[1 “How to Run Agricultural Production Cooperatives”] Preface (September 25, 1955)  During the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, the general line of the Communist Party of China is: basically complete the country’s industrialization, while at the same time basically accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce. This transitional period will take approximately eighteen years—three years for the recovery period plus three Five-Year Plans. Within our Party, on the surface, there is general agreement on the formulation of this general line and on the timing; however, in practice, differences of opinion do exist. At present, these differences are mainly manifested in the question of the socialist transformation of agriculture, that is, agricultural collectivization. Some people say that, over the past few years, a certain pattern has seemed to emerge regarding agricultural collectivization: in winter, development is encouraged, but as soon as spring arrives, there are calls to reverse the “excessive advance.” There is good reason for this view, because they have already seen several such reversals of what was labeled as “over-ambitious progress.” For example, there was a wave of development in the winter of 1952, followed by a reversal in the spring of 1953; another surge occurred in the winter of 1954, only to be reversed again in the spring of 1955.  The so-called reversal of “excessive advance” does not merely halt development; it also involves the mass forced dissolution—referred to as “cutting down”—of cooperatives that have already been established, causing dissatisfaction among cadres and the peasant masses. Some peasants were so angry that they refused to eat, lay in bed and would not get up, or failed to go to work for more than ten days. They would say, “You were the ones who called for setting them up, and now you’re the ones ordering them disbanded.” When the cooperatives were broken up, the well-to-do middle peasants rejoiced, while the poor peasants were deeply worried. Upon hearing news of the suspension or dissolution of cooperatives, poor peasants in Hubei felt “as if half their bodies had turned cold,” remarking that it was “like making a pilgrimage to Mulan Mountain.” Some middle peasants even joked that this was comparable to going to worship at the Mulan Temple on Mulan Mountain in Huangpi County, Hubei Province.  Why, then, do some comrades experience such vacillation, which seems entirely unwarranted from an ordinary person’s perspective? The reason lies in the influence exerted by certain middle peasants. A segment of the middle peasantry, particularly those with pronounced capitalist tendencies among the better-off, initially harbored resistance toward the socialist transformation. This highlights the Party’s policies and working methods concerning the middle peasantry during the collectivization drive. Many middle peasants of lower economic standing but higher political awareness—especially the lower-middle peasants among the new middle peasants and those in the lower ranks of the old middle class—will join cooperatives provided we implement policies that benefit both the poor and middle peasants equally, rather than favoring the former to the detriment of the latter, and that our working methods are sound. However, a minority of middle peasants, even under such policies, still prefer to remain outside the cooperatives for a time, hoping to enjoy “a year or two of freedom.” This attitude is perfectly understandable, since collectivization entails a fundamental change in the system of private ownership of means of production and in the entire mode of operation, which represents a profound transformation for them. Naturally, they need to consider their options carefully and may find it difficult to make a quick decision. Instead of addressing the problem through appropriate Party policies and working methods, some of our comrades, upon hearing objections from the wealthier middle peasants and encountering certain deviations in their work, become unduly alarmed, vehemently denounce the supposed “excessive advance,” and are quick to call for “cutting down” cooperatives, as though failing to swiftly excise this “tumor” would lead to immediate death. In reality, however, the situation is far from this dire. While there are indeed shortcomings in our work, the overall movement remains healthy. The vast majority of poor and lower-middle peasants welcome the cooperatives. As for the remaining middle peasants, we should allow them time to observe; those who are relatively well-off, except for those who voluntarily wish to join, ought to be given even more time to reflect.  