Talk at Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau
(April 1956)

Source: Kau & Leung, The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976, Vol. II
Pages 66-74
============================================================

tin one single somersault. See also text Sept. 16-18, 1953, note 21.

Talk at Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau
(April 1956)

Source: Wansui (1969), pp. 35-40. Other Chinese Texts: Wansui (n.d. 3), pp.
94-96; Ziliao xuanbian, pp. 171-174. Available English Translations: JPRS, Miscellany, I, pp. 30-35.

This speech was made in one of a series of meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the CPC, in March-April 1956 (see K. Lieberthal [1976], pp.80-81) and probably
preceded Mao's famous speech ‘‘On the Ten Major Relationships” (see text Apr. 25, 1956). The
Wansut (11.d. 3) source cited here indicates that the speech was made on April 25, 1956, the same
day as the ‘On the Ten Major Relationships’’ speech, but we have no conclusive corroborating
evidence for this. It is quite clear that the Wansui (1969) rendition of this speech does not contain
the full speech but is a summary of the points, probably taken down by a secretary,

During March and April 1956, the Political Bureau met a number of times to
discuss how to react to Khrushchev’ s criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of
the CPSU! and to hear reports from the thirty-four departments of the Central
Committee on finance and economics. In response to Khrushchev’ s speech, the CPC,
on April 4, 1956, published a counterpoint editorial entitled ‘‘On the Historical
Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.’ The reports of the various
departments were synthesized into ten contradictions, which would form the basis for
Mao's famous Ten Major Relationships speech on April 25.

The themes in this document are clearly linked to the ‘‘Ten Major Relationships’
speech which was given to a conference of secretaries of provincial and municipal
Party conmittees. However, in the less public forum of the Political Bureau meeting,
Mao's stvle was more direct and his criticisms of the Soviets more explicit and
wide-ranging. In reading this document it is important to be aware that in calling for


decentralization, Mao was advocating a specific form of decentralization, i.e.,
decentralization of decision-making power to the level of provincial and municipal
party committees. Although he did advocate further decentralization to lower-level
party committees in the ‘‘Ten Major Relationships’’ speech, Mao’ s model of decentralization continued to be one of confining the extension of the decentralization of
decision making within the Party rather than decentralizing decision making directly
to production units as had been done in Yugoslavia; Mao believed that production
units, if given the powers of decision making, would have a tendency to make decisions
solely in economic, rather than political-economic, terms.

In their speeches [many comrades] displayed a lack of vigor. The relationship
of the lower-level [cadres] to the upper-level [cadres] is like that of a mouse when
it sees a cat, as though its soul had been eaten away. There was so much [on their
minds], but they didn’t dare to speak out. This same problem of a lack of democracy
also exists in the various provinces. However, there are some model workers who
do speak out quite spiritedly. Our Financial and Economic [Work] Conference?
and the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee* had some side effects. Because
of several stipulations, people did not venture to speak their minds. At the Economic and Financial [Work] Conference certain comrades did not give appropriate
speeches, and there were some who didn’t dare to speak up at all.

Another reason [for the lack of vigor] was the inadequate understanding of the
situation; thus they did not speak clearly or in depth. Comrades XX5 and [Li]
Xiannian both have their own opinions about the economic and financial system,
but this is not a question of individuals; only when the system is changed can the
work style be transformed. We must delegate certain powers to the lower levels.
Our [system of] discipline has come mostly from the Soviet Union. If the discipline
Is too strict, we will be fettering people. It is not possible to smash bureaucratism
this way. The dictatorship of the proletariat requires an appropriate system. The
Political Bureau and the State Council have not yet decided on either the problem
of the division of power between the central government and the local areas, or
how the one-person management system® of the Soviet Union came about. The
various provinces should share power, they should not be afraid of being called
people who clamor for independence. As the Center has not yet arrived at a
decision, all are free to speak up. Every locality can first draw up [its own]
regulations, by-laws, and methods, as provided for by the Constitution.’ We must
enable the various localities to be creative, spirited, and full of vigor. Beginning
next year we should convene a large conference annually. On May Day we need
not hold a large rally; there can be small gatherings for entertainment, and we need
not publish the Soviet Union’s May Day slogans.

