We could refrain from executing a single person.
If public outrage is very strong, we can delay the matter for a year or two until public sentiment subsides, after which it may be dropped. Neither Su Yonghe nor Ma Liang was executed! Executing these individuals would have an adverse impact on Tibet’s upper echelons.
Liao Zhigao121 (hereinafter referred to as Liao):
The monasteries’ firearms remain untouched, but the populace remains uneasy; weapons belonging to the upper classes are being transferred to the monasteries.
Mao:
For now, let them stay put—not permanently. Keeping them undisturbed temporarily, coupled with establishing three clear principles, puts us on solid ground.
Li: Regarding the classification of class components in agricultural areas, we will delineate three categories—peasants, rich peasants, and landlords—with no further subdivisions within the peasant class, so as to strengthen unity among the peasantry. However, when developing Party and Youth League organizations, cultivating cadres, and selecting leading personnel, it is essential to ascertain each individual’s class background and performance during struggle.
Mao: Developing the Party is a crucial issue and must be done thoroughly. Special attention should be paid to nurturing ethnic minority Party members and cadres.
At present, there still exists some mutual distrust among ethnic groups, which is understandable. As the Communist Party, our goal is to achieve complete trust among all ethnic groups. To accomplish this, we must listen to the opinions of ethnic minorities. Such opinions come in two forms: one correct, the other incorrect. The correct ones should be adopted, while the incorrect ones require persuasion; if persuasion fails, we must wait. I have personal experience with this: back in northern Shaanxi, whenever a problem arose, I would consult Gao Gang(I) and take his advice. That he later turned bad is another matter; the principle remains the same even if someone else were in his place. As for northern Shaanxi, whose knowledge was greater—theirs or Gao Gang’s? Clearly, it was Gao Gang’s. Therefore, I always sought his counsel. Before he went to Northeast China, I shared this experience with him, but upon arriving there, he seemed to forget my words.
This approach applies equally well in Han areas and even more so in minority regions. Local residents invariably understand local affairs better than outsiders. Even if their views differ from ours, we should strive to persuade them with a spirit of camaraderie. If persuasion proves futile, we must exercise patience, waiting three, four, or five years until they eventually agree. By adopting this method, Han cadres can earn the trust of local populations; indeed, when it comes time for you to leave, they may actively try to retain you. It is advisable to station a contingent of Han cadres trusted by locals to serve long-term in these areas. Earning their trust begins with trusting them first—to listen to their opinions. Without this foundational step, genuine rapport cannot be established.
Ethnic divisions will persist for quite some time. To shorten this period, we must make listening to their voices a standard practice. Additionally, we should introduce a “counter-discourse” mechanism, providing them with platforms to voice their grievances and vent frustrations. Your current meeting has been very successful: Han cadres spoke on one side, while minority cadres presented their perspectives on the other. Such forums could be convened once or twice annually, with provinces also encouraged to hold similar sessions.
Li: Over the past few years, minority cadres have raised several concerns, which I will now report. These include:
First,
their opinions are often disregarded, whereas Han cadres’ views are almost always accepted—even when delivering speeches or work reports that do not reflect their true thoughts or intentions.
[1]
Gao Gang
(1905–1954), native of Hengshan County, Shaanxi Province.
In 1933, he began working in the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Region and served as one of the leaders of the Shaanxi-Gansu Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he successively held positions such as Secretary of the CPC Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Committee and Secretary of the Northwest Central Bureau.

Remarks Made While Hearing Reports on Reform and Pacification in the Garzê and Liángshān Autonomous Prefectures
Mao: This constitutes imposition. We must never impose anything on others, not even good deeds.
Li: Second, there is considerable pressure to remain silent, especially to avoid expressing dissenting views, out of fear of being labeled arbitrarily.
Third, the autonomous rights of ethnic autonomous regions exist only in name or are largely nominal, leaving them unable to exercise genuine self-governance.
Mao: That is undesirable; the situation should be reversed.
Li: Fourth, many difficulties and demands faced by autonomous regions are extremely challenging to resolve, and they harbor numerous criticisms toward relevant central departments.
Mao: Aren’t you planning to convene a national conference on ethnic affairs? You should definitely heed their opinions.
Li: In conducting class differentiation, we should consciously narrow the scope of targeted measures. The proportion of landlords and rich peasants should be reduced, allowing lightly exploitative rich peasants to be classified as ordinary farmers, and landlords to be reclassified as rich peasants. Specific implementation details will be studied by the local party committees. Isolate the landlords and maintain neutrality toward the rich peasants.
Mao: What percentage of the population currently falls into the landlord and rich-peasant categories?
Liao: According to the provincial committee’s proposal, landlords and rich peasants should account for approximately seven percent of the total population, with individual cases not exceeding eight percent.
Mao: I’ve seen enough. In some Han areas, the corresponding figures are likewise around seven to eight percent. A rate of three, four, or five percent would suffice. Some individuals could deliberately avoid being designated as landlords. For instance, in Han regions, the policy regarding small-scale land leasing has brought relief to millions of people. Life remains arduous for the masses in minority areas, and conditions for the elite are also far from ideal.
Landlords in minority areas differ significantly from their counterparts in Han regions. Following land reform in Han areas, landlords were stripped of electoral rights and barred from holding official positions; in contrast, minority-area landlords retained their voting rights after democratic reforms and could still assume governmental roles. Therefore, a more lenient stance should be adopted toward minority-area landlords. Just as we implemented a buyout policy for capitalists, we ought to extend even greater flexibility in dealing with minority landlords.