At present, the principal deficiency in this regard lies in the fact that, in many localities, the Party leadership has failed to keep pace. These leaders have not taken full control of the movement, lacking comprehensive plans at the provincial, county, district, and township levels, and instead proceed in a piecemeal fashion. They lack a proactive, positive, enthusiastic, and wholehearted spirit of active engagement. Consequently, a major problem arises: the movement gains broad traction at the grassroots level, yet receives insufficient attention from above, inevitably leading to various disturbances. Rather than strengthening leadership and improving planning in response to these disturbances, some have resorted to passively attempting to halt the forward momentum of the movement or hastily “cutting down” certain cooperatives. Such actions are clearly wrong and can only result in further complications.  We have now compiled a book titled “How to Run Agricultural Production Cooperatives,” which contains practical examples from provinces, municipalities, and districts—totaling over 120 articles. The vast majority of these materials date from January to August 1955, with a small portion originating in the latter half of 1954. Most of the documents were drawn from internal Party publications of various provinces, municipalities, and districts, while a few were sourced from newspapers. Others consist of reports submitted by lower-level Party committees or individual workers to higher authorities, including one record of a conversation held in Beijing with a cooperative chairman. With respect to these materials, we have made only minor textual adjustments, leaving the content otherwise unchanged. In some cases, we have added brief editorial notes. To distinguish these from the original editors’ notes found in the source publications, we have signed our comments as “The Editors of This Book.” We believe that the views expressed by all the authors of these materials are correct, or at least broadly correct. Through these materials, readers can gain a clear understanding of the scale, direction, and future prospects of the nationwide collectivization movement. They also demonstrate that the movement is generally healthy. Where problems have arisen, it has invariably been due to inadequate guidance from the Party committees. Once the committees, acting in accordance with the central directives, stepped up to provide proper guidance, the issues were promptly resolved. These materials carry considerable persuasive power: they can encourage those who have thus far maintained a negative stance toward the movement to adopt a more positive attitude; they can help those who still do not know how to establish a cooperative to find a viable approach; and they can effectively silence those who are prone to advocating the wholesale dismantling of cooperatives.  Implementing the socialist transformation of agriculture among hundreds of millions of farmers is an extraordinary undertaking. From a national perspective, the period involved is still relatively short, and our accumulated experience remains limited. In particular, we have yet to conduct a wide-ranging and vigorous publicity campaign across the entire Party, which has resulted in many comrades paying insufficient attention to this issue and lacking a clear grasp of the movement’s principles, policies, and methods, thereby undermining unity within the Party. The Sixth Plenary Session of our Party is about to convene shortly to discuss this very matter and is expected to adopt a new resolution on it. We should, based on this resolution, launch a comprehensive and forceful publicity campaign to unify the Party’s thinking. The publication of this book may offer some assistance in this effort.  Mao Zedong September 25, 1955 Printed from the manuscript. Included in Volume 5 of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong. Note [1] This was the title used in the first edition. Following a second editing in December 1955, the People’s Publishing House published it in January 1956 under the revised title “The Socialist High Tide in the Chinese Countryside.”
Comments on the Central Rural Work Department’s Self-Criticism Report (September 26, 1955)  To Liu, Zhou, Chen, Zhu, Peng Zhen, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Da, and Lu Yan [1]: Please read and return to Comrade Deng Zikui · · · Kui [2]. Mao Zedong, September 26.  To all comrades: Please read without delay. Comrade Zikui should follow up on this document [3].  Two: There are certain opinions [4] noted on Articles 3, 5, and 6. Mao Zedong, September 26, printed from the manuscript.  Three: That is exactly right.