Since the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee we have been somewhat dull
and listless. It was necessary to convene the Fourth Plenum. Its resolutions were
necessary; otherwise, if Gao Gang8 had been allowed to go on Carrying out his
activities for another year, [the consequences] would have been unthinkable.
However [these resolutions] led to timidness and over-cautiousness, and some
people would not venture to speak up about national affairs. This is not correct.
Before the Fourth Plenum there were occurrences of sabotage that had to be
overcome. The subversive activities of Gao and Rao had to be blocked, but some


68 {/ MAO ZEDONG

[people] have become overcautious and punctilious and will not talk about national
affairs. We ought to clearly distinguish two kinds of national affairs. One kind
consists of national affairs that are of a destructive nature, such as [the matter of]
Gao and Rao, and should be opposed. One kind consists of national affairs that are
of a constructive nature and should be talked about at length. At the Financial and
Economic [Work] Conference, some comrades said the wrong things and were
criticized, but this must be distinguished from the Gao and Rao affair. In the period
of the Great Revolution? the Party was full of vigor, but later Chen Duxiu
committed the error of Right opportunism, which was subsequently followed by a
‘“Left’’ deviationist putsch, and after that defeat we lost vitality.!0 For eight years,
we were correct [only] for short periods of time after the August Seventh conference, after the Sixth [Party] Congress, and after the Third Plenum of the Central
Committee.!! During the period of the land revolution there were three ‘‘Left’’
deviations, and in the period of the War of Resistance against Japan [period] there
was a Right deviation. Two of the ““Left’’ deviations were of our own doing, but
the third **Left’’ deviation was related to the Communist International. [In the]
third ‘‘Left’’ deviation, the resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee!2 was written by the Russians and we were forced to accept [it]. The Wang
Ming line, in particular, caused the greatest damage to our revolutionary forces
which suffered losses amounting to over 90 per cent. In view of this lesson, we
should accept things [only] in an analytical and critical way. Zhang Guotao was a
Right deviationist.!5 During the period of the War of Resistance against Japan, there
was again a Right deviation.!4 The three Right deviations [all involved] extreme
centralization and expression of different opinions was not permitted. After a defeat
we were not allowed to talk about [it as a] defeat. In light of these historical lessons,
we later [switched to] the practice of learning from past mistakes in order to avoid
future ones, and curing the illness in order to save the patient,!5 and having [both]
unity and struggle. During the period of the War of Resistance against Japan there
was a good deal of independence in the base areas, and free rein was given to local
initiative, but there was a bit of dispersionism.!® In some cases the assertion of
independence resulted in the publication of some things that should not have been
made public. This was related to the Wang Ming line. To correct this phenomenon
_ the Center resolved to strengthen the Party character, to have a unified [leadership],
but to preserve a good deal of autonomy. During the War of Liberation, the system
of filing reports and requesting instructions was promulgated to rectify the tendency
toward excessive decentralization. In the past few years things have become
abnormal, there has been a bit too much centralization. How much autonomy, in
the final analysis, should the factories, the villages, the cooperatives, and the
localities have? For the last forty years the Soviet Union has not gained [sufficient]
experience in this matter, we too have not gained [sufficient] experience, so we
Should study [this question]. There are some things that were not decided upon by
the Center or by the localities; they were simply done after [the Soviet] pattern,
such as the one-person management system. Only after Comrade [Li] Xuefeng
raised [the issue] did the Center discuss it.!7 In the history of our Party there has
been the excessive centralization of the Wang Ming line and the excessive decen-


tralization of the second Wang Ming line. An appropriate degree of centralization
is necessary, but excessive centralization is incorrect and does not facilitate the
mobilization of [our] strength for large-scale economic construction. [I] ask our
comrades to study our Party’s history well.

Regarding the issue of the ratio of income distribution among the individual,
the state, and the collective, I agree that 60 to 70 per cent of the total income should
be given over to the members of the cooperative, and 30 to 40 per cent should go
to the state and the cooperative. At most, this [portion which goes to the state and
the cooperative] should not exceed 40 per cent, and optimally it should be 30 per
cent. (This includes agricultural taxes, surtaxes, the cooperative’s public welfare
fund, the common reserve fund, management fees, etc.)

On the question of the socialist economic system: The Party committee system
is not to be doubted. Please study Lenin’s directives. Factories, mines, cooperatives, and enterprises such as those [concerned with] the process of circulation and
the transportation of commerce must have independence to a certain extent, but to
what extent is a question that should be studied carefully. Ours is not an independent
kingdom!8 of the Gao Gang type, but we should encourage open and legitimate
independent kingdoms ({although] not to be stipulated by the Constitution). Only
then will things be managed smoothly. Without any [independence] things cannot
be managed well. How the State Council should divide up administrative functions
is something that should be studied and resolved. A decision will soon be made on
how many ministries and departments the Central Government should set up and
how much authority [they each] should have. In regard to [the questions of] how
many departments the localities should set up, what affairs they should administer,
and how much authority they should have, [we] should come up with a draft
[resolution] in the next few months. The various ministries and departments of the
central government should pay attention to educating the cadres to help the lower
levels solve problems. When someone from the localities comes to the Central
Government and is unable to see the [appropriate] people, things drag on without
being solved. Some problems are left unresolved for years. We should investigate
the cause of this. These two problems must be resolved. In what way can [the
appropriate] people be seen and the problem be speedily solved? Could the various
ministries at the Center please give their attention to this?