Now, let us examine Comrade Li Weihan’s remarks from the first section point by point. Democratic reform is indeed necessary, and the resolve to carry it out is justified. Essentially, this conflict was a class struggle rather than an ethnic one. However, the rebel leadership portrayed it as an ethnic struggle. By invoking slogans like “defending ethnicity and religion,” they misled a segment of the population, thereby imbuing the uprising with a popular character. Engaging in combat was unavoidable, but now that hostilities have ceased, our focus must shift to winning over the populace and addressing this mass-based dimension of the conflict—to wrest the banners of ethnicity and religion from their hands. From our perspective, the ultimate aim of this campaign was to liberate the majority of ethnic minorities, enabling them to develop productive forces and improve their livelihoods. Our characterization of the struggle as a class conflict is entirely valid. The YI people participated in the fighting, and land was distributed to local farmers; we did not displace anyone. Historically, ethnic conflicts have often resulted in plunder. By contrast, our extensive assistance clearly distinguishes this campaign from mere ethnic strife. Furthermore, we uphold the principle that ethnic minorities should manage their own affairs. There remain shortcomings in this regard, which today’s discussion seeks to address. Hence, Sangji Yuexi’s assertion—that we simply follow his lead and allow ourselves to be completely swayed by him—is untenable.
It is accurate to say that both the general populace and the upper echelons were educated through this war, as was the Lhasa faction. Looking ahead, any future reforms in the Xizang region beyond the Jinsha River must strive to avoid armed conflict at all costs, prioritizing diplomatic efforts wherever possible. Of course, we should remain prepared for limited, unavoidable clashes. Even if actual fighting occurs on just one day out of the entire year, we must be ready. Nevertheless, our overarching objective should remain to prevent bloodshed.
Li:
We must walk our talk and uphold political credibility. Ethnic minorities lack trust in us. Failure to act on promises—even those made to influential figures—will only reinforce perceptions of deception among the broader population.
Mao: Sometimes, even Han Chinese citizens do not fully trust the Communist Party. After we proposed the policy of “long-term coexistence and mutual supervision,” some democratic parties initially expressed skepticism, only coming around after we published announcements in the press. To gain people’s trust, we must create the necessary conditions—namely,
Chuan
Sangji Yuexi, also known as Tianbao
(1917–2008), native of Barkam, Sichuan Province.
At the time, she served as Vice Governor of Sichuan Province, Deputy Director of the Provincial Ethnic Affairs Commission, and Governor of the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.

Remarks Made While Hearing Reports on Reform and Pacification in the Garzê and Liángshān Autonomous Prefectures
“Engage in counter-discourse”—first within the Party, then beyond—to encourage them to speak frankly. Unity achieved without genuine dialogue is superficial and unstable. When Han cadres go to minority areas, they often carry old baggage, presuming, “I’m not corrupt; I’ve come to liberate you.” Such attitudes undermine efforts to build trust.
It is important to reiterate that democratic reform is indeed necessary, and our determination to pursue it is correct. However, we have certain shortcomings: insufficient consultation, inadequate attention to public opinion, inadequate preparation, insufficient willingness to compromise, and a lack of sufficient flexibility. The central authorities also bear responsibility for these issues. Previously, we had never engaged in a dedicated discussion on these matters; today, after more than two hours of deliberation, we have finally taken the initiative.
In 1956, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Li Weihan were together.
Comments on the Proposal to Amend District-Level Autonomous Regions and Establish Ethnic Townships [1]
(July 23, 1956)
To be handled at Comrade Li Weihan’s discretion.
Some individuals oppose this amendment. Whether or not it should proceed remains subject to review and decision.
Guangdong <West>
(Mao Zedong
July 23rd
[1]
These comments were inscribed on a July 12, 1956, petition submitted by the United Front Work Department of the Guangxi Provincial Committee of the CPC to the Central United Front Work Department concerning the amendment of district-level autonomous regions and the establishment of ethnic townships. The petition noted that Mao Zedong had verbally instructed in late May to temporarily suspend work on amending district-level autonomous regions and establishing ethnic townships. To facilitate implementation, a written directive was requested.
[2]
Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, the Central United Front Work Department drafted in August 1956 a reply to the Guangxi Provincial Committee regarding changes to district- and township-level ethnic autonomous regions, which was subsequently transmitted to Party committees across provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. The telegram stated that various ethnic minority communities nationwide had expressed differing opinions on this matter, necessitating tailored approaches based on specific circumstances. District-level autonomous regions that could be transformed into autonomous counties through reconstruction, expansion, or merger should promptly undergo such conversion; however, those districts genuinely unsuitable for transformation into autonomous counties—and where local ethnic populations strongly opposed reverting to district offices or ethnic townships—must not be forcibly altered. Instead, any such modifications should be indefinitely postponed pending further consideration. Similarly, regarding the conversion of township-equivalent ethnic autonomous regions into ethnic townships, implementation could be deferred if local ethnic minorities did not consent.