Four: Why do you consistently seek to undermine socialist elements while showing no aversion to undermining capitalist ones? You have offered no answer to this question. The true explanation is this: you harbor quite serious capitalist ideas in your minds, which is why you find nothing appealing in socialist elements and heartlessly set out to suppress them. [6]  Five: This account is inaccurate. In reality, you have your own line and policy, which run counter to the central leadership’s line and policy. For a long time, the central authorities have been unable to persuade you; even after severe criticism, you remain unyielding and continue to cling to your own positions. It was only at the meeting on August 1st that you began to genuinely reconsider your stance, though whether this change will be thorough remains uncertain. Therefore, it is not simply a matter of “insufficient respect for the central leadership’s views”; rather, it reflects a fundamental lack of respect. Nor is it a case of “inability to seize upon even the slightest difference of opinion.” On the contrary, you refuse to accept the central leadership’s stern criticisms, as well as the Secretariat and Political Bureau’s rejections of your proposals. How could you possibly heed the opinions of your own department’s staff? Do you even pay attention to such low-ranking individuals? This directly relates to the fact that you allow yourselves to be influenced solely by the spontaneous capitalist tendencies of well-to-do middle peasants, while remaining completely indifferent to the widespread, positive forces present throughout the countryside—forces represented by the sixty to seventy percent of poor and lower-middle peasants who are actively embracing socialism. You have already acknowledged this point in Article 3. It is worth deep reflection: while the spontaneous capitalist inclinations of twenty to thirty percent of the well-to-do middle peasants [4°] have exerted a decisive influence upon you, you have brazenly ignored and even sought to obliterate the socialist enthusiasm of sixty to seventy percent of the poor and lower-middle peasants, treating it “not with care, but with suppression.” [ ] Could this possibly be coincidental? Printed from Mao Zedong’s manuscript. Notes [1] Liu refers to Liu Shaoqi; Zhou to Zhou Enlai; Chen to Chen Yun, then Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat and Vice Premier of the State Council; Zhu to Zhu De; Peng Zhen to Peng Zhen, then Alternate Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat and Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; Deng Xiaoping to Deng Xiaoping, then General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council; Bo Da to Chen Boda, then Deputy Minister of the CPC Central Rural Work Department; and Lu Yan to Liao Luyan, then Deputy Minister of the CPC Central Rural Work Department and Minister of Agriculture. [ ] Deng Zikui was then Minister of the CPC Central Rural Work Department and Vice Premier of the State Council. [3] Refers to the CPC Central Rural Work Department’s self-criticism report dated September 20, 1955, submitted to the central leadership and to Mao Zedong regarding the development of agricultural cooperatives. The “mistakes” identified in this report were subsequently exonerated in the Central Office of the CPC’s Notice of March 9, 1981, forwarding the National Agricultural Commission’s Party Group’s “Request for Rehabilitation of Comrade Deng Zikui.” See note [1] on the relevant page of this volume. [4] See sections (3), (4), and (5) of this text. [ ] In Article 3 of the Central Rural Work Department’s self-criticism report, it is stated: “This mistake was a manifestation of rightist deviation, with leadership lagging behind the masses, primarily due to an underestimation of the socialist enthusiasm of the broad peasant population.” It further notes: “At that time, what truly swayed our thinking were the wavering, resistant sentiments of the twenty to thirty percent of well-to-do middle peasants.” Mao Zedong drew a vertical line beside this sentence and wrote the accompanying comment. [ ] Article 5 of the same report states: “Closely linked to the aforementioned mistake was the failure to adequately encourage and protect the achievements of the mass movement, and the lack of the same kind of care shown to today’s cooperatives as was once accorded to guerrilla units during the war.” It continues: “Any revolutionary movement must fully mobilize the masses and cherish every spark of revolutionary zeal. Yet, in our case, we did precisely the opposite—we suppressed such initiatives rather than nurturing them.” Mao Zedong drew a vertical line next to these words and penned the corresponding comment. [7 “On organizational matters”] Article 6 of the Central Rural Work Department’s self-criticism report declares: “There were also errors here. Major issues should not be addressed through hasty resolutions issued without prior careful study and approval by the central leadership. The Zhejiang Provincial Rural Work Department’s unauthorized dispatch of a telegram strongly urging contraction constitutes a grave disrespect toward the central leadership and a failure to heed the Chairman’s initial warnings about our deviations—actions that are highly improper and fraught with significant dangers of separatism. Furthermore, the collective leadership mechanism within the department itself is not sufficiently robust. Although conclusions and important documents are reached through consultation among all members, and no fundamental disagreements typically arise on routine matters, dissent does emerge on questions of contraction. If we could consistently adopt a balanced, dialectical approach to problem-solving, skillfully seize upon even the smallest differences of opinion to initiate discussion, and harness collective wisdom, we would be able to discern the correct course and avoid making mistakes, thereby doing our work more effectively.” Mao Zedong wrote this comment alongside that passage.