The localities have the right to resist all impracticable, unrealistic, and subjectivist orders, directives, instructions, and forms which the various ministries of the
Central Government may send down to them. It doesn’t matter if the localities
exercise a little too much resistance. This right is only given to the provincial and
municipal [Party] committees (which are comparatively mature politically). It is
not given to [special] district and xian [Party] committees.

The Party Constitution ought to embody discipline and creativity and should
manifest the mass line.!9 The various provinces should make a study [of this issue].
It would not work to have no discipline, but if the discipline is too rigid, initiative
will be stifled. Discipline that stifles creativity and initiative should be abolished.
The Party’s Constitution provides for the creation of [the office of] a vice-chairman
or several vice-chairmen. Is it possible [for us] to imitate the practice of the

ee


70 {/ MAO ZEDONG

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and designate standing
representatives with five-year terms who would have supervisory functions? Everyone please consider this.

In art and literature, to ‘‘let a hundred flowers bloom,’’ and in academic studies,
to “let a hundred schools of thought contend’’ (as the hundred schools contended
during the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period) should be taken
as our guideline.29 This was the view of the people two thousand years ago.

Democratic management in the cooperatives is very important: This is quite
natural. Even in collective labor the peasants should be allowed some [free] time
for their activities. It is right that correct orders should be obeyed, but it won’t do
for orders to be too profuse or too rigid. We must also have a little liberalism; it
will not do otherwise. Strictness arises as a result of opposition to laxity, and
discipline arises as a result of opposition to liberalism. What we are opposed to is
liberalizing those areas that should not be liberalized. But we do need a little
liberalism to facilitate getting things done. To be strict all the time would not work.
[For instance,] in the family, liberalism is still necessary; otherwise each family
would have to set up a control committee.

It is necessary to strike a balance nationally. Local independence must not
tamper with the national balance. Only when the nation as a whole strikes a balance
can the localities acquire a balance in the parts [of the whole] which they represent.
If there is no national balance the whole country will be chaotic; [for instance, ]
Beijing’s goods being no match for Shanghai’s, people will fear that Shanghai
products will flood the market. Therefore there must be national balance. Without
this balance, national industrialization can’t be achieved. In encouraging local
independence we can’t lean to one side, [but] for now an emphasis on local
independence is necessary.

This year and next year serious effort must be made to probe into economic
work. Each provincial and municipal [Party] committee is required to compile a
report [for the Center] and to furnish some models. [Since] we don’t have experience, we will contact certain ministries, districts, and [industrial] plants to study
the problem together. People say the Central Government has provided wise
leadership, but we are both knowledgeable and ignorant [about economic work].

In a four-day conference we can’t discuss everything. Little time has been spent
discussing suppression of counterrevolutionaries, united front work, minority
nationalities, and international issues. Will the various localities please pay attention to making some arrangements [for these matters]? [The suppression of] the
counterrevolutionaries should be affirmed. In the past it was extremely necessary
for us to execute, lock up, and put under surveillance two to three million
[counterrevolutionaries]. We could not have done without this effort. The democratic parties have different views from ours. At present the counterrevolutionaries
are fewer, [but] it should be affirmed that there still are counterrevolutionaries, and
this year we definitely must execute some of them. [The work of] weeding out
[counterrevolutionaries] must be carried out in [government] organs and schools.
Where [counterrevolutionaries] have not been weeded out, they must be weeded
out. We cannot relax our effort; we must do our work arduously. Every half-month


ou should make a telephone call to spur them on. You can also use the telephone
method with the [special] district [Party] committees.

Punishment within the Party: For some of the cadres at the xian, [special] district
and xiang [punishment] has been too much and too severe. It is difficult to reach a
conclusion on the errors committed by the higher-level cadres (including bureau
chiefs and [cadres] above that level). Once punishment is meted out (and we should
investigate clearly the reasons [for the punishment]), it is incorrect [for the
punishment] to be either too severe or too heavy. Except in the cases of counterrevolutionaries, all should be given a chance to correct [themselves].

With regard to the question of minority nationalities, as Comrade XX has said,
[what has been done] in Sichuan is correct. Although there was some revenge taken,
this has already been rectified. Other areas should also pay attention to this.

With regard to the problems of international relations, in some areas we should
not follow blindly; in some areas we already have experience. The Soviet Union
has already launched a massive criticism [campaign]. There are some points which
are suitable neither for our country nor for the Soviet Union. In view of the fact
that many errors have been committed [as a result of] their [system of] vertical
leadership, in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries for example, [in contrast]
we have [adopted the practice] of not arresting them for the most part, and of not
killing a single one of them.2! [The problem of] the one-person management system
[representing] a military viewpoint, and [the problem of] whether [to adhere to] the
mass line or to the viewpoint of bestowing favors [on the masses]¢* and [the
problem of] whether the method of accumulating funds should be one of scissors
differentiation23 or of taxation——all these remain problems. However, we cannot
therefore say that we have nothing to learn from the Soviet Union. They have many
things that warrant our study. It is the Soviet Union that has helped us in our
construction; after all, a socialist country is better. At present, there is only one such
country; even though it has made many errors, nevertheless it has much that is
worthy of study. We should not follow blindly but should analyze. A fart can be
fragrant or can stink. We can’t say that all the Soviet Union’s farts are fragrant. At
this time, when other people say that something stinks, we have been following
them and also say that it stinks. We should learn whatever is applicable, good
things, [even if they are] in capitalist [countries], should be studied.

We should adopt an attitude of equal treatment for all small foreign countries
and should not strut about with our tails in the air.24 Although we are not an
imperialist [country], neither did we have the October Revolution, we could not
cock our tails at the beginning. Nevertheless if we learn a few things too quickly,
we might cock our tails. Therefore we must educate our cadres who are sent abroad
to be honest and sincere, to acknowledge what is right as right and what is wrong
as wrong and to let other people see what are our good things, our bad things, and
the things in between. The Soviet Union had its tsarist era and we had our Chiang
Kai-shek. [People in] our country have bound feet; if others want to photograph
them, let them. If the clothes we wear are no good, don’t be afraid of looking
unsightly. If we tell lies in front of foreigners, they will be disclosed some day.

The problem of transmitting [communications]. There are certain things that can


70 {/ MAO ZEDONG

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and designate standing
representatives with five-year terms who would have supervisory functions? Everyone please consider this.

In art and literature, to ‘‘let a hundred flowers bloom,’’ and in academic studies,
to *‘let a hundred schools of thought contend’’ (as the hundred schools contended
during the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period) should be taken
as our guideline.2° This was the view of the people two thousand years ago.

Democratic management in the cooperatives is very important: This is quite
natural. Even in collective labor the peasants should be allowed some [free] time
for their activities. It is right that correct orders should be obeyed, but it won’t do
for orders to be too profuse or too rigid. We must also have a little liberalism; it
will not do otherwise. Strictness arises as a result of opposition to laxity, and
discipline arises as a result of opposition to liberalism. What we are opposed to is
liberalizing those areas that should not be liberalized. But we do need a little
liberalism to facilitate getting things done. To be strict all the time would not work.
[For instance,] in the family, liberalism is still necessary; otherwise each family
would have to set up a control committee.

It is necessary to strike a balance nationally. Local independence must not
tamper with the national balance. Only when the nation as a whole strikes a balance
can the localities acquire a balance in the parts [of the whole] which they represent.
If there is no national balance the whole country will be chaotic; [for instance, ]
Beijing’s goods being no match for Shanghai’s, people will fear that Shanghai
products will flood the market. Therefore there must be national balance. Without
this balance, national industrialization can’t be achieved. In encouraging local
independence we can’t lean to one side, [but] for now an emphasis on local
independence is necessary.

This year and next year serious effort must be made to probe into economic
work. Each provincial and municipal [Party] committee is required to compile a
report [for the Center] and to furnish some models. [Since] we don’t have experience, we will contact certain ministries, districts, and [industrial] plants to study
the problem together. People say the Central Government has provided wise
leadership, but we are both knowledgeable and ignorant [about economic work].

In a four-day conference we can’t discuss everything. Little time has been spent
discussing suppression of counterrevolutionaries, united front work, minority
nationalities, and international issues. Will the various localities please pay attention to making some arrangements [for these matters]? [The suppression of] the
counterrevolutionaries should be affirmed. In the past it was extremely necessary
for us to execute, lock up, and put under surveillance two to three million
[counterrevolutionaries]. We could not have done without this effort. The democratic parties have different views from ours. At present the counterrevolutionaries
are fewer, [but] it should be affirmed that there still are counterrevolutionaries, and
this year we definitely must execute some of them. [The work of] weeding out
[counterrevolutionaries] must be carried out in [government] organs and schools.
Where [counterrevolutionaries] have not been weeded out, they must be weeded
out. We cannot relax our effort; we must do our work arduously. Every half-month

ae gt Ta ee


you should make a telephone call to spur them on. You can also use the telephone
method with the [special] district [Party] committees.

Punishment within the Party: For some of the cadres at the xian, [special] district
and xiang [punishment] has been too much and too severe. It is difficult to reach a
conclusion on the errors committed by the higher-level cadres (including bureau
chiefs and [cadres] above that level). Once punishment is meted out (and we should
investigate clearly the reasons [for the punishment]), it is incorrect [for the
punishment] to be either too severe or too heavy. Except in the cases of counterrevolutionaries, all should be given a chance to correct [themselves].

With regard to the question of minority nationalities, as Comrade XX has said,
(what has been done] in Sichuan is correct. Although there was some revenge taken,
this has already been rectified. Other areas should also pay attention to this.

With regard to the problems of international relations, in some areas we should
not follow blindly; in some areas we already have experience. The Soviet Union
has already launched a massive criticism [campaign]. There are some points which
are suitable neither for our country nor for the Soviet Union. In view of the fact
that many errors have been committed [as a result of] their [system of] vertical
leadership, in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries for example, [in contrast]
we have [adopted the practice] of not arresting them for the most part, and of not
killing a single one of them.2! [The problem of] the one-person management system
[representing] a military viewpoint, and [the problem of] whether [to adhere to] the
mass line or to the viewpoint of bestowing favors [on the masses]*2 and [the
problem of] whether the method of accumulating funds should be one of scissors
differentiation23 or of taxation—all these remain problems. However, we cannot
therefore say that we have nothing to learn from the Soviet Union. They have many
things that warrant our study. It is the Soviet Union that has helped us in our
construction; after all, a socialist country is better. At present, there is only one such
country; even though it has made many errors, nevertheless it has much that is
worthy of study. We should not follow blindly but should analyze. A fart can be
fragrant or can stink. We can’t say that all the Soviet Union’s farts are fragrant. At
this time, when other people say that something stinks, we have been following
them and also say that it stinks. We should learn whatever is applicable, good
things, [even if they are] in capitalist [countries], should be studied.

We should adopt an attitude of equal treatment for all small foreign countries
and should not strut about with our tails in the air.24 Although we are not an
imperialist [country], neither did we have the October Revolution, we could not
cock our tails at the beginning. Nevertheless if we learn a few things too quickly,
we might cock our tails. Therefore we must educate our cadres who are sent abroad
to be honest and sincere, to acknowledge what is right as right and what is wrong
as wrong and to let other people see what are our good things, our bad things, and
the things in between. The Soviet Union had its tsarist era and we had our Chiang
Kai-shek. [People in] our country have bound feet; if others want to photograph
them, let them. If the clothes we wear are no good, don’t be afraid of looking
unsightly. If we tell lies in front of foreigners, they will be disclosed some day.

The problem of transmitting [communications]. There are certain things that can


70 { MAO ZEDONG

Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and designate standing
representatives with five-year terms who would have supervisory functions? Everyone please consider this,

In art and literature, to ‘‘let a hundred flowers bloom,’’ and in academic studies,
to ‘let a hundred schools of thought contend’’ (as the hundred schools contended
during the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period) should be taken
as our guideline.2° This was the view of the people two thousand years ago.

Democratic management in the cooperatives is very important: This is quite
natural. Even in collective labor the peasants should be allowed some [free] time
for their activities. It is right that correct orders should be obeyed, but it won’t do
for orders to be too profuse or too rigid. We must also have a little liberalism; it
will not do otherwise. Strictness arises as a result of opposition to laxity, and
discipline arises as a result of opposition to liberalism. What we are opposed to is
liberalizing those areas that should not be liberalized. But we do need a little
liberalism to facilitate getting things done. To be strict all the time would not work.
[For instance,] in the family, liberalism is still necessary; otherwise each family
would have to set up a control committee.

It is necessary to strike a balance nationally. Local independence must not
tamper with the national balance. Only when the nation as a whole strikes a balance
can the localities acquire a balance in the parts [of the whole] which they represent.
If there is no national balance the whole country will be chaotic; [for instance,]
Beijing’s goods being no match for Shanghai’s, people will fear that Shanghai
products will flood the market. Therefore there must be national balance. Without
this balance, national industrialization can’t be achieved. In encouraging local
independence we can’t lean to one side, [but] for now an emphasis on local
independence is necessary.

This year and next year serious effort must be made to probe into economic
work, Each provincial and municipal [Party] committee is required to compile a
report [for the Center] and to furnish some models. [Since] we don’t have experience, we will contact certain ministries, districts, and [industrial] plants to study
the problem together. People say the Central Government has provided wise
leadership, but we are both knowledgeable and ignorant [about economic work].

In a four-day conference we can’t discuss everything. Little time has been spent
discussing suppression of counterrevolutionaries, united front work, minority
nationalities, and international issues. Will the various localities please pay attention to making some arrangements [for these matters]? [The suppression of] the
counterrevolutionaries should be affirmed. In the past it was extremely necessary
for us to execute, lock up, and put under surveillance two to three million
[counterrevolutionaries]. We could not have done without this effort. The democratic parties have different views from ours. At present the counterrevolutionaries
are fewer, [but] it should be affirmed that there still are counterrevolutionaries, and
this year we definitely must execute some of them. [The work of] weeding out
[counterrevolutionaries] must be carried out in [government] organs and schools.
Where [counterrevolutionaries}] have not been weeded out, they must be weeded
out. We cannot relax our effort; we must do our work arduously. Every half-month

The problem of transmitting [communications]. There are certain things that can


be talked about everywhere. The bad things about Stalin and the Third Interna-tional25 can be transmitted to the [special] district [Party] committee secretaries as
well as to the xian [Party] committee secretaries. These [bad things] were not
written into the article26 out of consideration for the situation as a whole. (In this
article there was but one line written: Some bad suggestions were made), and we
are not prepared to discuss them in newspapers or among the masses.

Notes

1. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source note.
2. During the Great Leap Forward, however, Mao did advocate decentralization to the
communes which were to combine politics and production in a single unit. Since Mao’s
death, however, decentralization of decision making to the purely economic production units
themselves has been carried out. For a discussion of this, see Xue Muqiao (1982) and for an
analysis of this change, see H. Eastmarsh (1980); for more on the two forms of decentralization, see F. Schurmann (1970), pp. 175–178.
3. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), source note, and text Mar. 31, 1955, vol. I, notes 7 and 8.
4. The Fourth (Enlarged) Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC was
held February 6–10, 1954, in Beijing. See K. Lieberthal (1976), p. 63–64.
5. XX most likely stands for Chen Yun. For more on Chen, see text Jan. 20, 1956,
note 9. Li Xiannian was another dominant figure in the field of economic work. Since
September 1954, he was a vice-premier and Director of the Fifth General Staff Office
of the State Council in charge of finance and commerce, and simultaneously Minister
of Finance. For more biographical information on Li, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds.
(1971), I, pp. 499–504.
6. The single-management system, translated from the term yi zhang zhi (often translated by other sources as “one-man management system”), refers to the system of management wherein the factory manager, or head of an enterprise, assumes full responsibility and
personal authority over the administration and direction of the enterprise. This system
contrasts with the system in which the Party, acting through the Party committee within the
enterprise, has responsibility and authority over the administration of the enterprise. The
single-management system was, in China, developed primarily out of the early experiences
of industrial management in Manchuria under Gao Gang, whose thinking on management
was heavily influenced by his connections with the Soviet Union. Gao was chairman of the
State Planning Commission from its inauguration in 1952 to 1954, and among his general
policies was the installing of the single-management system on a nationwide basis. This
policy, and Gao Gang himself, were criticized at the meeting of the Political Bureau in
December 1953, and eventually at the Fourth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of
the CPC in February 1954. Gao Gang and several members of his group were purged. That
was the beginning of the shift away from the single-management system. See F. Schurmann
(1970), pp. 253ff; S. Andors (1977), pp. 52–62.
7. This refers to the Constitution of the PRC, adopted by the First National People’s
Congress, September 20, 1954. (See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 1). Mao is referring to
the spirit of Section 4, Article II, of the Constitution.
8. The criticism of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi was a key issue at the Fourth Plenum in
1954. See text Mar. 31, 1955, source note and notes 1 and 7.
9. This refers to 1925–1927, the period of the Northern Expedition, also known as the
Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War.
10. For Chen Duxiu and the line followed by the CPC during the period of his leadership,
see text Aug. 12, 1953, vol. I, note 23. The “Left deviationist putsch” refers to the Qu
Qiubai line. Qu (1899–1935) was elected general secretary of the CPC and secretary of the
Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC at the emergency meeting of the CPC Central

APRIL—JUNE 1956 / 73
Committee on August 7, 1927. This conference denounced Chen Duxiu’s “Rightist
deviationist” leadership and the united front strategy. Qu advocated the strategy of “continuous revolution” in spite of the major setbacks that the CPC had suffered immediately
prior to the conference and opposed the withdrawal of the CPC from the cities. He proposed
that the CPC ought to continue to intensify its preparations for the leadership and organizing
of armed insurrections in many places, particularly peasant uprisings to coincide with the
autumn harvest, and urban workers’ uprisings. He advocated also the establishment of
underground “revolutionary committees” everywhere, replacing the Party organizations
that had already been formed earlier. This was known as the first Leftist putschist line in the
CPC’s history. In July 1928, Qu went to Moscow to attend the Sixth CPC Congress and in
1933 transferred to the Central Soviet, where he remained after the CPC forces left on the
Long March (see text Feb. 19–24, 1953, vol. I, note 6). In February 1935, while on his way
to Shanghai, Qu was arrested by the KMT and, after making a confession, executed. For
more biographical information on Qu, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 239–244.
11. The eight years refer to the period between the defeat in 1927 and the consolidation
of the CPC under Mao’s leadership after the Zunyi Conference in 1935. The August Seventh
conference of the Central Committee of the CPC was an emergency meeting convened in
1927 shortly after the Shanghai massacre. At this meeting, a decision was made to remove
Chen Duxiu from his post as general Party secretary, to formulate the strategy of land
revolution and armed insurrection, and to organize the autumn harvest insurrectionary
movements in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Guangdong (see note 10). The Sixth Party
Congress was held in July 1928 in Moscow. In reviewing the experiences of the Party in the
immediate past, this Congress repudiated, on the one hand, Chen Duxiu’s line, and, on the
other, Qu Qiubai’s early line. It promulgated the “Ten Point Political Program,” formulated
the resolution on establishing soviets as forms of government, and further consolidated the
resolution to carry out land revolution. The Third Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee
was held September 24–28, 1930, at Lushan. It was given the task of criticizing and
repudiating the Li Lisan line. The Central Committee at this meeting, however, under Qu
Qiubai’s leadership, struck a pose of compromise and did not carry out the criticism of Li
Lisan’s line thoroughly. After the meeting there was agitation to carry the task further and,
consequently, the Fourth Plenum was convened in January of the following year, which
repudiated both the Li Lisan line and Qu’s compromise.
12. The three “Left” deviations refer to the Qu Qiubai Line, the Li Lisan Line, and the
“first” Wang Ming Line. Li (1896–1967) was elected member of the Political Bureau of
the Central Committee of the CPC and head of its Propaganda Department at the Sixth Party
Congress in 1928. From June to September 1930, he took over virtual leadership of the
Party and, following Qu Qiubai’s lead, advocated the immediate organization of urban
insurrection and the amassing of the Red Army’s forces to take the major cities. In late 1930,
after being criticized at the Third Plenum of the Sixth CC, he left for the USSR. After 1949,
he returned to China and served in the Labor Department, the Transportation Industry
Department and in the North China Bureau. He committed suicide in 1967. (For more
biographical information on Li, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. [1971], I, pp. 512–519. For
Wang Ming, see text Aug. 12, 1953[1], vol. I, note 23.) The last of these Left deviations,
i.e., the first Wang Ming Line, was launched at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central
Committee held in January 1931, at which Wang was elected to the Central Committee along
with Zhang Wentian, Shen Zemin, and Qin Bangxian.
13. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 23.
14. This refers to the “second” Wang Ming Line. Wang returned to China from the
USSR in November 1937 and became Party secretary for the Yangtze River (Changjiang)
Bureau. He then advocated that the CPC should toe the line of the United Front and relinquish
the development of a combat—and political—capacity independent of the KMT.
15. See text Aug. 12, 1953(1), vol. I, note 25.
16. See text Mar. 19, 1953, note 1.
17. Li was then head of the Ministry of Industrial and Communication Work. For more


biographical information on Li, see D. Klein and A. Clark, eds. (1971), I, pp. 504–506, and
Zhonggong renming lu, p. 203.
18. See text Oct. 11, 1955(1), vol. I, note 52. “Independent Kingdoms” can arise when
there is uneven development among the departments or areas, and those who are more advanced
are tempted to split off from the leadership and the comprehensive planning for development
established by the Party Center and the Central People’s Government. As such, the notion of
“independent kingdoms” combines the worst aspects of what is known as ben wei zhuji
(departmentalism) and fenlie zhuyi (splitism). Gao Gang was one of the earliest Party organizers
in northern Shaanxi and played a key role in developing the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia soviet base
that became the base area for the CPC Central during the period of the War of Resistance against
Japan. Later in 1945, Gao became the regional secretary of Manchuria of the CPC. He was later
accused of publicizing, in his position of leadership of Manchuria, the particularity of the
Northeast as a region and inflating its role (and his own) in “saving the nation as a whole.” His
activities in the Northeast were then seen as the developing of an “independent kingdom.”
19. The Constitution of the CPC was first discussed and adopted in the early 1920s.
According to Warren Kuo (1968), I, p. 72, it was adopted at the Second National Party
Congress in 1922, but according to Concise History of the Communist Party of China
(People’s Publishing House, 1956) and other PRC sources, it was the general program that
was passed in 1922, while the CPC Constitution was passed at the First Congress in
1921. This “First” Constitution was revised in 1925, and a new constitution was passed in
1928 at the Sixth CPC Congress. Another revision came in 1945 at Yanan, and at the time
of this meeting, 1956, the need to revise the Constitution again arose; hence Mao’s comments
here. A new constitution was eventually passed in September 1956. For a definition of the
“mass line,” see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.
20. See text Autumn 1956, note 1. The present text suggests that Mao had thought of
this policy perhaps fully a month before the policy was promulgated.
21. Mao’s blanket statement here appears to contradict the facts of the campaign to
suppress counterrevolutionaries in 1951. While throughout the campaign Mao and other
leaders continued to qualify, more and more narrowly, the conditions under which certain
counterrevolutionaries were to be actually executed, and to urge greater circumspection in
the campaign, the record clearly shows that many were arrested and a considerable number
were executed. In his speech “On The Ten Major Relationships” (see text April 25, 1956),
section 8, Mao alludes to a policy “started in Yanan” (i.e., probably in the early 1940s)
according to which “not a single [counterrevolutionary] was executed and just a few
arrested.” We have not been able to trace the history of this policy. In the same section of
the same speech, Mao argues that certain counterrevolutionaries had to be executed.
22. The viewpoint of bestowing favors on the masses, enci guandian, refers to the belief
that the masses cannot emancipate themselves and that this emancipation, as well as
accompanying benefits, or any goodness that may come of a correct policy, result only from
the efforts of a small number of people of foresight and vision, and from their actions. Thus
these benefits are not the result of the masses’ struggles but “bestowed” upon them. Such
a viewpoint would deny the importance of the role played by the masses in revolution. On
the other hand, it is also feared that there may be people among the masses who will also
adopt this viewpoint and will not participate in the struggle themselves but wait for the
benefits to fall upon them. This, too, would be an undesirable product of the viewpoint. For
the mass line, see text May 15, 1951, vol. I, note 7.
23. The scissors differential (jiandao cha) derived from the picture presented by a graph
showing the increasing differences between the prices of agricultural and industrial goods.
Against the position that the accumulation necessary for industrialization could most easily
be earned from the countryside by differential pricing in favor of industrial goods, Mao
argued that it was necessary to reduce this differential if the peasants were not to be alienated
and the worker-peasant alliance were to be consolidated. However, this had to be accomplished within a framework in which the total value of industrial production was only about
half of that of agricultural production. The issue of price differentials and its class conse-

APRIL—JUNE 1956 / 75

quences was the focus of long struggle in the Soviet Union during the 1920s. See, for
example, C. Bettelheim (1978), II, and Alexander Erlich (1960). See also text Apr. 25, 1956,
notes 10 and 27.
24. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.
25. The Third International refers to the Communist International Association of Na-
tional Communist Parties which was founded in 1919 and is also known as the Comintern.
Its guiding principle was to exercise Soviet control over communist movements in all
countries, through direct supervision or through a cadre of trained experts and advisers. In
the case of the CPC, the broad lines of its revolutionary strategy and its relations with the
KMT in the 1920s were largely influenced by the International from its founding until the
Zunyi Conference in 1935. The suggestions of the International were responsible for the
first United Front policy, for the formulation of the strategy of urban insurrection which led
to the almost total loss of CPC organizations in KMT-controlled areas, and for military
confrontations later that led to heavy military defeats. (All of which are discussed in this
document here in reference to Chen Duxiu, Li Lisan, Qu Qiubai, and Wang Ming.) The
Zunyi Conference marked Mao’s rise within the CPC and its increasing independence from
the Comintern. See J. Rue (1966). The International was dissolved in 1943.
26. By “bad things,” Mao is referring to the criticism of Stalin made by Khrushchev at
the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU held in February 1956. See text Feb. 9, 1956, source
note. Here Mao specifically refers to an “article” published by the CPC in response to
Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin. This most likely refers to the editorial “On the Historical
Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” which appeared in RMRB, April 5,
1956. The article was subsequently published as a booklet (translated by Foreign Languages
Press, Beijing, 1959) under a similar title and contains an editor’s note suggesting that the
article was written on the basis of a discussion at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau.
See also text Nov. 15, 1956, notes 38, 39, 40.

--- Notes

47. Famensi is an old Beijing opera telling the story of a despotic eunuch, Liu Jin, who
usurped the power of the emperor during the reign of Emperor Wuzong of the Ming dynasty.
Jia Gui is a low-ranking eunuch and an attendant of Liu Jin in the play. He was invited by
Liu Jin to sit down when the two were talking, but in typical slavishness, Jia replied, ‘* Your
humble slave is accustomed to standing. I have no desire to sit down.”’

48. This derives from the second segment of the chapter ‘‘Jin xin’’ in the book Mengzi
(Mencius). There are different translations of this saying, in which the terms ‘‘speak of”’
and *‘speak to’’ and *‘counselling’’ are used variably. The term for ‘‘superior man’’ (da ren)
is also variously translated. Annotations to Lun Yu (The Analects of Confucius) interpret the
term as referring to sages, whereas the annotations to Zuo zhuan (the Zuo Chronicle of the
Spring and Autumn Annals) interpret it as referring to high- ranking officials. Mao’s meaning
here of scorning people who are more powerful or seemingly more powerful than oneself is
clear. For a translation of this saying see D. C. Lau, trans, (1970), p. 201.

49. See text Aug. 4, 1952, vol. I, note 8.

50. See text Jan. 20, 1956, note 31.

51. See text June 14, 1954, vol. I, note 13.